When seasoned combat soldiers began returning from the war to help train new recruits here, the first thing they did was to stop training for what the Army called "convoy live fire.''
Nobody actually does that in Iraq or Afghanistan, they explained.
In fact, they said, much of what the Army was teaching its new recruits at this premier training center was wrong or irrelevant to actual combat...
That it took five years to get this stopped says something about the Army.It also provides a glimpse into a struggle inside the Army and, indeed, across the entire U.S. military. Let's call it the combat military versus the "garrison'' or "headquarters'' or "always done it this way'' military.
This is the dynamic behind Defense Secretary Robert Gates' effort to refocus the gigantic defense budget on real combat needs for today's wars -- and the resistance from the bureaucracies and defense contractors entrenched around lower priority budget programs...
Much more at Politics Daily.
Comments
"New" old ideas. GOOD!!! I have waiting for this "worm to turn." BRAVO! to those combat veteran NCO'S and Officers pushing the Army into change.
I saw the end of the following when I came into the Army (Post-Vietnam-prepare-to-be-a-speed-bump-in-the-Fulda):
1. Situational awareness scenarios based in Vietnamese villages and environs.
2. Instruction on small unit movement techniques that emphasized leassons learned from real ambushes and being on the wrong side of green tracers.
3. Individual movement techniques (IMT'S were something I saw when I reported into my first permanent unit).
4. Fire team and squad leaders given the lee way to execute as they saw fit. (Because they weren't taught, nor given the tools, to analyze their situation. Didn't Roger's Standing Orders provide a solid guideline for occasions similar to those mentioned...?)
While I like the lexicon given to training (and education) concepts that embrace "outcomes", this is not a new training idea. The Army could have EASILY changed Vietnam villages to "any-village" on X continent, or in Y country. The basic principles of small unit actions analysis would not change.
The Army has to embrace this reality and readily accept concepts allowing for decisions to be made at the closest position of the pointy "end of the spear" and not from those sitting in a JOC/TOC (or worse...) viewing action via predator drones.
However, it is a bright note seeing the Army (however begrudingly) admitting that the "Strategic corporal" is, has been, and always will be where we win wars. This is true of any conflict, be it full on convential or COIN.
I also applaud SecCef Gates' decision to re-think the FCS program; a program supported by technology that placed maneuver of single trooper in the hands of the NCA (or others a single degree removed...) as opposed to that trooper's own fire team leader.
He obviously isn't aware that a tectonic shift in the form of replacing a very flawed, 35 year old task, condition and standard based training process with sensible outcome based training is not easy, thus the lengthy switch time -- the important thing is that it's being done.
He got that important aspect right. Now if the rest of the Army can just follow...