

Thinking Small: Applying Hobbes to Counterinsurgency

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This article relies on a big assumption, which is that the United States and its coalition partners are directly involved in a counterinsurgency, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq. Naturally, not all insurgencies and counterinsurgencies follow this model. To a large extent, the United States can render advice and assistance to the affected state without direct military involvement. Moreover, many governments, and African states appear to head the list, do not see it in their interest to eliminate the insurgents completely or desire the type of reforms that may weaken their hold on power. So, this article focuses solely on those cases in which the United States finds itself involved directly in an insurgency as a result of invasion or intervention.

Perhaps the most bandied about premise in counterinsurgency strategy is the need to win the hearts and minds of the affected population. In abstract, both the insurgents and counterinsurgents vie for the allegiance of the people through social, economic, and political incentives. Yet, this premise begs the question: if the rectitude of hearts and minds is indisputable, why does it have such a poor record of success? The lackluster results of its application are certainly not from a lack of effort and resources. Here lies the rub. The aforementioned incentives are founded on a tacit assumption that people have a choice in the matter. If they don't, what eclipses hearts and minds?

In his book, *Leviathan*, Thomas Hobbes contends that the pursuit of self-preservation dominates human behavior first and foremost.¹ The covenant between the citizen and the government centers on security, not only at the macro-level (e.g., sovereignty of the state) but also the micro-level (e.g., sovereignty of local governance). People created society and surrendered some individual sovereignty in exchange for the collective good of security. It is within this province that citizens are able to pursue happiness and societal progress.² Hence, this covenant is founded on a tacit security agreement between the citizen and the government.

Insurgents understand and seek to shatter the covenant by creating the conditions of insecurity as a means of gaining control of the population in their area of operation.³ Subversion of government authority through terrorist acts, selected assassinations of officials, murder and threats perpetrated on the populace, and general mayhem ultimately results in the intimidation of the populace and hence its acquiescence to insurgent activities.⁴ With the individual's faith in and allegiance to the government in question, the government's task of reasserting its authority and regaining the confidence of the people becomes infinitely more difficult.⁵

All this is not to say that the present understanding of hearts and minds is unimportant, it is, but its application must be sequenced properly.⁶ Or stated another way, the attainment of security must be the first stage of hearts and minds. Without a solid foundation of security, the other incentives will crumble on a bed of sand. The challenge lies in the ways and means of achieving these ends.

In view of Hobbes' contention that self-preservation dominates human behavior, this article addresses the operational and tactical calculus for the prosecution of a counterinsurgency strategy: 1) the centrality of local communities in the conflict; 2) the methodology for securing local communities; 3) restoring the covenant between the government and the people; and 4) enhancing the covenant. Success for any counterinsurgency hinges on three factors: understanding the plight of the people caught in the vise of an insurgency; acknowledging that insurgents derive their strength from population centers; and denying insurgents access to local communities. In short, counterinsurgency strategy should focus on creating security spheres for every community (e.g., city, town, village, or hamlet) as the first step in restoring local societies. For the U.S. military, pursuit of this calculus carries significant political-military implications.

The Centrality of Local Communities in the Conflict

In counterinsurgency, selection of the battlefield, that is, where to challenge and engage the insurgents, becomes an imperative. Like American politics, all insurgencies are local, meaning they take root in those outlying local communities where government control is weak, before expanding into districts, provinces, and beyond. Because insurgents initially lack the combat power to challenge government military forces, the selection of outlying areas affords the best chance for the insurgency to accrue strength. To survive and flourish, they need population centers for sustenance, shelter, protection (i.e., using the population as cover and for intelligence collection), recruitment, and resources. To undermine the morale of the government and populace, inspire potential supporters, and garner international sympathy, insurgents leverage spectacular events in cities for propaganda effect. If a bomb explodes in the countryside, the event receives scant attention; however, if it explodes in a city square, it receives world-wide attention. In the immediate aftermath of these events, the insurgent spokesmen can deliver their messages with greater assurance that the intended audience is listening.

