A Fundamental Requirement for Military Leaders and why they should read Clausewitz
by MAJ Rob Thornton
September 11th, 2001 was a watershed event in that it was a vividly graphic demonstration of a war declared by a non-state actor on our domestic soil -- perhaps not since the British sacked Washington D.C. in the War of 1812 has a foreign entity extended its power across an ocean to threaten us here -- what made it all the more frightening was that they had obtained the means to attack us within the confines of our own country. The attacks of 9/11 had both a physical and a moral presence and altered the collective way in which we had considered the world before it occurred. It was the catalyst which changed the way Americans thought about securities and liberties, created organizations and legislations, created a stronger relationship between domestic and foreign policy and has led to our waging war in Afghanistan and Iraq, and on a much broader sense deployments world wide in the Global War on Terror. By most estimates the way we consider the world (and the way in which the world considers us) has changed permanently, and we may well be in a state of persistent conflict for decades to come -- a generational struggle as it has been called by some.
There is much the 19th Century Prussian military theorist and philosopher Carl Von Clausewitz can tell us about the objective nature of the war we are in -- which is to say that there are some things intrinsic to all wars. Clausewitz also has some things worth hearing on the subjective nature of war -- or that each war is different in some ways because at every level it is social and that it may mean different things to the people who wage it, and that their reasons for waging it may be different. That is important --particularly when the scope of the conflict is global in scope and indefinite in duration and because our political goals are broad and enduring. They are global because the people of the world and their interests are increasingly global, and they are enduring because we see preservation of our freedoms to interact globally as self-defining -- it is who we are. As Thucydides said, "we go to war for fear, honor and interests" -- the wars we fought yesterday, fight today and will fight tomorrow are no different -- in that regard they are waged by people and their political bodies within the same context as the Athenian General and Historian laid out almost 2500 years ago as he described the generational struggle between the two dominant city-states and their people of Hellenic world.
The demands on our military have been great, and increasingly those demands are extending to other branches of the government as we begin to understand the subjective nature of the broader context of this global war. Resources have been stretched and expanded to meet the requirements of waging war on a scale that we did not perceive prior to 9/11. Our ongoing quest for the best technologies to equip our forces with, the efforts to sustain them in remote and environmentally challenging places and the need to maintain the institutions which cross cut the DOTLMPF (Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Leadership, Material, Personnel & Facilities) spectrum in order to address the subjective nature of the wars we fight today in Iraq and Afghanistan, compete with the fears of being prepared for the subjective requirements of the threats on the horizon -- still vague and hard to define in some cases.
What have become increasingly clear are the increasing requirements on military leadership to take general purpose organizations originally designed for flexibility, but trained, manned and equipped to handle the most likely threats we viewed before 9/11 and adapt them to the subjective nature of the OIF, OEF, TF HOA, and a host of other humanitarian and world-wide commitments to which they were not optimally designed -- but will suffice. While we have had doctrinal descriptions of those types of missions in the past such as MOOTW (Missions and Operations other then War), SASO (Support and Stability Operations), LIC (Low Intensity Conflict), by and large our strategic cultural preference and emphasis was elsewhere. It was reflected in the acquisitions we made, the institutions we built, the doctrine we wrote, the training we conducted and the leaders we turned out. It was framed by our policy goals and our perspective on the way we would politically and militarily inter-act with the world. Even though there were some who perceived changes in the world, their arguments were not quantifiable or qualifiable enough to justify large scale organizational changes needed to optimally prepare for the future that eventually became the present.
Even today, with requirements for COIN (Counter Insurgency), UW (Unconventional Warfare) and other specialized SSTRO (Security, Stability, Transition, Reconstruction Operations) roles and missions being the basis of current operations, seemingly emphasizing the types of conditions and political environments described by the writings of Barnett, Friedman, Kaplan and others where globalization and instability have not only benefits but also adverse consequences; we must also contend with the possibility that nascent states might gain new conventional technologies and challenge our security at home, the security of the global commons and regional stability of our friends and allies. While this is not an essay about force structure design for the future, it is necessary to frame the problem of leadership development within controversies and conditions at hand -- as Clausewitz would point out -- and I'll paraphrase greatly to get to the heart of several chapters, "war is infinitely complex by nature of its being the product of human interaction, and despite our attempts to reduce it, the chaotic nature of war remains constant & defiant". Yes, the last sentence was full of contradictions, and that is what he was getting at.
Alan Beyerchen, a professor of History at the University of Ohio, wrote a piece for International Security (referenced on an end note) entitled "Clausewitz, Non-Linearity, and the Unpredictability of War". It is a piece that Army majors will recognize from ILE, and which was first given to me during the FA 59 (Functional Area for Plans and Policy) BSAP (Basic Strategic Arts Program) core class at the Army war College in Carlisle, PA. It is not easy reading -- no surprise since anything associated with Clausewitz is usually not -- but it is worth it. I was first introduced to Clausewitz as a CPT in conjunction with reading Antoine Henri de Jomini - the 19th Century Swiss military theorist and philosopher -- a contemporary and rival of Clausewitz. I was asked to compare the two and discuss "why", in an essay I was writing in pursuit of an online advanced degree. I was much more comfortable with Jomini's very rational and linear prescriptions -- it was recognizable, and fit better within the confines of my military experiences to that point.
My post command studies were interrupted by an OIF tasker to a MiTT where I was an embedded trainer with an Iraqi Infantry BN, and so changed my understanding of war. There are simply things which cannot be trained outside the context of it, and as has been observed by so many over time -- war is terrible, it is hell and it visits destruction unlike anything else. Consequently, my appreciation for Jomini greatly diminished as being too mechanistic (he did a good job describing the gears, but could not tell me how or why it worked), but my appreciation for Clausewitz is ever increasing. Clausewitz is hard to read because he commands you to think about what you are reading and place it within the context of your experience -- perhaps that is why I did not understand it before -- I simply lacked the commensurate experience to place it within the context required to make the leaps of understanding war that it offers.
