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The Targeting Process: D3A and F3EAD

by Jimmy A. Gomez

Since October 2001, combat operations in the Afghanistan Theater of Operations have presented the U.S. Army with constant evolution of complex situations that have routinely highlighted shortfalls in current doctrinal solutions. At every echelon, the Army has adapted to the complex situations within the Operational Environment (OE) by revising doctrine to reflect the adaptive responses to the ever-evolving spectrum of threats. The spectrum of threats within the operational environment range from smaller, lower-technology opponents using more adaptive, asymmetric methods to larger, modernized forces able to engage deployed U.S. forces in more conventional, symmetrical ways. In some possible conflicts (or in multiple, concurrent conflicts), a combination of these types of threats could be especially problematic to a one-dimensional, all inclusive Targeting Process.

The Operational D3A framework emphasizes full spectrum operations throughout the conduct of operations. It takes the entire staff to identify the sources of instability that interdict the Shaping Operations that were designed to set the conditions to decisively achieve the Strategic Objectives outlined in the Campaign Plan. In contrast, F3EAD enables the dynamic tasking process required at Tactical targeting level in support of Full Spectrum Operations. Currently, F3EAD has emerged as the methodology of choice to address certain sources of instability such as Personality and Network Based Targeting.

D3A is a great planning tool but it lacks in agility to execute the dynamic tasking process in the full spectrum operations environment. F3EAD is a great execution tool in the full spectrum environment but it lacks in depth and fidelity during the planning process! Simply put, D3A is a great planning tool and F3EAD is a great execution tool for short suspense targets!

Background

The Army Targeting Process doctrine is embedded within the DECIDE, DETECT, DELIVER and ASSESS (D3A) framework. (FM 3-60, the Army Targeting Process. Nov 2010).

Targeting is a simple process of identifying areas and/or sources of instability within a unit's Area of Responsibility (AOR) and Areas of Influence (AOI). The staff then nominates and vets these areas and sources of instability as targets that require a behavioral influence (productive) or a physical change (destructive). Additionally, the staff must identify the leveraging asset(s) required to achieve the Commander's end state in time and space in accordance with the Commander's guidance, priorities, vision, and Operational Objectives **and** in accordance with the Campaign Plan. The scope, complexity and intricate details of the Targeting Process horizon succinctly differ at the Strategic, Operational and Tactical echelons.

AOR/AOI. IPB also assists in the development of the Staff Running Estimates. The Staff Running Estimates helps each staff officer recognize and interpret the indicators of enemy intentions, objectives, combat effectiveness and potential enemy COA's which may counter the commander's end state. In the OE a thorough analysis of the population, the insurgency, and the counterinsurgency line of effort is a pre-requisite. This is conducted by using the eight operational variables (PMESII-PT) and the six mission variables (ASCOPE) outlined in FMI 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency. (March 2009).

The understanding of these variables by all staff officers is critical to developing a plan that can defeat an insurgency. Every echelon must use these operational variables as a way to define their operational environment, which often corresponds to developing Assessments for their AOR and AOI. FMI 3-24.2 uses eight interrelated operational variables to analyze the OE. The eight operational variables are known as POLITICAL, MILITARY, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, INFRASTRUCTURE, INFORMATION, PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT and TIME, (PMESII-PT).

PMESII-PT

POLITICAL: The political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of government. Since an insurgency is fundamentally a struggle for political power, the political environment in the HN country is critical. Attention should be paid not just to the formal political system (such as political parties and elected officials) but also to informal political systems such as tribes, ethnic groups, and other centers of power. Commanders at all levels, including platoon leaders and company commanders, need to recognize the importance of establishing and reinforcing the HN as the lead authority for all operations. This reinforces the legitimacy of the HN government.