Counterinsurgency strategy must take into account not only the insurgent dependence on population centers, but also the plight of the affected populace. Wresting insurgent control from a communities and gaining the people's trust cannot be assured by periodic patrols through hamlets, villages, towns, and city neighborhoods. Once intimidated, the population becomes passive and requires immediate and permanent security measures in order for them to regain their confidence. The operational centerpiece is not eliminating the insurgents; rather it is denying them access to the local populace. The manner in which security is assured to the populace drives strategy and tactics. In military parlance, it may be more useful to view local communities as strong points, which seek to channelize insurgents into open terrain and thus play into counterinsurgency military strengths.

Counterinsurgency strategy cannot focus predominantly on the establishment of national military and police institutions to the neglect of security in local communities.⁷ These institutions take

considerable time to mature. In the interim, insurgents will take advantage of the security vacuum to expand their networks into a formidable guerilla complex. Because insurgents operate in an environment of subversion, no news is not necessarily good news. National security forces are necessary for the long term, but local security forces are essential to stymie or contain a burgeoning insurgency so it remains manageable at the lowest level.

The Methodology for Securing Local Communities

The counterinsurgency leadership has three instruments for securing population centers: the military, auxiliary police or militia, and cadres. Of the three, the use of cadres has the most enduring and positive impact on the course of the conflict.

Military. Considering the vast number of hamlets, villages, towns, and cities, the task of securing them all is a monumental task. The operational dilemma is immediately apparent. The national government does not have sufficient military forces available to establish a permanent presence in every piece of urban terrain, nor is it economically supportable to increase the size of the military to attempt it. Moreover, such deployments lead to overextension, leaving the military potentially vulnerable to defeat in detail.⁸ As any student of military history can recite, “He, who tries to defend everything, defends nothing.”

A typical military solution is to concentrate on insurgent dominated areas in order to achieve sufficient mass to destroy them. Unfortunately, this strategy fails to achieve the desired effects. Insurgents demonstrate the marked ability to abandon safe havens when pressured and relocate to other areas so as to begin the subversion cycle anew. The military thus exhausts itself zipping from one insurgent area to the next in an endless cycle, a situation deployed soldiers cynically call “Whac-A-Mole™.”⁹ To prevent insurgents from infiltrating into other urban areas (even secure areas), one is forced to the conclusion that every local community must have the ability to defend itself.

Out of necessity, the military can and should deploy some units to major cities, which constitute the country’s strategic bases. Not only do military units supplement city police forces, they also serve as regional or provincial reserves against major insurgent attacks.

Auxiliaries. An ad hoc solution is for the government either to task local authorities with establishing their own security forces or to provide security using hastily raised auxiliary police forces. Either solution undermines the foundation of long term security and development. A police force or militia without proper vetting and training, without discipline and values, and without professional leadership is nothing more than a mob with questionable loyalties, effectiveness, and trustworthiness. In short order, they become no different than the insurgents, and more than likely will even conspire with them and criminal elements. Thus, relying on grass roots security forces tends to sap long-term stability and should be regarded only as a temporary, emergency measure.

Cadres. The use of cadres to raise local security forces has the most enduring impact on achieving security at the lowest level, throughout the country. In effect, the use of cadres reflects the modus operandi of an insurgency in reverse. Each cadre has a three-fold purpose: 1) provide

villages and city neighborhoods with capabilities to defend themselves; 2) establish an early warning network against insurgent incursions; and 3) serve as conduit for ombudsmanship with respect to local corruption and criminal activity as it relates to the insurgency. Before addressing the efficacy of cadres, the manpower issues require attention.

