Army Capstone Concept Draft
Version 2.7
21 September 2009

Operating under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict

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Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
Foreword

From the Commanding General
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

Ideas matter. Emerging from specific human, historical, and technological contexts, ideas affect understanding and influence behavior. Ideas can serve as the driving force behind significant institutional change. Because the need for change will always be with us, the exchange of ideas and guided conceptual development must be among our top priorities.

This document, the Army Capstone Concept (ACC), also matters. The purpose of the ACC is to clearly articulate ideas—how to think about future conflict within an uncertain and complex environment. Within the Army Concept Strategy, this concept will form the baseline of a campaign of experimentation and critique that will examine and test these ideas. Ultimately, the ideas that emerge from this process will guide changes in doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leader development and education, personnel, facilities, and policy.

Sound concepts should possess certain elements. First, concepts must be grounded in reality. Current operations, recent experience, and historical insight should all inform conceptual development. Second, concepts should also address specific needs. These needs should not emerge from a vision of warfare that we find convenient or one that we wish existed. Instead, an assessment of the challenges and capabilities of the future force should result from a projection of future warfare based on a deep and broad historical understanding of the nature of war and the characteristics of warfare emerging from current interactions with today’s enemies. The combination of these perspectives approaches a realistic view of future conflict. Third, concepts should either introduce new ideas or clarify current doctrine. Perhaps most importantly, the ACC will maintain a complementary relationship with current doctrine.

As if dealing with such issues was not difficult enough, the challenge of seriously thinking about an uncertain future brings with it an additional dilemma. How does a large institution acknowledge the uncertainty of the future as well as develop the detailed planning required to prepare for that future? When the Army attempts to deal with uncertainty, we are faced with two courses of action: we can either attempt to increase our information-processing capacity—to create a network-centric approach and operate with more information; or we can design the entire organization, and indeed structure our conceptualization of warfare itself, in such a way as to maximize our ability to operate on the basis of less than perfect information. Dealing with this dilemma underscores the primary ideas within the ACC. Moreover, this dilemma is at the heart of the challenges the U.S. Army will face in the future.

The ACC describes the broad capabilities the Army will require in 2016-2028 to apply finite resources to overcome a combination of hybrid threats, adaptive adversaries, and enemies in complex operating environments. These factors will challenge the future force’s ability to set conditions that achieve or facilitate the achievement of national objectives. Uncertainty will not go away in the future. Fog and friction will remain. Future adversaries will constantly adapt and seek ways to overcome our strengths and capitalize on our vulnerabilities. To counter these threats and deal with these challenges, the U.S. Army must maintain its core competencies of close combat in virtually any terrain, weather, and against a variety of hybrid threats. At the same time, the Army must also hone an ability to continually adapt to the changing situations of conflict.

As this concept will highlight, dealing with uncertainty requires a mindset based on flexibility of thought and operational adaptability. It calls for leaders at all levels who are
comfortable with collaborative planning and execution, allowable levels of risk, and the ability
and willingness to make adjustments according to the situation. Moreover, operational
adaptability acknowledges that we should not impose artificial categories on war—categories
that deny war’s ability to change in mid-course, or to adopt different guises at the same time.

To achieve this mindset, the Army must hone its ability to gain, sustain, and exploit
physical control and psychological influence over land, resources, and people by threat, force,
or occupation. The Army must be able to both persuade and coerce. Future leaders and their
organizations must have the capability to think in terms of friendly (partners and allies), the
enemy, and the people, and possess the flexibility to secure populations while simultaneously
attacking or defending to defeat enemy organizations. We must prepare our land forces, as part
of a joint, intergovernmental, interagency and multinational team to prevail in protracted
campaigns; engage to help other nations build capacity and assure friends and allies; to support
civil authorities at home and abroad; and deter and defeat hybrid threats and hostile state actors.
The future force must be able to conduct combined arms operations in sufficient force and for an
ample duration to establish security and overwhelm the enemy in their area of operations. Thus,
the task of the Army will be to assist its friends, to reassure and protect populations, and to
identify, isolate, and destroy the enemy. In the end, this concept will inform the education,
training, and organization of future forces.

In many ways, this concept seeks to underscore the importance of decentralization—or the
development of doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leader development and education,
personnel, facilities that can distribute the ability to deal with uncertainty throughout the force.
As we develop these ideas, the Army should look to technology to provide additional capabilities
to meet these challenges in the future. At the same time we must reinforce the conclusion that
technology is not a panacea to the fog of war and the friction of battle. Critical thinking by
Soldiers and their leaders will remain our most valuable asset. Yet circumstances will put even
those assets to the test.

Our attempts to impose order on the chaos of battle are just that—incomplete attempts. As
Martin van Creveld points out, “a certain amount of confusion and waste are, owing to the great
uncertainty involved, inevitable in war; and that such confusion is not inconsistent with, and may
indeed be a prerequisite for, results.” In other words, our actions in war are merely attempts to
impose order on chaos—they do not achieve this goal in its entirety. The ambiguity that remains
will be both an asset and a liability. We must accept this ambiguity and adjust our thinking to
prepare our organizations to deal with this uncertainty.

To achieve clarity in thinking about future war and future Army operations, it is critical that
our force engages intellectually with the draft concept that follows. While this document will
help provide the conceptual foundation for Army modernization, it is not the final word on these
ideas. I cannot overemphasize how important it is to scrutinize this concept. Between 15 August
and 01 December 2009, we must continue to question our assumptions and update our concepts,
and I welcome your comments and collaboration in this effort. We will publish the final concept
at the end of the calendar year. The more debate that occurs before that time, the better the
Army Capstone Concept—and the Army—will be.

MARTIN DEMPSEY
General, United States Army
History. This pamphlet is an in-cycle revision of the TRADOC Pam 525-3-0. The portions affected by this revision are listed in the summary of change. This revision changes the conceptual focus of the Army from major combat operations to that of operating in uncertainty and complexity.

Summary. TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 describes broad capabilities the Army will require to apply finite resources to overcome a combination of hybrid threats, and adaptive adversaries in complex operating environments. This operating environment impacts the future force’s ability to fight and win the Nation’s wars. This capstone concept will lead force development and employment efforts by establishing a common framework to think about future Army operations. TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 places modernization decisions in a broader context of future armed conflict, and establishes the conceptual foundation for subordinate concepts that refine the Army’s vision of how it will operate in the future.

Applicability. This concept is the foundation for future force development and the base for subsequent developments of supporting concepts, concept capability plans, and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process. It supports experimentation described in the ARCIC Campaign Plan and functions as the conceptual basis for developing solutions related to the future force within the doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) domains. This concept applies to all TRADOC, Department of Army and Arm Reserve activities that develop DOTMLPF requirements.
Proponent and supplementation authority. The proponent of this pamphlet is the TRADOC Headquarters, Director, Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC). The proponent has the authority to approve exceptions or waivers to this pamphlet that are consistent with controlling law and regulations. Do not supplement this pamphlet without prior approval from Director, TRADOC ARCIC (ATFC-ED), 33 Ingalls Road, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-1061.

Suggested improvements. Users are invited to submit comments and suggested improvements via The Army Suggestion Program online at https://armysuggestions.army.mil (Army Knowledge Online account required) or via DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Director, TRADOC ARCIC (ATFC-ED), 20 Whistler Lane, Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651-1046. Suggested improvements may also be submitted using DA Form 1045 (Army Ideas for Excellence Program Proposal).

Availability. This regulation is available on the TRADOC homepage at http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/regndx.htm.

Summary of Change

TRADOC Pam 525-3-0

The Army Capstone Concept

This revision, dated XX December 2009-

o Updates name of concept to reflect changed operating environment.

o Places uncertainty and complexity as the central themes of the document, replacing major combat operations.

o Updates specific terminology.

o Places greater emphasis on fighting for information vice assuming information superiority.

o Updates key ideas based on comprehensive lessons learned and recent experience.

o Places greater emphasis on stability and civil support.

o Updates assumptions, implications, and required capabilities.

o Creates appendices to provide more comprehensive information.

*This regulation supersedes TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, dated 7 April 2005.
Summary

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History teaches us that the nations that grow comfortable with the old ways and complacent in the face of new threats, those nations do not long endure. And in the 21st century, we do not have the luxury of deciding which challenges to prepare for and which to ignore. We must overcome the full spectrum of threats—the conventional and the unconventional; the nation-state and the terrorist network; the spread of deadly technologies and the spread of hateful ideologies; 18th century-style piracy and 21st century cyber threats.

—President Barack Obama
United States Naval Academy, 22 May 2009

Chapter 1
Introduction

1-1. Purpose

a. The purpose of TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, the Army Capstone Concept (ACC): Operating under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict, is to describe the how the Army will apply finite resources to overcome a combination of hybrid threats, and adaptive adversaries in complex operating environments. This operating environment—and the inherent choices and prioritizations that it demands—will challenge the future force's ability to fight and win our nation's wars. The concept identifies required capabilities (Appendix B) which will lead force development and employment efforts by establishing a common framework to think about future Army operations. The ACC places modernization decisions in a broader context of future armed conflict, and establishes the foundation for subordinate concepts that refine the Army's vision of how it will operate in the future. Revising the concept supports efforts to improve the Army's requirements review process. The ACC will ultimately guide change by directing experimentation in and exploration of new operational techniques, which, if validated, will lead to changes in doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leader development and education, personnel, facilities, and policy.

b. The ACC describes how the future All-Volunteer Army should conduct operations as part of a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) force. This version of TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 is compatible joint and Army doctrine, and the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). However, the ACC extends beyond current doctrine and concepts, describing new ways and means of conducting future operations within the land domain. In short, the ACC will frame an answer to the strategic guidance issued in the National Defense Strategy to “...develop the military capability and capacity to hedge against uncertainty, and the institutional agility and flexibility to plan early and respond effectively alongside interdepartmental, non-governmental and international partners.”¹

c. The 2009 Army Capstone Concept poses and answers the following questions:

(1) What is the Army's vision of future armed conflict and how should the Army operate to conduct joint land operations that contribute to attaining strategic objectives consistent with political outcomes?

(2) How does the Army adapt to recent and ongoing conflicts and prepare for future threats to U.S. interests?

(3) What capabilities should the Army provide to joint force commanders in order to meet a broad range of national security threats on short notice, for indeterminate duration, and in response to unexpected events?
d. To answer these questions and inform internal and external audiences about how the Army will conduct operations as part of a JIIM force in complex and uncertain environments, the ACC requires precise language and clearly articulated ideas. Consequently, TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 will address contemporary issues and contentious terms, retaining joint and Army doctrinal and conceptual terms where appropriate, redefining terms as necessary, and recommending removal of others when analysis has found them wanting or redundant.

e. The ACC consists of four chapters with specific implications pertaining to the each major section of the chapters. Chapter 1 explains why the Army is revising the concept and introduces the theme of uncertainty and the Army’s requisite need to continue to deal with this uncertainty in the near future. Chapter 2 describes national interests that shape the Army’s missions and military objectives while also describing the emerging challenges in the operating environment. Chapter 3 discusses core operational actions and key and supporting ideas used to meet the emerging challenges. Chapter 4 presents a summary of the major ideas in the concept relating them to the important thread of leader development that will bind them together.

1-2. References

Required and related publications are listed in Appendix A.

1-3. Explanation of Abbreviations and Terms

Abbreviations and special terms used in this pamphlet are explained in the glossary (Appendix C).

1-4. Background

a. The April 2005 version of TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 firmly focused on the demands of major combat operations and did not explore in depth the demands for countering irregular threats, supporting efforts to establish governance and rule of law, or developing and operating with foreign security forces. Portions of the 2005 version remained grounded in assumptions about the character of future armed conflict derived from thinking associated in the Revolution in Military Affairs and pre-Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) publications, such as Joint Vision 2020.

b. These assumptions were based on a belief that technology would change the conduct of war from uncertainty toward a high degree of certainty. This, in turn, would allow future forces to achieve information superiority, which would lead to decision superiority. A key benefit of decision superiority would be that the force could economize on manpower, and trade-off protection and firepower for speed and precision.

1-5. Analytical Framework

a. Accordingly, the ACC proposes a new set of assumptions built around complexity and uncertainty. Unquestionably, the United States (U.S.) will continue to pursue its national interests through proactive global engagement. Until future enemies perceive an asymmetric advantage to employing maneuver warfare against the Army and other U.S. forces, these enemies and adversaries will continue to do what they have always done: employ a mix of traditional and irregular countermeasures while fighting in complex terrain (both urban and rural) in order to limit the Army force’s ability to achieve overmatch. Additionally, future enemies—like current and past enemies—will continue to counter and interrupt U.S. significant advantages in communications, surveillance, long-range precision fires, armor protection, and mobility. These same enemies will also continue to seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction as a
means to deter the employment of Army forces and, if so employed, to create chaos and limit U.S. forces’ effectiveness. Given the homeland as a power projection platform and the expeditionary nature of the Army forces, future adversaries will attempt to penetrate and attack the continental U.S. Additionally, the network (global information grid, collection platforms, fusion and dissemination capabilities, and others) will rarely deliver information superiority. Finally, advanced air and sealift capabilities in the quantities required to meet Army deployment goals and that permit strategic maneuver over operational distances, mounted vertical maneuver, and avoidance of improved ports of debarkation, will not be fielded in the next 15 years.

b. These assumptions serve as the starting point for the analysis which undergirds this concept. These assumptions provide the grounded projection of threat capabilities and characteristics of the operating environment in which the Army will have to operate in the near future. This projection will develop a broad range of threats that, in turn, create a series of operational and tactical challenges and implications. These implications—what the grounded projection of future conflict means for the Army—identify a number of required capabilities that the future force must possess. Importantly, this concept will also promulgate a unifying central idea that combines the required capabilities in a coherent way to meet the challenges and implications of future warfare.

