

**Senior Defense Department Officials Commentary On
Irregular Warfare Related Issues**

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1. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

a. “The strategy strives for balance in three areas: between trying to prevail in current conflicts and preparing for other contingencies, between *institutionalizing capabilities such as counterinsurgency and foreign military assistance* and maintaining the United States' existing conventional and strategic technological edge against other military forces, and between retaining those cultural traits that have made the U.S. armed forces successful and shedding those that hamper their ability to do what needs to be done.” ([Article](#), “A Balanced Strategy”, *Foreign Affairs*, January 2009)

b. “It would be *irresponsible not to think about and prepare for the future*, and the overwhelming majority of people in the Pentagon, the services, and the defense industry do just that. But we must not be so preoccupied with preparing for future conventional and strategic conflicts that we neglect to *provide all the capabilities necessary to fight and win conflicts such as those the United States is in today*.” ([Article](#), “A Balanced Strategy”, *Foreign Affairs*, January 2009)

c. “The United States is unlikely to repeat another Iraq or Afghanistan -- that is, forced regime change followed by nation building under fire -- anytime soon. But that does not mean it may not face similar challenges in a variety of locales. Where possible, U.S. strategy is to employ indirect approaches -- primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and their security forces -- to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention. In this kind of effort, *the capabilities of the United States' allies and partners may be as important as its own, and building their capacity is arguably as important as, if not more so than, the fighting the United States does itself*.” ([Article](#), “A Balanced Strategy”, *Foreign Affairs*, January 2009)

d. "The military and civilian elements of the United States' national security apparatus have responded unevenly and have grown increasingly out of balance. *The problem is not will; it is capacity.*" ([Article](#), "A Balanced Strategy", *Foreign Affairs*, January 2009)

e. "...*militias, insurgent groups, other nonstate actors, and developing-world militaries are increasingly acquiring more technology, lethality, and sophistication -- as illustrated by the losses and propaganda victory that Hezbollah was able to inflict on Israel in 2006. Hezbollah's restocked arsenal of rockets and missiles now dwarfs the inventory of many nation-states. Furthermore, Chinese and Russian arms sales are putting advanced capabilities, both offensive and defensive, in the hands of more countries and groups. As the defense scholar Frank Hoffman has noted, these hybrid scenarios combine "the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare," what another defense scholar, Michael Evans, has described as "wars . . . in which Microsoft coexists with machetes and stealth technology is met by suicide bombers." Just as one can expect a blended high-low mix of adversaries and types of conflict, so, too, should the United States seek a better balance in the portfolio of capabilities it has -- the types of units fielded, the weapons bought, the training done.*" ([Article](#), "A Balanced Strategy", *Foreign Affairs*, January 2009)

f. "The Department of Defense's *conventional modernization programs seek a 99 percent solution over a period of years. Stability and counterinsurgency missions require 75 percent solutions over a period of months.* The challenge is whether these two different paradigms can be made to coexist in the U.S. military's mindset and bureaucracy." ([Article](#), "A Balanced Strategy", *Foreign Affairs*, January 2009)

g. "*I have repeatedly made the argument in favor of institutionalizing counterinsurgency skills and the ability to conduct stability and support operations.* I have done so not because I fail to appreciate the importance of maintaining the United States' current advantage in conventional war fighting but rather because conventional and strategic force modernization programs are already strongly supported in the services, in Congress, and by the defense industry... Apart from the Special Forces community and some dissident colonels, however, for decades *there has been no strong, deeply rooted constituency inside the Pentagon or elsewhere for institutionalizing the capabilities necessary to wage asymmetric or irregular conflict -- and to quickly meet the ever-changing needs of forces engaged in these conflicts.*" ([Article](#), "A Balanced Strategy", *Foreign Affairs*, January 2009)

h. "There is no doubt in my mind that conventional modernization programs will continue to have, and deserve, strong institutional and congressional support. *I just want to make sure that the capabilities needed for the complex conflicts the United States is actually in and most likely to face in the foreseeable future also have strong and sustained institutional support over the long term.* And I want to see a defense establishment that can make and implement decisions quickly in support of those on the battlefield... In the end, the military capabilities needed cannot be separated from the cultural traits and the reward structure of the institutions the United States has: the signals

sent by what gets funded, who gets promoted, what is taught in the academies and staff colleges, and how personnel are trained.” ([Article](#), “A Balanced Strategy”, *Foreign Affairs*, January 2009)

i. “... my message today is not about the defense budget or military power. My message is that if we are to meet the myriad challenges around the world in the coming decades, *this country must strengthen other important elements of national power both institutionally and financially, and create the capability to integrate and apply all of the elements of national power* to problems and challenges abroad. In short, based on my experience serving seven presidents, as a former Director of CIA and now as Secretary of Defense, I am here to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use “soft” power and for better integrating it with “hard” power.” ([Speech](#), Kansas State University, 26 November 2007)

j. “One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win: *economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications*, and more – these, along with security, are *essential ingredients for long-term success*.” ([Speech](#), Kansas State University, 26 November 2007)

k. “However uncomfortable it may be to raise Vietnam all these years later, the history of that conflict is instructive. After first pursuing a strategy based on conventional military firepower, the United States shifted course and began *a comprehensive, integrated program of pacification, civic action, and economic development*. The importance of deploying civilian expertise has been relearned – the hard way – through the effort to staff Provincial Reconstruction Teams, first in Afghanistan and more recently in Iraq.” ([Speech](#), Kansas State University, 26 November 2007)

l. “I remain concerned that we have yet to create any permanent capability or institutions to rapidly create and deploy these kinds of skills in the future. The examples I mentioned have, by and large, been created ad hoc – on the fly in a climate of crisis. As a nation, *we need to figure out how to institutionalize programs and relationships such as these*. And we need to find more untapped resources – places where it’s not necessarily how much you spend, but how you spend it. The way to institutionalize these capabilities is probably not to recreate or repopulate institutions of the past such as AID or USIA. On the other hand, just adding more people to existing government departments such as Agriculture, Treasury, Commerce, Justice and so on is not a sufficient answer either – even if they were to be more deployable overseas. *New institutions are needed for the 21st century, new organizations with a 21st century mind-set*.” ([Speech](#), Kansas State University, 26 November 2007)