Having sufficient numbers of cadres pursuant to a local community denial strategy becomes a strategic imperative. Admittedly, an organization comprised of even four-man cadres would conceptually require large numbers with a host nation containing tens of thousands of villages. Even though Special Operations Forces (SOF) are the most adept as cadres, their numbers are limited. Select conventional military personnel (e.g., military police and infantry) can augment cadre numbers to an extent. However, civilian volunteer police have considerable potential and are certainly an appealing idea with coalition countries. Private contractors (i.e., DynCorp) can also provide retired policemen as cadres. As part of the strategic calculus, the combatant commander could allocate SOF to high-threat areas while the conventional military and civilian police cadres operated in secured or stable areas. Lastly, expediency may require cadres to cover multiple villages in the near term (i.e., district-level cadres)...but it should not become a permanent fixture.

The insertion of cadres is predicated on the security situation. Normally, a window of opportunity exists in the immediate aftermath of a conventional conflict since the insurgent threat level is at its nadir. In contested or ambiguous threat areas, military prudence suggests that cadres accompany military units as they sweep villages or city neighborhoods and remain in place once the military moves on. Note that inserting cadres is possible even during a full-blown insurgency, but military units will likely need to linger until the cadres have established local security forces.

The cadre's first task is to meet with the local authorities (i.e., chieftain, tribal elders, mayor, etc.) to explain its presence, gain permission to operate, and establish good rapport. Rapport is especially critical because the cadre's safety is intimately linked to the benevolence of the local authorities. In many cultures, the acceptance of guests into the community incurs an obligation for their safety.¹⁰ Nevertheless, the cadre should tactfully warn of the swift consequences to the community if the cadre is targeted. As a matter of course, the cadre vets and hires safe house security guards.

The cadre recruits (in consultation with the local authorities), organizes, equips, trains, and pays the local police force.¹¹ The cadre has the essential task of instilling discipline and values in the force as well. Without ethical underpinnings, the police force will likely operate as a rabble and worse, degenerate into an oppressor (i.e., death squads, extortionists, and smugglers). Cadre-led forces also ameliorate the problems associated with pre-existing local police and auxiliary police forces in terms of mixed loyalties, corruption, and weak commitment to the community they serve and protect.¹² After a period of evaluation and consultation with the local authorities, the cadre selects those personnel with the greatest leadership potential for formal police training.¹³ Upon their return, the trained personnel assume the leadership positions, permitting the cadre to step back and assume a mentor role. Note, that once a local police force is firmly established, cadres can be reduced to cover multiple villages in a district, with mentorship cycling through the villages to monitor progress.

Generally, local police forces are sufficient to protect against incipient insurgent and criminals. However, in high-threat areas, district or even provincial militias may be required to bolster security, as were successfully used in the final years of the Vietnam War. In order to avoid long term problems associated with rogue militias, cadres are paramount and should have a military background. As with local police, the cadres stand up the militia, but do not pay them. Since a militia is a volunteer organization, cadres inculcate a sense of duty among the militiamen to the community and are on-call. In general, the prestige gained from a uniform, rank, and public approbation provides sufficient inducements for service.

The use of cadres does not insinuate conventional military forces have no role. In view of their combat power, military forces are more effective in hunting down militant units or fugitives in the areas surrounding population centers. This role is particularly useful in cases where insurgents have been expelled from villages and are momentarily vulnerable. Roger Trinquier, a French practitioner of counterinsurgency, asserted that insurgents invest substantial time and effort in creating sanctuaries, all of which are lost once they are forced into unfamiliar territory. "He cannot live among a populace he has not previously organized and subjected to his will."¹⁴ Small unit operations (i.e., squad and platoon) in the surrounding areas maintain pressure on the insurgents to keep moving, intercept the movement of weapons and munitions, and uncover caches and bases. It is important to note that insurgents do not need to live in a population area to gain its benefits. They may operate out of bases in the surrounding area and visit local villages periodically to maintain their control over the population.¹⁵ The counterinsurgency effort aims to push them increasingly away from population centers as a means of depriving them of this access. Hence, the true measurement of success in counterinsurgency lies in the number of local communities under physical government control and not the number of insurgents killed.

