Comments
In my view the Philippines/Basilan model are excessively hyped, and have proven to be ultimately unsuccessful due to what was mentioned on the last page. If we leave, then the HN can't or won't continue to fill that gap. If we're going to really develop the ability to "hold", then we must develop a real ability to build capacity.
While capacity building may been an objective in the Philippines, with the exception of a CT unit, and few infantry Bns trained (skills perished within months) we have failed miserbly at it. This is not due to not knowing how to do it, but because we lack the authorities to do it. Our current process of building capacity under Title 22 and under 1206 is woefully inadequate and ultimately ineffective. We need the Security Force Assistance legislative changes that will give DOD the authorities it needs to conduct capacity building correctly. Otherwise we'll continue to go through the motions of capacity building without achieving our objectives, and in short that means wasting tax payer's dollars instead of getting a return on our investment.
Things are better in the Philippines, and the new President holds much promise, but the reality is if we have been doing capacity building for the last 9 years in all areas of concern the Filippinos would be ready to fill in any gap we leave if we redeployed.
Somehow we stood up an Army in relatively short order and defeated Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in less time, so while insurgencies tend to take time to defeat building capacity shouldn't take a life time.
There is much good in OEF-P; but at the end of the day U.S. operations there suffer from the same core flaws that undermine all current U.S. COIN opertions:
1. They place U.S. interestes in the country of intervention ahead of those of the country (government and populace) who we are intervening to "help."
2. They are military led, and as such are overly focused on managing the symptoms of insurgency, or building the capacity of those elements of HN government that manage the symptoms of insurgency.
3. Just as military leaders focus on what is in their lane (counterguerrilla operations, security force capability and capacity operations, civil and phychological opertions); the military pointedly AVOIDS what is outside their lane, such as HN politics.
The heartbeat of every insurgency is the relationship between a populace and its government. Understanding the nature of that unique relationship and repairing the fundamental flaws of governance that create the conditions that are historically exploited by internal and external actors to incite and conduct insurgency is the key to true COIN. This is policy-based, must be State Department led, and the key terrain is in the capital cities and the halls of government rather than in some remote village where the insurgent currently operates.
OEF-P is far less abusive of HN sovereignty than OIF or OEF-A, and that is a good thing (due far more to the fact that we were forced to operate in such a way in the beginning, and constrained from escalating throughout than by any grand design). But it still shares these same fundamental flaws; and FM 3-24 only reinforces this flawed construct, only offering a softer "Galula-like" focus rather than the harder "Tranquier-like" focus preferred by many.
COL Jones:
Do you think that, in instances such as the US intervention in the Philippines and elsewhere, the United States:
a. Does not see itself as placing its (the US's) interests above those of the countries (government and populace) wherein it intervenes but, rather,
b. Sees itself as intervening because of interests it (the United States) believes it has "in common" with these countries, governments and populaces?
Thus, (1) these interventions being justified, understood and undertaken re: this "common interests" theme with (2) the specific "common interest" being understood as that which promotes "modernization," "universal values," etc.?
RCJ:
The conflict in the southern Philippines is not at root about "the relationship between a populace and its government", and as soon as we introduce the idea of "a populace" we stray off the path of understanding. The core of it is between two populaces with fundamentally irreconcilable expectations. The government has vacillated between ineffectual attempts to mediate and outright support for one of the two conflicting populaces.
You're quite right that the only lasting solution will be for the Philippine Government to take charge of its own problems, most notably its inability to control its own military and local government apparatus. However, there is absolutely nothing the US can do to make this happen. The State Dept is not going to transform the Philippine Government.
Our often exaggerated "success" in the Philippines has barely scratched the surface of the causes of conflict and is unlikely to generate more than a transient period of diminished conflict. Realistically, though, that's all we were ever going to accomplish. It's not a problem that we have the capacity to solve.
Bill:
This is an excellent point, and one that frustrates me to no end. The U.S. relies far too often on the position that U.S. interests are "universal interests," and even more damaging that U.S. values are "universal values." We use this to rationalize much of our more invasive or coercive foreign policy.
We use this to rationalize much of the expanded intervention aspects of our GWOT response.
We use this to twist the arms of allied governments to go against the express desires of their own populaces to engage with the U.S. in these interventions.