m. “What is clear to me is that there is a need for a *dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security* – diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development.” ([Speech](#), Kansas State University, 26 November 2007)

n. “At the strategic level, *the greatest evolution in NATO over the last two decades is the transition from a static, defensive force to an expeditionary force – from a defensive alliance to a security alliance.* This change is a result of a new security environment in which threats are more likely to emanate from failed, failing, or fractured states than from aggressor states; where dangerous, non-state actors often operate from within nations with which we are not at war, or from within our own borders; and where weapons proliferation and new technologies make possible the specter of chaos and mass destruction in any of our capitals.” ([Speech](#), NATO Strategic Concept Seminar, 23 February 2010)

o. “...*the need for closer cooperation with partners and non-military multinational organizations.* One of the lessons of Kosovo and Afghanistan is that the missions we are most likely to undertake require a comprehensive approach that leverages both military and civilian capabilities. In recent years, there has been a recognition that the *EU* will not supplant *NATO* or vice versa – but that *both organizations have unique skill-sets that can, if used properly, add up to more than the sum of their individual parts.*” ([Speech](#), NATO Strategic Concept Seminar, 23 February 2010)

p. “All of this should be a *wake-up call that NATO needs serious, far-reaching, and immediate reforms* to address a crisis that has been years in the making. And unless the Strategic Concept spurs operational and institutional changes like those I just mentioned, it will not be worth the paper it is printed on.” ([Speech](#), NATO Strategic Concept Seminar, 23 February 2010)

q. “...our security assistance efforts writ large must be steady and long-term, in part to provide some measure of predictability and planning for our government, but more significantly, for our relationships abroad... *...whatever we do should reinforce the state department’s lead role in crafting and conducting U.S. foreign policy, to include foreign assistance, of which building security capacity is a key part.* Proper coordination and concurrence procedures will ensure that urgent military capacity building requirements do not undermine America’s overarching foreign policy priorities.” ([Speech](#), Nixon Center on Security Assistance, 24 February 2010)

r. “The *black-and-white distinction between conventional war and irregular war is becoming less relevant in the real world.* Possessing the ability to annihilate other militaries is no guarantee we can achieve our strategic goals – a point driven home especially in Iraq. The future will be even more complex, where conflict most likely will range across a broad spectrum of operations and lethality. Where even near-peer competitors will use irregular or asymmetric tactics and non-state actors may have weapons of mass destruction or sophisticated missiles.” ([Speech](#), U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 7 May 2010)

s. “*Confronting these threats is not the task of any one nation acting alone.* Rather, our collective response will test our commitment to the principles I just mentioned – principles that are key to the region’s continued prosperity. In this, all of us have

responsibilities we must fulfill, since all will bear the costs of instability as well as the rewards of international cooperation. My government's overriding obligation to allies, partners, and the region is to reaffirm America's security commitments..." ([Speech](#), International Institute for Strategic Studies, 5 June 2010)

t. "One of the most important areas where these forums can play a role is in promoting open, transparent, and equal access to the global commons. *Whether the issue is cyberspace, maritime security, or freedom of navigation, it is clear that increased multilateral dialogue is necessary* to avoid unnecessary tensions, miscalculations, and, in a worst-case scenario, open conflict. It is the longstanding policy of the United States to defend these principles, and we will continue to do so in the future." ([Speech](#), International Institute for Strategic Studies, 5 June 2010)

u. "The base budget request reflects these major institutional priorities... *...rebalancing America's defense posture by emphasizing both the capabilities needed to prevail in irregular conflicts, and the capabilities that likely will be needed in the future...*" ([Opening Statement](#), Senate Appropriations Committee, 6 June 2010)

v. "*There is the overall challenge of operating as part of a multinational, civil-military effort.* For sure, coalition warfare is nothing new. We did it in World War Two, in Korea, in the Persian Gulf, and we prepared for it with our European allies through the 40-year twilight war. However, in the case of Afghanistan, NATO's operations are hamstrung by national caveats, where different countries impose different rules on where their forces can go and what they can do. A number of our allies and partners have stepped forward courageously – showing a willingness to take physical risks on the battlefield and political risks at home. But *many have defense budgets that are so low, and coalition governments that are so precarious, that they cannot provide the quantity or type of forces needed for this kind of fight.*" ([Speech](#), U.S. Institute of Peace, 15 October 2008)

w. "Afghanistan has also shown the importance of what is called *strategic communications* – and by that term, I don't mean trying to use public relations as a substitute for policy. In Afghanistan, for example, the Taliban employ so-called night letters to sway and intimidate the local population. I've said before that *we need the equivalent of day letters* to persuade and inspire in the other direction. This is tied directly to the success of development efforts. As one USAID contractor who worked in Afghanistan put it, we need to show the citizenry that we are "*fully committed to making a difference, rather than working disconnectedly on 'one-off' projects.*" ([Speech](#), U.S. Institute of Peace, 15 October 2008)

x. "To be successful, the entirety of the NATO alliance, the European Union, NGOs, and other groups – *the full panoply of military and civilian elements – must better integrate and coordinate with one another...*" ([Speech](#), U.S. Institute of Peace, 15 October 2008)

y. "The security of the American people will increasingly depend on our *ability to head off the next insurgency or arrest the collapse of another failing state.* These are the *things we must be able to do as a nation, as an alliance, and as an international coalition.* As