MILITARY: This variable includes the security-sector capabilities of all armed forces and police. Most counter-insurgency efforts need to analyze the insurgency's military forces (guerrillas), local militias, other power-brokers and the Host Nation security forces. Commanders must consider quantitative and qualitative aspects to enable capacity, capabilities and efficiency within the security sector, such as conscription or recruitment systems, economic basis (to include appropriations system), and physical position of these forces near national, provincial and local government infrastructure and institutions. Additional qualitative considerations are general organization, training and doctrine, efficiency, rapport with population, and the police role in the nation's internal security of all major population centers.

ECONOMIC: The economic variable consists of the general economic categories of an AOR. Some examples are energy producing infrastructure; raw materials; government development policy; distribution of labor and labor policies; gross domestic product; income distribution; national food distribution; free market or socialist interface and functions; price of main-staple items; price of petroleum products; consumption patterns; external investment, taxation policy; port authorities; movement of goods; consumer issues; border controls; foreign trade; tariffs; and corruption. Low standards of living, lack of options for the unemployed, and a desire for economic reform may be a cause of resentment toward the government which erodes the legitimacy of the recognized government officials.

SOCIAL: The social variable describes societies within an operational environment. A society is a population whose members are subject to the same political authority, occupy a

common territory, have a common culture, and share a sense of identity. Both insurgents and coalition forces need the support of the population to be successful. Most insurgencies attempt to increase friction between different groups in a society and to gain or increase support from any group that shares common elements with the insurgency. These groups may be aligned along racial, ethnic, religious, or social lines. Language similarities or traditions can also be a reason for alignment. Religious influences often play a major role in the sociological factors that affect the insurgent. To be successful against insurgents in a particular area and to avoid alienating the populace, counterinsurgency lines of effort must understand the local environment. This includes local religious, social issues and national issues that effect the local environment.

INFORMATION: The information variable involves the collection, access, use, manipulation, rapid distribution, and reliance on data, media, and knowledge systems—both civilian and military—by the global and local communities. Insurgents seek to control and manipulate how the local, regional, national, and international community perceives its cause and events within their operational environment. To achieve this, their success and acceptance from the populace revolves around their ability to control, manipulate, and distribute information. Understanding the existing communication system is important because it influences local, regional, national, and international audiences. In the United States, media coverage influences US political decision-making, popular opinion, and the sensitivities of coalition members. In the OE, illiteracy and the people’s inability to purchase a radio or TV pushes the populace towards the local teahouse to get information on matters that impact them most. Essentially the local teahouse may control the community’s opinion and influence the “word on the street.” Commanders must use information engagements to fully achieve their tactical goals --this starts at the local teahouse.

INFRASTRUCTURE: The infrastructure variable includes the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for a community or society to function. Typical key infrastructure includes sewers, water, electrical, academic, trash, medical facilities, safety, and other considerations (also known as SWEAT-MSO). The degradation or destruction of infrastructure will negatively affect both the Host Nation and its population. Thus, the degradation or destruction of infrastructure often helps the insurgency, especially with respect to propaganda and the population’s perception of the HN government officials and HN security forces.

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT: The physical environment variable is often the most noticeable aspect of an operational environment. Terrain affects people, equipment, trafficability of the roads, visibility, and the employment of many weapon systems. The terrain aspects of each area of operations must be evaluated to determine the impact on both friendly and enemy forces. For Full Spectrum Operations, terrain is categorized as either rural or urban. Weather and climate influence must be analyzed to determine its effect on the population’s well-being, friendly and enemy operations. Despite any weather extremes, most insurgents always have an advantage, since they are usually native to the climate.

TIME: Time affects everything and influences all decisions. However, the population, friendly forces, and the insurgent often view time differently. Insurgents may design operations with the intent to influence the American political process or elections. In contrast, coalition forces must understand that popular support for extended operations may diminish over time.

ASCOPE

The ASCOPE concept provides an in-depth analysis of the civil considerations which are vital for the long-term success of coalition forces. There are six categories of civil considerations: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events, represented by the useful acronym, ASCOPE. During IPB, the commander and staff analyze civil considerations from several perspectives—the population, the insurgents, and coalition forces—to determine the effects on friendly and enemy courses of action. Analyzing the six categories of civil considerations from multiple perspectives aids in understanding of the OE, and helps to isolate the insurgents from the population (FM 3-0, Operations, February 2008; and FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, August 2003).