It becomes clear that increasing the distance between the insurgents and the population centers pushes the conflict to the border regions. In the final stage, the military concentrates on the border areas in order to intercept militants infiltrating from bases located in neighboring countries. This places a tremendous burden on the insurgents, who must travel in small groups over extensive distances and rough terrain to villages before their supplies run out. Their plight is accentuated if they must fight local police forces to gain this critical access. The traditional insurgency-counterinsurgency roles are thus reversed. The insurgent must attack from the outside without benefit of civilian cover and intelligence. Even if insurgents successfully take a village, they must contend with the local militia and military reaction forces. Once repulsed or expelled, where do they go? Harried by military forces, they must abandon their wounded and heavy weapons to make the eventual long trek back to the border. Exhausted and demoralized by the lack of success, insurgents will eventually fade away. Conversely, the populace awakens to the fact that it is no longer the victim, that it can defend itself from threats. With new found confidence, the people begin to put their lives back together.

Restoring the Covenant

The physical and psychological aspects of security are not mutually exclusive. They form the critical dyad of counterinsurgency. A prevailing sense of security among the population creates

confidence in the future, which in turn encourages people to seek jobs, education, and business investments. The government must recognize that insurgent occupation intentionally shatters society, creating among the citizenry an atmosphere of isolation and paranoia, and driving people to despair. The insurgent demands compliance and not affinity from the population. The threat does not need to be continual, just occasional, to be effective. It is little wonder that the vast majority of the people try to remain non-committal to either side, but this neutrality serves insurgent goals.

To break the insurgent's psychological grip on the population, the government must provide hope and self-empowerment, that is, giving the population the sense that they can take control their destiny or at least assist counterinsurgency forces without incurring insurgent retribution.

One of the first acts of the cadre is to conduct some form of information operations, acting through the local authorities. The gist of this effort is to inform, reassure, and persuade the population. Letting the locals know what is going on outside of their village is much better than allowing rumors to rule them. People yearn for reassurances that the government understands their plight and shall enhance their security and other concerns. This is the essence of hope. The cadre must persuade the population that the government has the superior capability, will, and strategy to defeat the insurgents. But, the struggle will not be successful without the people's help. Throughout this communications effort, the cadre must rebut insurgent propaganda because the population will readily believe all kinds of accusations, no matter how absurd, if not addressed immediately. Hence, an internet link to news services is essential to the cadre.

Simply by dominating population centers, the counterinsurgency deprives militants of their greatest platform for propaganda. As mentioned earlier, terrorist acts that occur in the rural areas hardly warrant a mention in the media, but the same acts in a city gain international coverage. This fact alone gives added value to controlling urban areas.

A recurring problem in counterinsurgency is the infiltration of militants back into villages and cities once military forces move on. This threat has the greatest psychological impact on the local citizens because they bear the brunt of insurgent retaliation for acts of cooperation with the government. In view of their close relations with their community, local police are the principal force to identify and neutralize inchoate insurgent cells and to root out those cells which have gone underground. Yet, their mere presence is not sufficient to root out insurgents. The cadre must organize the community to detect and report insurgent presence. As David Galula observed, "Intelligence is the principal source of information on guerrillas, and intelligence has to come from the population, but the population will not talk unless it feels safe, and it does not feel safe until the insurgent's power has been broken."¹⁶

The implementation of curfews, census taking, identification cards, checkpoints, and patrolling is a well-known necessity in restoring control of the population. Not as well known is the implementation of a neighborhood watch network, which is critical in large towns and cities, to acquire intelligence.