1-6. Uncertainty and Dealing with Uncertainty

a. Taken as a whole, this analysis indicates that despite the significant changes that will arrive with the future, noteworthy continuities in the nature of war will remain constant. One of those important continuities exists as a central theme of TRADOC Pam 525-3-0—uncertainty. As the Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz emphasized, “In war everything is uncertain and variable, intertwined with psychological forces and effects, and the product of a continuous interaction of opposites.” The real point is that conflict—war—has its own dynamic and its own interactions that give it a life beyond the initial objectives of its involved parties. War has always defied efforts to control it precisely. It will continue to do so in the future. Moreover, it is this uncertainty—the product of continuous interactions between friendly forces, enemy and adversarial forces, and key populations—that will continue to define the future operating environment.

b. Consequently, the U.S. Army must develop the capability to think in terms of friendly (partners and allies), the enemy, and the people, and possess the flexibility to secure populations while simultaneously attacking or defending to defeat and destroy enemy forces and organizations. The Army must provide joint force commanders with forces capable of prompt and sustained operations on land and skilled in operational adaptation. As the retired British General Rupert Smith remarked, “On every occasion that I have been sent to achieve some military objective in order to serve a political purpose, I, and those with me, have had to change our method and reorganize in order to succeed.” The need to adapt results from the decisions of adaptive adversaries, the choice of objectives, the way force is applied, and the political, social, and cultural context of the environment in which the operations take place. The requirement for such operational adaptation will not go away in the future. The task of the Army will be to assist its friends, to reassure and protect populations, and to identify, isolate, and, when necessary, defeat the enemy. War is a three-person, not a two-person game. This paradigm must be the basis of all education, training, and organization. In the end, the Army must develop the capabilities to gain, sustain, and exploit physical control and psychological influence over the
enemy, people, land, and resources. How the Army should set out to accomplish this is the focus of this concept.

c. The U.S. will continue to face multiple national security challenges in the future. Some argue that the next war is never the same as the last, often emphasizing some revolutionary change emerging just beyond the horizon. Yet such sweeping claims often neglect important historical continuities in the nature of war. Current operations suggest the character of future conflict. The U.S. Army must make grounded projections based on interactions with today’s enemies to develop a realistic view of future conflict. At the same time, however, we cannot consider war or conflict in isolation. Conflict is above all a political activity whose political context requires attention. Acknowledging these enduring facts is a necessary first step when considering the operational context and national security challenges of the future.

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**In the years ahead, the United States will confront complex, dynamic and unanticipated challenges to our national security and the collective security of our friends and allies. These challenges will occur in many forms and will be waged across the spectrum of conflict—ranging from peaceful competition to general war and at all points in between—and in all domains: land, sea, air, space and cyberspace.**—The Army of the 21st Century: A Balanced Army for a Balanced Strategy. General George Casey, Chief of Staff of the Army

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**Chapter 2**  
**Operational Context**  
**2-1. The Army’s Mission and Military Objectives**

a. The Army is America’s principal land force, organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat [or operations] on land. Because national policy will shift in response to threats and opportunities, the Army must be prepared to adapt to different levels of demand for its forces, different types of threats, and different types of operations. The Army continually refines the range of potential contingencies based on strategic guidance, defense planning scenarios, and national security objectives. The National Defense Strategy, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy speech focused on Rebalancing the Force, the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, and the Army’s Chief of Staff white paper addressing a balanced Army provide an understanding of those objectives: defend the homeland, deter or prevent the use or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), win the nation’s wars, deter potential adversaries, protect the global commons (sea, air, space, and cyberspace), develop cooperative security, and respond to civil crises.

The following more specific military objectives, derived from those national security guidance documents, inform the ACC.

- Protect the United States against external attacks and aggression
- Detect and deter potential adversaries and prevail against enemies, including hostile states, non-state actors, and hybrid threats
- Secure United States strategic access to the global commons and retain freedom of action
- Strengthen and expand alliances and partnerships
- Prevent adversaries from acquiring, using, or proliferating WMD
● Engage to help other nations build governance and security capacity, preventing state failure and eliminating safe havens for criminals and terrorists

● Respond to civil crises at home and abroad

b. Army forces must be prepared to conduct operations to accomplish these military objectives in the evolving operating environment—and against emerging threats that are likely to employ a broad range of capabilities. Assessing and continually reassessing how adversaries and potential enemy organizations are likely to use their forces to pursue strategic and operational objectives that threaten National interests is critical to defining the problems of future armed conflict.

2-2. The Future Operating Environment

a. This concept analyzes the future operating environment with a focus on relating future threats and environmental factors to U.S. national security strategy and Army roles and missions. U.S. Joint Forces Command’s The Joint Operating Environment: Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force provides a thorough description of the overarching strategic and operational challenges facing the joint force. Its companion document, the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, states that: “The future operating environment will be characterized by uncertainty, complexity, rapid change, and persistent conflict.” These documents, as well as TRADOC’s Operational Environment 2009-2025, and analyses from the U.S. national security community, detail emerging threats and environmental factors ranging from state failure, to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), to terrorism and hybrid threats, to natural disaster, and to regional conflict escalation. Adding to the challenges will be routine operations against determined threats hiding among the people. Increased proliferation of advanced weapons and communications technologies compound the threats U.S. forces could face as potential enemies continue to pursue methods and tactics to counter U.S. strengths. Advanced and nearly ubiquitous electronic and cyberspace warfare techniques will be available to virtually anyone. Non-state actors already seek WMD. Terrorist and criminal elements operating in lawless spaces will continue to disrupt weak and failing states. Each of these challenges contributes to a complex, uncertain operating environment with significant implications for how the future force will have to operate.

b. The ACC develops a framework of analysis that incorporates three distinct components:

   (1) Harbingers of Future Conflict: What adaptations are happening now that are likely to continue?

   (2) Projection of Potential Threats and Challenges: What are the likely future threats and challenges based on current conditions?

   (3) Probable and Likely Technological Advancements: What technologies are likely to influence operations in the near future (five to ten years)?

c. Each of these components of analysis will describe challenges for the future force which have implications for force structure, organization, operations, training, leader development, and other areas. These challenges comprise the military problem for the future force.

2-3. Harbingers of Future Conflict

a. Recent history and current operations expose harbingers of future conflict including hybrid threats, information warfare, criminal activities and terrorism, and natural or manmade disasters.
A close look at these events reveals types of threats, trends in tactics and techniques, unique and common methods for employing capabilities, environmental conditions for employment of forces, and successful strategies for countering U.S. strengths and attacking U.S. vulnerabilities. Informed judgment can then derive a number of challenges for the future force.

b. Hybrid Threats. One of the most significant indicators of future conflict involves the continued presence of hybrid threats. These are organizations capable of pursing sophisticated strategies that combine political, economic, social, and information means with conventional, irregular, terrorism, and criminal methods. In the future, adversaries will be capable of adapting organizations, equipment, processes, and procedures to minimize their vulnerabilities and attack what they perceive as U.S. weaknesses. Hybrid threats will operate in and take advantage of complex environments and interrelated conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of joint force capabilities and bear on commanders’ decisions. Importantly, two recent conflicts offer clear indications of the specific components of future hybrid threats and the environments in which they will operate.

(1) Iraq, 2003-2009

(a) After U.S. forces invaded Iraq in 2003, American Soldiers experienced a combination of success and frustration. A successful conventional campaign against key elements of the Saddam Hussein regime deteriorated into a protracted counterinsurgency campaign. Throughout all phases of the conflict, the enemy’s willingness and ability to adapt tactics, operational schemes, and strategic objectives to changing conditions was evident. As early as 2003, the Iraqi regime chose to face U.S. forces with a mix of unconventional tactics combined with conventional defensive operations. Insurgents emerged in pickup trucks armed with machine guns and rocket propelled grenades from urban terrain to ambush the U.S. forces’ logistics tail. The enemy used Global Positioning System jammers in an attempt to neutralize U.S. air superiority, and the Iraqi regime mounted a crude information campaign to erode international support for the coalition while bolstering morale among its own military forces and civilian population. Although the U.S.-led coalition defeated the Hussein regime and achieved the initial objectives of regime change, residual forces in combination with the Baathist intelligence apparatus initiated a localized, decentralized, hybrid insurgency that coalesced and grew in strength over time.

(b) The ability to employ countermeasures, including dispersion and concealment in urban and complex terrain, allowed the enemy to evade many of the U.S. forces’ advantages and frequently conduct attacks at times and places of the their choosing. Combat experience and the interaction with the enemy exposed flawed assumptions associated with concepts, such as network-centric warfare and the defense transformation efforts of the late-1990s. Iraqi insurgents adopted off-the-shelf technologies in innovative ways to develop improvised explosive devices (IEDs). While avoiding decisive combat, the enemy used IEDs, ambushes, and complex terrain to inflict casualties on coalition forces. The enemy also endeavored to gain control of the population and frustrate economic and political development through intimidation, coercion, the incitement of ethno-sectarian violence, and a sophisticated propaganda campaign. By 2006, the conflict had evolved into a sectarian civil war that contained strong elements of insurgency and terrorism interacting within the context of a failing state as the institutions of government and security forces themselves became battlegrounds in the conflict.

(2) Southern Lebanon, 2006
(a) In 2006, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) experienced a similar series of tactical and strategic frustrations at the hands of a very capable non state hybrid enemy. Drawing lessons from a generation of Israeli occupation as well as recent conflicts in Gaza and Iraq, Hezbollah leaders developed a highly effective form of hybrid warfare. When the IDF invaded southern Lebanon in the summer of 2006, it met a well-trained and organized Hezbollah force. In the 34-day campaign that followed, Hezbollah forces surprised the Israelis with a networked defense-in-depth nested within complex terrain. Further, Hezbollah employed a mixture of conventional capabilities—artillery, anti-tank guided missiles, rocket propelled grenade, unmanned aerial system (UAS)-supported targeting and intelligence, and light infantry—with unconventional techniques that included distributed operations coordinated with cell phones, pre-positioned weapons caches, and an extensive use of harassing fires and unattended minefields.

(b) Hezbollah’s tactical successes, reinforced by a sophisticated information campaign, portrayed the Israelis as the aggressors that heroic Hezbollah fighters thoroughly defeated on the battlefield in defense of their homeland. When Israeli forces withdrew, Hezbollah was able to credibly claim strategic success.

c. Information Warfare

   (1) The Russians and Chinese believe that information warfare is a way of resolving a conflict in their favor. The stated goal is for one side to gain and hold an information advantage over the other. This is achieved by exerting a specific psychological and technical influence on an enemy nation’s decisionmaking system, on the enemy nation’s populace and on its information resource structures using all capabilities available including armed forces, nuclear weapons, and electronic assets. Information warfare is a useful term of art for the Army to describe a range of activities inherent in any operation, but especially those amongst the people.

   (2) As information technology becomes increasingly vital to the political, economic, and social well being of nations, it also emerges as a potential vulnerability. In 2007 and 2008, China and the United States both destroyed aging satellites using ground-based missiles. Other countries have or are developing anti-space military technologies, placing at risk many U.S. spaced-based technological advantages. Computer network attacks in 2007 crippled Estonia for weeks. Russia’s use of combined cyber space attacks with conventional capabilities in 2008 quickly defeated Georgia. Additionally, cyberspace attacks against U.S. networks in July 2009—suspected of originating in North Korea—revealed information vulnerability in the U.S. homeland. In the cyber domain, peacetime does not exist; our nation is under daily attack from cyber threats that are increasing regularly in sophistication and destructive potential.

d. Criminal activities and terrorism. High-seas piracy common in the Strait of Malacca and other global choke points, heroin and opium drug traffic flowing through the tribal regions of northern Pakistan, and the cocaine trade growing throughout South America, the Caribbean and Central America, are all criminal activities associated to some extent with violent extremist organizations, insurgencies, and terrorism. These criminal activities originate and flourish in regions where government services and authority are either absent or weak, and are often sources of funding for terrorists and other hybrid adversaries. The enduring nexus of criminality and terrorism will continue to be a threat to stability and productivity in the future.

e. Natural and manmade disasters. The combination of large urban and poor rural populations, stressed infrastructures, natural disasters and even the effects of war (in the form of refugees, destroyed infrastructure, and even mass atrocities) can produce catastrophic outcomes. This is evident in recent disasters ranging from the tsunami in Malaysia and Thailand, to the
Chinese and Indian earthquakes, to Hurricane Katrina in the United States. Some countries band
530 together to provide relief while others may clash over the resulting shortages of potable water,
531 food, medicine, and shelter. The U.S. military will continue to play a major role in disaster relief.
532 Missions include restoring essential services, establishing civil security, establishing civil
533 control, support to governance, support to economic and infrastructure development, and
534 consequence management. U.S. forces will work side-by-side with host nation (HN) agencies,
535 U.S. governmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

2.4. Projection of Potential Threats and Challenges

a. While it is not possible to predict the future with absolute certainty, it is possible to
develop a grounded projection of potential threats, challenges, and enemy capabilities in the
future operating environment. Some of these threats include regional power struggles, ethnic
tensions, and political instability; threatened WMD proliferation and use; terrorist and criminal
activities originating in ungoverned spaces; economic attack launched by an advanced hostile
state; and catastrophic natural disasters. Each of the following projected scenarios is based on
analysis of current threats and conditions in specific regions and areas:

Power struggle in WMD-capable failing state: A hostile failing state government is thrown
into chaos by infighting among leadership factions, resulting in instability, potential WMD
proliferation issues, and likely threat to key regional U.S. allies. Critical security challenges
include anti-access capabilities, WMD proliferation, state use of proxies, hostile, failing states
that harbor terrorist and criminal safe havens, and border tensions.

Ally launches a pre-emptive surgical strike against a threatening hostile state: This results
in regional military conflict, global economic instability, and blocked access to shipping lanes.
Critical security challenges include anti-access capabilities, WMD proliferation, hybrid threats,
terrorist organizations, state use of proxies, hostile state, and violent extremist organizations.

Terrorists acquire WMD through transnational criminal organizations: Supported by
transnational organized criminal networks, several terrorist groups acquire WMD materials.
Critical security challenges include WMD proliferation, terrorist organizations, violent extremist
organizations, and criminal enterprises.

