



A Primer for Generating Force Integrated Strategy to Campaign Plan Development

by Rob Thornton

This paper is designed to assist organizations responsible for strategic planning in understanding how a process can be used to develop a *business strategy* and how it can be used to operationalize that strategy into FY (Fiscal Year) campaign plans within the Generating Force. The paper does not seek to distinguish who has authority to make a strategy with respect to establishing an overarching course that guides actions, rather it seeks to assist those charged with strategic planning in distinguishing why the Generating Force may require specific processes based on the nature of its roles, responsibilities and the constraints, limitations and conditions that affect it.

For the purpose of this paper it may be useful to draw a distinction between a “*strategy*” which we will define as a national level document that guides executive actions, and strategic planning, which for these purposes means to consider what threats and/or opportunities¹ will arise over time within the environment against the organization’s strength and problem areas (weaknesses) as they relate to the core lines of business or functions that the organization exists to serve. Unless an organization enjoys zero change in its environment, then it must learn to think and plan strategically or accept undue and potentially catastrophic risk.

Roles and Responsibilities: Differences between the OF and the GF

Overall, the United States military exists to accomplish those policy objectives which require the unique capabilities of DoD, this is a significant expansion on Von Clausewitz, but our employment history appears to justify it. There has been a recent distinction between elements of the force for the purpose of considering how militaries generate, employ and sustain themselves across time and space. While in many ways this is an artificial construct since members of the military move back and forth between the two, and since both have elements of each within them, it does allow the consideration of the “business” and of the “business of business”. First however, it is worth considering how we measure the success of the Operating and Generating Forces and what role they play in the broader purpose of the United States’ Military.

Operational Forces exist to, and are measured by their ability to achieve a policy objective through the employment of military force. The Generating Force however is measured

¹ A threat can be defined as an event or entity which jeopardizes established goals and/or interests – for example a down turn in the economy that threatens future funding levels may force a change in business practices or quality; an opportunity can be defined as an option in time to increase efficiency and/or effectiveness. Threats by their nature require validation and action whereas opportunities offer the chance to better posture the organization for future changes. Both threats and opportunities must be considered against organizational strengths and weaknesses to obtain a full cost – benefit analysis in the context of a strategic vision.

on its ability to provide needed capabilities (the ability to accomplish tasks) to the Operating Force and its ability to do so within resource constraints². This largely explains those Title 10 responsibilities apportioned to the service secretaries and service chiefs who man, equip and train forces in order to ensure they are ready to be deployed in pursuit of military and policy objectives.

The nature of the purpose the Operational Force serves places it in conditions that are highly interactive and constantly evolving. For the most part it could be argued that while Operating Forces inform the strategic processes of the broader Department of Defense (DoD), they do not, in the execution of DoD and national strategy, have a need to devise strategy in the role of “policy implementer” – in this role they are mostly operationalizing national strategy to achieve specific objectives. However, outside of their role as implementer/executor, Operating Forces also often have “generating” elements or functions which must be carried out in order to sustain themselves and prepare for the future; in this role they may require the capability to conduct “strategic planning”

The Generating Force by contrast is primarily in the business of the business. It exists within a different set of conditions than the Operating Force (which as noted can be thought of as the “customer”); however, like other suppliers it is affected by changes in its customers’ conditions (for example - new capability or capacity requirements) as well as any changes in its own requirements (for example changes in the DoD budget). The Generating Force is also responsible for looking beyond the more immediate concerns of Operating Force and ensuring the viability of the Force based on anticipated changes in the broader operating environment.

With respect to manning, equipping and training, the Generating Force must consider both individually and as a composite the impact of various factors such as: national and force demographics; public attitudes toward military service; changes in the economy; cultural changes in accessions population; education trends; general population health and trends (physical fitness and obesity); impacts of technology both on the individual and on tactics and operational capabilities; and time required to train educate and develop leaders. All of these factors (and more) must be considered against available and projected resources, then prioritized and then ultimately compared and adjusted against yet other priorities that fall outside of the services and the Department of Defense – for example budget deficits, or domestic spending.