This is not to say that U.S. interests and values are bad, merely that it is with a high dosed mix of arrogance and naivety that we mirror image them onto others.
Even if many of these interests are so broadly defined as to be fairly universal at the "Ends" component of them; it is in the "Ways" and "Means" that are best to achieve them where variations emerge quickly and significantly. This is where the U.S. is burning so much of our "Influence capital" as we bulldoze over the contrary viewpoints of what are the best Ways and Means to achieve these Ends. After all, you are "either with us or against us," right?
Similarly with Values. We tend to use the words "values" and "principles" as if they mean the same thing. They don't. We do the same thing in similar context with the words "legitimate" and "official." Both mind-sets lead us into dangerous positions.
I drilled into this idea of Values and Principles and came to the position that a "Value is a Principle with a Judgment applied to it." As an example, the express Principle that "all men are created equal" draws a great deal of attention in our Declaration of Independence. It is a powerful Principle. Yet everyone knows that the Value assessed to that Principle in 1776 America has been evolving continuously for the past 135 years to what it is today. And that is just in America. We then go to other cultures in other countries and declare to them that the current U.S. value that we assess to this principle is the only correct one, and that they must change to be like us. The hubris and hypocrisy is off the chart. This is also extremely judgmental, and no person, no populace, no nation, wants to be judged.
U.S. foreign policy needs to back away from "The U.S. way is the only way" and work with others whose help and support we need to find ways more Suitable, Acceptable, and Feasible for everyone. This means everyone must compromise a little. Currently we demand that everyone else make the compromises, and often they are huge. Ask Pakistan. Ask the Netherlands. Ask Mexico. We're hard on our friends.
Dayuhan.
Agree with you as well, however, I hope that you can concede that when there are two populaces in such a state of disagreement, that when it is widely perceived that the government backs the position of one over the other, that it is that government bias that must be addressed first. After all, insurgency is politics, so focus on fixing the governance before one sets out to "fix" the people.
Many think that such positions are hair-splitting, but it is in such nuances that define success and failure in such operations.
RCJ:
Yes, i can agree with that, though Americans have consistently underestimated the degree and extent of the anti-Muslim prejudice in the majority populace from which the Government is almost entirely drawn. Since government is drawn from and is primarily accountable to that populace, I don't know that one can be fixed without fixing the other. Since we can't fix either, it may not matter much, but we'd do well to recognize that when formulating expectations.
In terms of interests, I don't know that we have any significant interests in the southern Philippines. There was no real threat to the US, and the ASGs AQ connection, at least post 1994, have been vastly overstated. I suspect that we went there primarily because it offered an opportunity for a quick win, a bit of good PR (Christian missionaries in the hands on Islamic terrorists couldn't be ignored in the post-9/11 environment), and required very limited forces. There is no major national interest or strategic gain involved.
I should write something on the article itself, especially since it cites something I wrote (misinterpreting the conclusions I believe, but I may not have stated them clearly). First impression was that it's a good deal better than some of the drivel written on Philippine operations, but still with some rather startling omissions... I need to read it again slowly, and to think, and it's holiday season. One of these days.
I weigh in reluctantly here. It is interesting to read these comments. Let me just make a couple of points.
Those involved in the initial assessment, planning, and campaign development in October-November 2001 did not envision any kind of quick win. In fact the decision to support our longest standing treaty ally in Asia was the result of a request from President Arroyo to President Bush. There was tremendous resistance to this mission at the upper levels to include from Secretary Rumsfeld. In fact, according to the late GEN Downing (who at the time was the CT advisor to NSA Rice) Rumsfeld recommended not executing this mission but it was President Bush who overruled him because he said President Arroyo asked for support and he was not going to abandon an ally.
No one who participated in this operation called what was done the "Basilan Model". Someone outside of SF coined that term. To the SF who participated this was a fundamental SF mission and in fact was business as usual except for the fact that this time there was a lot of "help" from above and a lot of publicity - the forces were under a microscope and in a fish bowl. But what was executed was a basic SF operation with CA and PSYOP (now MISO) support as well as ISR and the great Marine Engineers and Navy SEABEES.