Intra-state insurgency expands beyond state borders to entire region: This threatens UN
and U.S. forces conducting counterinsurgency and stability operations. Critical security
challenges include terrorist organizations, state use of proxies, hostile state, failing or failed state,
violent extremist organization, safe havens, and border tension.

U.S. ally is threatened by violent extremist organization activities emanating from safe
havens in a bordering state: This results in state-on-state conflict. Critical security challenges
include terrorist organizations, state use of proxies, hostile state, violent extremist organization,
and safe havens.

Advanced hostile state launches an economic attack on U.S. firms: By dumping economic
assets and conducting a concurrent wide-ranging cyber attack, an advanced hostile state can
create critical security challenges including state use of proxies, cyber attack, unrestricted
warfare, and resource competition.

Narco-criminal gang violence along the U.S. borders: This creates instability in border
towns and cities and increases illegal immigration due to people fleeing the violence. Critical
security challenges include civil security, violent extremist organizations, criminal enterprises, and border tension.

**Catastrophic natural disaster:** The United States suffers a 7.0 or greater magnitude earthquake devastating infrastructure across a large region, triggering internally displaced persons, widespread crime, and large scale civil support responses. Critical security challenges include humanitarian assistance and civil security.

b. Further, these threats and environmental factors provide a list of critical security challenges which the future force must be prepared to face: Anti-access capabilities, WMD proliferation, state use of proxies, hostile and failing states, terrorist and criminal safe havens, hybrid threats, terrorist organizations, cyberspace attack, unrestricted warfare, resource competition, humanitarian assistance, and civil security.23

**2-5. Probable and Likely Technological Advancements**

a. The Army must be prepared to use future technological advancements and counter the technical advances employed by our enemies. The Army works closely with defense and civilian laboratories, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, academia, and industry to identify trends in technological advances. For example, today the Army employs tele-operated robots and virtual training and will have reliable autonomous robots and neural networked prosthetics in the near future. Development of new technologies is driven by an identified requirement for U.S. forces, or by a need to counter an emerging technology or practice used by an enemy. An example of a new requirement would be the V-22 Osprey which provides a fixed wing vertical take-off and landing platform for transporting troops and materiel. An example of a need to counter an emerging technology or practice by an enemy would be jamming systems mounted on vehicles to disrupt remotely detonated IEDs. Finding the right balance between developing countermeasures and developing new capabilities is critical to ensuring the future force is able to seize and retain the initiative. Being technologically surprised by the enemy could be devastating. The interaction between military technological innovation and the development of countermeasures is likely to introduce the following broad changes to combat operations for the United States and potential enemies.

- Improvements in computing technology—specifically the development of quantum computers—will enable virtually 100 percent secure communications, non-satellite based precise positioning, navigation, and timing, and advanced image resolution and sensing capabilities.24
- Improvements in non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse technology will likely allow potential enemies to acquire the capability to attack U.S. forces or specific localized areas with weapons capable of producing significant damage to certain fragile electronic control systems of the type critical to the operation of many ground vehicles and aircraft. Military tactical-level networks could remain shielded from an electromagnetic pulse, however, operational-level, interagency and intergovernmental networks could still be at risk.25 More damaging large-area, even up to continent sized, electromagnetic pulse effects would require high altitude detonation of a nuclear weapon. This is potentially more likely given the proliferation of nuclear technologies.26
- Improved sensors, sensor fusion, communications, and knowledge networking will allow higher levels of information sharing, enabling more effective application of combat power, decentralization, and noncontiguous operations under certain conditions.27
Improved system durability and reliability, fuel efficiency, and precision munitions will reduce sustainment demands and sustainment infrastructure, and will extend the duration of operations prior to required replenishment.

Improved robotics will enable development of autonomous systems which can perform desired tasks in unstructured environments without continuous human guidance.

Improvements in immersive technologies will enable development of virtual training areas inside a finite training space, allowing Soldiers to walk through virtual environments that contain both real-world objects and simulated characters, facilitating training and education, and better enabling Soldiers to make decisions under stress, to practice, and to get experiences they would not normally get in the school house or in their unit before they deploy.

Improvements in nanotechnology will enable development of materials with increased strength and lighter weight, devices with improved electrical performance, nano-robots for medical, sensor, and weapons applications, and genetically engineered organisms for producing alternative fuels.

Improvements in neuroscience will mitigate stress and improve mental, moral, and physical capacity.

Improvements in renewable energy and management of fuel and electric power requirements will enable greater fuel efficiency, advances in engine designs, and improved power generation capability for individual Soldier systems.

b. Future force technological asymmetries may erode quickly as agile competitors innovate in disruptive ways or adapt operations to limit U.S. advantages. Potential adversaries will watch wargaming, experimentation, and operational employments in order to estimate future capabilities and vulnerabilities. For example, many of the information technologies U.S. forces are developing are likely to improve the capabilities of peer and near-peer adversaries. U.S. forces must prepare to fight adaptive enemies.

2-6. Conclusion The key implication of the future operating environment is that due to the uncertainty and complexity of the future operating environment, Army units must be able to respond to a broad range of threats and challenges anywhere in the world, on short notice, for potentially long duration (an Army of expeditionary and campaign quality). The preceding analysis of the operating environment provides many more implications that drive the solution to the military problem facing the future force. Key implications of the harbingers analysis are the requirements to create a combined arms force capable of fighting for information, in close combat, and engaged with partners. Key implications of the emerging threats analysis include developing a force capable of JIIM interoperability, savvy in delivering consistent words and actions, and flexible in securing populations while defeating threats. Finally, key implications of the analysis of future technologies emphasizes requirements for designing a force capable of fighting degraded, operating autonomously across wide areas, and imbedding training and education opportunities that capture lessons learned rapidly. Many implications overlap or are interrelated and can apply to different portions of the solution. In order to demonstrate the logic, each part of the solution addresses implications derived from the analysis of the operating environment.
Chapter 3
Meeting the Challenges

3-1. Introduction. This chapter addresses how the U.S. Army will create conditions that facilitate achievement of national objectives by ensuring future leaders and their organizations have the ability to think in terms of friendly, enemy, and the people, and possess the flexibility to secure populations while simultaneously attacking to defeat enemy organizations. Beginning with a statement of the military problem, the chapter then describes the central idea that aims at dealing with the context of uncertainty outlined in the previous chapter. Next, the chapter presents the military solution—the way the Army will meet future challenges through a series of supporting ideas and operational tasks. Throughout the chapter, key implications derived from the analysis of the operating environment set off their supporting ideas in a logical model postulating that if these conditions exist, then the Army must use this approach and combinations of other supporting ideas to achieve its goals.

3-2. Military Problem. Given a complex environment of uncertainty and persistent conflict, how will the U.S. Army apply finite resources to fight and win wars? Other than combat, how will Army forces engage in security force assistance to persuade and influence relevant populations in order to achieve strategic goals and policy aims? How will the U.S. Army support joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational efforts to prevent conflict?

3-3. Central Idea. Dealing with uncertainty requires a mindset based on flexibility of thought and operational adaptability. It calls for leaders at all levels who are comfortable with ambiguity, collaborative planning and execution, allowable levels of risk, and the ability and willingness to make adjustments according to the situation. Operational adaptability applies to all levels of command. It is founded on the fundamentals of mission command and decentralization of operations, as well as the commitment of the U.S. Army to maintain an all volunteer force trained and equipped to execute full spectrum operations.

3-4. Military Solution.

a. The ability of the future force to successfully operate in uncertainty requires:

(1) An understanding of the environment that is informed by pre-deployment engagement and analysis and then driven and sustained by development of intelligence at all levels of command.

(2) Operations against irregular threats and among the people require an intelligence weight of effort significantly tilted toward the tactical level, focusing on reconnaissance and security missions.

(3) Commanders who can exploit opportunities, control the tempo of operations, and maintain freedom of action in order to seize and maintain the initiative at the earliest opportunities.

(4) The ability to conduct simultaneous, distributed operations across the operational area. This is complementary and synergistic with seizing and maintaining the initiative.

But in war everything is uncertain... all military action is intertwined with psychological forces and effects. Carl von Clausewitz, On War
Operations conducted at key points across the operational area extend operational reach, apply continuous pressure to the enemy, and require a joint and combined arms approach.

(5) Decentralized and adaptive command and execution at the point of decision. Distributed operations require tactical and operational commanders to understand and develop the situation in their portion of the operational area. Decentralization, guided by mission command, multiplies the capabilities of the force by allowing commanders to take the initiative and exploit opportunities.

(6) A combined arms force capable of reacting to the situation as it develops and robust enough to fight and survive in a complex, uncertain environment.

(7) These requirements are enabled by and depend on creative leaders and soldiers who exercise individual initiative guided by commander’s intent and built on a foundation of trust, training and experience; focused on tactical and technical competence, cultural awareness, and strategic perspective.

b. In order to develop leaders and organizations that can think in terms of friendly, enemy, and the people, while retaining flexibility for simultaneous combat, and stability tasks, and acting with initiative, the U.S. Army will require a framework of operational adaptation that emphasizes:

- Understanding the situation in depth, breadth and context
- Acting in concert with partners
- Continually assessing and adapting actions
- Consolidating gains, transitioning between tasks or operations, and transitioning responsibility

c. The operating framework builds on the CCJO’s three interrelated ideas: Addressing each unique situation on its own terms, conducting and integrating combinations of activities, and assessing results to modify understanding and subsequent operations. To the CCJO ideas, this concept adds the ideas of consolidating and transitioning as a way to account for the demands of operations unique to the land domain.

d. Understand (1) Understanding is fundamental to battle command and a critical element in developing the situation. Situational understanding is essential to the commander’s ability to visualize and describe the situation’s context. Analysis of the enemy and operational variables (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment and time) provides the information that senior commanders use to develop decisional levels.
understanding and frame problems in the operating environment.\textsuperscript{34} It is particularly important to understand the enemy’s risk tolerance, morale, and degree of flexibility or adaptability (both tactical and strategic). In framing the problem, the commander must work closely with the civilian leadership and appropriate higher headquarters to understand the logic that underpins their guidance. In all cases, the commander must work to frame the problem with the best information available and continually reassess the situation and reframe the problem, as necessary.\textsuperscript{35}

(2) Situational understanding (SU) is more than the aggregated product of a common operational picture. Situational understanding consists of the concentrated effort to understand the enemy’s relationship to, and interaction within, the local environment. This requires applying the commander’s judgment and experience to relate local understanding to the operational context. This understanding is a product of planning and action that begins with an effort to understand the operating environment driven by intelligence prior to taking action. But this is just the initial step. To expand understanding, the force develops the situation through positive and directed action. Recent operations continue to emphasize that the local nature of politics and conflict remain critical to understanding the situation and the operating environment in which a commander takes action to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Because of the complex nature of potential enemies and the local conditions, action is still required to gain visibility of the enemy organization and understand how they interact with the environment, including the population.\textsuperscript{36}

(3) Adaptive enemies will use the complex terrain, particularly urban population centers, to conceal critical aspects of their organization. As a result, action—physical reconnaissance, persistent surveillance, and human intelligence—is essential. Units must determine what must be known about the enemy and the environment. This also includes determining what the enemy organization looks like and how it operates. How does the enemy access resources and support within the area of operations? What are the enemy’s strengths and vulnerabilities?\textsuperscript{37} Or, as C.E. Callwell wrote in \textit{Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice}, “what does the enemy prize most . . . the destruction or deprivation of which will probably bring the war most rapidly to a successful conclusion?”\textsuperscript{38} Answering that question and understanding the likely effects of friendly action will require cultural and historical expertise as well as effective intelligence and reconnaissance efforts.

d. \textit{Act}. As units develop SU, they must act using all elements of available combat power and other enablers to isolate the enemy from sources of support and conduct attacks against weak points and vulnerabilities. Commanders develop an understanding of the operating environment, conduct continuous reconnaissance, and encourage prudent risk taking to seize and exploit the operational initiative to reach the desired state. The degree of understanding necessary for successful operations against hybrid threats in complex environments will require not only the employment of technical means, but also the conduct of reconnaissance and the development of intelligence in close contact with the enemy and civilian populations. In counterinsurgency operations, reconnaissance efforts must extend beyond combined arms operations and to include interagency and indigenous elements with subject matter experts to help build a holistic estimate of the situation as the basis for applying interagency and HN resources to address local grievances and gain local support. In short, understanding always requires action and often requires fighting for information. Adaptive combinations of offense, defense, and stability (or civil support) operations, guided by mission command—the conduct of military operations
through decentralized execution based on mission orders—are the means that allow units to seize, exploit, and maintain the initiative and create the conditions for success.\textsuperscript{39}

e. \textit{Assess and adapt}. Assessment is a continuous effort to measure the progress of the force toward mission accomplishment. Because the enemy and other destabilizing factors will continue to interact with operational plans and actions, commanders and civil authorities must continuously assess the operating environment and the progress of operations, and compare them with their understanding, vision, and intent. Through assessment, commanders determine if the situation has changed sufficiently to warrant reframing the problem. This may require commanders to establish measures to aid in understanding and evaluating progress towards the desired state. They must constantly evaluate these measures to ensure they are viable means of judging progress. To meet objectives and achieve the desired state, commanders adapt operations based on this assessment and their professional military judgment.\textsuperscript{40}

f. \textit{Consolidate}. The focus of consolidation is to protect what has been gained while retaining the initiative by disorganizing the adversary in depth and across time. Sometimes the initiative is built on operations with the local population, especially during stability and civil support missions. This calls for a continuous effort to organize and strengthen the land force position with respect to the environment and enemy.\textsuperscript{41} In counterinsurgency and stability operations it is particularly important to sustain improvements in the situation that permit progress toward achieving political goals over time.