As priorities are validated they become components of a broader business strategy that addresses the threats and opportunities identified in the environment that either sustain or protect strengths, or mitigate or improve problem areas (weaknesses). After a business strategy is devised, there has to be a process in place to implement or execute it while providing monitoring and controlling through valid metrics. The assigned metrics provide the means to ensure the right things are being done and that they are being done in a manner consistent with the desired outcomes in the strategy. All of this requires a detailed and comprehensive planning process that ensures scope/quality, time and cost are identified, accounted for, and monitored throughout execution to provide leaders with the tools needed to make course adjustments or reprioritize broader efforts. Without these tools leaders lack the true visibility that reaches across all of their

² Occasionally capabilities in the Generating Force itself are deployed as a unique capability directly in support of Operating Force requirements, when this occurs that Generating Force element should be considered “*operational*” by virtue of a change in purpose even if its task remains the same.

projects and programs and provides accurate data vs. reliance on intuition or anecdotal comparisons.

Ultimately, what makes the Generating Force different from the Operating Force is the nature of the purposes they serve. The objectives assigned to the Operating Force have a different type of political attachment to them where scope/quality and time are the most important factors (with scope being the political objective and time being the window of foreign policy opportunity or the domestic political clock). The objectives assigned to the Generating Force predominantly are focused on costs with scope / quality being a close second. Simply, it is much easier in the Generating Force to quantitatively evaluate success vs. doing so qualitatively where the differences are hard to distinguish, and are not domestically politically attractive, or are placed within the context of future requirements that are currently not completely defined. Too often with respect to scope/quality we don't know that we have not met the true requirement of a capability until it is being employed under a specific set of conditions by the Operating Force.

If the nature of the objectives between the Operating Force and the Generating Force are different, then it is reasonable to consider that the processes that each use to plan may have unique requirements and necessitate differing approaches. What follows is description of a planning process that begins with a strategic vision rooted in an assessment of the Operational Environment³ and ends with the implementation of annual campaign plans which deliver projects on time and on budget against a defined standard for quality. This process ultimately allows leaders to:

- establish metrics that support oversight and accountability
- develop a common operating picture
- make the required decisions that ensure the organization's goals and objectives are being met while also ensuring resources are accurately programmed

The last point is critical given cost is the day to day dominating factor for the Generating Force. A process that forces the evaluation of resources, and the programming of resources supports the integration of fiscal discipline into the organizational culture. This leads to the development and implementation of a strategy that gets the organization out of bad habits such as living out of their current FY allocation for requirements that were not identified and which are not attributable to a strategic end.

The Process of Developing and Implementing a Business Strategy within the Generating Force

The key idea is that all FY campaign objectives are ultimately traced back to an analysis of an operating environment where strengths, problems, opportunities, and threats that impact the command and its core mission are identified, prioritized, resourced, and ultimately implemented and tracked.

This idea allows the organization to base its goals and objectives on conditions in the environment. Ultimately this allows it to:

³ Each function within the Generating Force may require a unique perspective on the Operational Environment, i.e. manning vs. equipping or training, however with respect to the Generating Force they should all be rooted in the broader context of how the environment will affect the role and mission of the Operating Force.

- develop a vision that is rooted in a strategic environmental assessment of strengths, problems, opportunities and threats
- develop a rational and incentive to change that can be clearly communicated across organizational lines
- select and implement goals and objectives that bring it closer to its vision
- remain agile in its decision making as conditions change by providing future leaders and strategists with analysis as to why a particular objective was undertaken, how it is progressing and how it may be impacted by unforeseen events
- program resource requirements farther into the future by mapping out when a goal moves from being an objective in the strategy and into a FY campaign plan requiring resources