Trinquier offered a useful framework, which he coined "Gridding," for collecting intelligence from the population. Similar to insurgent cellular organization, the urban government employs

an organizational pyramid, appointing a chief monitor, who divides the city into two sectors and assigns a subordinate monitor for each sector. The process of subdivision continues down to local overseers in direct contact with and responsible for the inhabitants of a residential building or group of houses (4-5 families). Each monitor in the pyramid must be vetted and held accountable by their immediate superiors.¹⁷ Local police forces interact with the monitors to investigate tips on insurgents or insurgent activities.¹⁸ In this manner, the people and the authorities are empowered to root out existing cells or attempts by insurgents to infiltrate back into a city or town. The neighborhood watch effort lays the foundation for the gleaning of human intelligence, which is fed up the national intelligence directorate daily. This is the essence of the intelligence effort and pays profound dividends. For example, insurgents producing explosive devices need a secure facility to collect materials and assemble components (from suicide bomb vests to car bombs). Deprived of secure facilities, they cannot make these devices easily or in vast numbers. The neighborhood watch system rests on the assumption that there is always someone in the neighborhood who is aware of insurgent activity. The trick is to provide the ways and means to tap into that person.

The last component for restoring the covenant, reconstituting local society, has a practical objective. Just as the insurgents seek to sever the authority of the government and sew a sense of isolation and paranoia among individuals, the cadres must mend the fractures. The establishment of sports clubs (e.g., soccer and volleyball), social clubs (e.g., sewing, music, and games), and schools encourages social interaction. These create the sense of community worthy of self-sacrifice and commitment among the participants, which include the local authorities, police, and militia. Under these conditions, local police and militia are less likely to leave fellow citizens in the lurch if insurgents attack.

Enhancing the Covenant between the Citizenry and the Government

Once a sphere of security is created in a local community, the core issues of hearts and minds can proceed coherently and with greater effect, at least without incurring a profligate waste of resources, money, and time. At this stage, construction, development, and economic growth are central to hearts and minds. Because these initiatives are reserved for secure areas, they serve as incentives for other local authorities to accelerate their security posture.

A critical component of the covenant is the national army and national police forces, which epitomize the nation's security institutions. On a practical level, without them, coalition forces could never withdraw without risking the entire enterprise. These forces need years to mature as institutions, and this maturation is necessary for the confidence of the people. Not only do the national security forces assume a greater security burden over time, they also serve as a symbol of pride for the citizens. National military and police advisory agencies should resist rash timelines and unrealistic milestones for progress though. The cadre approach permits these institutions to develop without an undue sense of urgency.

One of the frustrations that impregnate perceptions is the uneven distribution of benefits to the local communities. Cadres are ideally placed to determine exactly what the villagers want and to coordinate for immediate impact projects with the various reconstruction and development agencies (i.e., UNHCR, USAID, ICRC, etc.). However, construction projects are not nearly as

important as providing resources, material, and skills training to the local inhabitants (e.g., carpentry, construction, electricity, plumbing, maintenance, etc.). Providing salaries for local labor jump-starts the local economy. This is the way to satisfy expectations and enhance confidence in the government. Of course in the larger sense, the national government must continue to concentrate on capacity building (i.e., infrastructure, agriculture, industry, etc.) but cannot ignore local expectations without invoking grievances.

Cadres also serve as a reporting conduit for acts of criminal activity, human rights violations, and low level corruption as they relate to the insurgency. Generally, addressing these activities directly with the perpetrators would endanger the cadre position or even personal safety, but the cadre should inform the local authorities that the cadre is aware of the activities and have submitted reports. Bringing in appropriate agencies to investigate sends the signal that such activities will not go unnoticed. The intent is to deter improper behavior by exposing it, and create greater confidence among the population by reporting illicit behavior.¹⁹

Political-Military Implications

Western practitioners of counterinsurgency must divest themselves of the notion that insurgents are bound by the same ethics, customs and laws of warfare.²⁰ In practice, because insurgent movements are not states, international institutions, such as the United Nations, do not hold them accountable. Insurgencies are more analogous to criminal enterprises, meaning they take on the aspects of a continual, paramilitary struggle and not a clearly delineated state of war with a clear beginning and end. In this setting, battlefields are not the venue for settling the conflict.

