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Civil Affairs as a General Purpose Force: An Opportunity

by Phil W. Reynolds

The Problem

CA doctrine has not kept pace with the execution of CMO by maneuver forces and this is creating a dangerous seam. CA is supposed to provide the commander with expertise in the execution of tasks that deal with the civil component of the battlefield. Stability Operations, Security Assistance and Non-Lethal Targeting all are areas which need to be addressed because of their strong civil component. With publications like FM 3-07 and FM 3-0 outstripping CA doctrine, the framework of operational themes and missions to CA missions is broken. But with the creation of the 85th CA Brigade, there is an opportunity for the branch to simplify and clarify its own doctrine. As the Army's General Purpose Force (GPF) Civil Affairs brigade takes shape there will be a greater emphasis on integration, particularly in regards to planning, conventional training, and deployments as part of a combined arms team. Nothing new needs to be created- Rather, bring CA doctrine more line with the rest of the Army and the Joint force.

Is The Greek Temple Outdated?


FM3-05.40¹ writes that civil affairs operations are conducted by CA Soldiers and consists of the following core tasks: Populace and Resources Control (PRC), Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA), Civil Information Management (CIM), Nation Assistance (NA), and Support to Civil Administration (SCA). In the last ten years, while bringing success to Iraq, the Army has created new CMO intensive doctrine which bears little resemblance to Civil Affairs' operating concepts. FHA is increasingly being performed by non-CA personnel and units. Nation Assistance is bridging the gap between peace and war, as increasingly, the USG sees the importance of Phase 0 missions in mitigating the causes of instability and warding off failed states and irregular threats.

Now is the opportunity for the old 'Greek Temple'² task to operations construct to be updated to reflect CA as a general purpose force with GPF missions and tasks. Even further, this is an opportunity to develop CA tasks across the spectrum of conflict. The relationship between CA and the broader CMO can be better developed than what is current in FM 3-05.40. The outdated Temple figure illustrates the core tasks without clarifying the connectivity between the operational environment, themes and the reality of force provider requirements. Nor does the 'temple' address the scope of the four basic military missions the Joint staff envisions for the future: Combat, Security, Engagement, and Relief and Reconstruction³.

¹ FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington DC, September 2006, pg 1.2.

² FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington DC, September 2006, pg 1.3.

³ M.G. Mullen, Capstone Concept For Joint Operations v3.0, Washington DC, January 2009.




A New Paradigm

“Any integrated approach... requires a framework that applies across the spectrum of conflict, from stable peace to general war. It must frame purposeful intervention at any point along that spectrum.”⁴ While FM3-05.40 Civil Affairs indicate that full spectrum operations are the basis determining CA missions, it is more helpful to start with the operational themes. This new paradigm will clearly demonstrate integration while retaining a realistic menu of activities that CA will employ in support of the Joint Force Commander.

It also places CA missions in context with the themes in which Army forces will operate. Gone are the five CA tasks. They are replaced by new missions and a suggested core task list. Also shown are some potential collective tasks which cover what CA has been doing on the battlefield. And while this author is not prepared to make recommendations for changes to the Army Universal Task List⁵, it is useful to put a mark on the wall.

⁴ FM 3-07, Stability Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington DC, October 2008, pg 1.3.

⁵ FM 7-15, Army Universal Task List, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington DC, February 2009, pg 7.7.



WHY NEW MISSIONS?