Dean Acheson did so brilliantly, we must be prepared to change old ways of doing business and create new institutions – both nationally and internationally – to deal with the long-term challenges we face abroad. And *our own national security toolbox must be well-equipped with more than just hammers.*” ([Speech](#), U.S. Institute of Peace, 15 October 2008)

z. “..... the recent past vividly demonstrated the consequences of failing adequately to address the dangers posed by insurgencies or failing states. Terrorist networks can find sanctuary within the borders of a weak nation and strength within the chaos of social breakdown. A nuclear-armed state could collapse into chaos, and criminality. Let's be honest with ourselves. The most likely catastrophic threats to our homeland - for example, an American city poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist attack - are more likely to emanate from failing states than from aggressor states. *The kinds of capabilities needed to deal with these scenarios cannot be considered exotic distractions or temporary diversions. We do not have the luxury of opting out because they do not conform to preferred notions of the American way of war.*” ([Speech](#), National Defense University, 29 September 2009)

aa. “In Iraq, we've seen how an army that was basically a smaller version of the Cold War force can *over time become an effective instrument of counterinsurgency. But that came at a frightful human, financial, and political cost.* For every heroic and resourceful innovation by troops and commanders on the battlefield, there was some institutional shortcoming at the Pentagon they had to overcome. *Your task, particularly for those going back to your services, is to support the institutional changes necessary so the next set of colonels, captains, and sergeants will not have to be quite so heroic or quite so resourceful.*” ([Speech](#), National Defense University, 29 September 2009)

bb. “It has become clear that *America's civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned and underfunded for far too long* - relative to what we traditionally spend on the military, and more importantly, relative to the responsibilities and challenges our nation has around the world. Though I cannot pretend to know the right dollar amount - I do know it's a good deal more than the one percent of the federal budget that it is right now. Because the numbers we are talking about are relatively small compared to the rest of government, a steep increase in these capabilities is well within reach - as long as there is the political will and wisdom to do it.” ([Speech](#), U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, 15 July 2008)

cc. “Repeating an Afghanistan or Iraq - forced regime change followed by nation-building under fire - may be unlikely in the future. *What is likely though, even a certainty, is the need to work with and through local governments to avoid the next insurgency, to rescue the next failing state, or to head off the next humanitarian disaster.*” ([Speech](#), U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, 15 July 2008)

dd. “*The challenge facing our institutions is to adapt to new realities while preserving those core competencies and institutional traits that have made them so successful in the past.* The Foreign Service is not the Foreign Legion, and the U.S. military should never

be mistaken for a Peace Corps with guns.” ([Speech](#), U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, 15 July 2008)

ee. “Much of what we are talking about is a *matter of balancing risk: today’s demands versus tomorrow’s contingencies; irregular and asymmetric threats versus conventional threats*. As the world’s remaining superpower, we have to be able to dissuade, deter, and, if necessary, respond to challenges across the spectrum. Nonetheless, I have noticed *too much of a tendency towards what might be called “Next-War-itis” – the propensity of much of the defense establishment to be in favor of what might be needed in a future conflict*. This inclination is understandable, given the dominant role the Cold War had in shaping America’s peacetime military, where the United States constantly strove to either keep up with or get ahead of another superpower adversary...” ([Speech](#), Heritage Foundation, 13 May 2008)

2. Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn III.

a. “U.S. conventional dominance in almost all instances has *led potential adversaries to seek asymmetric tactics*. Rather than fighting us head to head, they use IEDs to counter our mechanized advantage, or guerrilla tactics to avoid direct combat. Some countries with ambitions in their regions are also investing in asymmetric weapons that could deny our access to the global commons.” ([Speech](#), LA World Affairs Council, 27 April 2010)

b. “...in a broader sense *we are working to institutionalize our ability to wage irregular warfare, a core mission that has been neglected for too long*. At the same time, we need to address the asymmetric threats I described by developing a range of new capabilities. This includes our ability to track and neutralize weapons of mass destruction, our ability to offer security assistance to weak and fragile states, and our ability to defend our computer networks against intrusion and attacks.” ([Speech](#), LA World Affairs Council, 27 April 2010)

3. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen.

a. "I would argue that in the *future struggles of the asymmetric counterinsurgent variety*, we ought to make it a precondition of committing our troops, that we will do so only if and when the *other instruments of national power* are ready to engage as well. " ([Speech](#), Landon Lecture Series, 3 March 2010)

b. "Now, there’s been much debate over how to balance traditional and irregular warfare capabilities in our military. As an underpinning, I see this principle applying to both. It chooses quality of people, training and systems over quantity of platforms. It means that we choose to go small in number before we go hollow in capability. And it *favors innovation in leaders, in doctrine, in organization and in technology*.” ([Speech](#), Landon Lecture Series, 3 March 2010)

c. “So too must it be in keeping with our security commitments around the world. We cannot ignore obligations to contribute to the defense of others and we cannot forget the

criticality of engagement with civilian agencies, allies, partners and nongovernmental organizations. Indeed, we should embrace such engagement, as I know you did here in this curriculum.” ([Speech](#), National Defense University, 10 June 2010)

d. “I urge you to make the effort to see problems through the perspectives and the eyes of others because America’s own power and our security is stronger when we act in concert with our friends. *No one military, no one nation can do it alone anymore.*” ([Speech](#), National Defense University, 10 June 2010)

e. “I think we all can see that many of the *problems we face today are best solved through cooperation over coercion, dialogue over distrust.* Ambassador Crocker said it best when he said that what’s needed in dealing with this world is a combination of understanding, persistence and a strategic patience to a degree that Americans traditionally have found hard to muster.” ([Speech](#), National Defense University, 10 June 2010)

4. Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General James Cartwright.

a. “... *lessons from the Iraq conflict about irregular warfare - including the need for simpler but more effective intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) collectors and new ground vehicles protected from improvised explosive devices - had not been indoctrinated into the service's strategies.*” ([Article Quotation](#), “Gates Proposes Massive Spending Shift”, *Aviation Week*, 12 April 2009)

b. “I have all too many experiences, from the ’70s forward, of having capabilities that we thought were right for the last war and really turned out not to be what we needed for the next war. *There is no crystal ball, but there is an understanding that through your people and through the capabilities that you field, you can have the Department of Defense and the national security apparatus relevant for the next conflicts.* That's our objective here.” ([Article Quotation](#), “Efficiency Initiative Has Broad Support, Cartwright Says”, *American Forces Press Service*, 10 August 2010)

c. “The reality is, *we don't fight alone. We don't deter alone, the U.S. cannot afford to do everything ourselves.* We are not an island. And that means the Pentagon must include the capabilities of those we will be partnered with as it builds requirements. The services first instinct — the country’s first instinct — is to say; we have to have the only capability. We have to fill every wrung on the ladder with the best capability in the world. *We cannot do it.*” ([Article Quotation](#), “Quantity, Not Quality, Says Hoss... U.S. Must Rely on Allies, DoD Buzz, 13 May 2010)