AREAS: This term refers to the specific localities within an AOR, where a particular demographic group lives, neighborhood by neighborhood and block by block. Unless a unit occupies an ethnically homogenous area, it will have multiple “areas” within its AO. In addition, a single demographic area may cross several unit boundaries. Examples of specific areas include—

- Those defined by political boundaries such as city districts or regional municipalities.
- Social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves.

Once a unit defines the geographic area occupied by a demographic group, then it should complete the remainder of the ASCOPE analysis for that area. Then repeat this for other areas within the AOR.

STRUCTURES: Existing structures can play many significant roles. Bridges, communications towers, power plants, and dams are important infrastructure. Others, such as churches, mosques, national libraries, and hospitals are cultural sites. All of these structures play important roles in the community. Still others are facilities with practical applications such as jails, warehouses, television/radio stations, and teahouses. Some aspects of the civilian infrastructure, such as the location seats of government, may influence operations. Analyzing an existing structure involves determining how its location, functions, and capabilities support an operation and the civilian institutions they were designed to enable.

CAPABILITIES: Capabilities refer to the ability of local authorities to provide citizens with key services such as public administration, public safety, emergency services, and food. Capabilities include areas in which the populace may require assistance, such as public works and utilities, public health, economics, and commerce. Commanders and staffs must analyze capabilities from different perspectives. They must view capabilities in terms of those essential to save, sustain, or enhance life, in that priority. Within each demographic group, identify which institution/agency is responsible overall for each item that is required to save, sustain, or enhance life. Include all preexisting needs as well as the needs of the populace after a particular operation or catastrophic-phenomena/events that require humanitarian assistance. Capabilities (or lack-there-of) play a large part in identifying root causes of the insurgency.


ORGANIZATIONS: Organizations are nonmilitary groups or institutions in the AOR. They influence and interact with the populace, coalition forces, and each other. Organizations generally have a hierarchical structure, defined goals, established operations, fixed facilities or meeting places, and a means of financial and logistic support. Some organizations may be

indigenous to the area such as tribes and ethnic based organizations. Other organizations include religious groups, patriotic or service organizations, labor unions, criminal organizations, political parties, and community watch groups. Other organizations may come from outside the AO. Examples of these include multinational corporations, United Nations agencies, US governmental agencies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), etc.

PEOPLE (MEANS OF COMMUNICATION): In Full Spectrum Operations (as in all forms of operating environments) all complex situations involve people -- that is what makes war so complex, it's not the terrain, the structures or our technological advantage. It's the people. One important aspect of people is how they communicate. The term *people* include all civilians within the AOR and AOI's whose actions or opinions can affect the mission. Both formal and informal means of passing information, actions, opinions and political influence, are critical to understanding the AOR. All coalition forces must look for the obvious visual and audible signals as well as where people gather. Visual examples include graffiti, posters, signs, billboards, murals, videos and DVDs, and television shows. Audible examples include pirated radio broadcasts, loudspeakers from a Mosque, someone reading to a group, speeches, and religious teachings or services. Most people who serve as the spokesmen in the community (community, labor, and religious leaders) should also appear in the people matrix. If the coalition force's information dissemination techniques differ from the insurgents, this difference could explain why the enemy's propaganda campaign is more credible, timely, and considered to be more legitimate by the populace it influences.

EVENTS: Events, both public and private, are routine, cyclical, planned, or spontaneous activities that affect organizations, people, and our operations. Examples include national and religious holidays, agricultural crop/livestock and market cycles, elections, civil disturbances, and celebrations. Once staffs determine significant events, they must template the events and analyze them for their political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications.

To see how to graph all the PMESII-PT and ASCOPE variables that impact the planning, operations and targeting cycles, see the figure below.