No one who participated in this operation was under any illusion that the US could solve the problems on Mindanao. They understood this was and remains a Philippine problem that has to be solved by Filipinos (at every level from local to national). Everyone understands the complexity of the multiple insurgencies, the current peace agreement with the MNLF, armistice agreement with the MILF and on again, off again peace negotiations, the issues of ancestral domain, the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, rogue elements of the MNLF, ridos, the Communists, and the fact that elections in the Philippines is a "contact sport," and the list could go on and on.
No one who planned or participated in this operation ever said there was a quick win here. And it is not about the US winning. It is about coming to the aid of an ally with the right support based on political considerations and the overriding consideration of Philippines sovereignty.
That said, it is easy to see why people might think there was an idea of a quick win. And in fact this operation would likely not have been executed had it not been for 9-11. The US probably would not have provided support had it not been for 9-11 but also President Arroyo probably would not have requested it either if it weren't for 9-11.
This was a basic Foreign Internal Defense mission (based on a strong foundation of Unconventional Warfare training and education) with US military and civilian agencies supporting an ally in its internal defense and development programs in order to defend itself against lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorism; to deny sanctuary, resources, and mobility to insurgent and terrorist organizations, to bring good governance to under-governed or ungoverned spaces and bring development activities to conflict affected areas to separate the population from insurgents and terrorists. This is a work in progress and these is still much work to be done by the Philippine government and its security forces.
But the bottom line is this is not a fight for the US in which to gain a quick win. This is a Philippines fight and it is a complex one. The US is supporting an ally at the ally's request. No one should be under any illusions that the complex problems of Mindanao can be solved by the military alone (Philippines or US) and they certainly cannot be solved without a lot of hard work, negotiation and compromise and unfortunately, time. But in the end only the Filipinos can solve the problems and every person participating in OEF-P should know that.
I don't think anyone would have proposed peace in Mindanao as a "quick win" objective, but a more limited set of objectives, such as freeing American hostages and eliminating or degrading a relatively small, geographically constrained "terrorist" group might easily be seen as having quick win potential. Operations in the Philippines have been consistently portrayed, in numerous rather glossed-over reports of success, as exactly that.
In reality, I doubt that we've "won" more than a hiatus: this conflict has been through cycles before. It is certainly true that US forces have been well received, but I think the extent to which this has translated to respect or support for the Philippine government or armed forces is being enormously exaggerated. I realize that much of what we do is "locally led" but I don't think there's a man, woman, or child on Basilan or Jolo who doesn't know exactly where the money and impetus are coming from, or who doesn't expect (for good reason) a return to the status quo ante as soon as we leave.
I realize that we have to say that our actions were initiated purely in support of a threatened ally, but there may have been a bit more to it than that. The article in the original post mentions that the US was urging a training mission as early as the Estrada administration, and goes on to say that "President Arroyo <i>agreed to allow</i> the U.S. military to deploy to the Philippines to advise and assist the Philippines Armed Forces". That's consistent with the widespread perception in the Philippines that President Arroyo's request for assistance was directly encouraged from the US side.
There were of course reasons why Arroyo would have wanted to make that request: it's well remembered in the Philippines how the "Communist threat" opened up the US coffers and produced US support for the personal ambitions of Ferdinand Marcos; Arroyo may well have thought that the "terrorist threat" could do the same for her.
I think we all agree that the core problems must be resolved on the Philippine side, but there seems a real reluctance to even mention many of those problems. We speak of building capacity, but we don't want to talk about how the ASG were fostered by direct connivance with military, police, and local government officials, including cuts of ransom payments and sales of arms. It's almost universally accepted that all of the insurgents, bandit groups, and private armed groups purchase their weapons and ammunition from the armed forces and police... but we don't talk about that. There's strong evidence that arms are being sold out of the same facilities where our troops train with local forces, but we don't mention that either. There's been no real change in local governance in these areas, and nobody is held accountable for the extravagant corruption that's an ordinary feature of day to day life, but we don't discuss that much either.
How do we expect a long-term resolution to come about while terrorists are buying guns and explosives out of government arsenals, government officials haggle for percentages of ransom payments, local officials treat the official budget as private property, and feudal rulers actively perpetuate a conflict that allows them to sustain their own positions and prerogtives? These are the problems that created the situation in the first place. They still prevail today, even if they aren't in the picture we try to paint.
I'm not saying we can solve these problems. We can't. We might, however, force them into the public eye and generate some momentum for resolution if we were a little more willing to admit that they exist.
