The Winter 2007 - 2008 issue of the US Army War College's Parameters is posted.
Parameters, a refereed journal of ideas and issues, provides a forum for the expression of mature thought on the art and science of land warfare, joint and combined matters, national and international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management, military history, ethics, and other topics of significant and current interest to the US Army and Department of Defense.
Here is the line-up:
In This Issue - Parameters Editors
Afghanistan: Regaining Momentum by Ali A. Jalali
On the sixth anniversary of the US-led military invasion, Afghanistan is faced with its worst crisis since the ouster of the Taliban in 2001. There are increasing concerns, both internationally and domestically, that Afghanistan faces the distinct possibility of sliding back into instability and chaos. The country is challenged by a revitalized Taliban-led insurgency, record rise in drug production, deterioration of the rule of law, and weakening national government in the regions outside the major cities.
New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency by Steven Metz
From the 1960s to the 1980s stopping Communist-backed insurgents was an important part of American strategy, so counterinsurgency was an important mission for the US military, particularly the Army. Even when most of the Army turned its attention to large-scale warfighting and the operational art following Vietnam, special operation forces preserved some degree of capability. In the 1980s American involvement in El Salvador and a spate of insurgencies around the world linked to the Soviets and Chinese sparked renewed interest in counterinsurgency operations (as a component of low-intensity conflict). By 1990 what could be called the El Salvador model of counterinsurgency, based on a limited US military footprint in conjunction with the strengthening of local security forces, became codified in strategy and doctrine.
US COIN Doctrine and Practice: An Ally's Perspective by Alexander Alderson
Until very recently, the four and a half years of military operations in Iraq appeared to have created an obstacle in people's minds. Rightly or wrongly, reality has subsumed theory, and because of the media coverage Iraq has received, counterinsurgency is now seen as nothing but an indescribably bloody, draining, protracted, and arduous business which makes tremendous demands on popular support, political resolve, and the resources required to sustain the fight. History shows this has always been the case, but perhaps the initial incidences of rapid, decisive, conventional operations misled the public. The fact remains: The cost of counterinsurgency is high. It always has been, depressingly so, and it is largely unrefundable. There is now more than a glimmer of hope, a detectable, increasingly palpable feeling that something may be changing, that there is now what can be best described as "a reasonable degree of tactical momentum on the ground."
Strategic Realignment: Ends, Ways, and Means in Iraq by Bruce J. Reider
Four years into the war in Iraq, the debate rages over whether there are enough troops deployed to accomplish the mission. Congress and the White House continuously argue over resources and the conduct of the war. Meanwhile, American and Iraqi casualties persist at an unacceptable rate. America's political and military leaders suggest progress is being made and we should stay the course; after all, it generally requires eight to ten years to defeat an insurgency. From a historical perspective, they are correct. But the situation in Iraq is not just an insurgency, and labeling it as such is a gross oversimplification of the challenges we face.
The Military and Reconstruction Operations by Mick Ryan
The post-Cold War trend of convergence between military and nonmilitary tasks has accelerated over the past six years as western nations seek to defeat the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. One result of this convergence is an increased role for military forces in the conduct of humanitarian missions previously viewed as the sole preserve of nongovernmental organizations. This transition is reflected in a greater emphasis on reconstruction activities by the military in contemporary operations.
Disarming Rogues: Deterring First-Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction by David Szabo
The United States and its allies invaded Iraq in 2003 with the declared intention of removing Saddam Hussein's regime. Although it was determined after the war that Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD), removing a regime believed to be in possession of WMD raises the possibility that the post-9/11 US security policy is more —than previously believed to tolerate the risk of precipitating a WMD exchange. In future crises, policymakers may conclude the risk of WMD use during a preemptive attack or disarming strike is lower than the risk of a terrorist attack utilizing such weapons.
Stabilization and Democratization: Renewing the Transatlantic Alliance by Zachary Selden
The transatlantic disagreement over how to deal with the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003 gave rise to a spate of warnings about the imminent demise of NATO. To some extent it is easy to discount many of those predictions based on the endurance of the alliance and its ongoing expansion. But there is an underlying concern that should not be ignored: The original mission of the alliance disappeared 15 years ago and nothing has completely taken its place. Throughout the Cold War, NATO was seen as absolutely essential to the core security interests of its members. Regardless of the disagreement, nothing undermined the fundamental necessity of the alliance.