Back to Beyerchen -- interpretation of Clausewitz rests on the premise that war is non-linear, or that in war sum of two parts will not necessarily equal the same thing within the changing contexts typified by the political environment that gives rise to war. Even if the means are the same, the outcome will be different; or put mathematically 2 + 2 will not always = 4. This is exactly the nature of war that I saw exhibited in Iraq, and that good leaders understand and carry out every day on the battlefield in applying the notion that what worked yesterday may not work tomorrow, and what worked in one place may not work in another -- it must be adapted. There are no constants because the forces at work are so subject to randomness that any two contacts, battles, campaigns, or wars will never play out the same. The leader might recognize similarities, and apply variations of the solutions that worked before, but to try and replicate the tactical, operational or strategic solution totally ignores the nature of war and is a gamble at best. We sometimes describe this as fighting the plan and not the fight, or ascribe it to leaders who ignore the reality of the situation at the peril of the mission and the unit they lead.
Within the Essay, Beyerchen uses the science of non-linear equations to explain the applicability of many of Clausewitz's better known, if misunderstood principles, and explain how the concept of non-linearity expresses itself in War. We often turn to History and marvel at the way an unforeseen event of seemingly small importance is explained to have some effect visibly out of proportion on its surface. A unit gets lost, comes out from an unexpected direction and at a time where other factors have influenced an enemy to the point where he abandons his position and breaks contact. The enemy's perception of real and unreal events forced a decision, that from our point of view, we may have seen as unreasonable. Consider how many times you may have driven past an IED ambush, but for whatever reason the enemy decided it was not the right time to execute that ambush. Consider the chance contact with AIF enroute to some other location that was quickly exploited while the non-linear forces acting upon the enemy were greatest, and resulted in destroying a large cell or seizing a large cache. It is the insticntive feel for knowing that there was more to it then just two Opals and a Bongo truck traveling in just a certain way that intuitively separated them from the thousands of other Opals and Bongo trucks in close proximity. Beyerchen makes relative the concept of fog, friction and chance by placing them in the chaotic environment of war as it exists in living, breathing, inter-active life vs. scripted, limited and designed events subject to artificial constraints.
So by now you may be asking what is the impact on leadership -- after all we have the traits of innovation and adaptive to guide us, and we have a fantastic OER bullet of "pentalthlete" to describe it on our report cards. Beyerchen has a quote in his essay (pg. 88) I think we should consider in our leadership development programs:
One implication is that full comprehension of the works of Clausewitz demands that we retrain our intuition. For historians, who have often been attracted rather then repelled by the subtleties of "On War", this may not be too unsettling of a task. But for those trained in the engineering and scientific fields, as are so many military officers and analysts, this retraining is likely to be a more wrenching and unwelcome experience. As the various scientists and mathematicians cited above (ed. within Beyerchen's essay) have suggested, the predominance of a linear intuition is endemic. Such an intuition guides value judgments and choices, with real world consequences.
With the range of military operations being so diverse while the means to accomplish political objectives remains relatively established with regard to those policies, the value of leadership is the only way to make up the difference. Leadership is the element of combat power that allows us to work within our limitations of organizational flexibility and the rest of the DOTLMPF to achieve the missions given to us. It is also the element we have the most control over in terms of shaping and preparing for the objective and subjective nature of war. While we do produce doctrine to frame problems, we should not appeal to it as a prescriptive solution, but rather as a descriptive outline. War is non-linear, it is full of contradictions and conditions which sometimes masquerade as problems and have no concrete final solutions, but instead offer only a slew of choices of which the best one must be constantly applied, evaluated and altered to meet a dynamic enemy subject to the same forces of war, but who perhaps interprets them differently to produce unforeseen actions, reactions, counter-actions. It is our leadership ability which will determine who best understands the conditions at the moment and near future, makes the best choice available and seizes the initiative to deny the enemy freedom of action. From my personal experience, I believe Clausewitz's description and contemplation of war has great depth and utility across the full spectrum of war and range of military operation. If they send a soldier to do it, then it stands to reason the potential for violence which requires armed force to counter it exists, and that the chaotic nature of war will require leaders to utilize non-linear intuition to make better decisions.
So What?
Is Clausewitz's fog, friction and chance, and Beyerchen's non-linearity applicable outside of pure combat, and therefore relevant to the other complex tasks asked of leaders today and tomorrow? Lets consider another area where social inter-action, or what Dave Matthews referred to as "The Space Between" is subject to non-linear influences. Army leaders have said one facet of the total person they want to produce in officers and NCOs is the "strategic communicator -- for most of us that sounds like a good thing -- so sign us up -- now what? On the service it is about a opaque as the term "Public Diplomacy" -- which I "think" means that we are trying to articulate our policy goals in a public way so that they are transparent to not only the governments with which we interact, but with the populations of those governments. I like that definition because it potentially acknowledges the complex environment in which communications takes place, and the ever-increasing number of forces which shape and alter messages and discourses surrounding new information.
Communications requires a sender, a message and a recipient at a minimum. Is it a good idea to assume that "message sent, message received" when the same message is addressed on multiple levels to a diverse, global audience where levels of culture, sub-culture, counter-culture etc. naturally filter, pervert and block messages? How about the interactivity between themes or narratives with other complex environments or systems? Even if a message were so clearly articulated that it were communicated well to the target audiences to the point they all heard the same thing at the same time, the other social systems within their environments would soon alter that message -- social systems are interactive by design and as such can't be stable from one moment to the next -- only more stable or less stable.
This is one reason it is so difficult to match our actions on the ground, or behind the doors where politics, business and other social actions are negotiated -- while the message communicated at a given time remains recorded and frozen for others to bring forward at will and scrutinize against our actions which are constantly under the unstable forces at work in the interactive spaces. The non-linearity of social activity between people defies attempts to perfectly arrange events that are frozen in time -- like a speech, or a testimony with events that are in a consistent state of flux such as relations between people, and their cultures, organizations, states, etc. This is nothing new, but it's a question of managing expectations and navigating the effects of non-linearity. So if you can't engineer a linear solution that is resistant to the effects of constant interaction, can you mitigate the effects?
