"The significance of this operation, lead by U.S. Marines in coordination with coalition and Afghan partners, cannot be underestimated as it is the largest joint operation in Afghanistan since 2001 and the first major test of the additional U.S. forces President Obama ordered last December," explained Jeffrey Dressler. Prior to their deployment, Mr. Dressler briefed Marines at Camp Lejeune on his comprehensive work on Helmand province published last fall by ISW.
Key facts from this backgrounder include:
- Operation Moshtarak (Dari for "Together") is largest joint offensive involving Afghan forces to date. Unlike previous operations, one battalion of Afghan troops will be paired with one battalion of U.S. Marines.- Marjah is a major Taliban stronghold in Helmand province and remains the command and control hub for the insurgency. Marjah is also considered to be one of the main narcotics centers in Helmand.
- The Taliban has formed or forced an alliance with local opium farmers, taxing each factory at a rate of $1,200 per month. The Taliban has also installed an elaborate shadow government in Marjah including judges, a mayor and a tax collecting committee.
- British Special Forces and U.S. Navy SEALs have commenced shaping operations, killing and capturing top Taliban commanders and dropping leaflets "warning the [insurgent] fighters to leave the area or be killed."
- In preparation for Operation Moshtarak, insurgents have constructed tunnels and bunkers, brought in heavy weapons, set booby traps and strewn landmines around Marjah. It is reported that 90% of the population remain in the town, trapped by IED belts that ring navigable terrain.
Comments
Gents -
I read this paper as a scene-setter for those who cannot find Marjah on the map. Dressler provides some 'facts' but does not offer much in the way of analysis.
Moshtarak is not decisive - I agree. However, what are decisive ops in a COIN environmnet? The insurgents in Marjah presented a surface but in the end, they will not let themselves be decisively engaged (no surprise there). In regards to the central Helmand River Valley, the removal of a significant Taliban presence paves the way to cement already successful on-going COIN efforts in adjacent areas (Nawa, Garmser, Now Zad) and severely restricts insurgent FoM from Pakistan into Helmand's key terrain. In my opinion, this op sets the board for the insurgents' loss of Helmand. However, Mr Jones correctly identifies the real tarpit which can mire this whole effort. Quickly going after the poppy prior to providing real alternative livelihood will be a huge mistake and keep/create insurgents in central Helmand.
I do think this operation is politically important in the US. Its coverage (and success) will certainly have cognitive effects for the US voters and buy some breathing room for Afghanistan weary policy makers.
Just a couple of observations that I believe are appropriate and worth sharing with the SWJ community:
First: for a self-proclaimed "expert on Afghanistan", Mr. Dressler's key points are laced with dangerous assumption, conclusions, and outright falsehoods. I would expect better from an "expert."
Second: A bit of context. Marjah is an important area, but is also just one of many important areas along the Helmand River. Overall operations there are important, but in no means decisive; similary current military operations to clear are important to the Marjah piece of this large puzzle, but are in no means decisive to that success either.
Third: Poppy is a multi-billion dollar industry that a whole lot of people have their fist in; and none of those people are walking away from it any time soon. To physically remove the Taliban from walking opnenly down the streets and through the bazaars with weapons is a far cry from breaking their link to this cash cow. Terrain means little in Insurgency, and the Taliban have unlimited options as to where they "command and control" from. One should not expect significant disruption of either access to drug finance nor command and control from this operation; nor should one create the false expectations that that is the goal either.
Fourth: This guy doesn't have a clue what Special Operations Forces have contributed, and will continue to contribute, along with their Afghan partners; and it is a breach of professionalism to just make stuff up to fill in the gaps to make it sound like he is in fact an informed source of information.
Lastly: No one is "trapped" in Marjah. Sounds dramatic, but it simply isn't true. The afghan people, their government, and the coalition, are all committedt to the protection and preservation of the lives and property of the popualce; and sitting tight in their compounds is often the safest bet for all involved.
It will be a long, difficult fighting season in Afghanistan. This is an important step, but that importance should be highlighted for the right reasons and reported accurately, and this effort does neither.