Plan B in Iraq

Plan B in Iraq

Beyond the Surge: Keeping the Military Relevant in an Asymmetric World

Fernando Martinez Luján

Regardless of “the Surge’s” outcome this summer, growing domestic political pressure will likely soon force American decision-makers to “pull the plug” on the large US troop presence in Iraq. Faced with this difficult situation, senior military and civilian leaders must act now to develop a viable “Plan B” as an alternative to precipitous, forced troop withdrawal. By necessity, this Plan B must incorporate both a smaller, sustainable troop presence and a series of sweeping organizational reforms to address the military’s badly outdated intervention strategies.

Yet the stumbling in Iraq is only a symptom of a much larger problem: America’s military and civilian institutions, organized for Cold War conflict have grown increasingly incapable of dealing with today’s world of failing states, insurgencies, humanitarian crises, and non-state actors. Without a major reform of institutions—leveraging interagency elements, developing more nuanced and culturally-attuned forces, and recognizing the importance of the media—the changing dynamics in areas of conflict will make American power increasingly irrelevant.

The Surge: Mission Impossible?

While public opinion is still radically divided regarding the ongoing plan to “surge” 21,500 additional American troops into Iraq, there can be little argument that the next 12 months will be decisive to America’s future. Despite attempts by the administration to portray the new plan as only one option out of many remaining, most media outlets are now describing the troop increase as a “last chance” for American and Iraqi forces to “secure the country.” As a result, insurgents and death squads can win by not losing. They understand that in a war that is being fought largely in the news, any major attack conducted during the surge discredits the US and helps mark this “last chance” as a failure. Even if the attacks occur in less defended areas outside of Baghdad and Anbar—away from where the surge is targeted—the insurgents know that the resulting 10-second news sound bites will make no distinction.

Once the additional troops are in place this summer (and even better, once American leadership has begun to call the new plan a success), the insurgents will be in ideal position to conduct a Tet Offensive-style campaign of escalated attacks to cripple any remaining US domestic support. But unlike the North Vietnamese, they will need to not attack US bases directly to achieve their aims; attacks against markets, mosques, schools, and other soft targets will be just as effective at reinforcing the perception that the surge has failed and the war is hopeless.

To make matters worse, the timing for the troop increase coincides with the run-up to the 2008 US elections. As early campaign speeches already show, the majority of presidential candidates have chosen some kind of troop withdrawal as a central part of their platform. Regardless of whether the surge results in limited success or limited failure, there is little chance that the newly elected President of the United States—Republican or Democrat—will be —or able to support sustained troop levels for more than a few months after taking office. Polls conducted in early spring 2007 by ABC, Associated Press, Wall Street Journal and Washington Post reinforce these predictions, showing that a growing majority of voting-age Americans support withdrawal within 12 months and see the situation in Iraq as “un-winnable.”

Meanwhile, the strain on the Army and Marines has grown to the point where continued deployment—even at pre-surge levels—will force ever greater mobilization of diluted and less-trained reserve forces, push retention levels to all time lows, and in the words of the National Security Advisory Group, risk “breaking the force.” As the group (chaired by former Secretary of Defense William Perry) details in its 2006 report, current operational demands “pose a very real threat to future security:” Even if the Army succeeds in meeting its recruiting and retention goals, it is already showing a deficit of 18,000 personnel in its junior enlisted ranks and is soon expected to fall short by 30,000 soldiers overall. Over 95% of National Guard and Reserve combat units have been mobilized and there is little remaining combat capacity remaining, short of rewriting the statutory rules that govern deployments. The smaller Marine Corps is being affected to an even greater extent: All active duty Marine units are on a continual “tight” rotation schedule, with 7 months deployed, less than a year home to refit, then another 7 months deployed.

The situation is critical for the senior leaders charged with ”winning” the war. They must develop plans to address the changing conditions at home and abroad, informed by the recognition that deployment of over 100,000 troops in Iraq will soon become untenable. The continued assumption that existing troop levels can be maintained is a prescription for certain failure. Instead, a more sustainable “Plan B” should be developed and presented to policymakers as an alternative to forced, precipitous withdrawal. The alternate plan must begin with a fundamental acceptance that the existing paradigm for military intervention is no longer adequate and a new framework is needed. Plan B would incorporate three critical elements: 1) A generational approach to the Iraq War based on the idea of smaller, embedded forces and long-term institution building. 2) A massive mobilization of talent from both civilian and military society to engage with Iraqi institutions across a broad front. 3) A drastically increased focus on information warfare and the role of public opinion. Yet these three components represent only the first steps towards an essential and all encompassing reform of America’s military and civilian institutions. The alternate organizational strategy embodied by Plan B points the way towards a new type of bifurcated force structure – a force consisting of two distinct but complementary conventional warfare and nation building elements-- that will become indispensable for success in future conflicts.

Football and Water Polo: How Did The Situation Get So Bad?

