Obama's Sunday TV Blitz

I believe there's a bit of interpretation being done in that Washington Post report. That wording seems to imply the President is saying "the military has to prove to me they know what they're doing or I'm not sending any more troops" - and I don't think anything the President said actually implies that, without a double twist and a squint.

Given subsequent reports he was probably speaking in full knowledge of the pending release by the Post of the McChrystal report. It's further likely the Post writer who put this together was also aware of that, and the many story angles that would result (Obama vs the military, for example).

(Schmedlap's comment, it's worth noting, came in that period between the two events.)

All that said, and with my sincere acknowledgment of (and admiration for) Ken's demonstrated ability to take things in stride (a model for us all), has anyone not had a few wtf moments this week?

The US Army and Marines will never be a 'COIN force.' We can do the mission barely adequately but we will never be 'good' at it. Americans do not have the temperament and patience for the job. Most Americans are mildly xenophobic and don't do other cultures at all well. A few do and they migrate to Special Forces where the COIN expertise should and does reside.

Further, in this era, we will likely never have the personnel strength required to effectively use COIN TTP in a mid size Nation. That is not to say that the GPF cannot do COIN like missions, they can and should be trained to do so -- but that application should be diligently avoided by better Intelligence, Diplomacy and application of FID/SFA with a small footprint and early on. We do the Small Wars well -- when we make them too large in the intervention mode for FID or SFA, we inevitably err. Badly.

That said, we do have strategic interests in Afghanistan. Those interests exist simply because the US is there and enticed others to join us. I agree with Jeremy Kotkin that the armed forces are not <i>directly</i> responsible for the current situation in Afghanistan. Indirect responsibility is another issue -- all irrelevant, really, we are there.

Many bemoan the fact that the Army is overly COIN centric. Many others complain that after eight years, COIN processes are not truly embedded. Still others complain that the civil-military coordination and joint effort required is lacking. Most of those folks are dreaming, on the military side for the reasons stated above. Still, the armed forces will go where ordered and will do their best and we can certainly be better trained and prepared in the future -- doesn't need to be COIN centric or MCO oriented; it just needs to <u>thoroughly</u> embed the basics of the trade.

The military-civil disconnect is due to the fact that most civilians do not want to be involved in such efforts -- that's one reason they're civilians. There are some that are willing, even eager to help but they too are unlikely to be available in adequate numbers for repetitions of effort on the scale of Afghanistan or Iraq.

All this was essentially known prior to our latest adventures. It probably was briefed upstream in several ways. All the advice that the proposed actions weren't totally wise was rejected by the Politicians. So the Army and the Marines went forth -- they had no option; orders are orders...

The Civilians don't have that obey the Boss imperative so their participation, heroic on the part of many of them, has never been adequate in total persons available for the many things that the Armed forces cannot do well or at all.

Add to all that our military and civilian personnel policies and rotation that destroys continuity and it is no wonder that we are not doing COIN in Afghanistan. My personal belief is that we do not have enough personnel to complete a pacification and rebuild effort there so we are confronted with a Theater Commander outlining his needs to accomplish the mission he was given. If those resources are not going to be provided, then the mission must change. That need not and should not in my view entail a rapid redeployment.

Jeremy Kotkin wrote:<blockquote>"That the military was, and still is used "whether or not there is any strategic interests in Afghanistan" is the crux of the matter and it always has been. The sooner we realize that, the sooner we can debate the real issues at hand, not how to perform better COIN or how to conduct a surge."</blockquote>I think most are totally aware of the crux he cites; that lacking a strategic reason to go to Afghanistan we did so anyway and the fact that we are now there and have attracted Allies there to support us presents a strategic reason if not an imperative to properly conduct operations to the extent we are capable and directed in order to achieve an acceptable outcome. Acceptable for us, NATO, other Allies there, Pakistan and Afghanistan. In that order...

As for "<i>performing better COIN..."</i> Unlikely. As I said, it is not the American way. We have never done that well using the en masse mode. A few units will do a superb job, most will do an adequate job but we have neither the psyches, the personnel strength, the need or the time and resources to get much better. I suspect those caveats also apply to any 'surge.'

Schmedlap: "Whether or not we have any strategic interests in Afghanistan, if the military cannot achieve them, then why keep them there? The burden is on the military to show that it can achieve them."

Excuse me, but WTF over? The military should achieve non existent strategic interests whether or not they even exist? Did I understand that correctly? And if they cannot then the *military* has failed??

The military nor its generals are responsible for the current situation....at the *grand strategic* level, in Afghanistan. The military is only the tool used as an extension of national policy. The military is currently trying to win in a situation into which they were placed for the ultimate desires of the national command authorities' overall strategy. That this strategy or policies are faulted or even failed is not because of the competence, lack of imagination, or wherewithall of the military or its leaders. Neither GENs Petreus nor McChrystal asked for the Army to be sent to Afghanistan; they are the ones trying to piece together an operation in lieu of any strategy from Foggy Bottom.

Any 'surge' or pop-centric COIN operation will not suffice for clearly articulated, Congressionally-bought off on, and taxpayer-approved strategy to defend national interests. *That the military was, and still is used "whether or not there is any strategic interests in Afghanistan" is the crux of the matter and it always has been.* The sooner we realize that, the sooner we can debate the real issues at hand, not how to perform better COIN or how to conduct a surge.

General McCrystal has outlined the way ahead in Afghanistan. Much like the surge in Iraq, more troops are necessary to stem the rise in Taliban and foreign fighters. It appears that domestic initiatives in the U.S. make the decision on sending more troops into Afghanistan an inconvenient development. Stability requires a long-term commitment in Afghanistan.

Actually, I was kind of hoping that Obama wouldn't use the military as a prosthetic for good foreign policy, vis-a-vis Central Asia.

How about a sound, civilian-generated, with military inputted strategy for a reason, with strong guidance to the military for their expectations?

Combined with a reenergization of the other elements of national power.

Sounds like Obama is setting up the military as a scapegoat, to me, to compensate for the fact that he doesn't have the slightes clue what to do.