d. “... people will immediately say, we can't rely on allies in a fight. But the truth is that *America has not and will not fight alone,* and in the face of fiscal constraints *our strategy must fit those resources we do have...*” ([Article Quotation](#), “Quantity, Not Quality, Says Hoss... U.S. Must Rely on Allies, DoD Buzz, 13 May 2010)

e. “The *current culture gravitates to industrial solutions to problems*. That is only going to benefit U.S. enemies who are able to stay ahead of the Pentagon's ability to produce new capabilities. The Pentagon is guided by a mindset that says that building a new airplane with better sensors will give the U.S. military an edge. That thinking is from another era, and may not be helpful because it takes years or decades to design and build a new airplane. *I don't know what the fight will look like in five years. It's not going to be the hardware or the sensor that will provide the winning edge, but rather using the information to solve problems, he said. Making that cultural shift is very difficult.*” ([Article Quotation](#), “Future of War: How the Game is Changing of War”, *Entrepreneur*, August 2009)

f. “Senator, I think you have framed it very well. The intent here is a shift in strategy to a more *counterinsurgency-type strategy of clear, hold, and then build*. We have been in the Helmand Province before with Marines and other forces and done clearing actions. *The challenge is that when we finish the clearing actions, we return to our bases and the local population takes the brunt of the punishment after we leave...* I believe personally that one of our key metrics for success will be over the next few months to see whether or not there is a shift in the attitude of the local residents.” ([Testimony](#), Confirmation Hearing Senate Armed Services Committee, 9 July 2010)

g. “*In the hold, the quicker that we can transition to some sort of a livelihood and stability that gives the local residents the opportunity to make a living and be advantaged by the conditions is key. Our ability to bring civilians in and surge those civilians from the U.S., from various organizations, the agriculture side, from the land grant colleges and things like that, right now has not moved at a pace that probably we would like it to. We would like to see them move faster, but we are working as hard as we can with our partners in State to make that happen.*” ([Testimony](#), Confirmation Hearing Senate Armed Services Committee, 9 July 2010)

h. “And the reality is *we don't fight alone; we don't deter alone; we don't assure alone. Everything is done in partnership. Everything is done in coalitions*. And if we don't do our strategy thinking about up and out instead of down and inward, we will miss the point of the way we do business, okay? Seems like an obvious thing, but I tell you, it is not. We tend to go inward. What are we going to do? We have to have the only capability. We have to fill every ladder on the – every rung on the ladder with the best capability in the world.” ([Speech](#), “Adapting to Tomorrow's Strategic Challenges”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 13 May 2010)

i. “There are other very capable nations out there, very willing to partner up. And *we've got to make sure that our strategy is inclusive, not just acknowledges but brings in and incorporates the capabilities of those we're likely to be partnered with, okay?*” ([Speech](#), “Adapting to Tomorrow's Strategic Challenges”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 13 May 2010)

j. “*Civil affairs has been an area that has been under-resourced* for as long as I can remember. The bulk of it, for the past 10 or 15 years, I think, has been in the garden

reserve which – the good on that is that we tend to get people who actually work in that area and bring real skill to the job but the demand seems to – has exceeded the capacity to go out and recruit to those areas. If we leave the demand in place, we incentivize it better. We'll get the quality. What we have to do now, my sense is, is not bring it into the active force because then you'll get somebody who gets, you know, six months worth of school and now is an expert versus somebody who's actually been a practitioner out there.” ([Speech](#), “Adapting to Tomorrow’s Strategic Challenges”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 13 May 2010)

k. *“I don’t think there’s anything in our future that says this (stability operations) is going away anytime soon. And so this is the classic, how many, you know, bomber squadrons do you want versus how many people do you want associated with stability operations and that end of the range of military operations? And it’s a question of balances. It’s not a question of either/or. And so the balance, right now, is moving more towards what used to be called the lower end of the spectrum, but *stability operations, influence operations. You know, those types of things that help our partners help themselves. And I don’t see us moving away from that anytime soon.* The difficulty here is in the competition for resource; people want to build the high end. *What we need is the low end.* It’s the war we’re in and the bias towards it that we’re trying to drive.”* ([Speech](#), “Adapting to Tomorrow’s Strategic Challenges”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 13 May 2010)

5. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy.

a. “Our 2010 QDR embraces a key lesson of more than eight years of war: *intelligent adversaries will seek to confront our weaknesses, not our strengths.* U.S. forces in this century will need to prevail against a wide range of challenges: from insurgencies and state failure, to regional powers seeking to deny U.S. access to critical regions, to the *ever expanding “hybrid” possibilities* in between. We will need the agility of a David, not the clumsiness of a Goliath.” ([Speech](#), Center for a New American Security, 10 June 2010)

b. “Our efforts to rebalance the force center on ensuring that our military can be truly versatile across the full range of possible conflicts. For far too long we assumed that, for example, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, building security capacity and stability operations were “lesser included” cases—subsets of the canonical contingencies that dominated our defense planning. As long as we planned for conventional warfare, so the argument went, we could succeed in these other operations. We all know where that approach got us. So today we are *elevating the most plausible series of challenges as the basis for our force planning.* These challenges include counterinsurgency and capacity-building operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also preparing for new threats to the primary means that the United States utilizes to project power—our military bases, sea and air assets, and the networks that support them.” ([Speech](#), Center for a New American Security, 10 June 2010)

c. “To put it bluntly, we’re trying to face 21st century threats with national security processes and tools that were designed for the Cold War—and with a bureaucracy that sometimes seems to have been designed for the Byzantine Empire, which, you will recall, didn’t end well. *We’re still too often rigid when we need to be flexible, clumsy when we need to be agile, slow when we need to be fast, focused on individual agency equities when we need to be focused on the broader whole of government mission. ... But if we as a government can’t get better at linking ends, ways, and means, we will not adequately position the United States to protect and advance our national interests in the face of a very challenging 21st century security and economic environment.* And just to translate for any lay persons in the audience: that’s defense wonk speak for “adapt or fail.””