Before examining a solution, we must first understand the problem: The most fundamental reason behind the deteriorating security situation in Iraq is outdated organizational structure and culture. During a January 2007 lecture at the Fletcher School, Cofer Black (President Bush’s former State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism) described the changing position of our security-related agencies and departments this way: “Before 9-11 we were like a fantastic football team. We could run and pass and tackle. We were invincible, and we ran through the doors of the stadium on game day ready to tear apart our opponents …. but instead of a field we found a swimming pool, and everyone was wearing goofy hats. The game was water polo, and we had no idea how to play it.”

Due to several factors that included major technological advantages, a lack of serious asymmetric (or unconventional) threats, and a desire to not repeat the Vietnam experience, the US pursued a doctrine prior to 9-11 that emphasized overwhelming firepower and decisive engagement. This approach – named the Powell doctrine after its greatest proponent, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of State Colin Powell -- asserts that when the United States engages in war, every resource and tool should be used to achieve overwhelming force against the enemy, minimizing US casualties and ending the conflict quickly by forcing the weaker force to capitulate. (Hence the initial “Shock and Awe” campaign in Iraq.) This philosophy of overwhelming force has its roots in the writings of Carl von Clausewitz and has been used successfully in conflicts over the past 200 years. But sadly, it has not proved effective in Iraq, and it will grow even less effective in the future. The doctrine that was perfected during the Cold War has begun to break down in today’s unipolar world of non-state actors, humanitarian crises, and failing states.

These emerging asymmetric conflicts (whereby weaker, non-state enemies attempt to circumvent superior military power through surprise and ruthlessness) refuse to be classified, understood, or fought in terms of the old doctrine: Decisive, quick victory is impossible. Success lies not in the number of enemies killed, but in the difficult campaign for “hearts and minds.” The use of firepower is often counterproductive. Technology and expensive equipment offer little advantage. Initiative, adaptability, and cultural understanding at the lowest level are often the most critical factors.

Yet to this day, the philosophy of overwhelming force and the legacy of conventional organizational architecture largely continues to shape stability operations: American Divisions are still generally organized to conduct synchronized, large-scale battles against advancing tank columns. Orders flow from top to bottom and war plans are created at the highest levels. Combat forces are formed into stove-piped, hierarchical, Napoleonic brigades, with high-level staffs growing wildly bloated in an effort to analyze all available data, develop strategies, and issue commands to their waiting subordinates. Innovation typically arises in spite of (rather than because of) organizational structures. Mid-level and senior commanders raised in pre-9/11 years stress kinetic (or offensive) operations and conduct large scale “search and destroy” type missions, fruitlessly attempting to flush out elusive enemies that refuse open combat and hide perfectly within the population. Deployed units—discouraged from taking risks or experimenting to develop better tactics—are concentrated on huge “super-bases” with little meaningful partnership or interaction with Iraqis. Initiative on the ground is replaced by strict rules and the need to gain “approval from higher,” usually through an elaborate process of Power Point slide requirements sent over secure e-mail.

The centralization and bureaucracy exhibited by military forces only encourages a similar trend in the inter-agency (ie government but non-military), multinational, and private entities that ostensibly support them. Invaluable assets such as linguists, analysts, and technical advisors are often retained at the highest level instead of being sent down to the units engaged in the reconstruction and stability effort. The majority of civilian support personnel are confined to the most secure areas, far removed from the realities of local politics, intimidation, and survival (for more, read Imperial Life in the Emerald City by Washington Post writer Rajiv Chandrasekaran). Huge military staffs become so bloated with haphazardly added interagency and contractor personnel that their primary purpose—supporting forces on the ground—is obscured by the production of meaningless slide presentations and 100 page reports. In such an environment—where weekly Latin Dance nights, Burger King, swimming pools, and ice cream are the norm—it is easy to understand how reconstruction plans have failed to fully address the needs of Iraqis. The salient truth is that no plan developed in such an isolated environment can ever hope to save Iraq or curb the violence. In other words, Iraq is far too granular and complex for a plan developed in the “Green Zone.” Interagency resources must be pushed down to the lowest level, fully integrated with military forces, then empowered to plan and execute in a decentralized manner.

This in not to suggest that there has been no attempt to include other agencies outside of the “Green Zone.” The military’s interim solution, the “Provincial Reconstruction Team” (PRT), is certainly a step in the right direction. In theory, this interagency team, consisting of elements from the State Department, the Agency for International Development, various NGOs, and other reconstruction-related groups would work cooperatively at the provincial level to “win hearts and minds.” However, in practice, the PRTs are generally understaffed by inter-agency personnel, not integrated fully with the efforts of American ‘combat units,’ and lacking an effective program to develop the capability of Iraqi administrators. Those civilian personnel assigned duty at far-flung firebases are often very junior and uninformed about joint operations. A comprehensive reform in the way America staffs, organizes, trains, and employs its interagency forces overseas is becoming increasingly urgent. None of the involved agencies have committed to developing a robust cadre of professional, deployable, and fully trained personnel capable of operating completely outside of the familiar embassy circuit. Instead, the military—still organizationally outdated and struggling to transform itself out of Cold War paradigms—has become increasingly tasked to perform the whole range of reconstruction and security activities with little interagency support. Secretary Rice’s request earlier this year for military assistance in filling the State Department’s assigned PRT billets vividly illustrates this problem.

