Small Wars Journal

Next-War-itis, This-War-itis, and the American Military

Tue, 01/13/2009 - 5:22pm
Next-War-itis, This-War-itis, and the American Military by Michael P. Noonan at Foreign Policy Research Institute

In a recent CBS News story, Marine Corps Commandant General James Conway stated—for at least the second time publicly—that it was time for the Marine Corps to leave Iraq and focus on Afghanistan. In the Commandant's view, the Marine Corps is a "fighting machine," Iraq has turned into "nation building," and "[t]hat's not what we do.... Where there's a fight, that's where the Marine Corps is needed." The subtext of this seems clear enough. General Conway feels that his Marines should focus on "real war," where their martial skills of air and artillery strikes and violent maneuver to close with and destroy the enemy are employed to effect. The extended current counterinsurgency and nation-building campaign in Iraq is seen as a misapplication of the Corps' core competencies and soften the force, or at least emphasize the wrong skills sets and lessons that will cause the United States to pay a steep tax in blood and treasure on some future battlefield.

These comments caused a stir in some circles. Some argue that his comments misread the source of success in Al Anbar, where patient "nation-building" by the Army and the Marine Corps was crucial. It also arguably misreads what will be most useful in Afghanistan, where U.S. strategy emphasizes more than just conventional brawn. But this is not just solely an issue of debate amongst the Marine Corps. All of the services currently are having debates about their dominant service culture and core competencies. A distilled short hand for this debate is between the antagonistically labeled schools of "this-war-itis" and "next-war-itis." This short piece will provide a glimpse of these contemporary debates and offer opinions on how they might play out going into the Obama administration. This is an important debate because strategic success—and no small amount of treasure—is at stake...

Much more at Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Comments

Ken White

Fri, 01/16/2009 - 5:30pm

My apologies for misconstruing this statement by you:<blockquote>"...might be the best way to specialize for the full range of missions?"</blockquote>as agreement with the Barnett philosophy and thereby thinking you were suggesting such specialization was an asset.<blockquote>"But isnt the range of COIN/FID/stability ops/low intensity missions too broad to be accomplished with such a limited number of personnel, especially considering the increased demand for SOF to execute direct-action missions?</blockquote>Taking those in order, yes, if the current usage continues. Even with a more sensible and correct mission allocation, there will never be enough COIN effort available from SF for many situations, thus the General Purpose Force will almost always have to fill in. That is not a problem, units will do what is required and what they're trained to do. The real issue is doctrine and training and the current system covers that adequately -- though it would help if SOCOM could get their DA assets increased and leave SF to their primary mission.<blockquote>"I think many of your objections relate to your narrower conception of "force" than Barnetts: ... I think its really just another way of conceptualizing a better balance of responsibility, a new interagency process using all elements of national power, and all those other clichés."</blockquote>I read the book; the fundamental difference between Barnett and I is that he's read about it and I've done it. What he fails to realize and I apparently didn't say well above is that the I know that on the street, the US is thoroughly distrusted and the SysAdmin crew will be perceived a 'force' whether it actually is or not. My conception of force isn't more narrow than his, it's far broader -- he's advocating force and doesn't seem to realize it. I'd also suggest that fact is germane to the thread, Barnett advocates a process directed at next war or the prevention thereof.
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I hear what he and others say about a better balance of responsibility and so forth -- have advocated that myself, in fact -- but I also know how this nation operates. In fits and starts; we do not do the continuity thing at all well for many reasons, so your use of the word 'clichés' is appropriate. That's about all they'll ever be for any extended period of time. That's really okay, we adapt well and reasonably quickly and there's no need to keep a force in being that may or may not be needed.<blockquote>"...I think its also true that non-MCO missions have often received short shrift - whether in WWII, Korea, Vietnam, or elsewhere - as a result of the general culture of the military; which is to say that organizationally, it is only in recent years that the institutional attitude has evolved to the point that killing bad guys and destroying hardware has been understood as a means to an end rather than an end itself."</blockquote>No question on the first. Don't think I agree with the second statement though; it's been my observation that the means to an end has always been well understood. We just concentrated on and got better at achieving that means...<blockquote>"...most of them are related to globalization and the changing conception of what it means to be constructively engaged around the world - not to anyone getting smarter or better at their jobs...</blockquote>Here we seem to be in total disagreement. <i>"...constructively engaged around the world"</i> is a chimera of sorts. We have been doing that for my entire lifetime. Sometimes better than others, to be sure but we've been there. The differences in the quality of our engagement have never been solely due to our efforts; all the others and their efforts had and have an impact.<blockquote>"...Simply put, it was a lot more viable 60 years ago to go to another continent, destroy an army, capture a city, and come home. This just doesnt get the job done anymore."</blockquote>Not really, having been in the service 60 years ago, I can tell you that perception is quite wrong. Make it well over 100 and you <i>might</i> have a point. Our relatively lengthy engagements in the last 60 years should tell you that the statement is woefully shortsighted and incorrect.