([Speech](#), Center for a New American Security, 10 June 2010)

d. “We need partners and allies who can effectively secure their own borders, work with us to address transnational threats like terrorism, and provide legitimate and effective security and governance to their populations. *We also need partners who can stand and fight alongside our forces and contribute to peacekeeping and stabilization missions.*”

([Speech](#), Center for a New American Security, 10 June 2010)

e. “*Our security assistance system was inherited from the Cold War. It was built to provide major weapons platforms to allies over a period of many years. It was not designed to provide counterinsurgency assistance to Pakistan—or counterterrorism assistance to Yemen—or counternarcotics assistance to Colombia or Mexico—on an urgent basis. It lacks flexibility and responsiveness: witness our struggles to build the military capacities so critical to successful transitions in Iraq and Afghanistan.*” ([Speech](#), Center for a New American Security, 10 June 2010)

f. “Last December, Secretary Gates proposed one possible way ahead. Drawing on a model employed by the United Kingdom, he suggested a “*pooled resources*” approach that shares funding and responsibility across departments. The idea is for DoD, State and perhaps other agencies to contribute resources to create one or more pooled funding mechanisms. These pooled funds would be used for *urgent programs that cut across traditional DoD and State mission areas like stability operations and conflict prevention, and would incentivize interagency collaboration* on a deeper and more meaningful level.”

([Speech](#), Center for a New American Security, 10 June 2010)

g. “A core task of senior leaders at the Department of Defense is to ensure that hard-fought *wartime lessons are institutionalized at all levels* to win the wars we are in while simultaneously preparing for future challenges—not all of which are apparent today. Finding and maintaining the right balance between these imperatives remains the guiding principle as DOD develops and eventually implements the Quadrennial Defense Review.” ([Article](#), “The Contested Commons”, *Proceedings*, July 2009)

h. “In broad terms, America's recent wartime experience, combined with insights derived from other contemporary conflicts, suggest that the U.S. military will *increasingly face three types of challenges: rising tensions in the global commons; hybrid threats that*

contain a mix of traditional and irregular forms of conflict; and the problem of *weak and failing states*.” ([Article](#), “The Contested Commons”, *Proceedings*, July 2009)

6. Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy James Miller.

a. “*I do not see the need to modify the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichol Act at this time. The Act was a very significant piece of legislation that, over the course of several decades, has led to dramatic improvements in the effectiveness of the Armed Forces – from strategic decisionmaking to operational command and control. An entire generation of military officers now has a much improved perspective on coordinated, multi-service, joint training and operations.*” ([Answers to Advance Questions](#), Confirmation Hearing Senate Armed Services Committee, 26 March 2009)

b. On *priorities*: “If confirmed, I would give priority to the major challenges identified by the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P), and to strengthening the organizational capacity of OSD Policy to address them. I would also *pay close attention to help develop and maintain effective working relationships with both military and civilian counterparts in the Department and the interagency.*” ([Answers to Advance Questions](#), Confirmation Hearing Senate Armed Services Committee, 26 March 2009)

c. On *priorities*: “If confirmed, *I look forward to aiding the USD(P) in working with interagency partners to help implement an improved strategy that can effectively engage our coalition partners and the international community to advance reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan.*” ([Answers to Advance Questions](#), Confirmation Hearing Senate Armed Services Committee, 26 March 2009)

d. “*Without question, the job of adapting our transatlantic alliance relationships to meet 21st century challenges is going to be arduous.* The President and the Secretary of Defense have stressed our country’s stakes in a strong, mutually supportive NATO alliance. To rebuild NATO solidarity, we need, first and foremost, a broadly agreed way-ahead for achieving durable progress on Afghanistan, especially where ISAF operations have been impeded by national caveats or the dearth of civilian expertise for critical missions. Closer to home, the alliance faces a more assertive Russia, continued instability in part of the Balkans and among former Soviet republics, and new concerns over cyber security and global climate change.” ([Answers to Advance Questions](#), Confirmation Hearing Senate Armed Services Committee, 26 March 2009)

e. “*President Obama and Secretary Gates have both stressed the need for the United States and NATO to invest more in its non-military instruments of national power. Many of our NATO allies have unique civilian capabilities that can enhance the overall effort in Afghanistan. The questions that both we and they now face are how best to mobilize these resources and target them to maximum positive effect. Also, as previously noted, forging a shared strategic view of the emerging threat environment and updating NATO’s strategic concept from both a military and civilian governance perspective will be critical to success in Afghanistan.*” ([Answers to Advance Questions](#), Confirmation Hearing Senate Armed Services Committee, 26 March 2009)

f. “If confirmed, subject to guidance provided by USD(P) and the Secretary, I will support a policy of continued U.S. military-to-military engagement, and as appropriate, given opportunities and resource constraints, expanding this engagement. *The emerging security environment requires that we engage with our partners and allies around the world, and work to build productive relationships with many states for which our past military-to-military engagements have been limited or absent entirely.*” ([Answers to Advance Questions](#), Confirmation Hearing Senate Armed Services Committee, 26 March 2009)

g. “*I believe military-to-military contacts contribute to U.S. national security in a variety of important ways. Such activities can help to strengthen the capacity of partner nations to counter terrorism and other transnational threats, both within and beyond their borders, thereby potentially relieving stress on U.S. forces. They can help harmonize nations’ views of common security challenges. Military-to-military activities can also help safeguard investments made by other U.S. assistance programs. Finally, and very importantly, when performed effectively, military-to-military activities should show by example how military forces can act effectively while respecting human rights and civilian control.*” ([Answers to Advance Questions](#), Confirmation Hearing Senate Armed Services Committee, 26 March 2009)

h. “*Success in stability operations in a post-conflict environment requires integrating the efforts of civilian and military organizations in all aspects, from planning through execution. It is important for civilian agencies to lead in areas such as fostering political reconciliation, building accountable and legitimate institutions of government, restoring public infrastructure and reviving economic activity. Military forces are best suited to helping provide a safe and secure environment and to assist in building accountable armed forces. Over the last several years, the U.S. military has learned many hard lessons, and if confirmed I will work closely with the USD(P), military leaders and other U.S. government agencies to ensure that the Department properly institutionalizes adaptation to better prepare for future challenges.*” ([Answers to Advance Questions](#), Confirmation Hearing Senate Armed Services Committee, 26 March 2009)