Closing Windows of Opportunity in Iraq

Perhaps the best way to illustrate the impact of these collective organizational shortcomings is to imagine the Iraq War as a series of closing windows of opportunity: In the days after toppling Saddam’s regime, coalition forces had a rapidly closing window of opportunity to re-establish basic services and security before losing the confidence of Iraqi citizens. The outdated organizational concepts I’ve described played a critical role by encouraging misplaced operational and strategic focus. Instead of capitalizing on existing Iraqi power structures and working through local institutions, interim US administrators drafted short-sighted policies such as de-Baathification and the demobilization of the Iraqi military which only helped sow the seeds of a powerful insurgency. Instead of leveraging interagency expertise and planning in advance for the complex political and cultural geography, planning initiatives such as the Free Iraq Project were brushed aside in favor of traditional military war plans (as detailed by former senior State Department Advisor David Phillips in his book, Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco). By failing to meet the initial window of opportunity in Iraq and leaving local citizens vulnerable to mass looting, food shortages, unemployment, and politically motivated violence, the coalition set into motion events which would begin the long, slow decline into chaos.

The loss of Iraqi confidence in the first few months enabled other actors to use grievances to recruit followers, gain power, and eventually oppose coalition efforts. In this sense, one failed window of opportunity led to others, each more difficult and more disastrous if unmet: The neutralization and/or integration of Sadr’s Militia, the reconciliation of Sunni moderates, the blocking of “Mughaweer” militiamen attempting to infiltrate Iraqi Police Forces, the engagement of regional actors – none of these goals necessary for security was accomplished. At each stage, the military’s outdated structure and procedures only made each task more difficult by wasting valuable time: Time that could have been devoted to containment of insurgent elements and large-scale reconstruction was instead spent learning hard lessons, attempting to adapt the military’s culture to a counterinsurgency, and forming ad hoc organizations to conduct vital training and development missions—which, prior to the war, were seen as ancillary concerns at best.

This summer, the US-led coalition faces a final closing window of opportunity: They must hand off security responsibilities to reasonably competent Iraqi forces and begin drawing down troop levels before logistical, political, or operational concerns force a precipitous withdrawal. If a handoff cannot be done on coalition terms, the consequences will go far beyond military defeat. Foreign policy experts continue to debate about a whole range of likely nightmarish scenarios, including the emergence of a Sunni-dominated mini-state that facilitates international terrorism, an upsurge in sectarian violence that rips the nation apart and leads to genocidal activity, the rise of a nuclear Iran as a regional hegemon, and the permanent loss of US prestige.

Despite these dire possibilities, there have been some encouraging signs of change: Lieutenant General David Petraeus and his small cadre of counterinsurgency experts have assumed command in Iraq and set to work reversing the long-standing culture of conventional-minded operations. The surge beyond its obvious call for more troops, also calls for a renewed focus on securing civilian populations and working to win hearts and minds. Coupled with the other economic, political, and structural reforms unveiled earlier this year, the overall Iraq strategy has clearly improved on many fronts. But given the rapidly changing political situation at home and the state of our overstretched military, the simple reality is that time is going to run out for the surge. An alternate plan is needed, built upon the assumption that the current troop presence will be forcibly drawn down in the near future by political pressures. The following represents an outline for such a “Plan B” based upon three critical policy initiatives that leaders at the highest levels of government must consider.

Critical Step #1: Force a Paradigm Shift -- Smaller, Embedded, and Long-Term

The first critical step attacks the fundamental cause of failure and makes immediate, sweeping changes to the organization of forces on the ground. Senior governmental leaders must preempt a politically-forced, complete withdrawal from Iraq by presenting an alternate plan that incorporates major organizational changes and significant—but not total—troop reductions. Plan B would force a paradigm shift in the way our troops are organized and directed on the ground. The US military in Iraq would be drawn down drastically to reflect a mission focused exclusively on combat advisor duties and long-term engagement. The rhetoric and policy of “decisive victory” would be scrapped in favor of a generational approach. Attempting to surge forces into Iraq in hopes of speeding up the process of bringing a functional central government, competent security forces, and a self-sustaining economy to Iraq is simply unrealistic; Plan B would reduce the US presence as much as possible while simultaneously increasing integration with Iraqi forces. This smaller, more sustainable force structure — numbering 35,000 troops or less -- will send the message that these advisory teams are “here to stay,” and capable of working with Iraqi security forces for as long as necessary.

