The role of the police is an important but largely overlooked aspect of contemporary counterinsurgency and stability operations. Although academic and policy specialists have examined the role of police in post-conflict environments, the question of how police should be organized, trained, and equipped for counterinsurgency campaigns has received little systematic attention.
Similarly, US military doctrine and the professional military literature, while not ignoring the subject entirely, do not consider it in any systematic way. This gap is particularly ironic, given the prominent role that soldiers and Marines have played in training indigenous police and other security forces in counterinsurgency campaigns from Vietnam to Afghanistan.
If the broader topic of police and counterinsurgency is under-examined, the subject of mentoring—that is, advising and training—foreign police forces is even more neglected. American Marines, soldiers, and other military personnel preparing to deploy to Afghanistan for the police mentoring mission have few sources of information and analysis available to them.
This monograph addresses that gap. Using a series of ten vignettes, this report examines in depth the experiences of individual American and British soldiers and Marines who served as mentors in Afghanistan during the 2007-2009 period.
Police Mentoring in Afghanistan 2007-2009 by Dr. William Rosenau, CNA.
Comments
Very interesting paper. The SF technique used is very similar to how it was done in the old west. There was usually just a Sheriff and a couple of deputies for anything major a Posse was raised to handle the problem. Couple of other things they did was to not allow guns in town especially if you were a stranger. You had to check you guns at the Sheriff's office and state your business and when you were done you got your guns back,also a local town person may have to vouch for you, very good form of access control.
Couple of other things to old timers used to do was a thing called "posting" meaning your banned from entering the town for any reason kind of like being exiled. The other thing was to post a "Peace Bond" if you had to come back in the area a large cash deposit would be made to guarantee that the peace would not be breeched, if it was you went to jail and would forfeit your bond money. A lot could be learned from old LE techniques in my opinion.
Totally agree. On the ground there are some smart units at the battalion level doing "the right thing". One in particular set up a combined task force that had local ANP, ANA, NDS, a platoon of Coalition, and a few other entities (prosecutors, etc.)- and these guys ran around the battalion's AO in RC-E doing "rule of law". They might not have been following the playbook from Kabul- but they were effective: sort of like a traveling territorial judge/court/marshal/regulators/posse force.
They were very careful not to tread on what the tribes were already handling- instead concentrating on tribe on tribe issues, outsiders causing problems, and insurgent types of activities. Since each group had their own strengths, caveats, and mandate- they were all able to chip in some where the others fell short- so that their combined effect was large. After a few months police were able to travel outside of the main city in this AO- prior to that they would have been killed.
Of course, there is no guarantee that the next battalion task force would build on that concept, it is not necessarily transferable elsewhere, and not necessarily a long-term solution. But- the fact that they came up with that on their own and it got very little press/recognition from on high made me think that it wouldn't be sustainable or lead to anything bigger. Things like that in the short-term with a more longer-term, pragmatic, and holistic plan that we aim at in the future would have been preferable in my opinion- but, you're right- we've made it more complex.
MAJ Martin:
<blockquote>The problem with the ANP is massively complex.</blockquote>
Granted, but it wouldn't be so complex if the US/ISAF approach had slowed down and thought about what has been developing over the past 5 years rather than striving only to be seen "doing something."
All this talk of the numbers of ANP being trained and fielded is pointless without them effectively contributing to our overall effort. All it is now is a modern equivalent to Vietnam body counts - impressive in press releases, worthless in reality.
The problem can only be addressed by first conducting studies, surveys, operating experimental units and adjusting the program(s) based off of feedback -- not by blundering ahead giving AK-47 marksmanship lessons to 100,000 Afghans and patting oneself on the back.
I know it would actually require listening to someone in a remote village and that in the process a bunch of officers' and contractors' careers might not be advanced, which is why it ultimately won't happen.
<blockquote>It isn't and has never been totally an ISAF program. Prior to 2010 it was mainly State Dept. On paper in the past it was supposed to be the Germans.</blockquote>
Regardless, the entire premise of the organization is flawed. I don't see ISAF addressing that, either.
Great reading. I thought the reference to PMT Swampfox was neat....they were a sister team to my PMT Gridiron in Kandahar City.
In any case, Grant & Slap make a good point about enforcement of legal code and culture. I was in Kandahar in '08. One of the district police chiefs my team mentored told us of his efforts to respond to criminal activity, specifically a "domestic" call. He had received a call about a woman who was being beaten by her husband. Prior to responding, he called his supervisor at the provincial HQ and explained the situation in order to get approval to go. He told me he was berated for wanting to respond since that was a family issue....."why are you getting involved?" was the question his supervisor asked.
Not sure what kind of training USF police advisors get now, but I know I didn't get any training regarding the Afghan legal system when I was there (and it was difficult to find when we asked). Knowing that would have helped my efforts in determining what I should've focused on with my police chiefs.
I've read in several articles/ papers/ books about the need to avoid imposing a "western" approach when advising HNSF. Yet we seem to do that on a regular basis and ignore the situation on the ground. Every area of Afghanistan is different. Even within Kandahar City, there were differences in the security situation between the west side of the city and east side (the western side...Zhari-Panjwai...being worse).