i. “*Improved interagency planning of operations is critical, and must start early. Because the situation on the ground will change, strategies and plans must be adapted over time. The Department of Defense must retain significant capabilities for stability operations, and other agencies and departments must build increased capacity to support these operations. Building partner capacity is an essential task which requires significant leadership attention and resources. Engaging allies and other coalition partners to contribute, while often challenging, is essential. It is critical that the Department of Defense and other departments/agencies better institutionalize wartime lessons, and fully resource those capabilities and organizational innovations that have proved critical to success in stability operations.*” ([Answers to Advance Questions](#), Confirmation Hearing Senate Armed Services Committee, 26 March 2009)

j. “Generally, the Department of Defense’s role should be to support, not lead, in the exercise of “soft power.” However, *the Department plays an important role in helping to promote – through planning, exchanges, exercises, operations, and bilateral defense relationships – the conditions that enable these instruments to be applied successfully.*” ([Answers to Advance Questions](#), Confirmation Hearing Senate Armed Services Committee, 26 March 2009)

k. “The State Department should have the lead in setting U.S. foreign policy and foreign priorities broadly, including security assistance. *DoD has critical roles to play, however, in informing, developing, and implementing such programs in an effective and timely manner. In my view, strong interagency.*” ([Answers to Advance Questions](#), Confirmation Hearing Senate Armed Services Committee, 26 March 2009)

7. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Spec Ops/Low-Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities Michael Vickers.

a. “Well, first, the United States really faces *three broad challenges as you look out over the next 20, 25 years.* ... second is the *irregular warfare challenge*, principally dealing with radical Islamists, but perhaps not exclusively—which includes state failure and a range of other problems... Others say irregular warfare is a passing fancy, and you certainly wouldn’t want to bet the farm on that and be wrong in either case.” ([Panel Discussion](#), Council on Foreign Relations, 27 October 2006)

b. “...*there’s not one form of irregular warfare.* There’s counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, large-scale stability. They all *require different concepts, different forces, different technologies*, in some degree. *The idea that one force does all that is just wrong.*” ([Panel Discussion](#), Council on Foreign Relations, 27 October 2006)

c. “Over the longer haul, I think the correct direction with them is to move the—to take advantage of some of our technological skill and move the meter a little bit, if you will, *more toward the irregular spectrum—that is, in terms of equipment, in terms of the vehicles that provide force protection, in terms of the training and skills sets and organization—because irregular warfare is probably going to be the dominant business for ground forces*, but they still may have to project large-scale land power against a conventional adversary.” ([Panel Discussion](#), Council on Foreign Relations, 27 October 2006)

d. “*If you think you’re going to be in this business longer term, you ought to start fencing this.* We’re starting to do this. The Marine Corps just stood up a foreign military training unit, but *we’re really at the infant stages.* I mean, *Iraq is just a response to a problem right now; it’s not institutionalized.*” ([Panel Discussion](#), Council on Foreign Relations, 27 October 2006)

e. “Now I’d like to talk about the *irregular warfare challenge* and its implications for air and space power. I think it’s really *imperative that this be seen as a core mission for the*

US Air Force, and the very different challenges of irregular warfare and these higher-end threats really necessitate not only a portfolio approach to capabilities across our department but I believe within our services and in particular in the Air Force. The requirements of the Global War on Terror require just enormous demands for ISR. The challenges in a high scale conventional campaign will require different forms of ISR. Now that ISR that we use for conventional can also be applied to irregular warfare but we wouldn't have it in sufficient numbers if we basically focused on one on trying to make a general purpose. We should use general purpose forces wherever we can but again these requirements are so diverse in terms of advanced air defense environments, versus just the need to have persistence over wide ungoverned areas that I think *a portfolio approach is absolutely essential.*" ([Speech](#), Air and Space Conference, 16 September 2008)

f. "Well *building partner capacity is really a central aspect in our war on terror strategy*, as I said, that relies principally on an indirect approach. This is one of the nine joint portfolio areas by which we're increasingly managing the department. And this is why we've had an expansion of a lot of forces that really specialize in this; our special forces, for example, our combat aviation advisers and others, and we may need to expand some further. And *general purpose forces, they need to take on a larger role in this area* than they have historically. But whether it's hardening allies to withstand conventional attack or building partner capacity to win the war on terror, it's *a central element now of US strategy.*" ([Speech](#), Air and Space Conference, 16 September 2008)

g. "Terrorism occurs globally. It occurs sub-regionally. And it occurs within countries. And *we need to adapt our institutions* to make that work. *In stability and reconstruction operations, we need to build capabilities in other parts of the department, like the Department of State.*" ([Testimony](#), Senate Armed Services Committee, 14 June 2007)

h. "What one can likely say is that the war we're in will likely continue for some time—that is, the broader global war on terrorism. *Irregular warfare will be the most likely form of conflict in the couple decades ahead.* But we retain the *requirements to maintain strategic deterrence, conventional deterrence, and if necessary, the ability to wage traditional wars, while we fight these irregular wars.*" ([Interview](#), Council on Foreign Relations, 24 June 2008)

i. "As to your question about whether the war on terror is fundamentally winnable—yes it is. But as *it is a global insurgency, and one that is ideologically driven, it will take—most irregular wars take time to win.* They typically take a decade or more when they involve a single country. One that takes advantage of globalization and spans continents can be expected to take at least that amount of time or more. But typically *the way irregular wars end is you drive the belligerence down to a very small level and then increasingly negotiate with those that can be accommodated, and not have successive generations join them,* depending on whether they're a traditional insurgent group or a terrorist group. And then the violence goes from low levels to petering out or to having a negotiated settlement." ([Interview](#), Council on Foreign Relations, 24 June 2008)

j. “We’re in the midst of another Quadrennial Defense Review that is still in its early stages. The big decisions will be made early this fall. *But further improving our irregular warfare across the force, not just Special Operations Forces, capabilities and capabilities is job one for the QDR.* So we will look principally at where we still have gaps during this QDR. It may be more in the area of things that enable our Special Operations Forces to operate even more effectively rather than expanding some of the operating units, but there may be some combination of that as well as we go through the review.” ([Interview](#), Defense Writers Group, 23 July 2009)