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h. \textit{Transition}. Effective transitions are critical to mission accomplishment. Transitions include shifting between operations and tasks (for example, from reconnaissance to offense) and transitions between phases of a campaign. These transitions may also include the transfer of routine responsibilities over the operational area from military to civilian authorities, another military force, or regional or international organizations. There are unique resource, planning, and command and control requirements to enable effective transitions. The dynamic nature of the threat and environment will make transitions hard to predict and difficult to execute. This, an aspect of \textit{operational adaptability}, implies that transitional forces must be prepared to execute transitions with little or no notice.\textsuperscript{42}

i. This framework requires an increased emphasis on specific strategic, operational and tactical enablers. The Army must continue to develop and refine its capabilities for simultaneous offense, defense, and stability (or civil support) operations and imbue its leaders with the contextual understanding and the judgment to make decisions to seize and retain the initiative in complex and uncertain environments. In addition, the Army must team with joint, interagency, and international partners to exploit the comparative advantages that each team member brings to the operation and to align efforts through cooperation and coordination in support of U.S. national policy. Finally, the U.S. Army must understand and exploit technological developments in its own operations while ensuring that the Army can adapt quickly to threats caused by enemies’ technological innovations or disruption of friendly technological networks.
3-5. Supporting Ideas. The central idea is strengthened by related supporting ideas, several broad fundamental characteristics that underlie all successful future Army operations. Each supporting idea addresses specific implications derived from the analysis of the future operating environment shown in Chapter 2. There are six supporting ideas: develop the situation through action, exert psychological and technical influence, employ a combination of defeat and stability mechanisms, conduct combined arms operations, cooperate with partners, and leverage joint capabilities.

a. Develop the Situation through Action

(1) Developing the situation through action has been an important element of Army intelligence operations. It is an inherent acknowledgement that intelligence sensors and surveillance operations cannot by themselves produce a clear picture of the environment, the enemy, or the other elements of the situation.

(2) The Army must develop leaders and Soldiers imbued with the spirit of seizing and retaining the initiative. This enables Army operations and requires operational and individual initiative grounded in mission command and supported by Warrior Ethos; a fighting centric approach to operations; combined arms operations; and operations decentralized to the point of decision. Defeating hybrid threats requires fighting—the measured application of all elements of combat power that include leadership, information, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, command and control, and protection—in order to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

(3) Developing the situation through action will mean a number of things for Army leaders in the future force. Leaders will need to know how to fight, how to organize information and understand the complex contexts in which they are operating. They must know when to take decisive action. Acting is not necessarily attacking. A contextualized understanding and continual assessment will be necessary to develop the situation through action. Sometimes, “doing nothing is the best reaction.”43 At other times, a specific action to regain the initiative will be necessary. Future forces and leaders must possess an ability to create surprise through executing operations with speed and not necessarily in haste. The distinction is important.44

b. Exert Psychological and Technical Influence

(1) Our enemies will employ coercion, intimidation, propaganda, and disinformation to effect populations. Therefore, Army influence operations (both psychological and technical) must be relevant to policy goals and objectives, and contribute to the success of the future force. The future force will employ all available means to achieve influence across the air, land, maritime and space domains and in the cyberspace environment. This concept will treat cyberspace in the same way it does communications, as an enabler to all operations and a component of full spectrum operations. Commanders will employ information engagement...
Implications

Consistent Messages and Actions. Because future operation will occur in and among the people, under the unblinking eye of the media, and against threats savvy enough to present competing narratives, Army actions and messages must be congruent with and consistent with policy and objectives.

Versatile Cyberspace Forces. Because future cyberspace threats—nation-states, criminal syndicates, activists, terrorists, and other non-state actors—are able to adapt to U.S. actions and adopt countermeasures extremely rapidly while posing grave risks to all instruments of national power, the Army must develop and provide versatile cyberspace forces to combatant commanders.

(2) Future force commanders face three interconnected operational requirements: defeating enemies; informing and influencing relevant actors and populations; and prevailing in the competition for advanced technologies. To meet these challenges Army commanders must:

- Protect and defend friendly information and information systems to ensure timely, accurate, and relevant information. Information protection denies enemies, adversaries, and others the opportunity to exploit friendly information and information systems for their own purposes.

- Inform and educate U.S., allied, and other relevant publics and actors in order to gain and maintain their trust, confidence, and support. Information engagement is characterized by a comprehensive commitment to transparency, accountability, and credibility.

- Attack enemy decisionmaking systems and their information resource structures (such as, networks, computers, and others).

(3) Understanding the wide variety of situations in the future requires a realization that fighting is often a necessary but insufficient component of achieving the nation’s strategic aims in war. In order to achieve favorable outcomes in complex environments, the Army must be prepared to take action to exert psychological and technical influence on a complex population. This includes ensuring messages and actions are congruent with one another and the policy they seek to achieve. Like fighting, military actions to exert influence must clearly support and further the guiding objectives of national policy and strategy.

(4) Instead of developing messages in isolation from national strategic planning processes, Army information engagement needs to integrate with planning processes at every level of war in order to enhance the development of SU, and develop specific plans for land component action that support national policy objectives.

(5) Commanders must consider the second and third order effects of not only their actions, but also of their statements. Just as actions inconsistent with the statement damage credibility, statements not supported by action can result in a loss of the trust and support of the audience.

(6) The Army will face enemies who will seek to undermine popular support at home and on the battlefield. It will not be enough to act appropriately; it will be just as important to engage in the debate about how to interpret those actions, and it will usually be best to initiate the debate on terms of the joint force’s own choosing.45
(7) The Army’s ability to operate in cyberspace as an important component of simultaneous offense, defense, stability, or civil support operations will be increasingly critical to its future operational success. Army commanders must be able to operate in the cyberspace environment to promote the psychological and technical effects that enable mission success. The Army will use technical methods to both attack adversaries and defend friendly capabilities and electronic warfare (EW) to achieve psychological influence.\(^46\)

(8) In addition to preparing for war on land, the Army must be prepared for threats in cyberspace. Cyberspace is a separate warfighting environment in which freedom to maneuver must be safeguarded, just as the joint force ensures freedom of navigation on and over the world’s oceans. Similar to the land domain, cyber operations are conducted with a high degree of uncertainty, and cyber threats—nation-states, criminal syndicates, activists, terrorists, and other non-state actors—are able to adapt to U.S. actions and adopt countermeasures extremely rapidly. These cyber threats pose grave risks to all U.S. instruments of national power, with the potential to conduct crippling attacks on military, government, public and private sector networks. Consequently, the Army needs cyberspace and electronic warfare subject matter experts in their formations to enable access to these capabilities at higher and joint levels, as well as provide continual updates on both capabilities and vulnerabilities to commanders. Army forces must be organized, trained and equipped to continue operations when successful enemy cyberspace or EW attacks degrade capabilities.

c. Employ a Combination of Defeat and Stability Mechanisms

(1) In order to develop the situation through action and to exert psychological and technical influence, the Army must be able to both coerce and persuade. Army forces accomplish this by employing the clearly defined defeat and stability mechanism explained in current doctrine.\(^47\) They offer important points to consider in future military operations.

(2) Defeat mechanisms are the methods through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition. They include: *destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate.*

*Destroy* means to apply lethal combat power against an enemy capability so that it can no longer perform any function and cannot return to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt.

*Dislocate* means to employ forces to obtain significant positional advantage, rendering the enemy’s dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant.

*Disintegrate* means to disrupt the enemy’s command and control system, thus degrading the ability to conduct operations while leading to a rapid collapse of the enemy’s capabilities or will to fight.

*Isolate* means to deny an enemy or adversary access to capabilities that enable the exercise of coercion, influence, potential advantage, and freedom of action.

(3) Army forces are most successful when applying focused combinations of defeat mechanisms in order to produce complementary and reinforcing effects not attainable with a single mechanism. Defeat mechanisms are not tactical missions; rather, they describe broad operational and tactical effects.

(4) A stability mechanism is the method through which friendly forces

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**Implication**

**Flexible Civil Security:** Because relevant populations are an integral and impressionable part of the OE, the Army will be required to strategically plan for civil security, adapt tactics that boost rather than cripple civilian support, and provide means to redress civilian harm.
Implication

Domestic Civil Support: Because the Army may be called upon to respond to domestic civil crises, the Army must develop and maintain habitual relationships with civilian agencies and federal and local law enforcement authorities. The regular exchange of ideas and intelligence will facilitate rapid integration of Army forces into existing civilian command structures during domestic contingencies.

affect civilians in order to attain conditions that contribute to a lasting, stable peace. They include: compel, control, influence, and, support.

Compel means to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, effect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority.

Control means to impose civil order. It includes securing borders, routes, sensitive sites, population centers, and individuals. It also involves physically occupying key terrain and facilities.

Influence means to alter the opinions and attitudes of a civilian population through information engagement, presence, and conduct. These effects are the most difficult to achieve.

Support means to establish, reinforce, or set the conditions necessary for the other instruments of national power to function effectively.

(5) Like defeat mechanisms, stability mechanisms describe both the physical and the psychological effects they are intended to produce. Further, combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that accomplish the mission more effectively and efficiently.

d. Conduct Combined Arms Operations

(1) To accomplish the associated tasks of simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability (or civil support) operations, the Army must use the actions of a balanced combined arms team to throw enemies off balance with powerful blows from unexpected directions, follow up rapidly to prevent recovery, and continue operations to destroy the enemies’ will to fight. In simple terms, competency in combined arms operations is the price of admission to any armed conflict. It is also a necessary component to developing the situation through action. This notion is not new. Reducing uncertainty by making contact with the enemy from a position of advantage is an enduring feature of tactics. In the future, U.S. forces will still need such skills to defeat future enemies. Yet this series of actions must be subordinate to strategic plans that integrate political, military, diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts. Recent experience strongly emphasizes that military operations, all intended to seize the initiative, must be made within a deep contextual understanding of the enemy, the social, cultural, tribal, and political nature of the environment, and the U.S. national policy being enacted. Current and future operating environments are of such a complex political nature that understanding local “human terrain”—or understanding the enemy and the population in the context of local terrain, culture, resources, and politics—is critical to success. Moreover, this degree of understanding exists as a necessary compliment to the synergy of combined arms-based maneuver.

Implication

Combined Arms Operations: Because future enemies will attempt to counter U.S. significant advantages in communications, surveillance, long-range precision fires, armor protection, and mobility, the Army must provide the Joint Force Commander with combined arms forces capable of operating in a decentralized mode, conducting area security operations over large areas, and capitalizing on joint capabilities at all echelons.
The actions within the operational framework described above (the ability of the U.S. Army to understand politics and conflict, to project power, to secure objectives, terrain, and populations, to coerce and defeat enemies, to persuade neutral parties, to win, and to transition), require competency in combined arms operations. Such competency is also a necessary component to developing the situation through action. Reducing uncertainty by making contact with the enemy from a position of advantage is an enduring feature of tactics. U.S. forces will still need such skills to defeat future enemies.  

Decentralization of Combined Arms Capabilities: Because enemies will utilize complex urban terrain to mitigate U.S. tactical advantages and will expose themselves to U.S. surveillance and firepower for only fleeting engagement opportunities, the Army must decentralize combined arms capabilities to the lowest possible level to facilitate the application of optimal weapons systems on identified targets.

This type of thinking lies at the heart of this capstone concept and its implications for full spectrum operations. The Army must have the conceptual capability and the physical ability to seize the initiative through the coordinated use of combined arms operations along all lines of effort including civil security, host nation security, essential services, governance, and economic development. Stability operations require joint forces capable of securing units, installations, facilities, lines of communication, and indigenous populations from enemy attack, sabotage, or intimidation. The combination of these operational types also requires a force that is capable of conducting simultaneous actions, both military and political in nature, under conditions ranging from peaceful competition to general war and at all points in between.

To better enable simultaneous FSO in complex environments, commanders must be prepared to incorporate interagency, intergovernmental, and indigenous actors with expertise in information operations, civil security, HN security, essential services, governance, and economic development. Stability operations require joint forces capable of securing units, installations, facilities, lines of communication, and indigenous populations from enemy attack, sabotage, or intimidation. The combination of these operational types also requires a force that is capable of conducting simultaneous actions, both military and political in nature, under conditions ranging from peaceful competition to general war and at all points in between.

Cooperate with Partners

The military will rarely find itself to be the only external actor during military operations. It is more likely that the military will operate in an environment with a variety of U.S. domestic, international, and local strategic partners. These partnerships will be essential to developing mutual understanding of the environment and effective, comprehensive solutions to address the root causes of conflict that threaten U.S. national interests and international peace and stability.

Uniting the diverse capabilities necessary to achieve success in both winning the war and winning the peace requires focusing the efforts of likeminded actors toward a common goal. Where military operations typically demand unity of command, the challenge for military and civilian leaders is to forge unity of effort among the diverse array of actors involved in overseas interventions whether for offensive and defensive operations, stability operations, or civil support. Unity of effort is fundamental to successfully incorporating all the instruments of U.S. national power with international partners, and the private sector to respond effectively to national and international security challenges.
Interagency. Interagency coordination ensures that all participating agencies focus their efforts on national objectives. The U.S. Army has unique capabilities to offer the interagency community. These include influence through established military-to-military domestic and international contacts, resources not available to nonmilitary agencies, trained civil affairs personnel and their assets; and responsiveness based on military training and readiness. Additional unique military capabilities include command and control resources supported by worldwide communications and intelligence infrastructures, cyberspace capabilities, robust organizational and planning processes, training support for large numbers of individuals on myriad skills, and support for inter- or intra-theater requirements. Unity of effort can only be achieved through close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation.

Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Interoperability: Because achievement of favorable outcomes in complex environments requires unified action, Army units must be interoperable with JIIM partners.

Security Force Assistance: Because joint forces will have to conduct operations among populations with differing cultures, success will require assistance to indigenous security forces and civil military operations (governance, rule of law, and capacity building) in a multinational environment.

Interoperable Design and Planning Processes: Because U.S. interagency, international and indigenous partners reside outside traditional military command and control structures, unity of effort requires the development of common or interoperable design and planning processes in order to establish a shared understanding of the situation, the problems, goals and objectives, and roles and responsibilities. Multinational Partners.

(a) While operating with multinational partners will continue to be challenging and will demand compatible doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures, shared situational awareness, interconnected battle-space management systems, and linked intelligence and compatible communication systems, multinational partners possess unique capabilities that enhance every operation. In order to leverage these capabilities and to improve its own capabilities, the Army must understand the resources and limitations of its multinational partners. To engender a better mutual understand between the Army and its multinational partners, the Army must increase efforts to conduct combined training, education, and cultural exchange.