Moving away from the centralized control from Kabul via CSTA/ NTM-A and allowing those on-ground to adjust & adapt to their particlar area is probably a better way to go for the moment. Higher-up provides the resources, the guys on-ground execute as they see fit.
<em>Administrators note: this comment was originally posted by the user at 2011-01-09 05:34:16. Its current timestamp is when we recreated it after a technical glitch.</em>
I haven't read the report yet, but to address "what we are doing propping them up", "our approach", "what role in trad Afghanistan society they are filling", and "what legal code they are trying to enforce":
The problem with the ANP is massively complex. Here are a few of the challenges that will help answer those questions:
- It isn't and has never been totally an ISAF program. Prior to 2010 it was mainly State Dept. On paper in the past it was supposed to be the Germans. There was a months long period in 2010 where the ISAF piece was in limbo due to a protest in the awarding of a contract to a defense contractor for the training of the police (don't ask me why we allow defense contractors to hold up a war effort...). There are many bi-lats involved that train police in Afghanistan that are outside of the ISAF purview. There are tons of police being trained outside of Afghanistan under bi-lat agreement. This makes it a little tough to describe the ANP "system" or institution as one entity that we can easily change and adjust as we see fit.
- In the past, as I understand it, many police forces played the role of central Kabul "regime protector". Many play the same role today- as ISAF has struggled to get MoI to assign police outside of Kabul.
- The legal code they "are trying to enforce"? I'd say that depends on their location and many other factors. In some places they just try to stay alive. In others, because of corruption (having to pay higher) or other reasons they shake the people down. In others they attempt to do "community policing".
I haven't really run into many- if any- anecdotal evidence of police interacting with prosecutors and judges, giving suspects due process, etc. I see two obstacles in the way: 1) the culture of most of the people: they don't go to the police for justice. They meet with elders and come to an agreement and when one side feels justice, then they are happy. If they don't, then you have blood feuds. When people take their cases to the police, expect blood feud. 2) the "Rule of Law" system is not synched with police training and is far, far behind where the ANP is (geographically and numerically).
- More on Rule of Law: there is disagreement internally on what this should be. Kabul-centric and uniform across the country- focused on Western-style concepts; or locally-focused, and contingent upon traditional Afghan concepts (traditional to location). It is easy to say- "duh, it should be traditional", but that isn't easily decided in Afghanistan. GIRoA doesn't like to share power. European reps want Western-style concepts. And, if ISAF tries pragmatic solutions, it risks short-term set-backs: something that may not be politically feasible.
The solution? If ISAF can't afford short-term set-backs, can't ensure the ANP can be effective across the board due to not having control of "the system" and traditional/cultural issues with police units, and the only thing the collective efforts can produce are police who could only operate effectively in a "Western" country- albeit with a literate partner (due to the difficulty of us setting up much else besides a carbon copy of ourselves)- then maybe the best thing would be for us to let GIRoA be in charge and just fund them. At least that would allow us to send many- apparently ineffective- advisers home. We'll just have to hope that an effective force emerges later on- or that whether the police are effective or not won't effect our national security.
Grant Martin
MAJ, US Army
The above comments are the authors' own and do not represent the position of the US Army or DoD.
<em>Administrators note: this comment was originally posted by the user at 2011-01-08 23:01:25. Its current timestamp is when we recreated it after a technical glitch.</em>
I am still reading the paper and will post some thoughts later. But it is pretty much as I expected. Dose anybody know what legal code they are trying to enforce? How were the people told about this legal code before they started enforcing it? How do you do that in a society that is 80% illiterate?
<em>Administrators note: this comment was originally posted by the user at 2011-01-08 14:52:04. Its current timestamp is when we recreated it after a technical glitch.</em>
I agree with the overwhelming majority of observations and experiences related in this report. I think several passages highlight my contention that the ANP are universally the wrong force, in the wrong place, at the wrong time.
<blockquote>* In areas with particularly high levels of insurgent activity, such as southern and southeastern Afghanistan, policing was a high-risk profession,
with ANP casualty rates far surpassing those of the ANA.</blockquote>
<blockquote>* Moreover, the high levels of insurgent
violence, combined with the very limited capabilities of the Afghan personnel, required the PMT to focus on developing the ANPs basic organizational, leadership, and tactical skills.
In short, it seemed apparent that what the district needed--and what was achievable, at least in the near term--was a paramilitary force rather than a Western-style crime-fighting agency.</blockquote>
<blockquote>* as of mid-2008, no ANP unit
anywhere in Afghanistan was rated as fully capable.</blockquote>
<blockquote>* In the commanders view, law enforcement training, even if the ANP had been capable of absorbing it, was a luxury under such conditions.</blockquote>
<blockquote>* "Many times, the police were simply afraid to leave their stations. They knew that if they did a good policing job, they would get a night letter [from the insurgents] threatening to cut their heads off." Moreover, the terrain was very isolating, which meant that police under attack would have a long time to wait for reinforcements.</blockquote>
Etc., etc., ad nauseum.
My question is, if the ANP are neither an effective police nor paramilitary force, and serve only to victimize the population, what exactly are we doing propping them up? Either our approach to mentoring them is flawed or we've set them up from failure from an organizational standpoint (which I believe).
Can anyone tell me what role in traditional Afghan society they are filling, other than uniting locals against foreign forces?