k. “The Afghan, *insurgency and counterinsurgency is a people intensive business* at the end of the day. You’re *fighting fundamentally for influence over a population.* So while technology can really enable that, and it certainly did in the 1980s, there are many other factors that were very important. The *international coalition* that was arrayed, the commitment of the Afghan people to a horrendous fight. They had lost a million dead. They had a third of their population driven in exile. I mean it’s not like one silver bullet capability made this some clean or antiseptic war. There was a decisive battle in the Cold War, but it was a very tough one. *Insurgencies and correspondingly counterinsurgencies tend to be protracted conflicts.* So they are *fundamentally won or lost by influence over a population and then respective wills of other decision makers about how long they want to continue a fight* or whatever the case is.” ([Interview](#), Defense Writers Group, 23 July 2009)

l. “Ultimately, *because insurgencies have to be won locally, they’re fundamentally internal conflicts.* Whatever one calls the indirect approach, you’ve got to get there sooner or later.” ([Interview](#), Defense Writers Group, 23 July 2009)

m. “As we have been engaged in these conflicts, we tend to believe now that *the most persistent form of conflict over the next couple of decades will likely be irregular conflicts of one kind of another.* But we still have to *be prepared for conventional conflicts* to deter them and if necessary fight them. And *we require general purposes forces to be able to span that spectrum.* We can’t have specialized, an oxymoron, but specialized general purpose forces. For the irregular conflicts that we’ve been in, we’ve committed our entire general purpose force on the ground force side with the rotation base. So we couldn’t have sliced off some segment of them.” ([Interview](#), Defense Writers Group, 23 July 2009)

n. “Where I think you get to this idea of SOF-like is for these counterinsurgency missions what kind of training do I provide? If *the SOF model is a lot of intensive training up front, and a lot of experience and continuity of personnel, can you replicate that in the general purpose force for the missions that they need to do?* They need languages. Again, they don’t have to do special operations force missions to take advantage of some of those same characteristics. Chairman Mullen has talked about recently trying to make some of our general purpose force higher headquarters more SOF-like in a sense, more agile in the way they process information. Again, to *adapt sort of organizational structures rather than the mission.*” ([Interview](#), Defense Writers Group, 23 July 2009)

o. “Then *because we expect irregular war or more appropriately, adversaries to adopt asymmetric strategies even at the high end. They won't necessarily take us on where we're strong. They will attack computer networks or they will attack our bases or they will do something else. So we need to make sure our whole suite of capabilities deals with those challenges, and again, recognizing that we're inevitably going to get things wrong.* So the idea that we could have one set of capabilities that can meet even what we know are our current challenge and what we think are our future challenges, it seems foolish that I would go to one end or the other completely and say go all conventional or go all irregular. And so *you need a balance.* And the question is whether we have that balance right. Again, some, if you look at this concept of high end, swing, and low end, and I don't really like the term low end. *Irregular wars can be more lethal than so-called high tech or conventional wars. But there are capabilities you might optimize for the low end.* Not all of them, but a big chunk of them might move into the middle area at least, against some kind of conventional adversaries.” ([Interview](#), Defense Writers Group, 23 July 2009)

p. “As far as SOF and irregular warfare, there are a number of irregular war studies that have been going on since the Quadrennial Defense Review which really highlighted the importance of irregular warfare. SOCOM just completed one, J8 of the Joint Staff has completed another, the Deputy Secretary has directed a couple of studies one of which my office is doing with PA&E, another one is being directed by the guidance for development of the force. *So we're looking at a lot of different aspects of that. How we train, advise and assist foreign partners and what kind of capabilities and capacities we need to execute that. Both with general purpose forces and special operations forces. And I might add, civilians as well. The full range of training and advising. What the appropriate roles for DoD are there compared to our interagency partners; how we should continue to try to strike a balance in our general purposes forces between irregular warfare and conventional campaigns. General purposes forces have to be able to swing both ways in how they should be trained, equipped and organized to be able to do that. That's an ongoing process of evaluation as well.*” ([Interview](#), Defense Writers Group, 6 February 2008)

8. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans Janine Davidson.

a. “The CCO¹ is an innovative, and, as I will explain in a few minutes, in some ways, radical, interagency experiment. Its goal is to *enhance unity of effort for complex operations [stability ops, counterinsurgency, and Irregular warfare]* by networking – both virtually and more traditionally – civilian and military educators and trainers dedicated to preparing people for *the most likely operational challenges of the 21st Century.*” ([Speech](#), CCO Kickoff Conference, 28 April 2008)

b. “These so-called “irregular” challenges – as outlined in the military’s Quadrennial Defense Review – stem from our significant overmatch in conventional military combat power combined with dramatic shifts in the international security environment. *This*

¹ Consortium for Complex Operations.

military overmatch means that 21st century enemies are simply less likely to face us head-on in a traditional military-to-military engagement, but will instead find other less conventional ways of challenging us. Additionally, as Dr. Cohen just discussed, the problems of failed and failing states; ethnic, tribal, and sectarian conflict; global warming, and other transnational threats and challenges in this increasingly interdependent world make it very likely that *the United States and its allies will continue to engage abroad in complex and often chaotic environments where establishing stability and promoting the human security of civilians will be a primary objective.* ([Speech](#), CCO Kickoff Conference, 28 April 2008)

c. “We also recognize that *success in these “complex operations” requires an integrated, whole of government approach that allows multiple actors from myriad agencies and organizations to apply distinct skill sets toward a common objective.* Let me unpack this last point: It is one thing to have complementary expertise and skill-sets, but it is something entirely different – and potentially toxic – to have divergent perspectives on what the problem is. What we need is a cadre of civilian and military practitioners with distinct and complementary capabilities; but they must share a common view of the strategic objectives and have common operating principles.” ([Speech](#), CCO Kickoff Conference, 28 April 2008)

d. “*To truly achieve such unity of effort, we need to work together before deployment, and, as General Petraeus indicated, before planning even begins.* Ideally, unity of effort starts in the classroom and on the training grounds, where people develop these shared principles – before they arrive in theater or even meet for the first time.” ([Speech](#), CCO Kickoff Conference, 28 April 2008)

e. “All of us in this room are charged with bringing up the next generation – even as we continue to deploy at a steady pace to Afghanistan, Iraq and beyond. *You simply gotta get it right.*” ([Speech](#), CCO Kickoff Conference, 28 April 2008)

f. “So, if the nation is to succeed in the short and maybe the medium term, the military will continue to need to fill this gap. But *in the medium to long term, the military will need prepare itself for the eventual arrival of more civilian partners.* I think *this will be much harder than we actually think it will be.*” ([Speaker’s Notes](#), Combined Arms Center Senior Leaders Conference, 3 February 2009)