It should not be surprising that we seek to "linearize" the future (in both the immediate and long range sense) given the appearance of linearization in historical events. For many, history (and other social sciences) often appears deterministic -- as if its various cause and effect relationships can be readily traced by working backwards- but is this true? How much of history is contingent upon nuances and events that go unrecorded because the context of their significance was never weighted accordingly, went largely unnoticed or was discounted as a non-factor given some bias present in personal accounts. While historical methodology goes to great pains to exclude bias it can only account for events which eventually make themselves evident so that the historian can account for them. That is the problem of considering complex social relationships absent the real-time context in which they took place -- they become somewhat isolated from their social setting.
By seeing History through a deterministic lens we often establish expectations for linear outcomes and ignore the complex environment which shapes the outcomes. For those familiar with 15-6 investigations -- we wind up looking for determinant causes of the incident under investigation. By doing this we try and establish a chain of responsibility and identify where the chain was broken. While we are often able to exclude those things not of direct consequence to get to the breakdown, we also take the breakdown out of the environment where it occurred to some degree. When we apply this same methodology to future events subject to context that has not even occurred yet, we risk isolating the event only to be viewed as we first envisioned it. The further in the future and the more complex the environment in which it will occur -- the greater the probability its character will be vastly altered from the way we imagined it would be.
So if we can't arrange complex events to guarantee a future outcome -- what can we do? We can start by acknowledging the requirements of a complex environment, and emphasizing what seems to come natural in some in order to spread those qualities to the extent possible to the broader leader population.
How do we do it?
So how might we equip leaders with the capability of non-linear intuition -- and what is it anyway? Non-linear intuition is, as many have said, about making leaders more adaptive and agile, but to the purpose of taking advantage of the environment as it unfolds and putting the enemy to a disadvantage or putting friendly efforts to greater advantage. So, how might we send people to complex operational environments already comfortable operating in "uncomfortable"? How do we cultivate non-linear intuition within our formations? Can we apply non-linear intuition to the many "other then military" tasks that confront military leaders on yesterday's, today's and tomorrow's battlefields?
While this essay is not about advisory duty, it is the perspective I'll need to use it to talk about complex environments and how it changed the way I thought -- others doing different jobs I war, may have had like experiences. It is also timely given the current increase in advisors, the debates about future Army force structure and the ways in which we might approach the security challenges of tomorrow. While many of my experiences in command and staff positions, and traits like confidence and courage fostered by military service did help me adapt and overcome some of the problems with operating as a small team with indigenous forces, there were many things that were unfamiliar and complex in ways beyond my experiences to date. I had to influence several layers of Iraqi command structure (in some cases the range went from below the battalion to which we were advising to Iraqi MOD levels), our own MiTT levels, our Coalition Force partner unit at various levels as well as learning where we might have indirect influence that would benefit the mission such as the local PRT and local business men, muktars and sheiks. On any given day I'd touch some or all of those at various levels -- and they all would often want different information, have different requirements or possibly be working counter to some or all of the rest -- I was hip deep in trying to create a common operating picture, explain motivations, and synchronize efforts. Some of this I was conscious of, and some I was not -- I suspect that some or all of the others were just as involved with either the same group, or parts of the same group.
It was a highly ambiguous environment where I did not really own any resources, had very little (if any) authority to directly arrange things, and one in which measuring progress toward goals was subjective, and hard to articulate to all involved. It was uncomfortable and hard to get used to at times because not only were others working on their own timelines, but because my other experiences as an Infantry officer to that point were largely objective -- it was as though the subjectivity normally only associated with my personal life (you know, marriage, kids and other complex relationships) had suddenly taken over my professional life. I had been raised to look at everything as a tactical problem that had an obvious and immediate solution which could be engaged and put to bed so I could move on to the next objective. This was very different -- I might spend months working on what was by outward appearance a very inconsequential thing, but which my gut told me had much broader and reaching consequences. Often I went to sleep wondering what if anything I had accomplished that day. It was unsettling to a professional soldier who had largely trained and operated in the physical world where buildings and hills, or elements of an enemy force were the measures by which I graded my efforts. It was not until I could consider the whole tour from a very macro perspective that I got any real satisfaction from what we'd accomplished.
Recently in an interview with Inside Defense, LTG Caldwell talked about an Army learning culture that was built on teaching "how" and not "what" to think. I think there may be a need to take what we do in the classroom of our PME and create opportunities for, and foster a culture of looking toward opportunities where we can be uncomfortable -- situations that provide the opportunities for the application of non-linear intuition to solve problems and reward risk takers. Advisory duty with indigenous forces, Inter-Agency Stints, duty on the Hill, perhaps even working at the state and local levels with civilians and public officials are good ways to place our leaders in uncomfortable situations that help them temper our A type personalities and tendencies prevalent in our culture of "series of Branch Qualifying jobs & stepping stones to the next echelon of command".
There is a linkage I believe between learning to be comfortable in the "uncomfortable" and developing non-linear intuition, ultimately however what a leader learns from an experience is up to him or her. The institution can provide the education, the opportunity and can even foster cultural flexibility by being tolerant of risk and encouraging diversity by reflecting it in its reward system (promotions and assignments), but ultimately this is an individual choice. If a leader believes they are an A type personality and that they can never be comfortable in a non-linear environment, then they probably never will be.
Now I realize that by today's academic standards I may not have applied adequate scientific rigor in coming to my own conclusions about non-linear behavior in complex social relationships and interactions. However, for me it is about reflecting on my own experiences so that in light of new perspectives gained from others considering similar experiences, I might better understand my own and gain insights that help me meet new challenges and responsibilities in the future. Clausewitz did a great deal of thinking about war that go well beyond examining it in the Napoleonic context, his insights into the nature of war as a social phenomena, as an extension of political behavior and that enduring objective qualities as well as those subjective qualities that are derived from the locations in which war originates hold the type of value that can not be digested in one setting and can be read and reread time and again to gain new insights.
Works cited include:
Byerchen, Alan, "Clausewitz, Non-Linearity, and the Unpredictability of War, International Security, VOL. 17, No. 3 (Winter, 1992-1993), pgs 59-60
Victor David Hanson and Robert B Strassler editors of The Landmark Thucydides; a comprehensive guide to the Peloponnesian War; Touchstone Books, NY NY 1998
Carl Von Clausewitz, ON WAR, ed. and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret; Princeton Univ Press, Princeton NJ,1976
COIN Seminar with DR David Kilcullen at MCB Quantico, VA. On 26 SEP 07.