The image shows a 'Staff Running Estimate' form. At the top left is a circular logo with a red and gold design. At the top right, a green box contains the text 'UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO'. The main title 'Staff Running Estimate' is centered at the top. Below the title is a large table with the following structure:

FIRES Estimate	AREAS	STRUCTURES			CAPABILITIES	ORGANIZATIONS	PEOPLE	EVENTS
		I	C	R				
POLITICAL								
MILITARY								
ECONOMIC								
SOCIAL								
INFRASTRUCTURE								
INFORMATION								
PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT								
TIME								

At the bottom right of the form, there is a 'Legend' box:

Legend	
I	Industrial
C	Commercial
R	Residential

Below the legend, a green box contains the text 'UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO'.

PMESII-PT and ASCOPE are fundamental concepts in Irregular-Warfare and Full Spectrum Operations. As noted on the figure above, graphing the PMESII-PT and ASCOPE variables are essential to begin outlining those variables that require simultaneous or sequential influence. PMESII describes the foundation and key features of an enemy state or ally Host Nation. ASCOPE enables an in depth analysis of the key civil considerations vital for the long-term success of our lines of effort, necessary to set the conditions to achieve the commander's long-term end-state. Both concepts can help determine a nation's strengths and weaknesses, as well as help estimate the effects various operations will have on the OE across these important areas. These concepts provide the staff a way to outline and define the spectrum of threats that interdict progress towards achieving our objectives. Additionally, both concepts provide the staff a universal sense of direction by outlining the priorities of work that contribute towards the big picture.

IPB, MDMP, Targeting and Combat Assessments are cyclic, not linear. All must be focused on the environment not the enemy. Focusing on enemy networks limits your thinking and often ignores the real problem: the threat. The sum of the Combat Assessments process provides the point of departure to meet the Commanders' intent, vision, guidance, priorities and Campaign Objectives. Assessments must be threat oriented and must answer the three fundamental questions: *What are we doing? How are we doing it? And, are we doing the right things?*

The OE Assessment must include availability and quality of self-sustaining essential services and the detailed level of interaction between the populace, government institutions and declared hostile individuals (DHI) which include insurgent networks, criminals, and the

involvement of any corrupt Host Nation government officials and/or corrupt Security Forces leadership.

Host Nation government officials and security forces leadership must be part of every process. Any process done unilaterally excludes the population we have to influence. Our processes and methodology must be combined with the national forces and political leaders of the nation we are helping and must be in sync with their National, Regional and local priorities. *“Afghans must be part of the process--they must be in the "decide" phase. If they are not, the analysis is already short sided and most likely wrong.”* (COL Walter Piatt, Cdr, 3/25 IBCT, Thoughts on Salah ah Din Province)

Conducting a “unified” analysis highlights the demographic factors that require synchronized *simultaneous* or *sequential* key leader engagements to achieve the Commander’s desired end state. By conducting all of the previous, the effective removal or reconciliation of these sources of instability may prevent or even reduce the removal of every target via lethal means. Reducing or limiting the use of violence as “the means to an end” prevents the regeneration of a systemic problem ...the insurgents!



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Spectrum of Threats

Physical Influence		Behavioral Influence	
HN Security Forces	Security	Governance	Economic
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sectarian Violence • Corruption • Anti-Occupation • Insurgency • Anti HN Govt. • Insurgency • Extremist Ideology • Insurgent Infiltration • Insurgent intimidation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sectarian Tension • Insurgency Funding • Insurgent intimidation • Extremist Ideology • Corruption 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provincial Powers • Corrupt Govt. Officials • Corrupt SF Officials • Organized Crime • Provincial Elections • Extremist Ideology 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Elections • Rule of Law • Unemployment • Lack of Economic Infrastructure • Lack of Essential Services • Extremist Ideology • Lack of private industry

The initial AOR/AOI Assessment helps focus intelligence collection efforts simultaneously identifying gaps in intelligence which generates request for additional resources and capabilities. As depicted on the graph above, once the environment and the spectrum of threats are analyzed for a specific geographic area, the Staff Running Estimates provide the point of departure for the planning process. It generates the draft Target Selection Standards, Attack Guidance Matrix and the High Value Target List which are essential to develop a COA to achieve the Commander’s End State. Armed with these foundational tools, the staff can selectively recommend the best COA to maximize results at the critical points of the operation as outlined in the Commander’s planning guidance.