(b) The Army must understand what assistance its multinational partners require to enable their participation (such as sustainment support, close air support, and access to networks for example). There are key allies with whom the U.S. Army will partner, making it appropriate to clearly articulate those contributions from multinational partners that will be most useful to...
coalition efforts. The Army must be prepared to assist multinational partners in matching critical U.S. battle and air space management norms for command and control to enable them to fully integrate in U.S. operational areas. Additionally, there must be clear understanding at all levels of each participant’s operational capabilities and the likely constraints on their employment within a theater of operation.

(6) Nongovernmental Organizations.

(a) NGOs operate independently of governments and their militaries. NGOs’ interests differ from those of military and other government entities in that national political objectives do not drive their missions which derive from humanitarian interests such as the desire to relieve suffering. Military leaders must work to establish a common cause with NGOs working in overlapping areas. NGOs tend to operate with a longer term perspective, with operational and resource flexibility, and with a greater degree of interdependency on local resources and personnel. Their local contacts and experience make NGOs valuable sources of information about the environment, local and regional governments, and civilian attitudes toward an operation.

(b) The willingness of NGOs to interact with the military varies immensely with the political and local context. The leadership of some large multinational and U.S. domestic NGOs are more likely to participate in the development of SU and strategic level planning prior to intervention if there is broad international consensus supporting action. Once military forces are in theater, some NGOs may prefer to adhere to strict principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence in an effort to create humanitarian space while other organizations will seek the protection and support of military forces. The Army must be adept at working within the constraints and imperatives of cooperation NGOs with whom it interacts.

(7) Private Sector.

(a) Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the fact that the private sector can play an important role in conflict prevention and post conflict stability operations as well as contribute to SU, planning, and execution of combat operations. The private sector is a diverse community of actors with capabilities that can both enhance and complicate military operations overseas. Private sector assistance in developing sustainable market economies is an essential element of strategies for conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. Companies with a long-term presence in conflict prone areas can help to assess the economic and financial needs of countries and to develop strategies to address good economic governance in key ministries, border security, the banking sector, revenue collection, human and social capital, national resources, host nation and regional infrastructure, regional energy markets, and long term international investment. When working with the private sector in overseas interventions, it is important to analyze each company’s culture, motivations, and mission and particularly the role that profits play in governing company behavior.

(b) In recent years, the U.S. government has become more reliant on private contractors because they provide a more flexible surge capacity with a diversity of expertise and are often more politically acceptable than increasing the number of military and civilian government personnel. Yet, the increased use of private contractors can provoke controversy based upon a perception of higher cost, less reliability in the field, and challenges in integrating military, government, and company operations effectively. In U.S. military operations around the world, the role of the private sector in both winning the war and winning the peace is essential. As part of U.S. government action, the Army should integrate private sector
contributions to Army missions in such a way that companies will seek a balance between making a profit and contributing to long-term sustainable peace and stability in concert with U.S. national security objectives.

f. Leverage Joint Capabilities

(1) In order to achieve synergy, the Army will continue to require access to joint capabilities at all levels. This has several implications for the future. Improvements in communications, surveillance, and precision strike technologies permit a higher level of SU, especially in connection with the disposition of friendly forces. Additionally, U.S. air and naval strike capabilities make it difficult for enemy ground forces to concentrate except in very complex terrain or urban areas. Vulnerability to the U.S. strike capabilities compels enemy forces to disperse and makes them vulnerable to concentrated efforts on the ground.65

(2) Training in JIIM operations builds teamwork, cohesion within units, discipline, and understanding. Ultimately this training helps forces to operate within the law of war, observe the rules of engagement, and better deal with uncertainty. The psychological benefit that ground forces gain from knowing that they will face no threat from the air, and that air and naval forces are prepared to come to their assistance at a moment’s notice encourages bold action. As the U.S. endeavors to expand and improve ground force capability for current operations and future contingencies, it must increase airlift and sealift capabilities while maintaining air supremacy and dominance at sea.

(3) Key to maximizing joint capabilities is developing leaders who are educated and experienced in operating in JIIM environments. This education and experience must inculcate sensitivity to differing cultures, emphasizing communication skills along with an appreciation of the role that diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts play in achieving national objectives.

3-6. Core Operational Actions. In addition to the supporting ideas, core operational actions that emerged from an analysis of ongoing operations provide a foundation for how the Army will meet future challenges.

a. Conduct security force assistance (SFA)

(1) Key to conducting effective stability operations and to countering irregular threats is the improvement of indigenous capabilities at the tactical through ministerial levels to include equipping the indigenous force with weaponry, and the supporting logistics and infrastructure, necessary for them to deliver security. Therefore, the focus of security force assistance should be the development of trained and robust indigenous forces that are able to maintain a secure environment and facilitate transition to civil control. Conditions that require robust SFA are not unique to the current or future operating environment. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy addressed the importance of SFA when he called for a “a wholly different kind of force, and…a new and wholly different kind of military
training” to confront the challenges of his time. Although many aspects of the operating environment have changed since then, the need to organize forces for effective SFA remains constant. Today, a “different kind of force” is one that integrates special operations forces (SOF) and general purpose forces (GPF). A “different kind of military training” requires an integrative approach that diffuses SFA expertise across the entire Army. Successful SFA that develops indigenous capacity necessary to achieve and sustain sovereignty or self-determination will require interagency unity of effort. Although broadly split between civilian, police, and military implementation in permissive environments, these tasks fall almost exclusively to the military in non-permissive environments. Failure to develop sufficient indigenous capacity to undertake stabilization tasks risks strategic failure.

(2) Although SOF and GPF will integrate under a joint commander in all core operational actions, the increasing role of GPF in SFA treads most heavily on a historically SOF-dominated mission. Contingencies in the future operating environment may require manpower and logistic requirements that exceed SOF capabilities. In such instances, GPF assume a larger role in the conduct of SFA, integrated in planning and execution with SOF. Conditions of the operating environment, priorities of internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy, and the ratio of U.S. forces available to indigenous forces to be trained will dictate the nature of SOF-GPF integration in SFA.

(3) In a permissive environment, SOF will require little GPF support. In the Philippines, for example, a low-level insurgency against a relatively stable central government, with regular diplomatic, economic, and military exchanges between the United States and the Philippines, and the relatively small number of indigenous forces to be trained for counterinsurgency accommodate classical SOF-dominated SFA. SOF has been highly effective in conducting SFA in permissive environments with a small manpower and logistic footprint.

(5) As campaigns transition from mainly offensive or defensive to stability operations, SFA across the breadth of the indigenous force assumes greater priority. In Iraq, for example, a semi-permissive environment exists that requires the training of a large number of indigenous military, border patrol, and police forces. In such environments, GPF will assume a larger role in SFA. SOF-GPF integration will occur under a joint commander, with GPF providing command and control and combat enablers (Mobile Transition Teams, Civil Affairs, PSYOP, Intelligence Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Fires, Lift, Quick Reaction Forces, Medical Evacuation, and Sustainment) to SOF within an area of operations.

(6) Should the conclusion of major offensive or defensive operations not yield a permissive or semi-permissive environment conducive to a full transition to stability operations, U.S. forces may be required to train a large number of indigenous forces in a short time period. In such environments, highly-integrated SOF and GPF operating under a joint commander are critical to success. Concurrent to offensive and defensive operations, GPF will conduct SFA of indigenous military forces, assuming primary responsibility in this role until indigenous military forces attain a command-designated level of capability and readiness. SOF provide SFA to indigenous special operations and police units with command and control and combat enablers provided by GPF.

b. Shaping and Entry Operations

(1) The Army supports shaping and entry operations within Unified Action in order to set the conditions for follow-on operations once the United States commits forces. The force will apply joint synergy and conduct immediate combined arms operations upon arrival, leverage
partner capabilities, develop the situation through action and produce multiple dilemmas for the enemy.

(2) Absent advanced air and sealift capabilities, overcoming enemy anti-access efforts will challenge the joint force. While it will always be desirable to seek multiple entry points and to avoid well-defended air and sea ports of debarkation, the Army must be prepared as part of the joint force to fight for points of entry. In order to reduce the time to deploy and employ Army forces the joint force develops and conducts extensive shaping efforts.

(3) Army forces conduct shaping by:

- Assisting in developing the joint force campaign plan to include deployment schedules and provision to carry out Army Title 10 logistical requirements.
- Establishing intermediate and forward staging bases as necessary to facilitate deployment and rapid build-up of combat power.
- Deploying forward elements such as logistics, theater air defenses, and early entry command posts as close to the theater as possible.
- Finally, by participating in the joint force efforts to establish host nation support.

(4) Commanders conduct joint forcible entry operations under the protection of a rapidly established joint air and missile defense umbrella, shielded further from interdiction by means of air and maritime superiority that may be local, wide area, or theater-wide in scope. A means of accelerating the buildup of combat power will be the use of intermediate staging bases as close to the joint operations area (JOA) as possible in order to more effectively configure forces for combat. This will require reloading shipping or aircraft for the final movement to the JOA. Configuring afloat and land based prepositioned stocks in combat ready packages will also facilitate the rapid buildup of combat power. Land maneuver forces will defend entry points to enable follow-on force flow and to hold objectives critical as anchors or start-points for transition to offensive operations. Forcible entry tactical elements must anticipate and defeat successive attacks by conventional and unconventional forces.

(5) Army forces conduct entry operations by:

- Overcoming enemy anti-access by direct actions of Army forcible entry forces as part of joint efforts.
- Destroying other key enemy capabilities essential to enemy offensive operations or defensive integrity.
- Establishing essential command and logistical infrastructures within and external to the JOA to facilitate accelerated reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of Army forces.
Seizing key terrain and facilities required to support force flow and conduct of decisive operations, extend the area of influence, and dislocate enemy dispositions.

(6) Carefully planned as springboards for early attack of key enemy capabilities, entry operations are supported by special operations force (SOF), information operations (IO), joint fires and intelligence, ground-based precision fires, integrated sustainment, and other shaping actions to assure continuous operations. However, higher echelon Army combat and support structures may not be fully in place. As a result, early entry maneuver forces must be able to draw on reinforcing and shaping support from air and naval forces, as well as from engaged multinational partners. Because these defenses occur during a time when sustainment flow must compete with force flow, it will be important that the tactical units committed early be particularly durable to place minimal demands on the logistical system.

c. Inter- and Intra-theater Operational Maneuver

(1) Operational maneuver by ground, sea, and air will extend the reach of the JFC. Army forces will maneuver to a crisis theater to accomplish assigned campaign objectives. Employing joint lift platforms still limited to improved air and sea ports, the future force will deploy, using combined arms formations designed for rapid build up to increase deployment momentum and to close the gap between early entry and follow-on campaign forces.

(2) Intra-theater operational maneuver enables the joint force commander to respond to opportunity or uncertainty, isolate portions of the battlefield, exploit success, and accomplish key campaign objectives. Operational movement of the force by ground, sea, or air can secure positions of advantage to destroy key capabilities and forces, extend tactical reach, achieve surprise, preemptively seize key terrain, overcome or avoid difficult terrain, accelerate the advance of the overall force, secure key infrastructure or populations and block enemy forces. Such operational maneuver can reposition forces in depth increasing the complexity of the situation for the enemy and potentially exposing the entire enemy area of operations to direct attack.

(3) In order to be able to execute inter and intra-theater operational maneuver the joint force commander must consider end-to-end force flow protection along international lines of communication that may be thousands of miles in length. This will require a whole of government effort to maintain protection of deploying forces, sustainment flows, and, as necessary, redeploying forces.

d. Full Spectrum Operations.

(1) Simultaneous offensive, defensive and stability (or civil support) operations are based on an understanding of the operating environment and the strategic and operational objectives. Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force in order to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Because U.S. future enemies will attempt to overcome U.S. strengths and exploit perceived weaknesses, Army forces will combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force in order to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
defensive and stability (or civil support) operations with fully integrated information warfare
which commanders constantly adapt to conditions. Small units must possess combined arms
capabilities and have access to joint capabilities in order to conduct decentralized operations.
Units must possess the ability to aggregate or disaggregate rapidly to defeat hybrid threats, and
must be able to adapt as the enemy transitions.

(2) The Army must have the conceptual capability and the physical ability to seize the
initiative through the coordinated use of combined arms and efforts along other logical lines of
operations such as civil security, host nation security, essential services, governance, and
economic development. Just as offensive operations require strong reconnaissance assets and
defensive operations require strong security capabilities, stability operations (to include
counterinsurgency and state-building operations) require joint forces capable of securing the
population. Each of these operational types also requires a force that is capable of conducting
simultaneous actions—of both a military and a political nature—across the spectrum of conflict.
In short, the Army must be able to both persuade and coerce. Seizing, retaining, and exploiting
the initiative is the object of tactical and operational maneuver throughout the spectrum of
conflict. This spirit of the offensive applies to offensive, defensive, and stability operations in a
wide variety of operating environments. Further, this fighting-centric approach must be applied
with the flexibility of mind and the depth of understanding to use any means available—be it
military, informational, diplomatic, social, cultural, economic, or political in nature—to seize the
initiative.

(3) Another critical challenge for FSO, specific to homeland security, is the capability for
efficient integration into federal civilian command structure for domestic contingencies.
Estimates of the future operating environment highlight the increased likelihood of natural or
man-made disasters and terrorist attacks in the United States and its territories. Such events may
require the Army to support civil authorities for domestic emergencies and designated law
enforcement activities. The Army National Guard will maintain primary responsibility as the
first military force to respond on behalf of state authorities. Should the scope of a domestic
emergency exceed the capabilities of the National Guard, the regular Army will be prepared to
deploy. The Constitution places clear limits on the actions of regular Army forces on U.S. soil;
therefore, the future force must be able to quickly integrate and operate within command
structures headed by other civilian agencies.

e. Ensure overlapping protection.