Developing a Five Year Strategy

The process of developing a five year strategy begins with either an event in the operational environment such as a major change in the economy, a time based trigger (if a time period is believed to produce sufficient change), or by other events⁴ such as the initiation or revision of higher echelon strategic processes/documents. One event which should trigger the review of current strategy is the production of a higher echelon/organization OE (Operational Environment⁵) study, which identifies the challenges and requirements the organization may encounter as it fulfills its roles and missions. Informed by the higher level OE study, the organization can then develop its own OE⁶ study specific to its concerns, which characterizes its environs in terms of opportunities and threats, and the organization itself in terms of strengths and problems/barriers, which:

- prevent it from, or allow it to capitalize on opportunities in the environment by exploiting, accepting, partnering or knowingly passing up/rejecting them
- subject it to threats in the environment which must be avoided, mitigated, transferred or knowingly accepted

Once the OE study is complete with the SPOT (strengths, problems, opportunities and threats) analysis⁷, the executive/organizational leadership now has the analysis required to craft his/her strategic vision. The strategic vision defines a future state for the organization and describes the conditions that organization desires to create and sustain. The strategic vision provides inspiration and the basis for defining identifying strategic goals. Ideally the strategic vision is written in the present tense as if has already been achieved.

⁴ A change in the environment need not force a major revision to the strategy, through the organization's innovation process, unforeseen requirements or opportunities can be addressed as long as the major assumptions the strategy was based upon remain valid.

⁵ OE studies can be performed using a number of techniques. It consists of identifying the environmental factors which are relevant to the command's mission. Factors include political, economic, socio-culture, technology, etc. Ideally this study would be produced and maintained by the G/J 2.

⁶ Development of the OE study should be a collaborative staff process that looks at both the product of the business and the environment within which the business exists. It should also look at "the business of the business" (the processes, structures, organizations, people and technology who make up the command).

⁷ The SPOT Analysis is a leader and staff effort where each element reviews its current processes in the context of the OE study.




Figure 1-1 depicts the relationship between the OE study, vision, goals and objectives

Using the Leadership’s strategic vision, strategists can now develop the strategic goals which must be achieved to realize the vision. The goals refine the vision into manageable and categorizable areas roughly consisting of the outcomes the organization wants to achieve. Strategic goals should be rooted in sustaining strengths and overcoming problems/barriers as well as capitalizing on opportunities and defending against the threats described in the OE.

At this stage, depending on the scope and number of the objectives, the strategist may elect to organize the strategy’s objectives into a format where objectives are grouped into element(s) such as LOEs (Lines of Effort) which characterize a related group of objectives whose accomplishment results in the fulfillment of the program’s mission.

The strategist can now lead a Strategy Work Group (SWG) through the development of the major strategic objectives. These objectives are the specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time based refinements of the strategic goals. The WGs’ role here is to define the objectives which must be met to achieve the strategic goals and thereby realize the vision⁸. Accompanying each objective is a description of the relationship between the objective and one or more of the goals that identifies how that objective supports a specific goal.

⁸ This process is essentially that associated with portfolio management.




Figure 1-2: Illustrates the hierarchical relationships between the components of a strategy that is nested under a study of what strengths, problems, opportunities and threats may occur during the time period covered by the strategy.

The SWG’s final task in the strategy development process are to establish a ROM (Rough Order of Magnitude) estimate for each strategic objective and the assignment of a span of time or a fiscal year to the objective. The ROM is made using analogous⁹ and parametric¹⁰ estimates. This supports assigning time in the overall strategy and it provides the budgeting office with an initial estimate to begin aligning resources. The process of developing the strategy is now complete.

Transitioning the strategy: Campaign Planning

There are two basic types of strategic objectives. The first are objectives that relate to process improvement where the organization seeks to take established processes and improve them or adapt them to meet some new strategic goal. This type of objective may benefit from an approach that uses process improvement efforts like Lean Six Sigma to improve quality outputs. The second type of objectives are those that are transformative in nature, or where there may be no established process and/or the objective requires some new capability identified as essential to fulfill strategic goals. Both types of objectives require further development; however the

⁹ **Analogous Estimating**, is one form of expert judgment and it also known as Top-down Estimating. This technique is used to determine the duration of the project. It compares previously completed project’s similar activities with the current activities and determines the duration. This estimate will give a ball-park idea about the estimation and will have bigger variance.