Target Selection Standards

In the OE, Target Selection Standards (TSS) are based on the enemy activity and the availability of attack systems that are positioned within striking distance. Target Location Error affects the attack systems capability to accurately acquire and deliver an effect on the target. The

size of the enemy activity (point or area target) must be proportional to the attack system tasked to deliver the desired effect on the target. The status of the target or activity also impacts our observer or detection platforms ability to acquire the target, and then transmit that information to the delivery platform to service the target. Timeliness of the information greatly impacts the designated Detect and Delivery platform from achieving the commander's desire end state.


The graph below outlines a technique to define targets by categories. It provides an overview from initial target nomination to target approval at the Targeting Board.




A technique in defining targets

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- **Level:** is a determination of the target packet's Nomination progress in the targeting cycle
 - 1=Approved by Cdr at Targeting Board
 - 2=Approved at Targeting Meeting
 - 3=Approved at Working Group(s)
 - 4=Developing TGT
 - 5=Initial TGT Nomination



- **Categories**
 - 1-5
 - Represents significance or priority of the target



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The graph below defines and categorizes target categories. The Red Target Categories prioritize from 1 (highest) to 5 (lowest) that require a Physical Influence to kill or capture, or destroy, disrupt. Division level targets are CAT 1. BCT level targets are CAT 2. BN TF level targets are CAT 3 and CAT 4. Company level targets are CAT 5.




Categories of targets

Targeting Effects: The expected results of weapons against specific targets.
Physical Change effects are: Kill (destroy) or Capture (disrupt)

KILL: Destroy – To render target a target so damaged that it cannot function as intended nor be restored to a useable condition without being entirely rebuilt.

CAPTURE: Disrupt – Preclude effective interaction or the cohesion of enemy combat and combat support systems.


- **CAT 1**
 - Transnational/transregional individuals **within MND AOR**
- **CAT 2**
 - Senior threat cell leaders **within BCT sector**
- **CAT 3**
 - Senior Cell Leaders **within Bn sectors**
- **CAT 4**
 - Facilitators, Cache, Trainers, Cell Leaders **within Co sectors**
- **CAT 5**
 - Direct Action/Trigger Pullers (Proverbial Low Hanging fruit and/or shiny objects). **Co or PLT targets**



Categories of targets

- Behavioral Influence targeting effects include:
 - **Inform:** Provide information, counter misinformation.
 - **Influence:** Curtail or cause specific action.
 - **Warn:** Give notice of intent to prevent an action.
 - **Co-Opt:** Gain cooperation.
 - **Disorganize:** Reduce effectiveness of ability.
 - **Isolate:** Minimize power of influence
 - **Deny:** Render ineffective by physically preventing use.

- **CAT 1**
 - Indigenous National Government Officials. Transnational/trans-regional individuals **within MND AOR and/or AOI**
- **CAT 2**
 - Indigenous Provincial Government Officials and Senior leaders **within BCT sector**.
- **CAT 3**
 - District Civic, religious, tribal or Institutional Leaders. Senior Leaders **within Bn sectors**.
- **CAT 4**
 - Civic, religious, tribal or Institutional Leaders **within Co sectors**.
- **CAT 5**
 - Village elders, local tribal and religious leaders, **within Co or PLT sector**



The graph above defines and prioritizes the Green Target Categories. It outlines Behavioral Influence on targets and prioritizes their importance from 1 (highest) to 5 (lowest). The echelon responsible for tracking and influencing the target is also defined by the Category level. Division level targets are CAT 1. BCT level targets are CAT 2. BN TF level targets are CAT 3 and CAT 4. Company level targets are CAT 5.