(1) Future Army units and fixed
and semi-fixed locations, along with
information systems and infrastructure,
will all require advanced protection
capabilities. The future force will assist
interagency and multi-national partners
and the host nation in providing
protection capabilities in an area defense
and area security role which will include
the population, facilities, population centers, bases, and installations. Future protection must be
comprehensive and provide layers of capabilities, capitalizing on joint capabilities to create
overlapping protection, resulting in 360º coverage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implications</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overlapping Protection:</strong> Because U.S. future enemies will be thinking, adaptive adversaries who strive for increasing lethal capabilities aimed at perceived seams and gaps, the Army future force must provide innovative, conditions based protection capabilities that are layered, overlapping, and networked.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Protection and Security Force Assistance:</strong> Because supporting friends, allies, and international groups that may lack advanced protection capabilities, U.S. SFA efforts must include providing protection during operations.</td>
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</table>
(2) Perhaps the more significant threat to ground forces will come during the conduct of
enduring, condition-driven operations where maneuver and fires do not dominate. Close
proximity to the population is common and increases the frequency of interactions in this
environment. This further increases the risk of a threat event. Therefore, combined arms
operations will continue to provide protective value to the combat force. Protective strategies in
the future will seek a heavy investment in autonomous capabilities within Soldier and equipment
systems themselves.

(3) Protection of the force will also involve a thorough understanding of the human
dimension to identify trends, patterns, and associations in the social environment that will allow
for the predictive analysis of specified threats. Deterrent and prevention strategies will be
developed based on an understanding of the local cultural, local psychology, and norms of
behavior. This knowledge will assist commanders in determining the most effective force
posture for conflict resolution, countering provocation tactics, and preventing troop over-
reaction.

f. Distributed Support and Sustainment

(1) Employing distributed support and sustainment will maintain freedom of action and
provide continuous sustainment of committed forces in all phases of the operation throughout the
JOA. More than ever before, Army and joint forces must fully integrate operational support and
sustainment operations with battle, support, and sustainment rhythms executed in close harmony.

(2) Integrated maneuver support
helps shape the operating environment
to protect and expand freedom of
action. The development and
dissemination of information on the
totality of the physical environment
(land air, water, space, and others), as
well as a wide range of variable factors
such as weather and health threats
along with other knowledge helps to diminish an enemy’s initial home court advantage. Further,
tactical and theater maneuver support assets enhance and protect entry points to support
deployment momentum, expand theater infrastructure, support onward movement, detect and
eliminate hazards and help provide the deploying force the SU needed to maintain force flow and
sustainment. Additionally, maneuver support forces contribute to friendly mobility, inhibit
enemy freedom of maneuver, and contribute to force protection and security, and engage and
control populations.

(3) Operations must blend strategic and operational sustainment flows into the theater to
provide continuous sustainment throughout the JOA, without requiring an extensive logistical
buildup or risking a shortage-driven operational pause. They also must fulfill the Army’s
mandate to support other components of the joint force. Sustainment capability will determine
what is feasible, when the force can fight, and how long it can sustain operations. The goal of
sustainment is the continuous, precise, assured provisioning of deployed Army and supported
joint forces in any environment, guaranteeing their ability to generate, maintain, and employ
combat power throughout the campaign.
g. Network Enabled Mission Command

(1) Exercising mission command in the future operating environment faces the same challenges articulated throughout this concept. Mission Command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission orders. Successful mission command demands that subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative, acting aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission within the commander’s intent.\(^59\) Uncertainty places an increasing demand on the command and control system to obtain, process, and disseminate information in a timely manner. Technology in the integrated battle command network provides the backbone for accomplishing command and control, but leadership is the indispensable element. Network-enabled mission command capitalizes on the network to extend the interconnectedness of higher levels to the edges of the force—individual soldiers, weapons, sensors, platforms, etc—while reaching back to both the operating and generating force. This pervasive connectedness extends the benefits of decentralization without sacrificing the coordination or unity of effort characteristic of centralization. Mission command restrains higher level commanders from micromanaging by freeing commanders to focus on accomplishing their higher commander’s intent and on critical decisions only they can make.

(2) Battle command is the art and science of understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing forces to impose the commander’s will on a hostile, thinking, and adaptive enemy. Battle command applies leadership to translate decisions into action by synchronizing forces and warfighting functions in space, time, and purpose to accomplish missions. Battle command involves in part the arrangement of personnel, command and control information management systems, procedures, and equipment and facilities required to direct forces. The most important dimension of battle command will be the commander’s ability to cope with uncertainty, conceptualize operations, and direct decentralized efforts toward the accomplishment of the mission.

(3) Of particular importance to the Army future force is the ability to continue operations when networks degrade through enemy action or system failures. Commanders at all levels must integrate operations with degraded command and control systems in training and exercises. Maintaining competency in fundamental military will continue to be essential counters to degraded communications and electronic systems impairment.

(4) Design is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex problems and to develop approaches to solve them. Critical thinking captures the reflective and continuous learning essential to design. Creative thinking involves thinking in new, innovative ways while capitalizing on imagination, insight, and novel ideas. Design occurs throughout the operations process—prior to and during detailed planning, through preparation, and during execution and assessment. Commanders lead design by

### Implications

**Design:** Because of the uncertainty and complexity inherent in the future OE, adopting design as a process for setting problems is critical.

**Fighting Degraded:** Because the network may be compromised and subject to enemy actions, units will have to be capable of operating in a degraded mode.

**Timeliness of Information:** Because command and control in the future OE will face a range of challenges uncertainty places an increasing demand on the command and control systems to obtain, process, synthesize and disseminate information in a timely manner.
employing critical thinking to frame the environment, frame the problem, and begin to identify
approaches that will help achieve the desired end-state.\textsuperscript{60}

(5) Mission command is about leadership and all the considerations of the moral,
physical, and cognitive components of the human dimension of warfare.\textsuperscript{61} Developing leaders
who are comfortable with uncertainty, who are skilled critical thinkers, and who know the
importance of learning organizations able to adapt to change is a vital requirement for the Army
future force.

\begin{center}
So our future security and prosperity depends on how much—how we respond to this rapidly
changing and complex environment, how well we adapt.
\par
Michele Flournoy, Under Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department Of Defense
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Chapter 4

Conclusion

4-2. Conclusion

The 2009 version of TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 retains enduring conceptual ideas of previous
versions while taking into account the changes that have occurred over the last five years. The
ACC describes the future operating environment and the fundamental military problem it poses
for the U.S. Army. The central idea of the ACC, operational adaptability, provides the
conceptual foundation for pursuit of solutions to the military problem. Meeting the challenges of
the future operating environment will require organizations and leaders that can understand the
situation in depth, act in concert with JIIM partners, assess and adapt actions, consolidate gains
to maintain the initiative, and transition between tasks and operations. Six supporting ideas,
broad fundamental characteristics applicable to all future Army operations, address specific
implications of the future operating environment. They link the core operational actions of the
Army to the military problem at hand and form the foundational capabilities of the future force.
The ACC sets in motion an examination of the implications of future challenges which, in turn,
suggest required future capabilities for combat developers to consider. It also lays the foundation
for the development of subordinate concepts while encouraging further examination of the future
operating environment and the military problem it presents. Ultimately, the ACC gives direction
to the process that will produce an Army that has the ability to gain, sustain, and exploit physical
control and psychological influence over people, land, and resources in the complex future
operating environment.
Appendix A

References

Section I

Required References

This section contains no entries.

Section II

Related References

ARs, DA pams, field manuals (FM), and DA forms are available at Army Publishing Directorate (APD)—Home Page http://www.usapa.army.mil. TRADOC publications and forms are available at TRADOC Publications at http://www.tradoc.army.mil.

Department of Defense Directive Number 3000.05

FM 1
The Army.

FM 3-0
Operations.

FM 3-24
Counterinsurgency.

Joint Operating Environment—The World Through 2030 and Beyond.

Joint Training Functional Concept.

TRADOC Pam 525-3-0

TRADOC Pam 525-3-1
The United States Army’s Operating Concept for Operational Maneuver 2015-2024.

TRADOC Pam 525-3-2
The United States Army Concept for Tactical Maneuver 2015-2024.

TRADOC Pam 525-3-3
The United States Army Functional Concept for Battle Command 2015-2024.
Appendix B

Required Capabilities

The required capabilities derived from this concept may be used, throughout the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System, to drive changes in doctrine, organizations, training, material, leadership, personnel and facilities for the future force. This list is categorized using the Warfighting Functions from Field Manual 3-0, where applicable. This list, while not exhaustive, is an attempt to capture some of the more important capabilities required by the Army in the future. Note that, unless otherwise specifically stated, the other required capabilities from the 2005 Army Capstone Concept remain valid.

Command and Control.

Required Capabilities from the 2005 Army Capstone Concept

- The future force requires the capability of a single, integrated network that enables leaders to communicate digitally, sending voice and data [to include operational graphics, a common operating picture, video, intelligence information etc] while enroute to the objective. These capabilities should be resident in joint and multinational formations conducting FSO, with built in redundancies to overcome enemy and environmental interference throughout the area of operations.
- The future force requires the capability to establish essential command and control and logistical infrastructures in the context of a joint operating environment, within and external to the JOA, including early entry command posts (EECPs) in order to enable the joint commander's ability to conduct operations.

Additional Required Capabilities

- The future force requires the capability to integrate joint, coalition, and government agencies into the planning and execution of FSO. This includes the capability to share planning, command and control, and intelligence information on compatible networks.
- The future force requires the capability to train against realistic scenarios varying the situation, and operational variables that allows leaders to analyze the situation and provide the commander information needed to develop understanding and frame operational problems in order to develop more adaptive Army leaders. The future force requires the capability to improve real time integration of joint capabilities (e.g. common picture, etc.).
- The future force requires the capability to defeat enemy efforts to disrupt or interdict command, control and intelligence networks.
- The future force requires the capability to command and control operations when C2 and intelligence networks are degraded due to METT-TC factors.

Movement and Maneuver.

Required Capabilities from the 2005 Army Capstone Concept

- The future force requires the capability to conduct shaping and entry operations in the context of a joint operating environment in order to shape regional security conditions and – if forces are committed – shape the area of operations, set conditions for maneuver, and seize the initiative throughout the entire campaign.
• The future force requires the capability to conduct inter-theater operational maneuver in the context of a joint operating environment in order to rapidly deploy ground formations that strengthen the JTF’s ability to deter conflict, limit its escalation, or preclude early enemy success, through occupation or seizure of strategic and operational positions of advantage that directly enable subsequent operations.

• The future force requires the capability to conduct intra-theater operational maneuver in the context of a joint operating environment in order to extend the reach of the joint force thereby enabling the joint force commander to respond to opportunity or uncertainty, isolate portions of the battlefield, exploit success, destroy key capabilities and forces, extend tactical reach, achieve surprise, preemptively seize key terrain, overcome or avoid difficult terrain, accelerate the advance of the overall force, block enemy forces, expose the entire enemy area of operations to direct attack, prevent resynchronization of enemy combat power, deny reinforcement and sustainment and accomplish key campaign objectives.

• The future force requires the capability to conduct concurrent and subsequent stability operations in the context of a joint operating environment in order to establish safe and secure environments leading to a viable peace, deter irregular action, and secure the results of maneuver.

• The future force requires the capability to overcome enemy anti-access in the context of a joint operating environment by direct actions of Army forcible entry and strike forces as part of joint efforts to destroy enemy anti-access elements.

• The future force requires the capability to destroy other key enemy capabilities in the context of a joint operating environment that are essential to enemy offensive operations or defensive integrity.

• The future force requires the capability to seize key terrain and facilities in the context of a joint operating environment in order to support force flow, conduct decisive operations, extend the area of influence, and dislocate enemy dispositions.

• The future force requires the capability for maneuver support units to obstruct the enemy by shaping the terrain, rapidly emplacing self-healing minefields and other obstacles, employing multispectral obscurants and a variety of other lethal and nonlethal means in the context of a joint operating environment in order to fix, canalize, constrain, and block the enemy’s tactical agility and freedom of maneuver.

• The force requires the capability to provide assured mobility in the context of a joint operating environment in order to achieve and sustain force agility, improve and expand trafficability, enhance mobility in complex terrain, eliminate obstacles and assist in preventing the adversary from impeding friendly movement.

• The future force requires the capability for maneuver support units, acting in concert with local authorities, multinational and interagency partners, and private organizations/NGOs in the context of a joint operating environment to engage and control populations and interact with indigenous and refugee populations in order to minimize potential noncombatant interference in operations and mitigate the effects of combat on the civilian populace.

• The future force requires the capability to exploit all available air and sea lift, both military and commercial, including advanced military lift platforms, such as austere access high speed sealift (AAHSS), super-short-takeoff-and-landing (SSTOL) aircraft, and theater watercraft, such as the joint high speed vessel (JHSV) in the context of a joint
operating environment in order to enable deploying forces to avoid vulnerable ports and
airheads and deploy in combat-ready unit configurations to carefully selected positions of
advantage in a matter of days, rather than weeks; further permitting the joint force
commander to accelerate force flow, reduce the enemy’s ability to deny physical access to
the theater, and increase the potential for operational surprise.

- The future force requires the capability to conduct vertical maneuver with mounted and
dismounted forces employing SSTOL or HLVTO aircraft in the context of a joint
operating environment in order to exploit positional advantage, put large areas at risk for
the adversary, shorten the duration of battle, present multiple dilemmas to the enemy and
contribute to the more rapid disintegration of the enemy force.

- The future force requires the capability to conduct simultaneous distributed operations in
the context of a joint operating environment in order to bypass less important or non-
threatening enemy forces or areas; focus operations against the most critical forces and
capabilities; expand operational reach; reduce vulnerability to enemy counter actions;
reinforce the effects of fires and interdiction; present a set of multidimensional options to
paralyze and overwhelm the enemy, and lead to rapid collapse of enemy forces.

- The future force requires the capability to directly attack enemy decisive points and
centers of gravity in the context of a joint operating environment in order to deprive the
enemy of key capabilities essential to his defensive integrity and accelerate collapse.

**Additional Required Capabilities**

- The future force requires the capability to conduct area security operations over wide
areas.