¹⁰ **Parametric Estimating**, an estimating technique that uses a statistical relationship between historical data and other variables (for example, square footage in construction, lines of code in software development) to calculate an estimate for activity parameters, such as scope, cost, budget, and duration. This technique can produce higher levels of accuracy depending upon the sophistication and the underlying data built into the model. An example for the cost parameter is multiplying the planned quantity of work to be performed by the historical cost per unit to obtain the estimated cost.

transformative objectives require additional development because there may be no existing capability or process to build upon.

Campaign planning can occur under the direction of the organization's strategist which assigns an office section or subordinate organization the lead responsibility for each strategic objective. Campaign Planning Work Groups (CPWGs) are then established in support of each lead. The composition and schedule of the CPWG¹¹ is based on the nature of the objective and competing priorities. The purpose of the CPWGs is to undertake the development process where each strategic objective is turned into a Campaign LOE so that it can be operationalized in an upcoming FY.

This process begins with the *planning* for the *initiation, planning, execution, monitoring, controlling and completion* of each Campaign LOE and ends with the transition of a FY Campaign plan assembled by the Strategist and handed off to a program or project management body for actual implementation¹².

The planning process should initially produce a LOE Charter¹³ that details the links to the strategic goal it supports by including:

- A high level description of the LOE
- The outcomes the LOE supports relative to the organization's strategic goals
- The selection of LOE major OBJs¹⁴
- CSFs (Critical Success Factors¹⁵)
- A milestone list that identifies key events, deliverables or phases
- An estimated budget based on the ROM identified in the strategy
- Initial risks that could hinder the accomplishment of the LOE
- Acceptance criteria that defines when a Campaign LOE is complete
- RACI¹⁶ assignment matrix

If the Campaign LOE is transformative in nature, the CPWG may need to follow a process along the lines of Project Management planning. This will support the command in achieving its objectives on time and within budget, and will minimize the risk to its other objectives.

The CPWG accomplishes its purpose by elaborating on the information developed in the LOE charter to produce a comprehensive set of plans that can be implemented by the G3. Each LOE plan produced by a CPWG should include a LOE Plan that accomplishes the following 13

¹¹ A CPWG does not require representation from all staff elements, it could have as few as two members

¹² In DoD this is typically a G or J 3 type body

¹³ The charter will be updated with refined information throughout the planning process

¹⁴ Each proposed Major Campaign Objective should undergo a 14 point selection and validation process where a set of scores are awarded to support selection based on their merit to: deliver the desired effect and achieve the Campaign LOE; be tracked and measured; the resources consumed (time, money, people, etc.); the risk to the enterprise and other strategic objectives. The awarded estimated value can now be used as a benchmark to track estimated value against current and anticipated value over the span of the objective's execution in order to support command decisions on its continued viability or success.

¹⁵ CSFs identify the conditions or capabilities which must exist in order for a Campaign LOE to be achieved

¹⁶ Responsible (Those who do work to achieve the task, there can be multiple resources responsible). Accountable (The resource ultimately accountable for the completion of the task - there must be exactly one person, office or command specified for each task) Consulted (Those whose opinions are sought – e.g. 2 way communication) Informed (Those that are kept up-to-date on progress –e.g. 1 way communication)

tasks in order to provide the implementing body a complete plan that will deliver the desired outcomes when executed:

1. Collection plan for requirements¹⁷
2. Define Scope for LOE and Campaign OBJs
3. Task Decomposition¹⁸ Diagram
4. Defined and sequenced Tasks¹⁹
5. Estimation of Resources²⁰ and durations required to accomplish tasks
6. Developed Schedule (for execution across a FY) using a Gant Chart
7. Estimation of Costs (by resource type)
8. Established Budget (and align to FY QTR based on resource type)
9. Planned Quality Standards (metrics and methods of review, RACI matrix)
10. Developed Human Resource Plan²¹
11. Planned Communications²²
12. Planned Risk Management²³ (should cover both threats and opportunities)
13. Planned Procurements²⁴