Comments
Well, I agree with you…
Well, I agree with you. Besides, intuition helps me quite a lot in life. Not so long ago I started to feel that I was being followed. There was absolutely no reason for it, but I really felt it. After a while it turned out that my ex-wife (herself or with someone else's help) had hacked into my messengers and was reading them all. Can you imagine? I started to find out more about it and it turned out that there are a huge number of apps that provide this surveillance. Just read this: https://celltrackingapps.com/how-to-track-an-iphone/ It's unbelievable! What a world we live in...
Rob,
My apologies, to my bemusement I seem to be turning into that quintessential absent-minded prof. Two electonic pieces that discuss the Traders Game are on their way to you.
One of the pieces states "Each day, exchange traders fight an information war where decisions based on digital data, experience, and intuition define the "battlefield." This pretty much captures the essence of why the Marines engaged with the traders as part of an effort to think hard about decision making on future battlefields (and the consensual view within the Corps of the future battlefield in 95-96 bears a more than striking resemblance to what American and other military personnel face in many parts of the world today).
Also, a mea culpa to all for a mistake - I said the Traders Game was one day, but in fact it was a two day exercise. The first day was, as I said, Marines shadowing traders on the floor of the NYSE (followed by a simulation in which the Marines doing the trading) but there was a second day where the traders participated in a computer generated wargame in which the the Marine officers and traders together 'prioritized calls for fire in a high tempo environment featuring changing information and severe time constraints.'
Terry,
Thanks for the link - a good read - any one else wishing to read it:
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/virtual_stress.htm
While the article discusses processing targeting data from the military perspective and stock selection from the trader perspective - it is still about processing lots of information, determining which information is important, and making timely decisions.
The determining of which information is relevant and placing it within the context of the situation both at hand and in the immediate future is what interests me most.
Once a decision is made - a reflex assessment is done to determine the importance of that action based on its impact on situation. It is a value judgment. In one of its simpler forms it might be adjusting rifle aim to account for down range wind on an uphill moving target. In another, it might be understanding what the enemy is attempting to do & how he might go about it, and then issuing a FRAGO that changes your operations so you steal the initiative and disrupt his operations. You then go on to make subsequent decisions - such as adjust your aim again and re-engage, or transition to other operations requiring attention.
I used to joke with company leadership that as Commander I sometimes felt like chief plate spinner (you ever see the guy spinning plates on sticks) when we did distributed ops (I had a SBCT rifle company back in 2002/2003 and we were prepping for the IOT&E) - I had sections and platoons all over the place as the Army wanted to figure out how much we could get out of the organization in terms of sustainable troop to task by providing CO CDRs with organic combined arms, lots of soldiers (about 170), a suite of C4ISR gear and good improvements (for a former light BN) in mobility, firepower and protection - they had us all over the place in time and space. I had to decentralize through mission type orders where possible (some leaders and some missions require more guidance then others), and use the tools available to synchronize my companys actions. I came to the conclusion I had to strike a balance between thinking, communicating and doing - sometimes it was more of one then another - but it was always a decision to be made about where I needed to be and where I needed to focus - which plate needs spinning now and which one will need it most in a minute - do I need to take some plates down and do I need to put some new ones up - it never stops.
As an anecdote of when things go right
- One evening I got to talking with a PL from the IN BN operating in Mosul toward the end of my tour there - his patrol had been out the previous day and got hit by an IED (no casualties) - one of his squad leaders noticed a building that sat back in a key hole position with limited observation of the intersection where the IED had been placed - the SL had a gut feeling that the patrol should check the building out - they did and found what looked like an OP, but nothing else - the decision was then made to check an adjacent building - and they found the mother load of IED materials - the SLs intuition and the trust of the PL to follow it made all the difference - sharp PL, sharp SL and sharp platoon - and not coincidentally sharp company and sharp BN - the atmosphere within the BN was one of adaptation and innovation.
In this situation the patrol made an intuitive decision based off of pieces of information that were not directly self-evident - they made a leap. Also this was not a full up platoon at the time - I think he was operating in 3 x 1114s with about 15 guys (his PSG had the other section) - some of which had to stay back with the vehicles while those who dismounted crossed over some obstacles and checked out the building further back - so your probably talking about 7-8 guys (including the lieutenant) - less then a full squad who go into two multi-story buildings that the vehicles cannot get to without going the long way around - so their support and comms were challenged - a decision based off what their gut told them they should do.
I cant say for sure, but Im betting that somewhere along the way the lieutenant went through the process of weighing the information - theyd just been hit by an IED - but no small arms and RPG ambush followed - and life was returning to the intersection - so the PL decided that he had some time to check things out before the enemy could take advantage of any actions he took to investigate the buildings - in the mean time hed have his RTO call back to the company - and see what other patrols were near by, and also check if there were some KWs (Kiowa Warriors) up and available - hed also have the RTO ask the CO HQs or the BN Battle CPT to tell the local ISF forces that he was there and could they provide some forces - he probably did all of this in about 30 seconds or less.
The enemy had also gone through a decision making process - nobody had probably ever checked out that building before - given its location and limited view - it just did not look obvious. As such hed decided to place all of his re-seed materials in a locked room on an adjacent building so to minimize his work and chance of getting caught transporting materials - he just never figured that somebody would be look up there and say - " we should check that out - its worth it".
The non-linearity piece - a SL gets a hunch that disrupts a major IED site and takes well over a 1000lbs of explosive out of the fight all based on intuition.
Best regards, Rob
<b>Walrus,</b> Thanks for the response.
We can indeed agree to disagree on luck and non-linear behavior. I've seen too many incidents and situations wherein an impending defeat or even minor disaster was turned around by calm, decisive action. My point was simply that while luck certainly exists, successful commanders and units minimize quite significantly its occurrences and impact.
I understand the concept of framing and also understand its political uses. I do not disagree with what you say on the topic and acknowledge that context is the issue. Though I will suggest that in the scenario you use, the 90+% probability is that 'my' take is most likely. :)
Percentages and probabilities are pretty important in planning...
