Small Wars Journal

Kilcullen Visits 10th Mountain

Wed, 06/06/2007 - 4:15am

Counterinsurgency Expert Advises Soldiers in Iraq

Spc. Chris McCann, Army News Service

2007-06-05

CAMP STRIKER, Iraq (Army News Service, June 5, 2007) - Recruit more Iraqi Soldiers and increase their divisions from 11 to 20 is what one counterinsurgency expert said he would do if he was in the shoes of the Multinational Forces - Iraq commander.

Dr. David Kilcullen, an authority on counterinsurgency, was appointed to advise the MNF-Iraq commander, Gen. David Petraeus. Dr. Kilcullen visited Soldiers with the 10th Mountain Division's 2nd Brigade out of Fort Drum, N.Y., to take stock of the "Commando" brigade's progress June 2 and 3.

Dr. Kilcullen served 21 years in the Australian army and has led Timorese troops, was a special advisor for irregular warfare during the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review, and remains a reserve lieutenant colonel in the Australian army.

Col. Michael Kershaw, 2nd BCT commander, escorted Dr. Kilcullen around Patrol Base Dragon, the Yusufiyah Joint Security Station and the Mahmudiyah Iraqi Army Compound.

"They've done a great job just setting it up," said Dr. Kilcullen of the JSS. "They've got the Iraqi army and Iraqi police working together, which is a great start, it's a good setup with the IPs doing municipal law and order, and the Iraqi army doing rural security. The next step is to set up a joint-operations room where they can plan operations together."

He observed that U.S. forces' performance is improving, although the situation has - at least temporarily - taken a turn for the worse.

"Your progress since the beginning of the year is substantial," Dr. Kilcullen said. "The trick now is putting the Iraqi structures into place. It's about sustainment and expectation management.

"The 10th Mountain Division is the most-deployed division in the Army today," said Dr. Kilcullen. "That experience really shows in your approach to the area of operations. This is a tough, unforgiving AO which punishes the slightest tactical mistake. I am extremely impressed with the way the brigade has approached the mission, and with the progress in this district, which is the best I have ever seen it."

Dr. Kilcullen also discussed ways to improve combined U.S. and Iraqi operations with Brig. Gen. Ali Jassim Al-Frejee, commander of the 4th Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division.

"What makes a local sheikh respect coalition forces more than terrorists?" Dr. Kilcullen asked. "Is it a case - like the Indonesians say - 'either silver or lead'?"

"Either way is difficult," said Brig. Gen. Ali. "People are getting tired of Al-Qaeda in Iraq - they're tired of the ideology and killing. In Anbar, many tribes are fighting terrorism. We just need time to re-culture the people."

"I'm very impressed with your progress here," Dr. Kilcullen told him. "The last time I came to this area, we couldn't even drive here. It's very impressive."

Dr. Kilcullen asked Brig. Gen. Ali what he would do if he were in Gen. Petraeus' shoes.

"More Iraqi army soldiers," Brig. Gen. Ali said without hesitation. "Right now we have 200,000 troops. The first reason is that we need more soldiers watching and protecting the people. The second thing is that it would improve the economy and reduce the unemployment rate - and when people are poor, it's easy to recruit them for terror. In my view, Iraq needs 20 divisions instead of the 11 (they) have now."

Capt. Blake Keil, commander of Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 15th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd BCT, spoke with Dr. Kilcullen about company-level operations.

"It's great to listen to him speak," said Capt. Keil. "And it's cool to see him here as an adviser to Gen. Petraeus."

"Everybody knows that July and August are going to be bad months," said Dr. Kilcullen, reminding several company commanders and other officers that Petraeus' plus up report, expected in September, will be a target for insurgents. "You should expect a spike in enemy activity. Civilian and U.S. Soldier deaths will look bad - I think we'll have a hot summer. But if we break (terrorists') backs, it might drop right after. You guys are an important reality check for what's going on, and you know things before division or corps-level people."

He encouraged lower-level leaders to trust their gut feelings and their Iraqi army counterparts.