The centrality of local communities in a counterinsurgency strategy places a premium on cadres operating independently but with robust communications, rather than on military maneuver forces. Special Operations Forces are especially suited for this role and hence should expand beyond current force levels.²¹ SOF can provide specialized training courses for earmarked cadres to provide the requisite organizational depth for future contingents. The Department of Defense may also consider recruiting active or retired police officers in a reserve status or through private contractors for such contingencies. With this view in mind, the NATO Response Force can adopt a police contingent similar to the EU Rapid Reaction Force, which has a 5,000-strong police contingent.²²

The cadre approach to counterinsurgency implies the deployment of a smaller military contingent, suggesting smaller and fewer headquarters and a much smaller logistical infrastructure. Logically, insurgents would have fewer targets of opportunity to engage. The vast reduction in bureaucratic overhead (i.e., security, facilities, and services) translates to more money and resources devoted to supporting the cadre missions and initiatives that benefit the local communities directly.

Cadres imply a decentralized approach and decreased tempo to counterinsurgency. Accordingly, the commanding general can render great service to the coalition by placing a cap on the number of meetings and reports (to include an obsession with power point). Weekly cadre reports are sufficient, and “NSTR” is definitive feedback. The commanding general can take a page from

General Patton in France and General Templar in Malaya by using small teams to check on progress with cadres and alert him to potential problems or obstacles to progress.²³

Commanding generals can heed the Duke of Wellington's example during the Peninsula Campaign, in which he told the British government he could stay at the headquarters and devote all his time to answering questions and filing reports, or he could focus on winning the war and provide periodic progress reports.²⁴ Many a reader will regard this recommendation as naïve because democracies place a premium on information and by extension, the free press, which in turn provides the news the government needs to bolster political support. The counterinsurgency leadership should not deny journalists access; rather, it should make the news environment mundane. In short, no conflict should become a spectator's sport.

The cadre approach places the counterinsurgency in its proper place—a struggle which requires the long term commitment of a coalition of organizations without the public's constant attention.²⁵ Journalists must understand that maintaining positive control of local communities represents the measurement of success rather than set-piece military operations. Granted, placing service members in harm's way deserves the concern of citizens, but not to the point of exciting the deep passions as a conventional war would entail. A local community denial strategy deprives insurgents of the propaganda value they seek and places the onus of achieving results on their shoulders—a major psychological boost for the citizens of both the host and coalition countries.

Perhaps most importantly, the cadre approach sends the signal to the host government that the coalition effort is to assist and not assume the burden of war fighting. A prevalent counterinsurgency error is creating over-dependence between the host country and its benefactors. Prodigious coalition commitments and lavish spending militate against the host government assuming ownership for the conflict and encouraging government reforms as expeditiously as possible. Conversely, over-commitment holds the coalition hostage to the political intrigues of the host country. Ultimately, political and economic development is the responsibility of the host government. Once the security apparatus is established, the military contingent should withdraw, lowering the political profile of the struggle.

The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is an excellent vehicle for demonstrating multinational solidarity with a coalition, associated burden sharing, and direct support to the cadres. As the name implies, every province should have a PRT, ideally near the provincial capital. PRTs provide the quick reaction force, a place of cadre refuge if required, the depository for local police force salaries and immediate impact funds, as well as the cadre's command and control hub and logistical base.

Nevertheless, multinational contingents that deploy with barely enough security to defend the camp and not much else, consign themselves to a flag pin on the map. A minimum capabilities model is needed so contributing states will live up to stated obligations.²⁶ In addition to an infantry component, a PRT contingent must include civil affairs, psychological operations, and construction units. Civilian offices (e.g., UNHCR, Human Rights, USAID, etc) provide the necessary advice and services for the local governments to progress. The camp must be located and designed for expansion so that subsequent, and sometimes unforeseen, necessities can be

brought in. If the donor nation is unwilling to agree to this arrangement, it should not participate because half-hearted measures only lead to acrimony, ineffectiveness, and frustration, not only among the other coalition forces but also the population.