Nor do I dispute the relative success in the clearly defined -- and stated -- Desert Storm operation versus the current imbroglio (that did not need to happen but that's another subject) that has been not clearly determined or stated by our political masters.
I'd also suggest that against a more competent opponent or had we extended the operation to change the government of Iraq, a lot of that clarity would have rapidly disappeared. That such things did not happen was not luck in any aspect, it was a calculated decision on the part of the then Administration.
<i><b>Any</b></i> COIN operation is going to be tedious, dirty, lengthy and ambiguous if compared to a more or less conventional combat effort, thus a lack of certainty is inevitable. that said, I have long railed about that lack of clarity and the use of misleading terms like 'winning' and 'losing' by this Administration. There is no question they've done a poor job in making their case and on the information effort in totality.
However, having partied in a couple of other 'uncertain' efforts, I do <i>not</i> think it's a huge burden on the troops. It will be for the weak or very sensitive, for most it will be of little impact. Unfairness is a part of life. Uncertainty goes with the job...
That's what makes it fun.
Ken, thank you for your comments.
I'll agree to disagree about luck and non linear behaviour because my extremely limited military experience suggests that the simplest explanations for a lot of events are just simply "luck" and no higher theory needs to be advanced, but I guess if one comes along that explains things, so be it.
"Framing" is, as you correctly point out, "spin", but everything we do or say in life is "spun" one way or the other. "Spin" is the context through which we view events.
"Spinning" is about trying to change contexts. It is important from a leaders perspective to ensure that the "spin: is somewhere near the truth, otherwise realities get altered and accidents happen.
For example, we both see a little girl being dragged screaming into a car. I see a child molester catching fresh prey and accordingly shoot. You see an angry Father dealing with a daughter's temper tantrum. Thats the context I am using when I discuss framing.
Look at the Iraqi context and you can see how one unit's context is helping Iraqi's rebuild their lives, while another units context (for example only) is about kicking AL Qaeeda backside. Framing will make the actions of both units quite different even if they operate side by side.
My comment of Gulf War One as a "success" is meant in the context of the challenge that was given to the armed forces.
There was a clear objective - the liberation of Kuwait.
There were clear reasons buttressing the objective - Kuwait had been invaded by an aggressor.
The reasons resonated with the American psyche as just and right, which translated into support.
The Army responded to a clear objective, backed and supported by reasoned argument in a superlative manner.
That is what I mean by "success", no heart searching, backbiting, spinning about why we did what we did.
We were given the job and it was done, no ifs no buts.
Compare that to the current situation where the pundits are still arguing what "success" means.
It is this uncertainty that is unfair to burden soldiers with.
Ken,
Good point about making your own luck - lots of guys eating chicken salad vs. the other variety by virtue of their quick wits and stones alone. I've seen a few leaders who could turn something that looked like it was headed South in a hurry into a real opportunity - they just refused to let the circumstances they found themselves in determine the outcome - self confidence and personal courage.
Terry,
Thanks for your comments - I know we've discussed some of them before - but I never heard you say anthying about the NYSE - while not combat, there is an awful lot of competing events and consequences to consider in their decision making - if you have anything on that please send me a copy.
Best Regards, Rob
<b>Walrus</b> makes some good points -- and some perhaps less good...
The good first.
He's absolutely correct on the meta message aspect. Occupying Saddam's palaces was dumber than dirt, literally. Building FOBs in old Republican Guard Compounds was equally poor; goes on down to the sunglasses and the full rattle foot patrols. I'm more than conversant with force protection issues and I acknowledge the added risk and possible increase in casualties by going out sans the glasses and armor but it's been done before in worse environments. I realize that many have been there and I have not and also realize force protection is a much bigger deal than in my day. Come to think of it, I'm not sure it was any kind of deal in my day...
The Palaces should be obvious and non argumentative.
There are many other meta messages that Walrus didn't mention. Not least the vastly oversized Embassy, the IMO excessive emphasis on force protection; the excessive involvement of the legal community in all decisions and our long standing tendency to micro manage for just a few.
His comments on uncertainty are also good.
I strongly disagree with his suggestion to rename <i>""Non Linear Conflict" and "Non Linear Intuition" as what they truly are - Chance and Luck. Live with it."</i>
While chance and or luck may be the same thing and whatever it is is always prevalent; the effect can be radically minimized in combat if one simply knows what one is doing and out thinks the opponent; thus luck can be relegated to the bumper sticker "Luck is finding an open parking space." That approach smack to me of the ME variant, "Insh'Allah," 'as God wills'...
Most good commanders make their own luck. Thus the "live with it' advice applies IMO only if one wishes to do so.
I suggest for most military purposes, 'framing' can be viewed as spin -- not meant to be pejorative, just aiming for accuracy in terminology.
Lastly and off topic, Gulf War I was not, in my view, a resounding success. It was a success but the adjective seems inappropriate. It was always going to be easy -- It occurred before I retired and several of us had a pool on the length of time that it would take once we launched any air or ground action. The LTC that won had 30 days; the next closest guy had 60 days. I say the adjective seems inappropriate because, IMO, it was halted instead of proceeding to Baghdad (let me save some flame; no, the Arab states would not have gone with us; Yes, they would have protested volubly -- in public, in private they would have acquiesced, they too wanted Saddam gone; Yes it would have been hard -- but probably less hard than it was 12 years later). YMMV.
Hi Walrus,
I appreciate the advice and the reading recommendations - seems my reading list gets longer and my stock in Amazon.com goes right along with it. I certainly appreciate and agree with much of what you said - somewhere along the line I think I failed to articulate or consider the points you made. I do indeed take comfort in, and hope that I am not the last to consider the complexity of war. It is all of our business, and you cant learn what you dont know unless you start asking the right questions - choice of terms is just a means of expression.
As for luck - well an old boss once told me "there are plenty of smart guys who are dead, but not many lucky ones" - then he said, "but the harder you work at getting smart, the luckier you will get". I think there is something to that. Trying to figure out a way to express how a leader makes the best of luck and chance is what I was trying to get at. Fog, friction, chance are prevalent on the battlefield - but what is not always present is the self-confidence and courage to exploit or mitigate them. I like Beyerchens description of non-linear intuition, as I do anything that helps me consider something in a different light so I that better understand it is worth the effort.