After a careful 12-18 month phased redeployment of excess combat units, the remaining troops would be organized into small groups of specially selected and trained American advisors working exclusively within Iraqi Security Forces. Instead of the traditional framework of brigades and battalions on huge “mega-bases,” US forces would operate in platoon-sized elements (approximately 30 men), completely embedded with larger Iraqi Security Forces and supported by interagency elements, civil society, and private contractors. The advisors’ role would be to provide mentorship, ensure the Iraqi forces work against the insurgency and sectarian violence, and call for reinforcements or air support if needed. Rather than attempting to directly intervene in the growing civil strife, this strategy focuses working with the Iraqi soldiers and policemen that will continue the fight long after the coalition withdraws. Advisors would evaluate and build local forces in the best way known to work, gaining their trust by eating, sleeping, training, and fighting along their counterparts at all levels in the chain of command. Iraqi leaders or soldiers found to be corrupt or incompetent would be replaced, their jobs turned over to the most effective and progressive of their subordinates.

Detractors who might ask, “What about the security of these small advisor elements? What if one of these platoons gets in trouble?” should remember that this type of program has already been in existence in Iraq for some time, on a smaller scale. Hundreds of Military Transition Teams (MiTT) exist in Iraq today, each consisting of 10-15 senior NCOs and officers. A large proportion of these teams already live completely embedded within their assigned Iraqi units. To this date, not a single MiTT team has been overrun by insurgents. MiTT teams, though seemingly more exposed and isolated, are generally less vulnerable because of the ties they’ve forged with their Iraqi counterparts. The Iraqi units feel a brotherly bond with their American advisors and hold themselves responsible for the MiTT team’s safety. The MiTT model has to be grown to be a primary elemnent of the US strategy.

As an additional safeguard, these dispersed, decentralized teams would also be covered by a perpetual “security umbrella,” provided by standard, conventional units. What many American leaders have failed to recognize is that in this new century, with technology and communication constantly evolving, the threat of immediate, lethal force is more potent than the actual presence of force. The tank on the street corner is more obtrusive and less important than the idea that a flight of fighter jets and a company of helicopter-borne shock troops are only a radio call away. While most of the overt American military presence would be withdrawn from country, a small but well-equipped presence of traditionally organized military forces would be retained in regionally positioned Quick Reaction Force (QRF) bases. From these few bases—far enough away from civilian populations to reduce frictions but close enough to respond—the more heavily armed standard military units could offer assistance by sending mechanized or helicopter-borne reinforcements and/or medical assets (MEDEVAC). With the assistance of the Air Force, these regionally located bases could also run 24-hour Combat Air Patrols (CAP) to provide the air support needed in the event of a serious enemy attack. Some mechanized ground units would also be pushed out as necessary to the Iranian border where their thermal sensors could make a difference in securing the vast desert expanses.

Yet the changed military framework called for under Plan B represents only half of the needed organizational reforms. The military advisor teams are designed to form part of a broader interagency network that would be embedded in all major Iraqi institutions—the army, the police, the courts, the government, the education system, and so on. In the same way that the military advisory teams would work with Iraqi security forces, newly created civil advisory teams would partner with their Iraqi counterparts to focus on capacity building, rule of law, development, and governance. The existing concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams does not go far enough—PRTs must be further decentralized and embedded within standing institutions at the lowest level possible. Without fully embedding civil advisors, American-led forces remain blind to the infiltration or influence of foreign or corrupt powers. Take for instance the example of a PRT-sponsored water purification plant in southern Iraq: After a very modest turn-out for the “ribbon cutting” ceremony to open the new facility in March 2006, US civil affairs personnel later discovered that a huge, second ceremony had been conducted only hours later in their absence—and that the entire project had been publicly attributed to the benevolent Iranian government! By embedding as closely as possible with the most critical Iraqi institutions, US-led forces can increase their ability to build productive relationships and expose the most harmful or corrupt actors.

Under Plan B, interagency and military elements would thus form a dispersed network of embedded advisor teams working through Iraqi institutions to help improve Iraqi society and governance. Top-heavy bureaucratic structures would be ruthlessly stripped away. To synchronize efforts, the various teams would still be grouped into provincially-sized geographic regions and issued guidance by an overall military leader, but cooperation and initiative would be the guiding principles. Instead of awaiting specific, detailed plans from headquarters in Baghdad, each team would be given general “mission type guidance” and given the freedom to determine the best way to contribute to the overall intent. Each team’s mission would define its composition, whether it be assisting a local mayor to bring basic services to his people, establishing a court system, or building a cadre of trained civil engineers. Select teams would be empowered with an “FDR New Deal” type charter to create a job corps and develop projects on a massive scale. A system of “reverse embeds” would also be created to allow the next generation of Iraqi administrators to learn by working within American-led teams, thus building an indigenous capacity to continue reconstruction efforts after the coalition withdraws. The overarching effort would not be to rebuild Iraq, but to create a capacity for self-governance within Iraqi institutions through the training, advice, technical support, and targeted financial assistance. This new dynamic of small footprints, direct embedding, and umbrella security is the key to success in Iraq and the larger war on terror. The current “surge” plan simply attempts to achieve too much in too short a period of time. Without fully partnering with Iraqi forces and embracing the idea of a lasting (but small-scale) presence, US-led coalition forces will constantly be faced with a “security vacuum” the moment they withdraw. The drastic change in strategy and organization prescribed by “Plan B” would transform the existing task force into an entity much more capable of achieving its true mission—the long-term, disciplined and gradual development of Iraqi institutions.