At a minimum CPWGs assigned responsibility for transformative LOEs should:

- Elaborate and clarify the project scope
- Develop a realistic schedule
- Develop a realistic budget
- Identify project and product quality processes
- Plan the human resource aspects of the project
- Determine the communications needs
- Establish the risk management processes
- Identify the procurement needs of the project
- Combine all the planning information into a Project Management Plan and a set of project documents that are cohesive and integrated and can be transitioned to the designated implementer for operationalization

¹⁷ Requirements category examples include: functional, quality, performance, safety, security, technical, training, support and maintainability

¹⁸ Task Decomposition, AKA WBS/Work Breakdown Structure – is the decomposition of all tasks that must be done to achieve the Campaign LOE. In this case it would be broken down into Campaign OBJs, sub OBJs, and tasks using a PERT Chart technique/format. Where the work supports more than one Campaign LOE or OBJ, or where there are interdependencies and issues of contingent development, lines or annotations should be included.

¹⁹ Provides a description of the work related to the task, the level of performance required in each tasks and the order in which the tasks should be performed

²⁰ People, Equipment/Technology, Materials, Infrastructure

²¹ Defines roles and responsibility, outlines a staffing plan and provides a staff management plan that covers acquisition, release, HR calendars, training requirements, etc.

²² Describes the communications requirements associated with the LOE including the audiences, messages, and methods.

²³ Should ID risks (both threats and opportunities), include a collection and analysis plan, and should include risk responses

²⁴ Should describe how all aspects of procurement will be managed to include: standard documents to be used, procurement responsibilities, contract types, SOW requirements, and selection criteria

Once a CPWG has put together the completed LOE plan, it is delivered to the organization’s strategist for evaluation and prioritization based on cost benefit analysis against other FY Campaign LOEs. During this process the strategist presents the findings to organization’s executives and staff for final decision.




Figure 1-3: illustrates the transition from the development of strategy to campaign planning. At the conclusion of campaign planning the FY Campaign Plan is delivered to the organization’s implementing body under an operations officer for execution

Campaign Plan Execution and Feedback

The FY Campaign Plan is now handed off to the organization’s operations officer with each Campaign LOE fully developed. It now directs the execution of objectives and tasks that result in:

- Deliverables
- Work Performance Information
- FRAGOs (based on required changes)
- LOE Revision (branches or sequels)
- Updates to the Common Operating Picture




Figure 1-425: Illustrates the handover from the strategist to operations officer and follows the FY Campaign plan through its execution and its effectiveness in meeting Strategic Goals

The Role of a Future Operations section

As part of the transition to the implementer, the following FY Campaign Plan (FY minus 12 months) is transitioned to a Future Operations Cell and its plan is validated and informed based on the execution of the current FY Campaign Plan (see Figure 1-5). This allows the implementing body to insure the resources are synchronized for implementation 12 months out from execution. It also allows the organization to potentially take advantage of any opportunities that arise which might support fast tracking parts of the next FY Campaign Plan into current FY execution; or to modify the next FY Campaign plan based on unforeseen changes in priorities or friction points that extend current FY Objectives. Any changes to the next FY's Campaign Plan are passed to the strategist through coordination²⁶ meetings or mechanisms.

²⁵ The process groups associated with the operations officer's execution of the FY CAMPLAN only provide a "wave top" view. Each process group has associated sub processes which are omitted from this document. The development and elaboration of these processes should be developed into a process map of the organization's operations section such that specific functions and capabilities can be identified and integrated into the overall business processes of planning and implementing.

²⁶ Many organizations have forums for formal coordination such as a Senior Plans and Operations Meeting that serve as coordination and decision points; however the implementer should be represented in the CPWGs.




Figure 1-5: depicts the following FYs Campaign Plan (FY – 12 months/1Yr) transition to the Future Plans / Operations Cell where it is validated and informed by the current FY Campaign Plan’s execution.

