Small Wars Journal

Learning from Contemporary Conflicts to Prepare for Future War

Tue, 10/21/2008 - 4:30pm
Learning from Contemporary Conflicts to Prepare for Future War - H.R. McMaster, Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Note

This essay is based on his full-length article in the Fall 2008 special issue of Orbis on "The Future of War."

War is the final auditor of military institutions. Contemporary conflicts such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq create an urgent need for feedback based on actual experience. Analysis of the present combined with an understanding of history should help us improve dramatically the quality of our thinking about war. Understanding the continuities as well as changes in the character of armed conflict will help us make wise decisions about force structure, develop relevant joint force capabilities, and refine officer education and the organization, training, and the equipping of our forces.

But first we need to reject the unrealistic, abstract ideas concerning the nature of future conflict that gained wide acceptance in the 1990s. Flush with the ease of the military victory over Saddam's forces in the 1991 Gulf War and aware of the rapid advance of communications, information, and precision munitions technologies, many observers argued then that U.S. competitive advantages in these technologies had brought about a Revolution in Military Affairs. It was assumed that there would be no "peer competitor" of U.S. military forces until at least 2020. Military concepts based on this assumption promised rapid, low-cost victory in future war. Ultimately, these ideas and their corollary of reduced reliance on military manpower became subsumed under "defense transformation."

Defense transformation advocates never considered conflicts such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq—protracted counterinsurgency and state-building efforts that require population security, security-sector reform, reconstruction and economic development, building governmental capacity, and establishing the rule of law. Our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the 2006 Lebanon war, provide strong warnings that we should abandon the orthodoxy of defense transformation and make appropriate adjustments to force structure and development...

Much more at FPRI.

Comments

MH (not verified)

Tue, 10/28/2008 - 5:07pm

MAJ Michael T. Heaton, student, Command and Staff College, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

I entered the Army in 1992, the tail end of the Gulf War 1, and in the middle of our Humanitarian Assistance/Peace Keeping/Peace Enforcement/COIN in Somalia. Ive directly or indirectly supported missions in Somalia, Hati, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Korea, and a couple civil support operations (Florida and Louisiana). It seems like my entire military career has been nothing but transformation and/or change, based on what I consider DoD reactionary contingency planning and doctrinal re/over development. When do you allow for time to master and test are existing systems or structure? Why cant we utilize current structures, systems, or doctrine to meet the challenges of the contemporary environment? I am afraid we will make the same transformative errors based solely lesson learned from our operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

One could argue that DoD and its transformers have for years considered protracted counterinsurgencies and asymmetrical conflicts such as Afghanistan and Iraq, as the military has dedicated more time in its history fighting "contemporary" type conflicts (the Indian Wars, Wilson limited military interventions (Vera Cruz, Hunt for Poncho Villa, Panama, Siberia and of course Vietnam to name a few); its the policy makers who have failed to recognize the importance. Therefore, one could argue that the true auditors of military institution are our civilian leaders, whose measure of effectiveness is based on our ability to execute policy objectives and/or priorities (which are often centered on the politicians ability to get them re-elected). Clausewitzen Approach "War, therefore is an act of policy".

I would also caution transforming based on "contemporary" conflict analysis vice enemy centric analysis. I am concerned our leaders of today are taking the same "unrealistic, abstract ideas concerning the nature of conflict that gained wide acceptance in the 1990s" based on their experiences in the on the current operational environment. Its hard to argue that US military forces wont be engaged in the Global War on Terror or protracted COIN/stability and reconstruction operation for quit some time, but its not the only threat. Former enemies or nations of concern, specifically Russia and China, are once posing a threat/challenge to the U.S. Here at CGSC, instructors are re-enforcing the importance of analyzing/planning for conflict across the full spectrum of operations, however no one has laid out a template on how we (the DoD0 will build a capability to execute each of the tasks simultaneously. Are our modular brigades truly capable of executing Full Spectrum Operations? How will the implementation of the Future Combat Systems (FCS), which we have committed billions of dollars, assist with nation building, building government institutions or with the establishment of basic civil services? How do we revamp are officer education systems to train future leaders how to establish a city governance from scratch, build a military police systems, understand the dynamics civil of society; whist maintaining a force capable of executing conventional combat operations? Will our national leaders continue to resource the military to meet all the challenges, both current and future, of the 21st Century?

The views expressed in this comment are those of the author and do reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.