"Even with Iraqi intelligence - if one of your Iraqi counterparts writes a one or two paragraph summary of what's going on, even if he can't justify what he expects, he knows his area."

He also reminded the leaders to keep notes for handing over to the next unit.

"I encourage you to write stories about your missions - everything from big issues to just personal recollections. Share them with the incoming guys, because they're valuable."

Dr. Kilcullen seemed genuinely impressed by the Commando leaders' accomplishments.

"You guys are doing one of the toughest jobs in this country, and I think you're doing it right. This brigade definitely 'gets it,'" he added. "They're doing it right. In this form of warfare, though, there are no shortcuts or gimmicks - it's all about keeping up constant, unremitting pressure over time. At the same time, you need to be alert to how the enemy and the environment is adapting, and constantly come up with new, entrepreneurial ways to work the area.

"At this stage of your tour, it's all about consolidation, improvement and getting to steady state so that you can hand over a well-controlled district to your successor unit."

Spc. Chris McCann writes for the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division Public Affairs.

Comments

kotzabasis

Sun, 06/10/2007 - 7:14am

A PROPOSAL HOW TO COUNTER THE NEW TACTICS
OF THE INSURGENTS

Con George-Kotzabasis

If one cannot calculate the probability of an outcome, one should simply do what history and honor teaches is right. Winston Churchill

Dear Colonel Kilcullen,

It seems that the insurgents in countering the "surge" are evolving new tactics that increase to an unsustainable level the number of casualties that your forces are enduring that jeopardize, both militarily and politically, the success of the new American strategy under general Petraeus. It appears to me, that unless your new strategy gestates quickly novel tactics that would check, if not nullify completely, the tactics of the insurgents, US forces on the ground will be engaged in a mountainous struggle with a continued heavy toll of casualties in your attempt to reach your admirable and courageous goal. And the corollary of the greater difficulties you will be confronting on the foreground of war is you will not be getting any succor or understanding from the background of politics. As an already weak-kneed Congress will readily throw the towel using as an excuse these heavy casualties, and hence depriving general Petraeus and his brave soldiers the laurels of victory.

Ostensibly, a new tactic of the insurgents is to attack your forces in one mini-theatre of operations with the expectation that your commanders in this theatre will be calling for reinforcements; and whilst the latter are en route to ambush them by another group of insurgents lurking on the side roads, and attacking these forces by direct firepower and roadside bombs. Its necessary therefore, in my opinion, to deprive the insurgents of this initiative to ambush your reinforcements that depends on the predictability of your reactions. Hence, the first thing you must do is to make your reactions unpredictable, to make the movement of your forces as to the route they are going to traverse hard to predict.

The implementation of this new tactic will entail the following: the vehicles that transport your troops to these mini-theatres or to other kinetic operations must not always traverse the main roads and highways where the roadside bombs are planted and where the insurgents are ambushing your forces, but instead use the rougher but safer terrain of the sides of the roads and highways which will be free from roadside bombs and ambushes. And by doing this you will not be setting up a pattern for the movement of your troops to which the insurgents would adopt their tactics. Since the expanse of the sides of the roads is by far wider than the latter, you will be using the segments of this expanse at your own interchangeable discretion. In the unlikely case that the insurgents will be so stupid--although stupidity is the twin of fanaticism--as to attempt to ambush you in such a militarily disadvantageous terrain for them, you will be able to annihilate them by using your firepower relentlessly both from the ground and the air without the normal limits that arise from the concern of inflicting collateral damage on civilians.

Further, you should consider other vehicles for the transportation and mobility of your troops in an environment where humvees and other bulky carriers are easy targets for the insurgents. Its four years ago that I suggested that a better, and by far safer, mobility for your troops in such an environment would be motorcycles. Whose smallness and speed and their operational functionality to travel both on smooth and rough grounds would make them hard for the insurgents to target. Moreover, if they were equipped with rocket launches they would be a highly mobile and effective armor in conditions of urban warfare. And by moving speedily and separated by a distance from each other their riders would not be targeted as a group by the insurgents, either by roadside bombs or by direct firepower.

Carpe diem, quam minimum credula postero