There has been several times where Ive been lucky and favored by chance to have the means at my disposal to capitalize on it, and a few times where Ive just been lucky - Ill take what I can get.
Thanks on all accounts. Ill eventually let you know what I got out of reading Berlin
Best Regards, Rob
Maj. Thornton, I'd like to make a couple of comments, not in any order, and I also have some advice that you might like to think about.
You are not the first nor the last to try and make sense out of conflict, and you should be comforted by this fact.
Let me start by renaming your "Non Linear Conflict" and "Non Linear Intuition" as what they truly are - Chance and Luck. Live with it. It will never go away and I don't believe you can train someone to be "Lucky" except to the extent that are well educated, intelligent and properly trained.
I would also like to suggest that the concept of "strategic communication" is far more complex than the simple subject - message- recipient model and I understand your frustration at attempting to make the chaos understandable through some semblance of order. I would like to suggest that you study the following.
For a start, there is the concept of the "Meta Message" - the "message you send when you don't think you are sending a message". Classic examples: What was the meta message sent to the Iraqi people when American troops and officers moved into Saadam Hussiens palaces in Baghdad?
What is the meta message sent by a soldier talking to an Iraqi while wearing Oakley wrap around sunglasses?
What messages are we constantly sending to troops and the public when we don't think we are sending messages?
Then there are the concepts of "framing", "Nominatives" and so much more.
In terms of leadership, one of the management theories that I think is highly applicable is the concept that the art of management or leaders is the reduction of uncertainty for those they lead - providing a framework within which their jobs are understandable, make sense and have a context that makes sense.
The role of the leader is to deal with uncertainty by accepting it himself, creating this stable environment for his followers, and so it goes on up the management chain of command. Trouble, and bad leadership, comes from a leaders inability to do this task - allowing uncertainty to cascade down the chain.
This, to my simple mind explains why Gulf War One was a resounding success - minimised uncertainty (read Shwartzkopf's autobiography thinking about uncertainty). On the other hand this concept neatly and totally explains our current predicament in Iraq - poor leadership and maximum uncertainty from the very top. No Generals or Admirals, no matter how gifted, can prevent this cascade of uncertainty from affecting the entire service - hence I think, the reason you are writing this essay.
Finally the advice.
Please find, buy, beg, borrow, or steal anything written by Isiah Berlin and start reading everything he wrote - his field was the History of Ideas.
My suggestion is to find a copy of his "Personal Impressions" and read Berlins essay on Winston Churchill as the best introduction I can give you. If you aren't impressed, and find vast quantities of mental sustenance and solace, then I will be disappointed.
Berlin's messages are that nothing is new. Nothing changed on 911 despite what people would have you believe. Your predicament is not new. Nor is the hype and vapid stupidity addressed at the predicament.
Please also learn about neurolinguistics - the study of communications, and absorb its messages. I know a lot of it is flaky, and its inventors were not nice people, but if you do, I assure you that you will never listen to a political speech the same way again and its core concepts of the meta message, framing and so on will make your life and communications a lot easier, both inside the Army and in personal life.
Steve was spot on when he said,
'Think back to the early days of Commandant Gray's MCDP 1-series publications, and the 1997 revisions. These were intended to teach Marines how to THINK about war. Clausewitz was sprinkled throughout all three main works...,
MCDP-1 both in the 1989 and the 1997 version certainly are infused by Clausewitz (though also with Sun Tzu and John Boyd, among others) and Warfighting' is a philosophy, or way to think about, of warfare. But interesting with respect to Major Thorntons think piece is that the rewriting of the 1997 version was in part informed by 'Chaos Theory or 'nonlinearity. Marines were sent out to the Santa Fe Institute, NM, which is the main intellecutal home of 'chaos theory to talk to the mathematicians and whatnot based in the institute about 'nonlinearity or 'chaos. What was learned was then thought about and ultimately applied in the rewriting of MCDP-1. John Schmitt who wrote the 1989 version also did the rewrite in 1997, and somewhere in the files stored in the Archives of the Gen. Gray Research Center (Quantico) is a paper by Schmitt on Chaos Theory (cant remember where exactly, though I think it is in Lt. Gen. Paul van Ripers papers, but if anyone is interested, PM me as I can check my own files to find out exactly where).
The term used in the 1997 version is 'complexity, as for obvious reasons they did not want to use the term 'chaos (the term maneuver warfare is misleading enough). Moreover, a short publication, 'Maneuver Warfare Science 1998, was subsequently issued that furnished an 'introductory look at various aspects of the military applications of nonlinearity for Marines. In terms of maneuver warfare, perhaps the main point was stated at the beginning of the Forward: 'A maneuver warrior is one who exploits the fact that warfare is nonlinear.
This short monograph consists of nine pieces, one which may be of interest with respect to Maj. Thorntons think piece, titled 'Nonlinear Decisionmaking and "Sea Dragon" For those of you who are not Marines, 'Sea Dragon was the term used for the series of Advanced Warfighting Experiments conducted by the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, with the two most notable AWEs being Hunter Warrior (1996) and Urban Warrior (1999).
I note this as one of the little experiments conducted by the MCWL was what they called the 'Traders Game(first half of 1996, I think), in which a number of senior Marine Officers shadowed 'stock traders for a day to see how they managed the 'chaos of the NYSE trading floor. In essence, what the Traders Game was about was intuitive decision making. As the above suggests, intuitive decision making was seen as being very important in terms of the advanced warfighting experiments as maneuver warfare, and hence, as has been argued already, is relevant to whatever form of warfare one is engaged in as all forms of warfare are nonlinear, not least as the opponent or enemy may behave in a nonlinear fashion (as humans tend to do).
Another example of intutive decision making, which many of the SMC may have already read, is Malcolm Gladwells 'Blink: The Power of Thinking without Thinking (Allen Lane, 2005). Gladwell examines a number of cases but one that will be of particular interest to this community focus on LtGen Paul van Riper, with a particular emphasis on his decision making as the Red OPFOR commander in the well known 'Millennium Challenge exercise of 2002.