- The future force requires the support of Joint Synergy (redundancy versus
interdependencies) in certain capability areas such as fires and surveillance platforms.

- The future force requires the capability to conduct combined arms offensive operations
and to overcome complex web defenses in complex/urban terrain.

- The future force requires the capability to integrate manned and unmanned rotary wing
and fixed wing aircraft in the close fight.

- The future force requires the capability to envelop or conduct turning movements against
enemy forces conducting area defense operations.

- The future force requires the capability to employ the manpower, mobility, firepower,
and protection necessary to close with the enemy.

- The future force requires the capability to employ offensive and defensive EW and Cyber
capabilities.

- The future force requires the capability to execute simultaneous combinations of offense,
defense, stability and civil support activities.

- The future force requires the capability to execute adaptive combinations of combat,
security, engagement, and relief & reconstruction activities exploit and maintain the
initiative and, ultimately, create the conditions for achievement of objectives.

- The future force requires the capability to conduct simultaneous, distributed operations
across the operational area.

- The future force requires the capability to fight for information and conduct effective
reconnaissance against an enemy employing countermeasures to surveillance and
UAS/UGVs.
The future force requires the capability to conduct and sustain operations from and across extended distances.

**Intelligence.** A detailed list of future required intelligence capabilities can be found in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-7-9 The United States Army’s Concept Capability Plan (CCP) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 2015-2024, Version 1.0 12 August 2008. A general statement of emerging required capabilities is provided below.

- The future force requires the capability to develop enduring and continually improving human intelligence networks and intelligence estimates in the context of a joint operation and particularly in a counterinsurgency/irregular warfare environment (despite unit turnover, etc.).
- The future force requires the capability to conduct effective detainee operations in the context of a joint campaign and especially in irregular warfare environments while fighting enemies with ambiguous legal status.
- The future force requires the capability to use interrogations (and detainees) to develop intelligence estimates at lower tactical levels.
- The future force requires the capability to develop, store, access and share tactical, political, economic, and cultural intelligence in a database that is enduring, continuously updated, and accessible to military, intergovernmental and interagency organizations in the context of a joint campaign and especially in an IW/COIN environment to align resources with information, allow deploying units access to current and historical information for planning, and to allow commanders at all echelons the ability to address gaps.
- The future force requires actionable intelligence in order to conduct operations to counter irregular or hybrid threats.

**Fires.**

**Required Capabilities from the 2005 Army Capstone Concept**

- The future force requires the capability to conduct long-range precision surface-to-surface fires and aviation strikes in the context of a joint operating environment in order to complement joint counter-precision and counter-anti-access capabilities.

**Additional Required Capabilities**

- The future force requires the capability of improved integrated joint fire control networks that provide more effective application of all source fires and effects, from theater to tactical levels to include precision fires and suppressive fires.

**Sustainment.**

**Required Capabilities from the 2005 Army Capstone Concept**

- The future force requires the capability to conduct Distributed Support and Sustainment in the context of a joint operating environment in order to become fully integrated with operational requirements.

**Additional Required Capabilities**
The future force requires the capability for a single joint capable logistics C2 headquarters with improved C2 and logistic information systems that provide forces a continuously updated logistical picture from the Soldier to the highest levels of command enabling real time collaborative planning; asset and resource visibility; combat power; force health status and material readiness and consumption. The system must assist in coordinating distribution operations and support course of action analysis in order to provide distributed sustainment in FSO.

The future force requires the capability for increased reliability, maintainability and sustainability of materiel systems including decreased consumption rates and volume (power sources, fuels, water and munitions), ultra-reliable, intelligent, embedded diagnostic and prognostic technologies with an anticipatory sense.

The future force requires the capability for a single joint capable logistics operating picture that is in concert with and in support of the operational commander. The system must enable real time collaborative planning and support course of action analysis.

The future force requires the capability to develop operational, tactical, and strategic capabilities that provide complete freedom of movement both inter-theater and intra-theater; rapidly deploy forces, equipment, and materiel, support forces across the area of operations; distribute sustainment from National level to widely dispersed locations down to soldier level, using ground, air, airdrop and sea platforms; and operate in austere locations (with limited infrastructure).

**Protection.**

**Required Capabilities from the 2005 Army Capstone Concept**

- The future force requires the capability to conduct entry operations in the context of a joint operating environment, under the protection of a rapidly established joint air and missile defense umbrella, shielded from interdiction by means of air and maritime superiority, supported by SOF, IO, joint fires and intelligence, ground-based precision fires, integrated sustainment, and other shaping actions in order to assure continuous operations.
- The future force requires the capability to conduct land-based theater air and missile defense in the context of a joint operating environment in order to degrade enemy long-range air and missile anti-access threats and form a component of the protective umbrella under which entry and follow-on forces can safely enter the theater.

**Additional Required Capabilities**

- The future force requires the capability to deny the enemy the ability to target our forces, allies, and civilian populations with precision systems (missiles, rockets, etc.).
- The future force requires the capability to detect and locate points of origin of enemy fires.
- The future force requires the capability for protection of sustainment operations, ensuring freedom of movement and uninterrupted sustainment, including protection of (sustainment) platforms, logistical installations, intermediate staging bases, forward operating bases, and air, sea and ground lines of communication against adversarial threats including: surveillance, operational compromise, improvised explosive devices (IED), snipers, rocket propelled grenades, directed energy, and WMD.
The future force requires the capability for stand-off detection of explosives and explosive precursor components.

Leadership.

- The future force requires the capability to educate and train leaders who can perform effectively in complex, uncertain, and dynamic operating environments.
- The future force requires the capability to create Soldiers and leaders who are adaptive and agile, able to shift rapidly from one mission to another and can seize, exploit, and retain the initiative.
- The future force requires the capability to manage personnel based on talent (including NG and Reserves) to allow the force to identify service members with specific skills.”

Information.

- The future force requires the capability to integrate the strategic narrative in the conduct of operations in order to inform and influence perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors and affect the information domain that exists beyond battle command to educate all audiences about our intent, and to counter enemy propaganda and dis-information.

Other.

Required Capabilities from the 2005 Army Capstone Concept

- The Future force requires the capability to conduct integrated maneuver support in the context of a joint operating environment in order to shape the operating environment and protect and expand freedom of action through a combination of a variety of functional capabilities (military police; engineers; aviation; nuclear, biological, and chemical defense; etc.)

Additional Required Capabilities

- The future force requires the capability to plan and conduct operations with interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, indigenous, and non-governmental actors and amongst diverse populations.
- The future force requires the capability to conduct "indirect operations" and support/influence reluctant and/or weak partners in COIN operations where we have limited access.
- The future force requires the capability to access adequate resources that improve the capacity of the indigenous government and its security forces in the areas of: police forces, border security, ground combat, air strike, intelligence, command and control, information operations, and civil-military activities.
- The future force requires a generating force that can accommodate challenges of an expanded 1.1 million person force and to meet demands of the changing security environment. All institutional processes must adapt to support ARFORGEN for sustained rotations and achieve shorter timelines to deliver solutions. The Army will need to synchronize personnel and equipment to achieve and maintain specified readiness levels.
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<td>before the common era</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
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<td>ground combat vehicle</td>
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<td>global information grid</td>
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<td>Government of Indonesia</td>
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<td>heavy lift vertical takeoff and landing</td>
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<td>Israeli Defense Force</td>
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<td>irregular warfare</td>
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<td>JHSV</td>
<td>joint high speed vessel</td>
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<td>1838</td>
<td>JIM</td>
<td>joint, interagency, and multinational</td>
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<td>JIIM</td>
<td>joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational</td>
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<td>joint operating environment</td>
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<td>military decision making process</td>
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<td>METT-TC</td>
<td>mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support</td>
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<td>available, time available, civil considerations</td>
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<td>morale, welfare, and recreation</td>
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<td>operational environment</td>
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<td>Reserve Officer Training Corps</td>
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<td>reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition</td>
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<td>operations and training officer</td>
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<td>1888</td>
<td>UGV</td>
<td>unmanned ground vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>United States European Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>USMA</td>
<td>U.S. Military Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>UQ</td>
<td>Unified Quest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>WMD-CST</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>WMD/E</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction/effects</td>
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Section II

Terms

Introduction. This section addresses contemporary issues and contentious terms, retaining Army and joint doctrinal terms where appropriate, redefining terms as necessary, and recommending removal of others when analysis has found them wanting or redundant. Lexicon issues address redundant terminology, colloquialisms, and unnecessary terms. These include:

- SFA, BPC, and Irregular Warfare; IO and its relationship to EW and cyber operations;
- information engagement and other related terms; stability operations vs civil support; and disaggregation of ISR.

The following tables list terms used throughout this concept. Some are terms that have been defined in other publications including doctrinal manuals. Some are well defined and in common use but are listed here with more discussion as they apply to this concept.

### Contentious Terms Requiring More Discussion

| anti-access | operational exclusion |
| building partnership capacity | remote area operations |
| global commons | strategic preclusion |
| hybrid threat | synergy |
| joint synergy | unrestricted warfare |
| information warfare | war |

### Current Terms

| area security | information operations |
| Army Capstone Concept | irregular warfare |
| Army Concept Strategy | security force assistance |
| combat power | seize the initiative |
| computer network operations | shaping operations |
| cyberspace | stability operations or civil support |
| cyberspace operations | strategic level of war |
| design | superiority |
| electronic warfare | unconventional warfare |
| full spectrum operations | unified action |
| information | unity of command |
| information engagement | unity of effort |
| information management |

- **anti-access.** Actions taken by an enemy to deter, slow, or prevent entry of U.S. forces to an AOR
- **area security.** A form of security operations conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within a specific area. (FM 3-90)
- **Army Capstone Concept.** A capstone concept is a holistic future concept that is a primary reference for all other concept development. This overarching concept provides direct linkages to national and defense level planning documents. A capstone concept drives the development of subordinate concepts. For example, the CCJO drives the development of JOCs, JECs, JICs, and Service concepts. TP 525-3-0 drives the development of Army operating and functional concepts as well as CCPs. (TR 71-20)
Army’s Concept Strategy. The Army documents its fundamental ideas about future joint operations in an ACS family of concepts. The ACS family of concepts consists of the capstone concept, Army operating concepts (AOCs), Army functional concepts (AFCs), CCPs, and concepts directed by CG, TRADOC. Concepts facilitate the visualization and communication of the Army’s key ideas on future operations. (TR 71-20)

balance. For the purpose of this concept the word balance means careful consideration of as many factors as possible and making choices that achieve the necessary goals and objectives. For example, commanders will continue to have to strike a balance between risk and mission accomplishment. “The principle of balance in our defense strategy: balance in our response to the current conflict vice preparing for future conflicts; balance in preparing for irregular warfare vice conventional warfare; and balance between the cultural advantages that have given us security vice the cultural changes needed to preserve it.” (GEN Casey, The Army of the 21st Century: A Balanced Army for a Balanced Strategy, 12 Jun 09 draft)

building partnership capacity. Targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the Department of Defense and its partners are part of building this capacity. (QDR Execution Roadmap Building Partnership Capacity, 22 May 2006)

combat power. The total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time. Army forces generate combat power by converting potential into effective action. (FM 3-0, Operations)

computer network operations. Comprised of computer network attack, computer network defense, and related computer network exploitation enabling operations. (JP 1-02)

cyberspace. (DOD) A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. (JP 1-02)

cyberspace operations. The employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects in or through cyberspace. Such operations include computer network operations and activities to operate and defend the Global Information Grid. (CJCS CM-0527-08)

degradation. Conditions that impair or reduce operational effectiveness between or within communications nodes or networks. Degradation can occur due to deliberate and unintentional friendly or enemy actions, materiel breakdown, natural atmospheric effects, and geospatial interference. There are degrees of degradation which can cause minimal effect or complete interruption of capabilities. Also, adversaries or enemies may deceptively degrade in order to impede operations undetected or for eavesdropping purposes.

design. Design is a method of critical and creative thinking for understanding, visualizing, and describing complex problems and the approaches to resolve them. Critical thinking captures the reflective learning essential to design. Creative thinking involves thinking in new, innovative ways while capitalizing on imagination, insight, and novel ideas. (FM 5-0 Draft)

electronic warfare. Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Electronic warfare consists of three divisions: electronic attack, electronic protection, and
electronic warfare support. (JP 1-02)

**full spectrum operations.** The Army’s operational concept: Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. They employ synchronized action—lethal and nonlethal—proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the operational environment. Mission command that conveys intent and an appreciation of all aspects of the situation guides the adaptive use of Army forces. (FM 3-0)

**global commons.** Global Commons are geographical areas that are outside the jurisdiction of any nation, and include the oceans outside territorial limits and Antarctica. Global commons do not include contiguous zones and fisheries zones of foreign nations. (DODD 6050.7)

**hybrid threat.** Threats that simultaneously employ regular and irregular forces, including criminal elements to achieve their objectives using an ever changing variety of conventional and unconventional tactics to create multiple dilemmas are hybrid threats. (TRADOC G2)

**Information.** (DOD) 1. Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. 2. The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation. (JP 1-02)

**information engagement.** The integrated employment of public affairs to inform U.S. and friendly audiences; psychological operations, combat camera, U.S. Government strategic communication and defense support to public diplomacy, and other means necessary to influence foreign audiences; and, leader and Soldier engagements to support both efforts. Commanders use continuous information engagement shaped by intelligence to inform, influence, and persuade the local populace within limits prescribed by U.S. law. (FM 3-0)

**information operations.** The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. (JP 3-13)

**information warfare.** Information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. (Archaic joint term taken from the 23 Mar 03 version of JP 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, that has been deleted from the joint lexicon).

**irregular warfare.** A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. (JP 1-02)

**ISR.** For the purpose of this concept ISR is not used as a term and the initials are disassociated since the term, confusingly, combines a function (intelligence) with a task (surveillance) and a mission (reconnaissance).

**joint synergy.** In this study joint synergy is defined as “combining the advantages of the joint team across all domains and applying those advantages against our opponents.” A more detailed description can be found under the term “synergy”.