However, I would posit that we are in an era where for the first time in over 100 years, we can in fact do just that and probably should strongly consider doing so if that is appropriate to the issue at hand... ;)

cjmewett

Fri, 01/16/2009 - 4:21pm

Ken - Thanks for taking the time.

Lets start here: <i>"the specialization you and Barnett suggest... "</i> I havent suggested anything. You shouldnt take my question as an endorsement of Barnetts ideas; I dont find those on force structure to be particularly compelling, though its interesting to see the reaction they provoke in others. I think theres some merit to the idea of specialization, but youre correct to write that a restructuring as dramatic as what TPMB recommends would face a great many obstacles. Having said that...

<i>"That separation of thinking was accomplished with the establishment of Special Forces."</i> But isnt the range of COIN/FID/stability ops/low intensity missions too broad to be accomplished with such a limited number of personnel, especially considering the increased demand for SOF to execute direct-action missions?

Your objections to Barnetts overall strategic concept are noted, though thats not really what I meant to discuss. Whether or not the "Gap" wants to be the Gap, or whether you want to call it by that name, or whether you want to commit US forces there to build states, etc etc... all of that is sort of beyond the scope of this thread.

On the force structure question, though, I think many of your objections relate to your narrower conception of "force" than Barnetts: the SysAdmin would not be a fundamentally, majority, or even primarily military organization, as I understand it. Security is obviously an important component of the missions that those personnel would be expected to accomplish, so military involvement is essential. But I think its really just another way of conceptualizing a better balance of responsibility, a new interagency process using all elements of national power, and all those other clichés.

Regarding the issue of whether or not full-spectrum ops are more common or more broad in the modern era: Youre of course correct to say that the US military has been engaged more frequently and for longer periods in what you term <i>"stability and punitive operations and COIN efforts than they have in conventional warfare."</i> This is obviously true. I think its also true that non-MCO missions have often received short shrift - whether in WWII, Korea, Vietnam, or elsewhere - as a result of the general culture of the military; which is to say that organizationally, it is only in recent years that the institutional attitude has evolved to the point that killing bad guys and destroying hardware has been understood as a means to an end rather than an end itself.

I dont say this to disparage the efforts of those who preceded us. A number of circumstances helped create this reality, and most of them are related to globalization and the changing conception of what it means to be constructively engaged around the world - not to anyone getting smarter or better at their jobs. Simply put, it was a lot more viable 60 years ago to go to another continent, destroy an army, capture a city, and come home. This just doesnt get the job done anymore.

But I digress here. I want to thank you for the education on the XVIII Airborne Corps and the rest of the historical context. Appreciate your thoughts.

Ken White

Thu, 01/15/2009 - 7:29pm

Sheesh. Posted too soon.

Last paragraph should read:<blockquote>"...core capacities are dependent on very different modes of thinking, training, and operating, might be the best way to specialize for the full range of missions?"</blockquote>That separation of thinking was accomplished with the establishment of Special Forces. The specialization you and Barnett suggest might (and we can do no better than 'might') be better than the ability to multi task but it would be expensive, would decrease the total force numerically (some will want to 'help' and join the SysAdmin; most will not) and would not be available for contingencies other than stability ops.

Bad idea with no saving graces IMO.