I am not sure whether the 1998 monograph can still be obtained, but the full citation is F.G. Hoffman and Gary Horne, eds, Maneuver Warfare Science 1998 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1998). In passing, Gen. Charles Krulak, in his preface to this little volume, termed nonlinear science as 'revolutionary'.
And lest I be accused of priviledging the Marine Corps, another work for those inclined to pursue the topic is Maj. Glenn E. James USAF, Chaos Theory: The Essentials for Military Applications, Newport Paper 10 (Naval War College, 1996).
TT
'
I'd really like to say thanks up front for all the folks who have signed on to think about and discuss Leadership in war here - it is my opinion that it is the most important commodity on the battlefield and its development and encouragement begins here at home, but should be shaped wherever it can be reached.
We can and must do everything we can to ensure our leaders have every advantage we can provide them with both for the sake of the men and women they lead and for the sake of the mission and our national interests which they defend. This is, as Steve noted, a "full spectrum of conflict" requirement - from COIN to MTW - the complex environment of war requires unconstrained thinking and the willingness to act.
I was thinking about the terms "revolution" and "evolution" today and what that means to us. Given the non-linear environment of war and social activities it is impossible to forecast with certainty the future, and to fully anticipate its requirements - so revolutionize may not only be hard, it might be a gamble - this could be why we really evolutionize.
So how do you evolutionize better then your enemy? Part of this is through the institutions which effectively articulate and communicate lessons available and then apply them across the DOTLMPF spectrum. What does it take to operationalize a concept? We have to identify the means required and communicate the vision or way ahead. Part of this must come from our evaluating and re-evaluating the requirements of war as it is, and as it evolves. We must also consider the objectives set forth in policy so we can establish the strategic framework in which the organizations and institutions can co-evolve - so we can adapt and innovate at the tactical levels.
While the dead Prussian may not have spelled it out like that - he does provide us the intellectual and philosophical framework with which to consider the problems we find in War - to that I greatly appreciate his emphasis on the description of the objective nature of war with the full acknowledgement that there is a subjective nature of war based on the societies and purposes to which it is waged. It is a broad and complex set of descriptions and wisely abstains from offering prescriptions that report to guarantee success.
Again - I greatly appreciate the time spent reading and responding - this is one of those flat organizations where I can access the thoughts from past, present and future. It is a community that serves us all very well.
Best Regards, Rob
<b>Phillip</b> raises a valid question and I think there is -- as Gian has suggested -- some fear that could happen. My own experience is that it's a mixed bag. Most people do not have the intuitive grasp of combat that is required to be successful commanders but there are plenty that do. Yet, some of those can do the conventional thing very well and do not adapt to the COIN arena. Others do well at the COIN process but aren't so good at conventional combat. Both those varieties are also echelon dependent. I have seen good Company Commanders do less well at Battalion and have also seen only fair Battalion commanders excel at Brigade and Division level [Corps can be echelons above reality... :) ]. I have seen only a very few do well at all levels in any type of warfare.
While I strongly believe that a selection process that indicates who is likely to possess the intuitive capability is not only desirable but imperative, I fully acknowledge that in a major war, that luxury will be difficult to obtain simply due to the fact that the numbers required will not support the process. Thus, a meld of better tuning our education and training is as important as a more responsive selection process. Both need to be pursued.
Another factor that impacts such processes is the adoption in the education and training process at all levels of a sustained effort to negate the effects of parochialism. We need to be a full spectrum force without question and we will not have the luxury of dedicated forces for specific types of combat. Everyone must be capable of making the tactical and thought shifts required. We are already seeing many light infantry units doing things that were considered the purview of the Ranger Battalions. We need both SOF and conventional forces and they must work together. They do today -- but it isn't always a happy marriage. That's wasteful and too many tend to get entirely too parochial. I submit that factor is also both innate and thus selection oriented as well as being environmentally addressable in the institution.
Ken,
I tend to agree that at least a certain amount of non-linear, intuitive thinking is an innate ability. I've seen many folks who were simply big guns in very linear activities but just couldn't "get" the flow of history in the non-linear sense. Not everyone is going to be able to open that toolkit...just like most toolkits that involve humans.
Phillip,
I'm not so sure that Rob's essay is arguing that this approach does NOT work in conventional warfare. I took it more as him using his recent COIN experiences to illustrate his own learning curve and explain where his thoughts came from on the subject. Frankly, I think that the toolkit to develop the intuition Rob's talking about is applicable to most situations we'll face. Notice that I said the toolkit, not necessarily the current situation or even some of the tools. To borrow the old phrase, "a good craftsman knows his tools," and more to the point will be able to recognize which tools are best suited for the job at hand.
This sort of thinking, as Ken points out, isn't for everyone; and not everyone will be able to adapt. This is normal, and has been the case for the entire history of warfare. What has changed the most is the time factor. The Boydian OODA loop has gotten shorter and shorter, making the consequences of failing to adapt much more immediately obvious than they perhaps have been in the past. The key here is for those who "get it" to develop the ability to explain "it" in small chunks to those who don't "get it," and to do so in such a way that the lessons don't become the system and create another mechanistic parrot system. We should be looking to think "outside the box" (to haul out yet another annoying business-speak term), not to build yet another box to hide inside.
Excellent essay.
Re: the discussion comments above, I'm inclined to agree with <b>Steve</b>; knowledge of <i>On War</i> is probably presumed. While presumptions can be dangerous, thats one is probably fairly safe.
<b>Blue</b> makes valid points but I suggest the ability to operate outside linearity and to use intuition -- particularly in combat -- is more innate than it is able to be learned. We have tried for years to 'teach' intuitive reaction in combat with little success. Simply, some have the ability and some do not.
Thus I believe that some selection is as much a requirement as is tuning the education and training systems. That flies against the (nominally) meritocratic processes we use today in personnel management and thus will be a difficult sell. The issue is what price are we willing to pay for a lack of combat success and increased casualties...