Critical Step #2: Surge Talent, not Troops

“America isn’t at war. The marines are at war. America is at the mall.”

-From a bulletin board in Ramadi

The next critical step addresses both staggering shortages in civilian interagency support and counterproductive manning strategies in the military. Plan B must be accompanied by a massive recruitment of talent from across American society to fill thousands of civil advisory positions. Up until now, there has been little real mobilization of any segment of society outside of the military. Conspicuously absent from all State of the Union addresses and White House press conferences is a call for sacrifice from the public at large. Yet the Iraq War, unlike the World Wars before it, does not hinge upon the mass production of tanks, guns, bombs, and warships. Instead, success in Iraq hinges on the mass mobilization of America’s best and brightest to solve the innumerable challenges of reconstruction, stability, training, and capacity building. The war is labor intensive, not materiel intensive. No amount of congressionally allocated reconstruction dollars will ever change the dire situation without the balanced application of skilled individuals to engage with Iraqi institutions-- talented civil servants, academics, technical experts, and administrators from all walks of life are needed to help build the capacity for development. Policy makers must turn their full attention to enlisting the kind of talent needed to take much of the reconstruction burden off of the military. Up until now, there has been no concerted effort to fill this shortfall because the need has scarcely been recognized or announced. The various agencies and departments involved in Iraq have not even committed to the idea of building a robust cadre of reconstruction advisors, let alone begun recruiting for it. As a result, a whole generation of experienced and committed Americans remains unengaged and underutilized. Plan B forces the United States to come to terms with the lack of non-military talent by identifying the specific numbers of personnel and expertise required in order to constitute the new organizational paradigm.

In the short term, the mobilization of talent will require not only recruiting for volunteers, but also calling upon expertise outside of government in the form of private contractors These contractors—unlike many of the private security companies currently in Iraq—must not be treated as separate, free-ranging entities, but instead integrated directly within civil assistance teams. Each contractor would be hired to fill specific gaps and held as fully accountable for performance and conduct. The range of useful skills is virtually unlimited: security, electrical engineering, farming, road construction, census taking, urban planning, and other skills that can be effectively taught to Iraqi administrators over time. The use of the private sector, which will continue to increase in asymmetric conflicts must be fully embraced but carefully structured—the goal is flexibility with oversight.

At the same time that America mobilizes its civilian talent to implement Plan B, the US military must similarly make a focused effort to send its best and brightest to Iraq. Having served a decade in the military and gone on multiple deployments, I can personally affirm that the US military is comprised of some of the most skilled and dedicated people that have ever filled its ranks. The resolve of these young patriots facing adversity in Iraq has been amazing. But like any organization, the military has within it a smaller, scattered group of extraordinarily talented individuals that continue to distinguish themselves. These individuals must be the foundation upon which a “Plan B”—or any strategy for success in Iraq—must be constructed. More than any other type of military endeavor, the forces charged with counterinsurgency and nation-building rely heavily on the individual talent of those working at the lowest levels. The effort requires soldiers that are comfortable working with only minimal guidance, through many cultural barriers, and surrounded by their Iraqi allies. These individuals—using their unique ability to assess the complex cultural landscape, build relationships, and develop trust—become invaluable over time as they gain a deep understanding of how to improve their surroundings. Given these realities, the current military manning strategy in Iraq makes little sense. In many ways the military is still conducting personnel management in ways that resemble peacetime. The majority of the military’s best officers and NCO’s regularly rotate through stateside academic tours or other non-combat related assignments. In a similar fashion, the troop rotation schedule in theater reflects the philosophy that the deployment burden should be shared as equally as possible across all units. A wide range of military units of all types, proficiencies, and experiences take turns serving in theater. While both these practices were designed with good intentions—they attempt to maximize quality of life—there are many unfortunate side effects: There is little continuity, and rarely do any of the constantly cycling units ever return to the same area for a second tour. As a result, the newly arrived units must spend months learning the intricacies of their individual areas. The former commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles Krulak, commented about the same phenomenon in Vietnam when he quipped “We didn’t fight a 9 year war… we fought a one year war 9 times.” Additionally, current manning strategies can lead to a mismatch in abilities, with poorly prepared units relieving highly proficient ones—sometimes in extremely sensitive areas where a weak plan can totally unravel stability. An ill-trained, culturally ignorant, or otherwise mediocre unit makes poor decisions, offends the locals, and undermines a year of development efforts.

