Small Wars Journal

Our Man in Kabul

Mon, 11/02/2009 - 3:43pm
Our Man in Kabul - David Wood, Politics Daily

... He is our man indeed. And Hamid Karzai's casual assumption this morning of another five-year term as Afghanistan's president, after the election runoff was canceled when his only opponent pulled out of the race, saddles the Obama administration with a king-size migraine.

The U.S. strategy in Afghanistan has rested on a central goal: building public trust in a strong, democratic central government. Sixty-eight thousand American troops are deployed there in service of that goal. The election process, beginning with a nationwide vote in August, was seen as crucial in demonstrating that democracy works and is worth the hard work and risk-taking required to support it.

Today that idea is a shambles. Now the U.S. strategy rests on an undemocratic, corrupt and weak central government, a president who cheated his way into office in an election held under American supervision, an election that even the government of Afghanistan concedes was stolen. The script couldn't have been improved if Taliban chieftain Mullah Omar had put himself to the task....

More at Politics Daily.

Comments

Further to...

Lost an entire paragraph somehow.

Recognizing that I'm generalizing here, Afghans understand representation; but they don't have any great appreciation for western styles of democracy. As an elder once said to me sitting in shura, "I've lived a long life; fought many battles; raised children; and studied the Quran for many years. Why should my grandson's vote count the same as mine?"

There's a fair bit of civic education to be done to bridge the gap between Afghan Jirgas as democratic representation and western-style electoral systems.

On a ligher note, but relevant; Afghans were quick to understand and appreciate the concept of "one man, one vote," but their appreciation was transactional; if it's your vote you can sell it to whomever you wish!

Chris, democracy is over-rated. I'm actually trying to write elsewhere about how our fixation on democracy (big D or little) is a red-herring that has dire consequences at all levels of engagement.

What's required in AFG (in my humble opinion) isn't a <b>democratic</b> government. It is rather a government that is competent and credible. When policy-makers use "democracy" as a surrogate term for government that is competent and credible it creates expectations that are often unreasonable and/or impractical, and it distracts us from focussing on the compentent and credble. And, to be quite literal about it, many Afghans would be happy - if not happiest - with a goverment that is <b>not</b> democratically founded (or at least not IAW US/Western standards of democracy).

Without getting <b>too</b> Jeffersonian here, a successful democracy will require at least some modicum of understanding on the part of the population of their role in this social order.

In short, our fascination with democracy diverts important resources and attention from the basics; "sewage, water, electricit and trash" sorts of governance issues. Afghans don't care about the bells and whistles of western style democracy; that'll come in time. Right now they need the Maslowian satisfaction of basic governance. And if that comes under the stern hand of a benevolent despot, I just don't think they'd care.

I'm losing my battery (travelling from I'bad), but hope this thread continues...

Cheers!

Christopher M… (not verified)

Tue, 11/03/2009 - 6:34am

As far as I can tell, there is no place in any of the "Af-Pak" strategy documents released by the White House (the President's Remarks, Press Release, or National Security Policy White Paper) where the word "democracy" mentioned in regards to Afghanistan.

Nonetheless, absent a moderate democratic government in Afghanistan it is difficult to see how the US and its allies can accomplish all five of objectives listed in the White House's strategy:

--Disrupting terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terror attacks.
--Promoting a more capable, accountable and effective government in Afghanistan.
--Developing increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight.
--Assisting efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy.
--Involving the international community to actively assist.

While the military plays a key role, particularly in providing security for the population, effective COIN strategy primarily entails a political effort. It looks like the political piece of a comprehensive effort is still largely missing.

Seahorse (not verified)

Mon, 11/02/2009 - 4:40pm

"The U.S. strategy in Afghanistan has rested on a central goal: building public trust in a strong, democratic central government. "

I have always had a problem with statements such as this, since I would characterize the current Afghan Government as, at best, a weak minority Government. In our (collective allies) efforts to install democracy we have meddled with its key principles by thwarting the democratic process in order to prevent democratically electing an unfavourable government. The abscence of political parties and platforms coupled with western ideals prevents potential presidential candidates from creating platforms that can both appeal to its constituents and realistically be implemented. Karzai was elected in 2005 with strong support but never had the ability to trully be in control. The country has suffered through the satisfaction of a myriad of special interest groups within Afghanistan, as well as the international community. Worse still, the majority of funding comes from donor countries which direct or constrain those very funds and their application to Afghanistan's problems.

Afghans strongly supported the concept of democracy and have welcomed its introduction. As well, polling has consistently demonstrated trust in the government and many of its institutions despite the presence of corruption. However, the lack of power within the presidency, coupled with the impotency of the Government has resulted in an inability to satisfy democratic expectations.

This is a fractured state, with serious security problems. One which has economic and social issues that aggravate further the situation, and one for which a strong government with the power to introduce and pursue significant reforms is necessary. I fail to understand why we strive for democracy first when it is clear that strong leadership and Government reform is the priority.

Sincerely,

David