The thing that troubled me was not the discussion about intuition being applied to irregular warfare, but the implication that somehow, the construct did not apply to "regular warfare." Clausewitz (and Beyerchen) were thinking about what we would consider conventional warfare. Their whole point was to explode the myth (still popular) that conventional warfare is linear and can be successfully approached with a formulaic mind-set.
The difference between irregular and conventional is not a question of linear versus non-linear. Both are non-linear, but with different characteristics and dynamics. While there is arguably a degree of overlap, there are also significant differences betwen the two. This is where the question of "intuition" becomes interesting. If we accept that intuition is "The capacity of knowing without the use of rational processes," (Websters II), then Clausewitz remains correct--the only ways to gain such intuition are 1) through experience and/or 2) though intense study of other's experience (critical analysis). So, intuition built up through training, study, and experience of conventional warfare will be every bit as non-linear as that for irregular warfare--but the intuition will be based on a different perspective and understanding of the inter-relationships. Likewise, the intuition that is currently being built into the US armed forces right now in Iraq and Afghanistan is different than that which was built up in say, World War II, or Korea (or old NTC and USMC CAX rotations). Parsing it even more, the intuition based on experience in Iraq even a year ago could lead to a different perspective than that of experience based on the last six months (and depending on the area of operations).
My whole point is that, like it or not, we are developing a whole generation of Soldiers and Marines who are developing a specific of intuition for irregular warfare. Will this intuition serve us well going into the next conflict? If Korea should kick off, how will this intuition work for/against us? If our next conflict is an irregular conflict in the Pacific rim, or in Africa, will this intuition help or hurt?
Taking Rob's approach, are we educating ourselves to put our experience in a very complex irregular conflict into correct context--so that it does not become the next version of linear mechanistic thinking?
Just a couple of quick thoughts regarding this piece. I would say that it meets all the academic standards for a historical think piece: for those of you who might be unclear as to what that means, its value is not in any way diminished by that status. In fact, it is enhanced...for as the term suggests, the point of a think piece is to get the reader to think. Not just to sit there and nod like a bobble-head doll repeating "just so" and "quite right." The intent of a good historical think piece is to get the reader to look at his or her own thought processes and possibly question them or at least give them a good shake before going on.
I'm not surprised that 3-24 cropped up in the discussion of this, but MAJ Thornton's piece did shake me in a slightly different direction with regard to 3-24 (which is also a Marine Corps publication). What if the authors assumed that readers would ALREADY have an understanding of what Clausewitz was talking about?
Think back to the early days of Commandant Gray's MCDP 1-series publications, and the 1997 revisions. These were intended to teach Marines how to THINK about war. Clausewitz was sprinkled throughout all three main works, and "On War" has remained a fixture on the Commandant's Reading List. One would assume that any inquiring mind might at least read "On War" without it being on a FM's reading list. And since Marines were involved in the creation of 3-24, it's also reasonable to assume that they would bring their own intellectual background to the process.
In any case, non-linear thinking isn't only something applied to the future...and I would argue that the ability to use non-linear reasoning isn't restricted to those professions. One major aspect of non-linear reasoning is the "why" of any problem. And whenever humans are involved, the complexity of that "why" is multiplied beyond normal measure. Unlike pop history accounts, the true historian understands that history isn't predictable, nor is it a predictive model (no matter how much some may wish to make it one). There are patterns to history, but like any human activity those patterns can deviate in ways that defy prediction. MAJ Thornton mentions some of these variable patterns when he talks about the gut instinct and the "something just isn't right" feeling. That is the historical pattern deviating in some small way...some way that can only really be discerned by non-linear thinking and the sort of "everything is familiar yet nothing is the same" reality that historians must navigate every day. It's the same sort of reality that Clausewitz articulates with such clarity (for such a hazy subject) in "On War."
Like the MCDP series, although on a much more elevated level, Clausewitz was trying to provide a framework for something that defies framing. History, good history, tries to do the same thing. In both cases we're dealing with a subject that has infinite viewpoints, no single "right" answer, and perspectives that shift based on viewpoint and cultural context (to name just two of the infinite factors that shape both war and history). The toolkit for reaching that non-linear understanding is difficult to define, and in many cases you only know you have it when that "gut feeling" kicks in and you start to see things that you didn't see before...to understand things that before appeared to defy understanding. And this think piece is another nice widget for that toolkit.
Rob:
Agree with your basic point contained in your title of the critical importance for military leaders today to read St Carl. Thanks for writing this piece.
Your description of your experience in Iraq in combat and how it reinforced in your mind the importance of Clausewitz was the same as mine. During my year in Iraq in 2006 at night before I went to sleep I would read a few pages of "On War." It did not give me prescriptions and lessons for how to conduct operations. It did, however, give me the words of a master who was helping me think through the problems that I faced. In short, "On War" does not provide lessons but wisdom for those who seek out its truths about war.
Sadly, the Army's new coin manual FM 3-24 chose to omit "On War" from its classic reading list. Such a pity and such an absurd thing to do especially considering that one preparing for a combat tour in Iraq would get much more out of reading a hundred pages of "On War" BEFORE reading Galulas pop-classic on counterinsurgencies.
FROM THE ARTICLE
"One implication is that full comprehension of the works of Clausewitz demands that we retrain our intuition. For historians, who have often been attracted rather then repelled by the subtleties of "On War", this may not be too unsettling of a task. But for those trained in the engineering and scientific fields, as are so many military officers and analysts, this retraining is likely to be a more wrenching and unwelcome experience. As the various scientists and mathematicians cited above (ed. within Beyerchens essay) have suggested, the predominance of a linear intuition is endemic. Such an intuition guides value judgments and choices, with real world consequences."
MY COMMENT
The premise of the above excerpt suggests science and engineering are linear fields. They are not. Both are oriented to understanding the future, which is a nonlinear phenomenon. Recall, engineering is a profession derived from battle. Arguably, engineers are more intellectually prepared to deal with the nonlinearity of war than any other field. A good historian or theologian might develop the capacity of nonlinear intuition through study of the past, but neither are responsable for the lives of citizens before, during or after a war. Like doctors, engineers are always responsable for life and death. But do not mistake an engineer for a doctor. In the field of engineering, a professional may be called upon to take life, whereas a doctor's only purpose is to save life.