Senior leadership must recall the military’s best talent to the fight now, while the outcome of the war hangs in the balance. The reduced force presence called for in Plan B would allow the military to surge talent by recruiting gifted individuals and selecting its most counterinsurgency-savvy units to deploy as the foundation for its embedded advisory force. These selected forces would undertake a type of “tag team” rotation schedule already being used by many Special Operations Forces. Under the new schedule, two similar embedded teams would take turns working a “year on, year off” with the same Iraqi unit. While local conditions will certainly change in the space of a year, the task of making adjustments and resuming old relationships with Iraqi counterparts will be much easier than starting anew in a strange area. Also, to capitalize on each embedded team’s inherent talents, those selected for service in Iraq under the new organizational paradigm would undergo extensive training in counterinsurgency, intelligence, reconstruction, and language/ culture to prepare them specifically for their role as advisors. This training would be conducted by experts: representatives from Special Forces, the CIA, the State Department, the FBI, and even Iraqi refugees would be employed for various phases of the program in order to give every team the best possible chances for success. While the two or three such contingents are fully committed to the long term campaign in Iraq, the rest of the military would begin the much needed process of recovery and retraining. Senior leadership would be given time to reconstitute military capabilities, continue the process of transformation, and repair the logistical damage done by 5 years of continuous operations. Despite the obvious benefits to the military as a whole, the emotional and physical toll on the most talented members of the force cannot be discounted. Healthy incentives will be necessary to attract and compensate the individuals selected for service in Iraq: Targeted bonuses equivalent to a 200% pay increase (comparable to the rates offered by private security contractors such as Blackwater), increased opportunity for promotion, and special training would be needed to compensate these patriots for repeated tours and more demanding roles. These measures—as well as the others I’ve described to mobilize civilian talent—are certainly drastic and costly. But this country has reached a point where drastic measures can no longer be avoided.

Critical Step #3: Wage an Information War

The final critical step deals with the role of the media. Even if the forces in Iraq can be effectively reorganized and American talent can be brought to the fight, any successes will be instantly nullified if portrayed negatively in the news. A major shortcoming in all Iraq strategy to date is the failure to recognize the supreme importance of information. The two “centers of gravity” for this war should not be identified as the senior Al Qa’ida leadership or Anbar Province, but instead as Iraqi and American public opinion. Victory is utterly impossible without fully engaging both. It is therefore surprising that we collectively have done so little to influence the media coverage at home and abroad. The military has much to learn from the public relations teams used by corporate America, where “brand” or reputation has a direct effect on earnings. The Department of Defense needs to adopt a strategy of more proactive, direct engagement with the US media, even direct-hiring the best of the private sector to train and lead these expanded media relations teams.

Plan B would include a far reaching and well developed media component. The goal would be an open dialogue: Instead of refusing comment or using carefully crafted scripts, Lieutenant General Petraeus should take the opportunity provided by his fresh command and the new strategy to start a running conversation with the American people. In the same way the General Schwarzkopf held press briefings during Desert Storm, General Petraeus should be a common sight on national television, offering frank assessments of our troops’ progress and setbacks. The existing rhetoric for Iraq is dangerously simple: Our troops are “hunting down Islamo-fascist terrorists,” who have been driven insane by some “perversion of their religion” that compels them to strap bombs to themselves. The American people need to hear from the Commanding General in Iraq that the reality is not so simple: The insurgent fighters are highly rational, committed to defined objectives, and understand the importance of the media better than we do. The American viewer sitting at home is more of a target for roadside bombs than the soldier in the convoy. The insurgent bombings, beheadings, and shootings are not only designed to kill their immediate victims, but also (and more importantly) to break the will of the American people through their psychological impact. This dynamic cannot be disrupted until Americans begin to understand the complexity of this war and its many different facets, instead of only being subjected to daily reports of anonymous violence.

At the same time, Plan B would engage Iraqi public opinion in a much more aggressive manner. The US must step up efforts to shape the stories produced by Arab television stations in the region using two distinct approaches. First, the US should invest significant time and money in creating a separate, overt, news medium that encompasses Internet, radio, and television coverage. The connection between this news channel, run by Iraqis, and the West does not have to be hidden. While an association with Western media may de-legitimize the channel to a degree, it will not prevent all Iraqis from watching. This Iraqi “alternate lens” (an “Arab Fox News”, as my colleague Stephen Hopkins has coined it) would present an alternative viewpoint to the heavily biased Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya networks, which consistently support insurgents by airing exclusive footages of their attacks. Truthful stories with a pro-Western spin would be the goal. Failures would be discussed frankly, but would be balanced with stories regarding the positive actions taken by coalition forces and the atrocities committed by insurgent fighters. The current effort to improve foreign perceptions of America, led by Undersecretary and former senior Bush adviser Karen Hughes, have not been given sufficient priority. To be effective, the propaganda efforts must be undertaken on a grand scale, on a similar footing to the Cold War campaign to counter Russian propaganda. Moderate Muslim society must be engaged on all fronts to build an alternate dialogue through academic circles, religious leaders, community gatherings, literary publications, popular culture, and other forums. Furthermore, the representatives selected to manage this effort and serve as ambassadors for American culture must be as close to Muslim society as possible—fluent in Arabic, well traveled, born abroad, and as far removed from American stereotypes as possible. Sympathetic American immigrants from the greater Middle East should be aggressively scouted, trained, and employed in this effort. A second, indirect media channel would also be expanded. Covert action would be broadly authorized to place positive stories through neutral or opposing Iraqi news outlets, all while hiding the “American fingerprint.” These actions would obviously be conducted more sparingly, but potentially to greater effect. The more neutral or anti-American the news outlet may be, the more legitimate the covertly-aired story. In both approaches, the channels between coalition forces and these news outlets would be drastically streamlined so that pro-Western, pro-Iraqi government stories air sooner than those of their pro-insurgent counterparts. Direct communications must be established to allow the embedded military and civilian advisory effort to pass images, facts, vignettes, and other valuable data onto well trained-information managers for rapid dissemination in the media.

