Small Wars Journal

More Small Wars: Counterinsurgency Is Here to Stay

Sun, 10/26/2014 - 6:49pm

More Small Wars: Counterinsurgency Is Here to Stay by Max Boot, Foreign Affairs

Although the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are far from the costliest the United States has ever fought in terms of either blood or treasure, they have exacted a much greater toll than the relatively bloodless wars Americans had gotten used to fighting in the 1990s. As of this writing, 2,344 U.S. troops have been killed in Afghanistan and 4,486 in Iraq, and tens of thousands more have been injured. The financial costs reach into the trillions of dollars.

Yet despite this investment, the returns look meager. Sunni extremists from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), also known as the Islamic State, and Shiite extremists beholden to Iran have divided the non-Kurdish parts of Iraq between them. Meanwhile, the Taliban and the Haqqani network remain on the offensive in Afghanistan. Given how poorly things have turned out, it would be tempting to conclude that the United States should simply swear off such irregular conflicts for good…

Read on.

Comments

In a way, what Max Boot would seem to be saying is that counterinsurgency is here to stay because regime change is here to stay.

And regime change is here to stay because this (regime change) is still the approach that we intend to use to achieve our political objective (fundamental and expansive outlying state and societal change).

Thus, his apparent continuing belief that it is via our universal values, and our exemplary example, that we will inspire populations to effect the state and societal changes that we desire.

But this, I suggest, IS NOT the way that we appear to be headed.

Why?

Because our reliance on our universal values and our exemplary example -- to adequately inspire populations to undertake and successfully achieve the fundamental and expansive state and societal changes that we desire -- this approach has failed us miserably. (See Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, etc.)

Thus, the recent move to work "by, with and through" the regimes -- to effect our goals and objectives noted above -- and not with the fickle, ineffective and incapable populations.

Thus, our OTHER instruments of power and persuasion (those designed more to influence rulers rather than populations) to, once again, become the "first team."

So: How do we help "them" (the regimes) help "us?"

By such initiatives as "building partner capacity;" wherein, we help the rulers build up the necessary military, police and intelligence forces needed for them (the rulers) to (1) overcome the resistance of their populations and (2) effect the (often significantly unpopular) political, economic and social changes that we desire.

Thus:

a. Counterinsurgency in the future? Yes. (The rulers will need help overcoming their resisting populations.) But

b. Counterinsurgency based on regime change and the reliance on a population inspired by our way of life, etc.? Not so much.