The Targeting Process (D3A)

D3A continues within the MDMP once receipt of mission has occurred with the DECIDE step. It encompasses *decisions* made while the staff is conducting the MDMP. Since the staff is also the targeting team, there is no need *during* MDMP to conduct a separate targeting meeting. The results of what the targeting meeting would give you are already being developed as the plan is being built. The initial DECIDE factors developed are based on the COA development, Fires Tasks (FiT's), other specified and essential tasks, and status of the Detect and Deliver assets. DECIDE factors address the what, how, when, and where to DETECT a source of instability or High Value Individual (HVI) target; what, how, when, and where to DELIVER or attack that source of instability or HVI target; and what, how, when, and where to ASSESS the attack on that source of instability or HVI target.

A High Pay-off Target List (HPTL) is developed to clarify the FiTs. Refined DECIDE factors address the what, how, when, and where to DETECT, ATTACK and ASSESS each High Pay-off Target (HPT) associated with a FiT. During execution, the DETECT, DELIVER, and ASSESS functions of targeting are conducted in accordance with the concept of the operation (or as modified by the evolving situation) which includes the commander's guidance and intent in a synchronized manner with the scheme of maneuver.

The Targeting Working Group (WG) is conducted during mission execution. Currently, this process occurs once during the targeting cycle (or event-driven). It accounts for all refinements to the current plan which stem from the Assessments Working Group. Assessments continue until the mission is accomplished or until the mission changes.

The Targeting Board occurs at the end of the targeting cycle. The commander approves each nominated target based on the collective staff recommendation(s). Once the targets are approved, the Current Operations Cell - Chief of Operations (CHOPs) publishes a Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) to subordinate units (BDE/BN TF's) for execution of the approved target(s). The Fire Support Officer at the lowest echelon provides 'Bottom-Up' refinements via Combat Assessments. These Assessments outline the success or failure of the target execution in accordance with the targeting cycle and existing reporting requirements within the unit's battle rhythm.

At every echelon, the Targeting Officer duties and responsibilities during Target execution revolve around all the work previously conducted to nominate, vet and approve all targets (sources of instability) that interdict the commander's shaping operations. The Targeting Officer must:

- Maintain Target Packets
- Brief the CDR, G-3/S-3, CHOPs on the target's Category (1-5) and background (cradle to grave). Do we need to inform the DIV/Corps CDR?

- Has the target been vetted Inter-Agency, CJSOTF, the Task Force, HN Security Forces and other agencies in our AOR/AOI?
- Battle Track actions on the objective. Implications to the populace, target area, tribes and religious sects pre, during and post CONOP. (Who does the target shake hands-with?)
- Based on pre-approved consequence management options, make recommendations to clean up the aftermath (radio messages, MEDCAP's, VETCAP's in the areas affected within 24 hours after the CONOP)
- What is the target's hierarchy location (Target Value) within the AOR. (Intelligence value, Operational value [Campaign Plan], Tactical value)
- Be ready to recommend: "Should we kill/capture? Or continue to develop?"
- What do we stand to gain? What do we stand to lose visibility on?

The Bottom-Up Targeting Process

Combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have clearly demonstrated the vital need for increased capabilities in the Army's Battalion Task Force and Company levels, where the risk is greatest.

Commanders at the tactical level must understand, decide, act and react in real-time to capitalize on fleeting opportunities, achieve intended effects and mitigate risk. Commanders have assimilated all or just portions of the FIND, FIX, FINISH, EXPLOIT, ANALYZE and DISSEMINATE (F3EAD) methodology. The accurate tactical implementation of this process provides timely fusion of all sources of information, aggressively re-aligning the BN TF staff, intelligence/operations teaming as Company Intelligence Support Teams (COISTS), sharing a common operating picture of the environment and the effective employment of organic and supporting intelligence assets and capabilities. The accurate fusing of these capabilities empower soldiers at the platoon level to influence the complex "human terrain" through responsive, agile operations at the tactical level across the full spectrum of operations in an era of persistent conflict.