Those who question these practices should take the time to examine the ruthless use of propaganda by insurgent groups to recruit volunteers and discredit American-led forces. Ever innovative, enemies of the US have learned to recover the bodies of their fallen comrades killed in battle, strip away all weapons and ammunition, drag the bodies into a mosque, and send video clips of the mock “atrocity” to Al Jazeera. Most disturbingly, these staged human rights violations consistently appear with stunning alacrity on television—often only hours later—and long before the hopelessly layered, bureaucratic system of official US message approval can release the true story.

The Way Ahead: The Need For A Bifurcated Military

The three critical steps outlined by Plan B are only a small part of much larger reforms that must occur throughout America’s military and civilian institutions. The rough reorganization into embedded teams, the mobilization of talent, the expansion of interagency assistance, the full engagement of the media—these are all short-term steps that reflect the need for a new long-term vision. We are on the fringe of a far-reaching and profound revolution that will change the way war is conceived. The standard notions of military strength—usually measured in the numbers of aircraft, tanks and personnel, or more recently, in the speed of deployment and level of training—will start to become less important than the ability to influence populations and strengthen governmental institutions abroad. Insurgencies, militias and other asymmetric enemies thrive where the government is weak and local sympathies are strong. In order to be effective in this type of conflict, the military must be capable of employing some very unconventional tools—health care, security, political advice, development projects, technical training, basic education, farming assistance, and a myriad of other services—to isolate enemies from their supporters. At the same time, the forces engaged in this effort must have the skill, autonomy, and cultural sensitivity to read the complex political landscape and take effective action where needed. The military’s solution to this dilemma thus far—as evidenced in the Army’s slogan “every soldier a decathlete”—has been to expect every combat unit to train for conventional war and nation building at the same time. This practice is both unrealistic and harmful. The way forward in Iraq and in the broader “War on Terror” calls for a bifurcated military , organized into two distinct but supporting elements.

The concept of the bifurcated military is strangely born of compelling but bitterly opposed arguments. The first, advanced by former Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and others in the lead up to the Iraq War, called for a lighter, faster military that can “outsource” warfare through surrogates and employ technology to minimize its presence. Rumsfeld, who once said “the [military’s] bureaucracy is the number one security threat to this country,” recognized the limitations of the military’s entrenched organizational structure. At the same time, the second argument, put forward by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Eric Shinseki, was that success in Iraq would require the massive employment of major combat forces (These arguments, and the term “bifurcated military” are developed by Thomas Barnett in his Blueprint for Action). General Shinseki understood the potential chaos that could result in the aftermath of the initial invasion.

Both of these arguments are correct. The changing nature of warfare has introduced a growing need for two distinct types of military forces, both robust and well-trained: The first, a conventional-type force, is needed to deter aggression by other nations, provide temporary security to maintain order abroad, and act as a reaction force during emergencies. This force is very similar to the current military, and still employs the full array of tanks, heavy weaponry, and large combat units—its task is to seize ground, destroy opposing forces, and provide instant security. There is no chance of eliminating the need for this type of force so long as future conventional wars remain a possibility.

The second type of military force needed in today’s world is altogether different: It takes the form of a diverse network of military, interagency, and civilian elements, and its role would be to work through the institutions of other nations to build the capacity for self-governance and self-defense. The embedded force structure described in Plan B is only a rough sketch of the full potential this type of organization would possess. This new conception of military power would be lighter and faster, show little sign of the standard bureaucracy, and would barely adhere to the standard definition of “military” at all. The interagency and military force would operate in a decentralized manner and work exclusively within foreign armies, police forces, and governmental offices as embedded advisor teams. The defining characteristics of the new force would be language skills, cultural understanding, and special training to allow the many civilian and military teams to work effectively with their foreign counterparts. While some units within the military have long developed this capability (namely the Army Special Forces and some elements within the Marines) there are simply no forces capable of this type of mission on a larger scale or within non-military institutions.