Ken White

Thu, 01/15/2009 - 7:23pm

In the late 50s, the Army designated XVIII Abn Corps as the Strategic Army Corps (that's where "Strac" came from) with the mission of responding to worldwide contingencies with two Battle Groups in a twelve hour launch window. Training for the 82d and 11th (later 101st) Abn Divs was essentially FID and stability operations (plus non combatant evacuation and a few similar missions) at about 70% of training time and High Intensity Combat (HIC) to include forced entry and airfield seizure for the remainder of their training time.

In the meantime; Seventh Army and the CONUS heavy Divisions focussed almost totally on HIC with minimal effort toward amphibious operations (yes, from the Sea...) and stability ops.

Then in 1961 a Joint command was created to force all the services to cooperate in developing and improving multispectral capabilities. US Strike Command, based at MacDill AFB was responsible for training and employment of joint forces worldwide in contingency operations. They conducted several multi service (and multi Division plus multi State in area) Field training Exercises of several weeks duration each year in the early 60s. Fairly good training.

You say:<blockquote>"I certainly don't mean to suggest that the idea of specialization is entirely novel. That said, it seems plain to me that the "full spectrum" in the modern era represents a broader range of missions..."</blockquote>How so? We had units do things in WW II and in Korea that no one has done since (well, for publication, anyway). What do you see as a broader range encompassing all of the Low, Medium and High Intensity conflict missions plus FID and stability ops? What else is there?<blockquote>"... I think it's also fair to say that those "irregular" or non-traditional missions are more often executed than in earlier times, whatever the force structure or training emphasis."</blockquote>Not true, not at all. Over the past 220 years the Army and Marines have spent far more time and effort in stability and punitive operations and COIN efforts than they have in conventional warfare. Nothing is being done today we didn't do in Korea or in Viet Nam -- mostly both. What is your basis for that statement?<blockquote>"...why isn't it reasonable to think that a dramatic restructuring, a separation of those elements ..."</blockquote>Because it is not affordable (keeping two highly different functional entities in uniform with quite different training and equipment requirements and on call), may not be required (what if we do not go to set up failed states?), will have significant difficulty recruiting (the Armed Forces are having trouble getting combat support personnel to enlist today; those would be the SysAdmin types. Conversely, the combat arms -- Leviathan types -- have no recruiting problem), it is predicated on a myth (the belief that other nations will want and accept the 'help' offered by the SysAdmin force is quite wrong IMO; any 'gift' from the US is looked at skeptically; we are not trusted and that has been true in my observation since the end of WW II. Many understand what we did to out friends and allies, the British and French...) and more...

Not least, who is going to become the Leviathan Force -- the Army? Not if the USMC and their friends in Congress have anything to say about it. Who's going to become the SysAdmin Force? Elements of all services? Only after the fight.

It's just a bad idea with no grounding in reality -- the Gap Nations object to being called the Gap and they don't want that kind of help; military strings require military purposes; military strings for the good of mankind tend to be a cognitive dissonance and be rejected out of hand...<blockquote>"...core capacities are dependent on very different modes of thinking, training, and operating, might be the best way to specialize for the full range of missions?</quote>That separation of thinking was accomplished with the establishment of Special Forces. The specialization you and Barnett suggest might (and we can do no better than 'might') be better than the ability to multi task but it would be expensive, would decrease the total force numerically (some will want to 'help' and join the SysAdmin; most will not) and would not be available for contingencies other than stability ops.

Bad idea with no saving graces IMO.

cjmewett

Thu, 01/15/2009 - 6:21pm

"It was even successfully put into practice in the late 50s and early 60s. The idea fell into disuse due to Viet Nam and its aftermath. That is emphatically not the same thing as the so-called Leviathan and SysAdmin Forces."

Ken, could you elaborate on this please?

I certainly don't mean to suggest that the idea of specialization is entirely novel. That said, it seems plain to me that the "full spectrum" in the modern era represents a broader range of missions. I think it's also fair to say that those "irregular" or non-traditional missions are more often executed than in earlier times, whatever the force structure or training emphasis.

The doctrinal culture of our ground forces has evolved as a response to changes in policy at the national level -- as well as a change in the international architecture -- as would be expected of a civilian-led military. But why isn't it reasonable to think that a dramatic restructuring, a separation of those elements whose core capacities are dependent on very different modes of thinking, training, and operating, might be the best way to specialize for the full range of missions?