The Moral Equality of Combatants by Carl Ceulemans
According to the Just War tradition a war can only be just if two sets of principles are satisfied. First there is the jus ad bellum. These principles tell us when it is just to start a war. There has to be a good reason or a just cause in order for a war to be morally permissible (self-defense, defense of others, putting a stop to human rights violations). The decision to go to war has to be taken by a legitimate authority. Those who wage war need to be motivated by good intentions (desire to promote a more stable peace). War should not only be a last resort (necessity), it must also offer a reasonable chance of success. Moreover, the good the warring party hopes to obtain should outweigh the evil caused by the war (proportionality). The second set of principles, the jus in bello or the right in the war, focuses on the moral constraints that need to be observed during hostilities. Noncombatants must never be the intentional target of military actions (discrimination), and the military utility of a particular act of war has to outweigh the damage it will cause.
Comments
What follows are a few comments and questions on one of the articles, Colonel Reiders "Strategic Realignment," in the new issue of Parameters.
First off Reiders piece is superb and I commend it to the readers of SWJ blog. It is clearly written, logical, and thought provoking. He raises very important issues and makes recommendations about the way ahead in Iraq that need to be considered.
I suspect that he penned the piece in early to mid 2007 because it does not take into account the recent reduction in violence in Iraq that has occurred in the latter half of 2007. As I see it Reider makes three critical points at the end of the essay that sums up his overall argument:
POINT #1: "First, America and its military need to understand the nature of the war, i.e., a conflict dominated by sectarian violence, entailing a low-level civil war, a Sunni insurgency against Coalition forces, and the limited actions of al Qaeda terrorists bent on spreading global jihad."
POINT #2: "One of the first steps in changing strategy will be to negotiate a ceasefire between the various factions and agree upon the terms of compliance. The diplomatic emphasis needs to shift from its focus on building capacity in the government to brokering a ceasefire and ending the violence, while empowering Shia, Sunni, and Kurd factions to negotiate their own political solution. Sunni inclusion will be the litmus test for a successful political solution."
POINT #3: "The security focus needs to be on Baghdad. Baghdad has a diverse population of approximately six million and has historically been the center of gravity culturally, politically, and economically."
Based on when Colonel Reider most likely wrote the piece in early to mid 2007 one could conclude that events in Iraq that unfolded in the latter half of 2007 have largely born out the recommendations that he makes. There does appear to have been a major shift in approach in terms of cutting deals with our former enemies--the non-alqueda sunni insurgents--to stop attacking us and become our allies in fighting alqueda; and, Sadrs probably related order to stand-down in attacks against Coalition Forces. So in a sense Reiders call for a cease-fire between the warring factions in Iraq appears to have come about through our own efforts and those of the factions. Too, Reiders call for a security focus on Baghdad also seems to be the case with the majority of Surge forces and effort going there or to the outlying "belts."
But a couple of questions come to my mind after reading Reiders thoughtful piece. What if we are not seeing an actual "cease fire" between the warring factions but instead a lull in fighting which is actually giving the various sides an opportunity to rearm and harden themselves for a bigger fight ahead? A "cease fire" implies that the various sides have agreed to it; but how do we really know that the sides have actually agreed to a cease-fire? Can we really know this? There are limits to our knowledge of the intentions of the warring sides. Even though the new Coin methods have established Combat outposts in neighborhoods with the suggestion that we now live "amongst the people," we are still not OF the people in Iraq and never can be; hence the limitations of our knowledge of them. If we are experiencing a lull in the fighting and not an actual cease fire then the alignment of ends, ways, and means that Reider calls for in his piece must be re-looked.
Why must Baghdad, to use Reiders words, be the focus of security, or to use American Army parlance, the "center of gravity?" Does not our new Counterinsurgency doctrine instruct us to always--always--in any Coin operation make the people the focus or center of gravity? If Reider is correct in that a shift in strategy toward brokering a cease fire and away from the centrality of the Iraqi central government is necessary then why is Baghdad still the focus? It seems that if the people are the center of gravity in ANY Coin operation then the people writ large in Iraq should be the security focus and we can not just limit ourselves to Baghdad especially if the importance of the central government wanes. If the security focus is protection of all the Iraqi people and if we are in a lull instead of a cease fire what implications does this hold for aligning American ends, ways, and means, and policy?
Admittedly I ask many more questions than I have answers but often very good scholarly essays like Reiders provoke and inspire inquiry and skepticism. It is my opinion that today as we assess the situation in Iraq skepticism combined with inquiry is what is needed instead of proclaimed certainty and perceived positive knowledge about the situation and way ahead.