The Role of the Current Operations section

During the actual fiscal year of implementation, the current operations section manages the Campaign Plan using three major process groups: Execution, Monitoring and Controlling and Closeout. This process methodology allows the operations officer to act as the organization’s agent in insuring that objectives in the Campaign Plan are on time, on budget and meeting the performance and effectiveness metrics that allow the command to accomplish its strategic objectives. Broadly, this allows the current operations section to:

- execute “make or buy decisions”
- issue taskings, issue contracts
- develop and synchronize resource calendars
- make recommendations on training, education and development
- track performance against a required baseline
- justify the need for additional resources, or the need to re-baseline performance and make adjustments to the timeline
- track the effect on achieving strategic objectives
- influence the development of follow on FY Campaign Plans

As the FY Campaign Plans included components on required communications the operations officer:

- distributes required information
- tracks the required decision points
- implements, monitors and controls the communications plan
- manages stakeholder expectations.
- monitors and manages risks during the execution of the plan.

At the conclusion of the execution of objectives and LOEs in a FY Campaign Plan the Current Operations Cell:

- closes out the project
- conducts an AAR²⁷
- submits lessons learned and increases knowledge of best practices

The Current Operations Cell can task responsibility for execution of specific LOEs or objectives to the organization's staff or subordinate organizations; or it can issue contracts where the organization does not have the in house capability and/or capacity to accomplish the specific work (or portions of it). However, it should not task out the oversight responsibility of management of the processes because of the risk to desynchronizing other current operations and the potential risk (threats and opportunities) that may impact future FY campaign plans and strategic objectives.

²⁷ In addition to an AAR that present any best practices observed and lessons learned during planning and execution, the AAR should provide a completed business case that uses data collected during the execution of the associated plans to develop a ROI (Return on Investment) that isolates out the campaign objectives effects on strategic goals and converts them to dollar figure. This type of AAR will provide the organization critical insights into the costs and benefits associated with like types of actions providing a solid analogous comparison for future objectives.




Figure 1-6: depicts the Operations Cell's role in managing the execution of the FY Campaign Plan through the use of the three process groups and the tasks that make up the process groups.

Developing and Using Metrics to Manage Change

The Current Operations Cell performs quality assurance using the metrics developed by the CPWG to make recommendations on organizational process changes, technology, infrastructure, personnel or organizational structures needed to complete tasks and achieve objectives. As illustrated in figure 1-7, it is critical that there are metrics that tell the command if its actions are having the necessary effects to achieve its strategic objectives and that it have metrics that indicate if the level of task performance is being met. Without quality metrics that are tracked throughout the execution the command will lack any logical means to make decisions about what actions to continue, what to curtail or what changes to make. This affects its resources, and its ability to achieve its strategic objectives.




Figure 1-7: Illustrates the way metrics support selecting and executing the right tasks to support achieving objectives and tracking performance of the tasks to insure they are being executed at the level identified as required to achieve the desired effect.

Innovations Management

Innovations management refers to the process of selecting, evaluating and introducing initiatives that result from unanticipated changes to the strategy and Campaign Plan due to new requirements in the Operational Environment. This means the first criteria for evaluating an innovation is if it originates from a change in the Operating Environment that impacts a strength, problem, opportunity or threat (see Figure 1-8, step 1). From there an innovation can be categorized and evaluated against other priorities that compete for resources (time, money, and people).

From validation and confirmation an initiative goes through one of three development processes. All three originate from changes made to the strategic vision (see Figure 1-8, step 2). If the change in the strategic vision is distinct and severe enough that it does not align to any of the command's defined strategic goals then a new strategic goal is created from which strategic objectives and campaign LOEs can be developed (see Figure 1-8, steps 3-6). If the changes to the strategic vision do not require new strategic goals then additional strategic objectives, campaign LOEs and campaign objectives can be modified or added to accommodate the innovation (see Figure 1-8, steps 3A-6A). This ensures that every innovation is developed to the same standards as other LOEs and objectives.