At BN TF level, the Army Targeting framework requires significant changes in design and practical application to keep up with the ever-evolving environmental requirements. Today, the Targeting framework encompasses other critical factors that define the operational environment. These factors are defined as targeting "variables", because the exact influencing factors *vary* in scope, intensity and complexity within any AOR. These environmental "variables" have expanded and enabled complementary targeting processes such as the F3EAD methodology. F3EAD has been modified from its original concept to address specific sources of instability in today's OE such as Personality/Network Targeting.

F3EAD

F3EAD was designed and adapted for Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions in Latin America in the 1980's to counter the growing Communist threat. The FID mission requires U.S. SOF units to train and advise Host Nation (HN) forces. During the *Find and Fix* phases of this TTP, U.S. forces assist with analytical support to HN forces. SOF units may establish the outer security perimeter of the objective area (outer cordon), but HN security forces conduct actions on the objective (inner cordon). During the *Finish* phase HN forces execute the operation (actions on the objective) and U.S. forces remain in the advisory role, or establish blocking positions to

seal escape routes. During *Exploitation*, U.S. forces remain in an assist role and might work with HN forces during Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) of the target within minutes after actions on the objective have been completed. U.S. forces in an advisory role may assist HN forces to conduct any pursuit operations based on information ascertained during SSE of the target. U.S. military intelligence analysts may assist HN forces with analytical support during the *Assess* phase. Both HN and U.S. forces participate in the *Disseminate* phase, using informational ‘tear-lines’ to limit target information only to those who truly *need to know*. (Bowden, *Killing Pablo*. 2001)

In support of Full Spectrum Operations, F3EAD has emerged as the methodology of choice to address certain sources of instability and has proven exceptionally efficient to kill or capture High Value Individuals (HVI’s) which have been determined as High Pay-Off Targets. F3EAD effectively translates the execution of the D3A process via Personality/Network targeting.

However, F3EAD has several critical flaws; it has been implemented primarily (not exclusively) for physical destructive targeting. It does not sufficiently address the “DECIDE” aspect of the D3A cycle, which can result in targeting for the sake of targeting, and not use targeting as a surgical tool to achieve the Commander’s desired end state. In contrast, the D3A process retains the critical and decisive “DECIDE” step which is the approving factor to facilitate full-spectrum operations; enabling the decisions required to combine physical and behavioral, productive and destructive targeting effects to achieve the Commander’s desired end state identified in the Campaign Plan.

The Commander who uses F3EAD as his operational framework requires substantial organic and complementary Intelligence platforms and capabilities to be successful. Often times, these platforms are employed beyond their carrying capacity. Intelligence sourcing capacity is linear not cyclic so these platforms and capacity must be carefully managed. If these platforms/capabilities are focused on everything, then they’re not focused on anything! The intelligence that emerges must be pre-approved for dissemination to HN security forces and other Coalition partners via “tear lines”. These tear lines outline what information is releasable beyond US forces. In the Full Spectrum Operations environment, the timely establishment of these “tear lines” is the Achilles-heel of the F3EAD framework.

Commanders who use the F3EAD concept as their operational main-frame are forcing a physical change upon the environment. This is best summarized by the following quote, “*Continued pursuit of an invisible enemy will increase his combat power by pushing a disenfranchised populace closer to the enemy. If you focus solely on the enemy, you will ignore the threat.*” (COL Walter Piatt, Cdr, 3/25 IBCT, Thoughts on Salah ah Din Province).

Unfortunately, a war of attrition does not assist us in setting the operational conditions to meet the strategic objectives outlined in the Campaign Plan. At the Operational echelon, Behavioral Targeting or “Influencing the Pulse of the Populace” is the premise of Full Spectrum Operations.

A war of attrition is counter to LTG McChrystal’s Plan for Afghanistan, where he outlines what he calls “*counterinsurgency math: If you encounter 10 Taliban members and kill two*”, he says, “*You don't have eight remaining enemies. You have more like 20: the friends and relatives of the two you killed.*” (Newsweek, September 2009).