The two forces—conventional and embedded—would thus have distinct roles, but provide mutual support throughout the campaign. Viewing the case of Iraq through the bifurcated paradigm, the intervention would have looked very different indeed: the large, conventional-type force would have overthrown the regime, then provided immediate security to prevent looting, preserve order, and avoid a power vacuum. The interagency, expeditionary-type force, organized into much smaller and culturally-fluent units, would have linked up with those elements of the former Iraqi government which could be persuaded to align with the coalition. Specially selected interagency and military elements would have embedded with existing Iraqi Police, Army, regional government, and civilian infrastructure to preserve as much capacity as possible while recruiting to fill gaps. As quickly as possible (to minimize the perception of foreign occupation), the conventional forces would have repositioned in regional “Quick Reaction Force” bases. In their place would be Iraqi forces, accompanied exclusively by their embedded military advisors. The dispersed network of government agency, civilian, and military advisors would have served as conduits through which resources could be introduced for reconstruction. Each embedded team would thereby have been in a position to empower, advise, support, or otherwise influence its Iraqi counterparts to provide needed services for the population. While we would need a time machine to show this plan would have worked initially in Iraq;, the current situation could still see great improvement using this alternate organizational approach.

Conclusion – Looking Beyond Iraq

The type of military and interagency framework I’ve described—both in Plan B and in the long range vision of a bifurcated military—will become more important as future contingencies arise where a more nuanced, scalable and legitimately-perceived intervention force is needed. In the cases of humanitarian intervention or assistance to failing states, the deployment of large, purely conventional forces may be counterproductive. A smaller, bifurcated force—led by a well-trained and decentralized network of interagency and military teams but supported by a few regionally-positioned, conventional response forces—may prove much more effective for many reasons: A smaller force is much more sustainable for the long periods of time needed to enact change in complicated asymmetric conflicts. The concept of multilateral, interagency teams assisting foreign governments to secure their own territories is far less likely to inspire accusations of neo-imperialism (and thus unintentionally unite disparate tribes, clans, and political parties against the United States as a “foreign occupier”). By partnering with local power structures at the lowest level and applying indirect influence via embedded advisory elements, the interagency force would serve as the proverbial glue to bind competing interests under a central government, instead of attempting to overcome cultural animosity, historical differences, and ethnic tensions with sheer numbers and firepower) The embedded expeditionary elements would be in a better position to ensure that their counterparts—local security forces, legal institutions, and governing bodies—adhered to universally-held standards for human rights.

Finally, the transformation to a more bifurcated force has its own logic due to other developments. Technologically, advances in communications have grown to the point where a decentralized military or multi-agency organization—which previously would have been unmanageable—is now preferable and far more responsive than a strict hierarchy. Financially, most of the cost of transformation arises from organizational restructuring or retraining. There is no “magic” piece of equipment that must be invented or procured to facilitate the change. But the transition will take time. The forces that will continue to prevent this type of transformation will be political and institutional. 45 years of Cold War structures cannot be undone overnight. The most senior military and civilian leaders must be informed and persuaded. The general public must be educated. The challenges of cultural inertia are daunting. Yet there is a growing voice for change coming from within the ranks of the military—from the junior officers and non-comissioned officers who are charged with the real work of the Iraq war and who have felt its frustrations first-hand. These young men and women—not a think tank, or a group of Pentagon generals—represent the best hope for transformation.

The real danger of the Iraq war going forward is that the United States will emerge from its aftermath learning the wrong lessons -- “Never intervene, and if we must—do so with more troops and more firepower. Nation building is nearly impossible. The military’s only job is to fight wars.” But such conclusions are misguided, and ignore the reality that non-state actors and asymmetric threats continue to grow. For all the policy debate and fiery accusations that will continue to rage over the invasion, we must not stop asking how things can be done better. If the wrong lessons are learned from Iraq, the damage to America’s position in the world will be inestimable: Rivals will be emboldened with the knowledge that asymmetric warfare is America’s Achilles heel—through insurgency, terrorism, subversion, and irregular fighting even the most powerful nation can be defeated. The United States must create the capability now to deal effectively with these types of threats on a larger scale, or it will be caught in a perpetual cycle of abortive conflicts. Without serious organizational reform, the considerable might of the US military—though armed with the most fearsome weapons and composed of the most dedicated people—will prove increasingly irrelevant and incapable of protecting the nation’s interests.

Major Fernando M. Lujan is a MPP1 at the Kennedy School of Government and 1998 graduate of the US Military Academy. He is an active duty Special Forces officer who commanded an A-team in Iraq just prior to starting classes last year. He has also served in Afghanistan and throughout South America in a variety of counterinsurgency or counterterrorism roles. Fernando is from San Antonio, Texas, and his interests include asymmetric warfare, Hemingway, Scotch whiskey, lifting weights, motorcycles, martial arts and salsa dancing (poorly). Following his time at Harvard, he will teach American Politics at West Point.

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SWJ Editors Note - This blog entry will appear as an article in an upcoming issue of the Kennedy School Review.