Conclusions

The insurgent struggle intimately involves the population, and the metaphorical battlefields are the local communities. In the physical sense, population centers are the logistical bases for the insurgents. In the psychological sense, they provide insurgents with the stage to amplify their propaganda messages, undermine the will of the government, and sow despair among the population.

Fighting an insurgency primarily through strict military operations is analogous to a naval power trying to defeat a land army. The navy may dominate the seas, but so what? Insurgents operate on the terrain of the population, so that fact compels the coalition to engage the insurgents where they derive their strength.

Operating as a cadre in a small village and away from friendly forces entails risk and logistical problems. As this article has touched on, risk and logistical problems can be mitigated but not eliminated. But the payoff is tremendous and worth the effort. National security is achieved from the bottom-up. The insurgents, finding no purchase among the population, eventually fade away. Development and construction agencies are able to have immediate impact with the local population in a secure environment. Economic development springs from the bottom-up rather than top-down, which ameliorates the problem of corruption that lurks among the various strata of government and society. The people regain confidence and trust in the government and hope for the future. With the covenant restored, the host government can reduce its reliance on the coalition, which can in turn reduce its presence without the question of victory or defeat becoming an issue.

Counterinsurgency warfare is the most likely type of conflict facing the United States and its partners in the medium term. It must seek ways and means to resolve these conflicts as quickly as possible, without large financial expenditures, and without colossal military deployments. It has to learn to think small, and the cadre approach is an effective solution.

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book, *Command Legacy*, was published by Brasseys in April 2002 with a second edition by Potomac Books scheduled for August 2008. Lieutenant Colonel Millen is a graduate of the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College (1997), and holds an M.A. degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown University (1991) and an M.A. degree from Catholic University of America in World Politics (2006). He is currently All-But-Dissertation for his Ph.D. in World Politics at Catholic University of America. Lastly, LTC Millen served from August 2006 to August 2007 in the Political Military Integration Directorate, Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan and thereafter the Political Military Integration Directorate, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan.

Endnotes

¹ For background on the impingement an insurgency has on the individual as well as its residual impact on the covenant between the individual and the government see Raymond Millen, "The Hobbesian Notion of Self-Preservation Concerning Human Behavior during an Insurgency," *Parameters*, Winter 2006, 1-10.

² Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994), 76.

³ Hobbes evokes the phrase, returning the individual to the "state of nature", in which every man is the enemy and the protection of one's life, family, and property becomes the sole and persistent occupation. Hobbes, 74-75.

⁴ Having observed the brutal effectiveness of terrorism in intimidating the populace in Indochina and Algeria, Trinquier concluded insurgents used terrorism because it was the fastest way to gain compliance: "A few brutalities, such as savagely executed preventive assassinations in the surrounding villages, will cow the inhabitants into providing the maintenance of the bands and will discourage them from giving useful information to the authorities." Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*. Translation by Daniel Lee (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1964), 8, 16-17, 24.

⁵ One should note that although the political context differs from insurgency to insurgency, the common thread among them all is insurgent exploitation of self-preservation to gain control of the population.

⁶ The shift to the other incentives is contingent on the local security environment and not at the national level. Hence, some urban areas will be able to proceed with construction and development whereas others will not.

⁷ Logically, national military and police forces will mature to the point in which they can assume the security burden; however, in the interim, the insurgency grows more formidable as well.

⁸ The military leadership is responsible for national defense and fear that overextension would entice the country's neighbors into attacking. Additionally, if the insurgency grows to the stage of guerrilla warfare, the isolated outposts become vulnerable to raids and ambushes.

⁹ "Whac-A-Mole™" is a trademark of Bob's Space Racers, Inc. I would like to thank Major Richard Lavosky (USA Ret) for alerting me to this trademark.

¹⁰ This obligation is particularly true in Muslim communities. Cadres can use this relationship to arrange for a safe house and a local security detail.