Ken White

Thu, 01/15/2009 - 5:20pm

The idea of the US Army and Marine Corps being capable of full spectrum conflict worldwide by having organizations with varied training focus, specializing mostly for one type of war or another -- while still training to an extent for all spectrums -- was around before Thomas. P. M. Barnett was born. It was even successfully put into practice in the late 50s and early 60s. The idea fell into disuse due to Viet Nam and its aftermath. That is emphatically not the same thing as the so-called Leviathan and SysAdmin Forces.

Said 'forces' are extremely unlikely to ever exist -- they certainly should not. Charly has identified what needs to happen...

cjmewett

Thu, 01/15/2009 - 12:49pm

"The U.S. could afford to have a portion of its Army focus primarily on COIN-Crisis Management (incl lots of coop with the civilian response corps etc), while keeping up basic pitched battle skills (say 80-20 training balance). The remainder (whatever percentage) could focus on pitched battle stuff, and simply learn 'the basics' of COIN-Crisis Management."

This has echoes of Tom Barnett's proposals for the restructuring of the force, drawing a distinction between the "Leviathan" (kinetics, force-on-force, or what I'd probably call The Gentile Army) and the "SysAdmin" (COIN, MOOTW, stability ops, etc.) force.

namhenderson,

I know there are far more able and experienced people reading this, some of whom will hopefully respond but, I'll take a crack at the first part of it:

Except in a nuclear exchange scenario, the U.S. is unlikely to fight a war of PHYSICAL national survival. However, many wars (and other events) could affect the U.S. in ways that significantly change the U.S. 'way of life'. Example, Nazi Germany defeats USSR and wins WWII. The U.S. is still not directly threatened (in terms of physical survival), but surely the country and its way of life would be significantly affected? At times it is necessary, then, to fight wars that are not about physically defending the N.A. continent, but still are in effect "wars of national survival".

As to training, I've only had a tiny bit of it, but it does make a difference what you train for. In theory it should be possible to (as an example) teach someone how to shoot, and then change the rules of engagement (ROE) to 'tune them'. Beyond the basics and moving up in complexity from individual skills to squad, platoon etc., you actually have to do some training under the expected conditions and ROE. Is it possible to spend, say 70% of your time practicing for COIN-Crisis Management and 30% for pitched battle scenarios? Yes, but as I'm sure someone will write in greater detail - it's quite hard. More importantly who decides (and based on what) what those percentages should be?

Finally, for smaller countries it's actually much harder to make these tradeoffs. The U.S. could afford to have a portion of its Army focus primarily on COIN-Crisis Management (incl lots of coop with the civilian response corps etc), while keeping up basic pitched battle skills (say 80-20 training balance). The remainder (whatever percentage) could focus on pitched battle stuff, and simply learn 'the basics' of COIN-Crisis Management. To me this would be sound hedging for the U.S. but much harder for a small country (like...Finland) to do, but that's for another post.

Hope this clarified something (if nothing else, how I view it), now waiting for the people who really know what they're talking about...

-Charly Salonius-Pasternak

What i haven't understood in this whole debate is how training for the type of current (small scale insurgency) wars would decrease our effectiveness in big wars. As Gian mentions none of our current wars are wars of national survival (i assume by this he means that they aren't a form of existential threat/not on our shores). Say we did in the next-war syndrome end up having to fight China or Russia (for example) i don't see how even in fightin these battles it would be issues of national survival. I mean what is the likelihood of the wars being on our shores or of them takign the form of huge naval/ or land battles. (ala WW I, II, Korea etc) Rather it seems to me they would likely take the form of smaller scale, insurgent type warfare (even if conducted by national forces). Even these wouldn't it seems be national wars of survival. The only scenario i see that would match this sort fo scenario would be a nuke war/launch. In which case BMD forces (which aren't really being discussed in the insurgent scale warfare discussions anyways) would be the only somewhat effective tool in our arsenal. Other than us bombin them back (MAD).
Anyone care to explain to this uniformed civilian?