Mission success cannot be defined by the number of HVI's killed or captured. The F3EAD methodology establishes an exclusively lethal-approach to contemporary operations in Iraq and Afghanistan which tends to embolden the threats, rather than engender submission or reconciliation. The offensive nature of this process often leads to recommended "action" verse influence.

Some BN TF Commanders tend to emphasize their objectives using destructive means. Why? It's easier! Building a Host Nation's governmental institutions and placing their government and security force officials at the forefront is difficult. Today, our strategic success hinges on our ability to transition the responsibility for all governance functions, rule of law responsibilities, economic and security institutions to the HN National, Provincial and Regional establishments. To tactically accelerate the process to achieve this gradient, the institutional approach to plans, operations and targeting must integrate a behavioral targeting framework at the forefront of all operations, while remaining prepared for all contingencies.

Another longstanding chasm the doctrinal framework must bridge is defining the relationships between "the plan" and the targeting process. We must permanently *bind* behavioral and physical targeting venues under one Targeting Process at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Simply put, we must place emphasis on *influencing targeted areas* consistently throughout; before, during and after every combat patrol which is resourced and designed as a last resort to kill or capture an HVI. Within minutes of removing a source of instability, the corresponding village, District or Provincial leader must inform the populace of the facts of the operation to remove that individual. Additionally, we must provide solatia to the immediate area(s) we've negatively influenced, not just the people affected. Consequence Management (Think before You Act) is the Commander Security Assistance Force's (COMISAF) #1 Key Point in his Guidance. (COMISAF's Counter-insurgency Guidance. *Protecting the People is the Mission*. August 2009)

In essence, we must tie all populace influencing venues and options into ONE Targeting Process. This relationship is a prerequisite and it's paramount to achieve a true synergistic effect which enables an enduring reduction of violence and eventual defeat of the insurgency.

Conclusion

Simply put, D3A is a great planning tool and F3EAD is a great execution tool for short suspense targets!

The Operational D3A framework emphasizes **full spectrum operations** (combining elements of offense, defense, stability, and civil support) throughout the conduct of operations. It takes the entire staff to identify the sources of instability that interdict the Shaping Operations that were designed to set the conditions to decisively achieve the Strategic Objectives outlined in the Campaign Plan. The staff then nominates and vets each target that requires either a behavioral or physical influence. Every nominated target **must** meet the Commander's Target Selection Standards and the outcome from *every* target engagement must provide progress towards achieving the Strategic Objectives in accordance with the Campaign Plan.

F3EAD enables the Tactical targeting framework in support of Full Spectrum Operations. F3EAD has emerged as the methodology of choice to address certain sources of instability such as Personality/Network Targeting. F3EAD has proven exceptionally efficient to kill or capture High Value Individuals (HVI's) which have been deemed High Pay-Off Targets. F3EAD

effectively translates the dynamic execution of the D3A process via Personality/Network targeting.

Lessons Learned from on-going combat operations have compelled Army Commanders to routinely develop and implement ways to assist tactical commanders, staffs and every War Fighting Function. Some of these initiatives have evolved from TTP's designed to outline a simple methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems. Over time, these TTP's have morphed into broad approaches which resolve and manage the contemporary problems emblematic of on-going Stability Operations (Iraq, Afghanistan) and Support Operations (Philippines, Horn of Africa) in support of the prolonged Global War on Terrorism. The greatest strength of our Army is our innate ability to improvise and innovate. However, if we do not understand the doctrinal framework from which to improvise, our innovations lose their applicability. Once we have achieved a solid doctrinal foundation, the implementation of *alternative* TTP's for **specific situations** or **specific targets** can be integrated successfully. The real challenge, however, requires synchronizing our targeting efforts across all echelons of the Army to enable a holistic approach. This requires educating Army leaders at all echelons, emphasizing doctrine across all Institutions (Centers of Excellence) to see *why* the concepts we have chosen are either working or falling short of our intent. Otherwise, nothing will change.

Acknowledgments

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