From Campaign LOE and Objective development the strategist looks at the existing FY campaign plans for opportunities to integrate the innovation without disrupting the overall

strategy and to establish a priority for introduction into a FY (see Figure 1-8, step 7). If the Innovation has a high priority for introduction, the strategist coordinates with the Operations Cell to determine the impact of early integration with the FY CAMPLAN (FY minus 12 Months) that is currently being managed by the Future Plans / Operations Cell, and the impact on immediate integration into the current FY CAMPLAN being executed by the Current Operations Cell. This allows the staff to identify the risk (threats and opportunities) to the overall strategy of introducing a developed innovation into the FY CAMPLAN schedule, and seek a decision from the CDR on when he wants to execute it and realign resources to carry it out (see Figure 1-8, step 8 and 9). This ensures that resources remain synchronized to planning and execution cycles and that the strategic ends are not jeopardized from lack of process.




Figure 1-8: The Innovations Management Process

This completes the process of developing a business strategy, FY campaign planning and FY campaign execution for the Generating Force.

Conclusion

The Generating Force has some unique requirements which distinguish it from the Operating Force. Out of Scope/Quality, Time and Cost as driving factors, the Generating Force is most subject to cost. As such the planning processes and doctrine that works for Operating

Force organizations may not be most suitable and provide Generating Force organizations with a detailed process that allows them to:

- understand the threats and opportunities in the environment
- create a vision which addresses it
- develop a strategy which selects the right actions to undertake to accomplish the vision
- provides a manner of implementing those actions that measures
 - their effectiveness (does it bring me closer to my goals)
 - the performance of the assigned the responsibility to carry them out

While a process such as the one described above may seem cumbersome, it actually provides the required discipline to support making the critical decisions that often elude Generating Force organizations. This type of discipline is required to keep the organization from selecting and supporting programs which have no bearing on their organizational goals, or worse may be working against them and draining resources.

Organizations that lack a disciplined strategic to operational planning and implementation process are constrained to making complex decisions on intuition and emotion. While this may suffice at a tactical, moment by moment level where one leader can see the immediate impact and adjust, it does not support the type of synchronization and resource management required for portfolio, program and project management that supports Generating Force organizational and institutional visions that may take years to accomplish and may outlive multiple changes in leadership.

A final point on this is the consideration of the impact of process on organizational design, infrastructure, people (and their training, education and development), and technology. If the processes required by the Generating Force are sufficiently different from those required by the Operating Force, then the other organizational components should also be re-evaluated in that light. The traditional G-Staff organization may not be the best suited to an organization that primarily uses portfolio selection criteria and implements and oversees programs and projects. It may be more cost effective to contract project and program expertise where specific expertise is required that is not cost effective to maintain and where the responsibilities are not inherently governmental. This does not mean the organization abdicates any oversight responsibilities, just that by understanding the true requirements of an objective through use of a detailed and comprehensive planning process, all requirements are identified and the organization can make the best sourcing decisions with respect to its other priorities as well as define the expectations that keep things on schedule and on budget.

This also does not mean that uniformed and civilian leadership is not required in the same quality or quantity; rather it means that the leadership takes on a different role with functions that correspond to the nature of the mission given to the Generating Force organization. In the Operating Force leaders are assigned to positions that have specific authorities (such as UCMJ), allocated resources (MTO&E), and a set of expected missions. This creates a specific cultural approach to getting things done and expectations that the responsibilities assigned will not exceed the resources and authorities allocated. The Generating Force offers a different set of conditions for leaders, one where the next project or objective may be unique from the previous and where a new set or resources may have to be obtained in order to meet the objective.

Ultimately this has the potential to add to the types of developmental experience afforded to leaders and thus create leaders who are better prepared to assume leadership roles at the general and flag officer level because they understand not only how to succeed in the Operating Force, but also the unique attributes of the Generating Force and the relationship between the two.

Rob Thornton, USA Retired, served in both Operating Force and Generating Force units and completed his service as a Functional Area 59.

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