C-6
operational exclusion. Based on their perceptions of historical patterns of deployment and employment, future opponents will apply operational exclusion to prevent U.S. joint forces from obtaining and using operating bases in the region and, in so doing, delay or preclude American military operations. Increased threats to forward bases raise the risks to forces, hindering operational phasing and diminishing host nation support for protection of U.S. lines of communication (LOCs). While it is possible for the U.S. to conduct an air and missile campaign without forward basing, a campaign using exclusively strategic rather than a mix of strategic and operational reach would be greatly diminished in its effectiveness and tempo. Operational exclusion applies diplomacy and coercion to keep other regional players on the sidelines. It includes capabilities that have operational reach—medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles, special operation forces, and WMD to name just a few. As the perception grows of the inevitability of U.S. operations, exclusion will entail pre-emptive attack, quite likely with WMD. (TRADOC G2)

remote area operations. Remote area operations are operations undertaken in insurgent controlled or contested areas to establish islands of popular support for the Host Nation (HN) government and deny support to the insurgents. They differ from consolidation operations in that they are not designed to establish permanent HN government control over the area. (FM 3-05.202)

security force assistance. The unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. Security force assistance (SFA) improves the capability and capacity of host-nation or regional security organization’s security forces. These forces are collectively referred to as foreign security forces. Foreign security forces are forces including but not limited to military, paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces; border police, coast guard, and customs official; and prison guards and correctional personnel that provide security for a host nation and its relevant population or support a regional security organization’s mission. SFA occurs within the framework of full spectrum operations (see FM 3-0). In most situations involving this assistance, there is relatively little weight on offensive and defensive operations from a U.S. perspective. However, when U.S. forces accompany foreign security forces (FSF) in combat, the weight of offensive and defense operations will change to address the situation and align with the foreign security force’s efforts. SFA is not just a stability operation, although it is a key contributor to the primary stability tasks of establish civil security and establish civil control. (FM 3-07)

seize the initiative. (in civil support and stability operations): All Army operations aim to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve decisive results. Operational initiative is setting or dictating the terms of action throughout an operation. Initiative gives all operations the spirit, if not the form, of the offense. It originates in the principle of the offensive. The principle of the offensive is not just about attacking. It is about seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative as the surest way to achieve decisive results. It requires positive action to change both information and the situation on the ground. Risk and opportunity are intrinsic in seizing the initiative. To seize the initiative, commanders evaluate and accept prudent risks. Opportunities never last long. Unless commanders are willing to accept risk and then act, the adversary is likely to close the window of opportunity and exploit friendly inaction. Once they seize the initiative, Army forces exploit the opportunities it creates. Initiative requires constant effort to control tempo while maintaining freedom of action. The offensive mindset, with its focus on initiative, is central to the Army’s operational concept and guides all leaders in the performance of their duty. It
emphasizes opportunity created by action through full spectrum operations, whether offensive, defensive, stability, or civil support. (FM 3-0)

**shaping operations.** Operations at any echelon that create and preserve conditions for the success of decisive operations are shaping operations. (FM 3-0)

**stability operations or civil support.** Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (JP 3-0). Civil support is Department of Defense support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities (JP 1-02).

**strategic level of war.** The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. See also operational level of war; tactical level of war. (JP 1-02)

**strategic preclusion.** Potential adversaries have observed the change in posture of the U.S. from a globally forward-deployed force to one that is less global and based within the Continental U.S. (CONUS). Therefore, they know the U.S. has become increasingly reliant upon agreements with other nations for force projection and subsequent reception in theater. Adversarial alliances between nations and even non-state actors that support access denial will prevent U.S. staging privileges. This serves as a buffer or strategic preclusion into a theater and will force the U.S. to seek alternative, less-desirable, and time-consuming ways of entry. (TRADOC G2)

**superiority.** (DOD, NATO) That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another which permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.

**synergy.** (a) JFCs integrate and synchronize operations and employ military forces and capabilities, as well as nonmilitary resources, in a manner that results in greater combat power and applies force from different dimensions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents. Further, JFCs seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in various domains and the information environment, all culminating in achieving the assigned military objective(s) in the shortest time possible and with minimal casualties. Additionally, JFCs not only attack the enemy’s physical capabilities, but also the enemy’s morale and will. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, contains the basis for this multidimensional concept—one that describes how JFCs can apply all facets of joint capabilities to accomplish their mission.

(b) In today’s complex operational environment, it is impossible to accurately view the contributions of any individual organization, capability, or the domains and information environment in which they operate in isolation from all others. Each may be critical to the success of the joint force, and each has certain capabilities that cannot be duplicated. Given the appropriate circumstances, any element of military power can be dominant—and even decisive
in certain aspects of an operation or phase of a campaign, and each force can support or be supported by other forces. The contributions of these forces will vary over time with the nature of the threat and other strategic, operational, and tactical circumstances. The challenge for supported JFCs is to integrate and synchronize the wide range of capabilities at their disposal into joint operations. The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing the actions of conventional and special operations forces and capabilities in joint operations and in multiple domains enables JFCs to maximize available capabilities and minimize potential seams or vulnerabilities. JFCs are especially suited to develop joint synergy given the multiple unique and complementary capabilities available in joint forces. The synergy of the joint force depends in large part on a shared understanding of the operational environment. (JP 3-0)

unconventional warfare. Unconventional warfare (UW) consists of activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying power or government by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerilla force in a denied area. (FM 3-05.202)

unified action. (DOD) The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.

unity of command. One of the nine principles of war: For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander. (FM 1-02)

unity of effort. (DOD) Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization - the product of successful unified action. (JP 1-02)

unrestricted warfare. Actions taken, both military and nonmilitary, to conduct multidimensional, asymmetric attacks on almost every aspect of an adversary’s social, economic, and political life. Unrestricted warfare employs surprise and deception and uses both civilian technology and military weapons to break the opponent’s will. Attacks are integrated and exploit diverse areas of vulnerability: cultural warfare by influencing or controlling cultural viewpoints within the adversary nation; law warfare or political action through transnational or nongovernmental organizations to effect a policy change that would be impossible otherwise; financial warfare by subverting the adversary's banking system and stock market; media warfare by manipulating foreign news media; network warfare by dominating or subverting transnational information systems; psychological warfare by dominating the adversary nation's perception of its capabilities; resource warfare by controlling access to scarce natural resources or manipulating their market value; smuggling warfare by flooding an adversary's markets with illegal goods; and, terrorism to create vastly disproportionate effects on national welfare. (TRADOC G2)

war. An armed conflict, or a state of belligerence, between two factions, states, nations, coalitions or combinations thereof. Hostilities between the opponents may be initiated with or without a formal declaration by any of the parties that a state of war exists. A war is fought for a stated political or economic purpose or to resist an enemy's efforts to impose domination. (modification of a definition from Dictionary of Military Terms, 2nd edition, H.W. Wilson Company, New York, 2003, Compiled by Trevor N. Dupuy et al., page 261.)

Section III
Special Abbreviation and Terms
This section contains no entries.
Appendix D
Endnotes

2 “Army deployment goals” are move a BCT in 4-7 days, 3 BCTs in 10 days, 9 BCTs in 20 days, and 15 BCTs in 30 days, IAW Army Power Projection Program and Army Campaign Plan. See Army Power Projection Program briefing titled, “Army Force Projection Strategy & Management”, February 2009.
3 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, p.134.
4 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force, x.
5 For example, historian Williamson Murray argues that the familiar convention that military institutions fail in war because they focus too closely on the last war is incorrect. In the oft-cited case of German military triumph and French defeat in 1940, for example, the Germans benefited from a detailed study of World War I to determine what really happened and identify implications for future war. Meanwhile, the French studied their last war only superficially and used selective observations to justify existing organizations and doctrinal trends. Actually, the French avoided meaningful debate and designed wargames and exercises to ensure results that reinforced flawed assumptions. See Williamson Murray, “May 1940: Contingency and fragility of the German RMA” in The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 157-169. As historian Eugenia Kiesling observed, “hard truths were blurred both by optimistic language and by refusal to ask questions whose answers might have proved unsettling.” See Eugenia C. Kiesling, Arming Against Hitler: France and the Limits of Military Planning (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 136-143, 175-181. Quotation from p. 180. Because flawed assumptions escaped exposure, French military doctrine and institutional culture developed in a way that was incongruous with the conditions of war in 1940. When the Germans invaded, the French, who had assumed they would be able to conduct “methodical battle,” maintain communications, prevent surprise, and control operations very closely were paralyzed and unable to contend with the actual conditions of war. Robert Doughey, The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1990), 27-32.
8 The National Defense Strategy, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy speech focused on Rebalancing the Force, the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, and the Army’s Chief of Staff white paper addressing a balanced Army all provide different lists of national security interests, priorities or objectives. National Defense Strategy, June 2008. Objectives: Defend the Homeland; Win the Long War; Promote Security; Deter Conflict; Win our Nation’s Wars. Rebalancing the Force: Major Issues for QDR 2010, Michele Flournoy, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Speech to Center for Strategic and International Studies, 29 April 2009. Security Challenges: Rise of violent extremist movements; Proliferation of WMD; Rising powers and the shifting balances of power; Failed and failing states; Increasing tensions in the global commons. Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, version 3.0, 15 January 2009, pp. 7. National Security Challenges: Win our Nation’s Wars; Deter potential adversaries; Develop cooperative security; Defend the homeland. Respond to civil crisis. The Army of the 21st Century: A Balanced Army for a Balanced Strategy, Casey, George W., General, Chief of Staff of the Army, 12 June 2009 draft. Objectives: Prevail in protracted counterinsurgency campaigns; Engage to help other nations build capacity and assure friends and allies; Support civil authorities at home and abroad; Deter and defeat hybrid threats and hostile state actors.
9 Derived from analysis of the following documents: The National Defense Strategy, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy speech focused on Rebalancing the Force, the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, and the Army’s Chief of Staff white paper addressing a balanced Army.
13 Gordon and Trainor, Operation Cobra II. The first American KIA in Operation Iraqi Freedom was a Marine ILT who was killed by elements of the SRG manning a civilian pick-up truck and armed with AK47s and RPGs.
19 Biddle and Friedman
26 For example, Dr. William R. Graham, Chairman, Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, made the following statement while testifying before the House Armed Services Committee on July 10, 2008: “Iran, the world’s leading sponsor of international terrorism, has practiced launching a mobile ballistic missile from a vessel in the Caspian Sea. Iran has also tested high-
altitude explosions of the Shahab-III, a test mode consistent with EMP attack, and described the tests as successful. Iranian military writings explicitly discuss a nuclear EMP attack that would gravely harm the United States."

28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 FM 3-0, Operations, 27 February 2008, pg. 5-4.
36 Leaders and units must still understand that these local conditions are connected to larger and often external and transnational dimensions of the problem. As Kimberly Kagan points out, the problem of counterinsurgency is “not only localized, but also systemic.” Kagan observed about the insurgency in Iraq that “the enemy had developed a system of allocating resources; command and control; financing; logistics; recruitment; training capabilities; information operations; force projection capacities; and methods for reinforcing priorities—not just in local areas, but hierarchically within the theater.” Failure to address the systemic dimension of counterinsurgency limits counterinsurgent efforts and creates opportunities for the insurgent organization. Kimberly Kagan, “III Corps AAR,” 5 May 2008, unpublished paper.
37 In Organizations At War, Abdul Kader Sinno observes that “ethnic groups, social classes, civilizations, religions, and nations do not engage in conflict or strategy interaction—organizations do,” 13. He argues that because engaging in conflict requires “coordination, mobilizations, and manipulation of information,” detailed studies of organizations are necessary to understand “how conflicts begin, evolve, and conclude.” He draws on organizational theory to develop an understanding of how structure affects the character and outcome of armed conflicts. Sinno also argues that centralized organizations are more capable of seizing the strategic initiative than decentralized organizations because they can “implement complex multistep strategies that require careful coordination, strict discipline and concentrated decision making.” In contrast, non-centralized organizations are “incapable of taking the strategic initiative beyond locales abandoned by weak rivals.” He argues that the non-centralized organizations “must centralize once they gain control of a safe haven,” 16. Interestingly, we have seen this phenomenon in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.
38 Charles E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, pg 40.
39 FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, August 2003, pg 1-17.
42 Ibid., pg. II-13.
43 FM 3-0, Operations, 27 February 2008, pg. 5-4.
45 Ibid.
46 Electronic warfare: (DOD) Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Electronic warfare consists of three divisions: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. Also called EW. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as amended through 19 June 2009.
47 FM 3-0, Operations, 2008.

48 Defeat: A tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight. The defeated force's commander is unwilling or unable to pursue his adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the friendly commander’s will, and can no longer interfere to a significant degree with the actions of friendly forces. Defeat can result from the use of force or the threat of its use. FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, September 2004.
51 Intergovernmental organization—An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g. a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. Also called NGO. JP 3-08. Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, 17 March 2006.
52 Such as those involved in the American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand (ABCA) Armies Program.
53 Nongovernmental organization—A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO. JP 3-08.
56 For one perspective on how technology has influenced the relative roles of air and ground forces, see David Johnson, Learning Large Lessons The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power in the Post-Cold War Era; RAND Corporation, 2007.
According to FM 3-0, Operations, disintegrate means to disrupt the enemy’s command and control system, degrading the ability to conduct operations while leading to a rapid collapse of enemy’s capabilities or will to fight. Dislocate means to employ forces to obtain significant positional advantage, rendering the enemy’s dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant.

FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 5-1 to 5-5

FM 3-0, Operations:3-39.

See Chapter 3 of the 2009 draft of FM 5-0, The Operations Process, for a detailed discussion of the elements of design.

See TRADOC Pamphlets 525-3-7 and 525-3-7-1, The U.S. Army Human Dimension Concept, and The U.S. Army Study of the Human Dimension for a comprehensive treatment of the components of the human dimension. These documents also treat the subject of future leadership in some detail. The Study also contains 102 required capabilities, many of which pertain to the Command and Control warfighting function.


The Top Palpable Threat Vignettes, TRADOC G-2, draft document, June 2009.