The so called Basilan Model provided temporary positive effects on Basilan, but the reality is this approach really didn't differ much from successes achieved in Talafar and other locations in Iraq where the coalition surged forces and CMO efforts; with the exception that the host nation forces did the fighting on this small island because it was a FID mission the principle remains the same. I think we all understand the difference between FID (they do it, we assist) and we do it.
Ultimately it was a drawn out irregular battle that our side won. However the ASG are now returning, so once again we (really the PH government) failed to hold the hard earned gains. This is the nature of this type of war. You have to assess progress over time, so the Basilan Model that so many love to bragg about and see it as the template to address terrorism globally is a model that is not complete until we figure out how to implement the hold piece correctly.
"I'm not saying we can solve these problems. We can't. We might, however, force them into the public eye and generate some momentum for resolution if we were a little more willing to admit that they exist."
You mean instead of cheerleading and promoting the party line we actually tell the truth so real problems can be addressed by those who can actually solve them?
Excellent idea, but is it doable in our culture?
In some ways our Philippine experience illustrates a problem we've had, and continue to have, in many places. When we look at deficits in security and development, we tend to look for something that is missing that we can add: training and equipment for military forces, or development projects. We're much less adept at identifying the obstacles to security and development that need to be removed.
In the case of the Philippines the overwhelming obstacle to security and development is the exemption from the law enjoyed by the political/economic elite and the security forces. It's not a question of the government bringing the rebels within the rule of law, it's a question of the government bringing its own agents within the rule of law. Unless that is done, the most that can be accomplished is a cyclic reduction in violence.
All too often foreign assistance makes it easier for government to avoid confronting the real issues and the real needs.
There's an interesting case study on an extreme example of the way feudalism operates in Mindanao here:
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/94137/section/6
This is an example of what causes insurgency, and these problems can only be resolved if the government grows the balls to impose the rule of law on those who rule. There's no indication at all that this is happening, and aid projects or "capacity building" for military forces won't make it happen.
Neither we nor the multilateral aid agencies can force the Philippine government to act on this issue. We can, however, do a great deal to force the problem into public debate and to keep it there, if we stop pretending that the problem doesn't exist.
Sounds like you are calling for Julian Assange to expose things. You will probably be very interested in reading the cables from Embassy Manila when they come out because everything you have identified (and much more that you are unaware of but will become aware of when the cables are eventually released) has been identified and discussed and the US continues to pressure the Philippine government to make the necessary reforms. But your proposals will not help the situation in the Philippines and do not work in the real world. You of all people should understand that culture and history play a huge role in these things and just exposing things is not going to cause change overnight. But of course such exposure will damage relations and set back much of the work that has been done and makes things worse not better.
Anon:
You might be surprised at what I'm already aware of; there's no need to write it all here. Nothing Wikileaks has revealed so far is terribly surprising. Some items in the future might be. We'll see.
Quiet US pressure doesn't work. It's been going on a long time and it's pointless. Nothing happens. The Philippine government will only move when it feels the heat from its own people.
Wikileaks could actually be useful here. What if a diplomat or two wrote up some scathing reports on, say, arms sales by the military and police to insurgents and private armies, or collusion with terrorists... or asked why the US is funding aid projects in insurgent-affected areas while the Philippine government money that could pay for those same projects is being stolen by local officials... and made sure those documents ended up on Wikileaks? Sure, a lot of people would be pissed off and there would be an uproar, but a bit of uproar isn't always a bad thing. What do we contribute by participation in the conspiracy of silence?
Of course culture and history play a part and of course none of this will change overnight. That doesn't mean it can't change, and the impetus toward change will be accelerated if the core issues are in the public eye. All of these issues are already known to the populace and generating serious discontent; how does it hurt to keep that ball rolling and give it a little extra shove?
Relations might be strained, but maybe they need to be. The status quo has accomplished all it can accomplish and is going to backslide as soon as we leave anyway, maybe it's time to shake things up a bit. We can't solve the real problems - and we should be perfectly frank about that - but we don't have to pretend they aren't there.
I would be perfectly happy to see us announce plans to wind up operations in the Philippines with a public comment that we've done all we can and the real issues causing the conflict are not within our capacity to address. Of course that might set back work that's been done... but if that work requires our presence to continue, has it really been done at all? We're coming up on a decade of this; is it meant to be eternal?