g. “*Many of these problems cannot be solved by the military, but need congressional intervention and budgeting realignment. DoD leaders can continue to advocate for their civilian counterparts, as Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates have done, but developing more empowered expeditionary civilians means taking a different tack with respect to authorities and funding.* For example, USAID officers on PRT’s have complained that they don’t even have the same spending authority that a soldier with CERP funds has.” ([Speaker’s Notes](#), Combined Arms Center Senior Leaders Conference, 3 February 2009)

h. “*If and when the civilian experts that the military is hoping for do show up, the military will need to be prepared.* Specifically, they will need to have internalized what

they mean when they say they will “support” the other elements of national power to accomplish the key lines of operation (e.g. governance, rule of law, economic development, etc). Supporting these efforts will not mean staying in the purely ‘kinetic’ or security lane. These *civil-military lines are overlapping and intersecting. Coordinating all elements of power will require civilians and military actors to understand the complex environment and have agreed upon frameworks for action.*” ([Speaker’s Notes](#), Combined Arms Center Senior Leaders Conference, 3 February 2009)

i. “Civil-military operations are like a symphony in which each musician has a unique skill and a different instrument. Each learns to play and practice alone; but then comes together to practice for the real performance. Unlike a symphony, however, in stability operations and counterinsurgency, we have had neither the same sheets of music nor a conductor in the field. Thus, *it is critical that people from various agencies and organizations are able to practice together before deployment.*” ([Speaker’s Notes](#), Combined Arms Center Senior Leaders Conference, 3 February 2009)

j. “As the stability operations manual makes clear, a comprehensive approach requires a “3C’s” approach to “coordinate, collaborate, and cooperate.” None of this can occur without a 4th C: “communicate.” Unfortunately, *a competing imperative for cyber security has meant that our ability to communicate with each other within the government – much less with outside agencies – has been stymied...* Although the cyber threat may be real, *if we cannot find ways to communicate in these civil-military environments, our efforts to operationalize the comprehensive approach will be for naught.*” ([Speaker’s Notes](#), Combined Arms Center Senior Leaders Conference, 3 February 2009)

k. “*It is perfectly understandable to hope that the military will conduct fewer stability operations in the future, but hoping does not make it so.* The military still needs to prepare itself for the missions it will most likely be called on to perform. *Given the thousands of troops over the last 200 years who have repeatedly been called to conduct these messy stability operations with little to no doctrine, education, or training, it seems high time someone put some rigorous effort into understanding how to conduct them better.*” ([Article](#), “The New Army Stability Operations Manual: Fact, Fiction, and Perspective on FM 3-07”, *Small Wars Journal*, 20 October 2008)

l. “...the nature of conflict is more complex than the pure science of defeating enemy militaries. *If we truly wish leave a lasting peace in the places in which we intervene or fight, we do not have a choice between preparing for pure scientific battles and preparing for stability operations.* At a minimum, if we do not stabilize a place after we bring down an enemy, then we set a trajectory for more chaos not peace. In so many other cases where the military is called to intervene in on-going conflicts or insurgencies, where the need to provide human security is the decisive line of operation, we need a military with a “full spectrum” mindset to understand the myriad interconnected tasks required to get the job done.” ([Article](#), “The New Army Stability Operations Manual: Fact, Fiction, and Perspective on FM 3-07”, *Small Wars Journal*, 20 October 2008)

m. “...*despite aspirations to the contrary, the desired capability and capacity in civilian agencies not only does not currently exist, but it is not likely to be built in the near future.* More importantly, even if and when USAID, State and all the other agencies were to enhance their expeditionary capacity 10 fold, these civilians would still not be capable – nor should they be – of doing their thing while bullets are still flying. That is the definition of a combatant, not a civilian. This means that *the military will, at a minimum, be required to set a trajectory for accomplishing the long term strategic objectives with or without civilian experts on the ground.* Once the environment is safe enough for civilians to engage, the military needs to know how to support their work. *This means having a fundamental understanding of the nature of the conflict environment, the intersecting lines of operation (e.g. governance, security, economic development, etc), and the appropriate coordination of efforts among myriad military and civilian actors.*” ([Article](#), “The New Army Stability Operations Manual: Fact, Fiction, and Perspective on FM 3-07”, *Small Wars Journal*, 20 October 2008)

9. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations/Low-Intensity and Interdependent Robert Martinage.

a. “...this paper recommends the following steps be considered by the next administration... *Establish a Joint Irregular Warfare Command* to ensure an appropriate balance, in both strategy and resources, between direct and indirect approaches to special operations.” ([Report](#), Special Operations Forces: Future Challenges and Opportunities, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2008)

b. “While the resources devoted to SOCOM’s indirect capabilities have increased substantially since the terrorist attacks of September 11 , 2001, *the indirect warfare part of the portfolio (unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, and PSYOPS) is under-represented bureaucratically and, in some areas, remains underresourced.*” ([Report](#), Special Operations Forces: Future Challenges and Opportunities, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2008)

c. “This *imbalance could be addressed by creating a three-star, sub-unified operational command under SOCOM focused on indirect warfare — a Joint Irregular Warfare Command (JIWC).*” ([Report](#), Special Operations Forces: Future Challenges and Opportunities, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2008)

d. ““Most [of the services] are focused on conventional military operations scenarios... the current wars have driven the military to rethink its smaller scale technologies. Clearly *there [are things] going on in the irregular warfare area that are significant shifts.*” ([Article Quotation](#), “Wars Drive Technological Changes”, *Medill Reports*, 9 December 2009)

e. “Defeating terrorist groups “*will require a multifaceted approach... one in which the military instrument will often be far less important than effective foreign assistance, public and private diplomacy, strategic communications and covert action.*” ([Article](#)

[Quotation](#), “Normalizing Unconventional Warfare”, *Defence and Arms*, 3 December 2008)

f. “Defeating terrorist groups will require *a multifaceted approach*... one in which the *military instrument will often be far less important than effective foreign assistance, public and private diplomacy, strategic communications and covert action.*” ([Article Quotation](#), “Normalizing Unconventional Warfare”, *Defence and Arms*, 3 December 2008)

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