¹¹ It should be clear that training the local population to defend itself also deprives the insurgents of recruits. As Robert Tabor observed, "The population, as should be clear by now, is the key to the entire struggle...it is the population which is doing the struggling. The guerrilla, who is of the people in a way which the government soldier cannot be (for if the regime were not alienated from the people, whence the revolution?), fights with the support of the noncombatant civilian populace: It is his camouflage, his quartermaster, his recruiting office, his communications network, and his efficient, all-seeing intelligence service. Without the consent and active aid of the people, the guerrilla would be merely a bandit, and could not long survive." Robert Taber, *War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare* (Washington DC: Brassey's INC, 2002), 11-12.

¹² The cadre can recruit from the existing police force (if one exists), but it must persuade the local authorities to give it the authority to hire and fire.

¹³ DynCorp operates Regional Training Centers in Afghanistan and Iraq, offering a six-week basic training course for police as well as specialized training courses for select policemen. The Germans run a six to eight-month course for higher law enforcement functions.

¹⁴ Trinquier, 63.

¹⁵ This appeared a prevalent feature of Algerian insurgent operations during the Algerian insurrection. Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (New York: New York Review Books, 2006).

¹⁶ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1964), 72.

¹⁷ Trinquier recommends that monitors comprise people with roots in the community (e.g., businessmen, teachers, clergy, etc.).

¹⁸ Trinquier expanded this concept of “Gridding” for command and control of military operations in outlying regions as well. This paper confines the concept to intelligence gathering in urban areas only. Trinquier, 30-33.

¹⁹ Reporting illicit activity is a delicate matter for the cadre. Some of the local authorities will likely have corrupt ties, so it is not in their interests to cooperate with the cadre. Nevertheless, this is important information for higher headquarters, which can take appropriate measures to compel compliance or co-opt the recalcitrant authorities.

²⁰ It is interesting how the West developed a rational approach to settling disputes through armed conflict among states after the Thirty Years War. With the exception of World War II, states have adhered to the norms of armed conflict. By the same token, these norms are so accepted, that most states are nonplussed when adversaries don’t follow the rules. Rather than adapt to the realities of the conflict, states waste considerable time and resources trying to force the insurgents to resolve the conflict on the battlefield like honorable gentlemen. That isn’t going to happen.

²¹ In his book *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare*, Professor Hy S. Rothstein contends U.S. military culture is unwilling to permit Special Operations Forces to assume the lead role in unconventional warfare, and hence SOF should become a separate service. Regardless of the merits of his argument, Dr. Rothstein makes a good case that SOF is ideally suited to excel in counterinsurgency.

²² As of the writing of this article, the European Union has a dubious crisis response record. It has neither the political mechanisms nor the political will for expeditionary operations. NATO is the appropriate vehicle for police contingents.

²³ For a variety of reasons, reports get filtered as they travel up the bureaucratic chain. Requests and initiatives are frequently suppressed by harried staff officers. This is less the fault of the staff officer than the bureaucratic system which demands he/she devote considerable time to meetings and power point presentations. It is little wonder they view the field officer/NCO as a distraction rather than a customer. Patton cites these teams in his book, *War as I Knew It*. John Nagl references Templar’s use of three or four-man teams, which “served as Templar’s eyes and ears, making unannounced inspection tours at his whim. See John A. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2002), 95-96, 106.

²⁴ The combatant commander and chiefs of staff must remain firm on this stance. In democratic states, the demand for information is insatiable. The military should avoid becoming an active partner with the news cycle.

²⁵ Unlike a conventional war which requires enormous resources, treasure, and the intimate support of the people as Clausewitz correctly maintains, an insurgency requires a much smaller effort and attention.

²⁶ The author is fully aware of the problems with coalition burden sharing as illustrated in Wallace J. Thies’ *Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2003). This is a political-military issue, which is far beyond the capabilities of the Department of Defense to resolve. However, DOD can specify the minimum criteria for PRT capabilities and missions. Like major weapons (aircraft, tanks, missiles), PRTs are symbols of prestige among coalition members; how they function and perform are less prestigious, and hence undercut.

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