Two of the old ‘core tasks’ have been retained and shifted upward- FHA and Nation Assistance, and Stability Operations (as part of Full Spectrum Operations) have been added from FM 3-07⁶. A Joint Task Forces can be expected to execute these missions. More importantly, these missions can be removed from branch specific doctrine because of the inherent responsibility for other government agencies to support them. In 2009, DoD elevated Stability to the equivalency of combat operations and began to prepare the department to “conduct stability operations activities throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations, including in combat and non-combat environments. The magnitude of stability operations missions may range from small-scale, short-duration to large-scale, long-duration”⁷. The versatility, flexibility, and effectiveness of the joint force in accomplishing these missions are multiplied by Unified Action. While CMO is conducted in all missions, and CA will be utilized by the force commander in countless ways, these are the three missions in which CMO is paramount and CA will be heavily utilized. The tasks listed are already current doctrine and lend themselves easily to ‘tasks to units’ and to the phasing of an operation. And many of these missions and tasks are the essence of civil-military operations. Also, in the complex future environment in which CA will operate, many of those core tasks are becoming interchangeable, as the Army finds itself fighting all phases concurrently at multiple levels of conflict- the root of Full Spectrum Operations.

⁶ FM 3-07, Stability Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington DC, October 2008, pg 2.2.

⁷ DoDD 3000.05, Stability Operations, Michele Flournoy, OSD-Policy, Washington DC , 19 September 2009.

Some doctrinal clarification is needed however. FHA is not one of the pillars of Army Stability Operations (SO), nor should it be. JP3-29 (FHA)⁸ and JP 3-57 (CMO)⁹ both indicate that FHA is a peacetime or limited intervention activity, not a mission performed during Major Combat Operations (MCO). FHA and its related mission, Nation Assistance, remains a powerful tool during Phase 0 shaping operations and should stay there. The Stability Operations provide a solid doctrinal basis for CA support during major combat operations; maneuver forces are prepared to surge to support stability, offensive, or defensive operations as required.

Nation Assistance (NA) is retained and is an incredibly useful and flexible mission. NA is primarily conducted under agreement with the host nation as part of a broader Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) plan¹⁰. An example of NA would be an Overseas Disaster/Humanitarian Assistance and Civic Aid civil reconnaissance and project nomination in support of a combatant commander's TSC objectives. Interagency requests for support of the country team's own objectives would fall in this category. Nation Assistance is also intertwined with Security Assistance and Foreign Internal Defense. As such, it is uniquely positioned at the crux of peacetime activities, and those designed to avert general war and failed states through irregular war missions.

It is important that CA retain a Phase 0 capability and mindset through the judicious execution of NA. The good that accrues to the combatant commander from successful Phase 0 missions is immense. Also, if the new CA Brigade retains its regional focus, operating in those areas will provide key experience and knowledge for future operations. CA products such as area assessments and peacetime project nominations are an invaluable resource to the maneuver staffs' understanding of the environment.

Stability Operations: The New SCA?

Finally, the way Stability Operations has transcended Support to Civil Administration needs to be explored. This discussion is important and timely- It is Stability Operations that will provide the most complex operating environment for CA with its wide array of actors with various experiences, resources, mandates, and capabilities. Multiple layers of command and control under the DoD aegis will operate in parallel with civilian USG agencies and with international organizations, increasing the 'fog of war.' The broadly mandated operations of State and Defense will often work quite independently of each other, despite best efforts at top down integration. Because Civil Affairs forces are "trained, and equipped specifically to... support the commander in planning and conducting CMO"¹¹ CA will have to provide the mechanism for coordination and cooperation. CA forces must build strong relationships through cooperation and coordination with all the interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations that will work alongside DoD during stability operations. This coordination will not only occur at the operational level, but will find battalion Task Force commanders with high priority projects and initiatives in their area of operations. As civil node targeting processes mature, the commander may assign his CA forces to find and affect the highest priority civil

⁸ JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Joint Staff, Washington DC, , 17 March 2009, pg I-11.

⁹ JP 3-57, Civil Military Operations, Joint Staff, Washington DC, , 8 July 2008, pg I-11.

¹⁰ JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Joint Staff, Washington DC, , 17 March 2009, pg I-8.

¹¹ FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington DC, September 2006, pg 1-3.

nodes- much the same way lethal fires are assigned against targets based on the targeting process prioritization.

Of the two distinct tasks under SCA, the first, CA support to a friendly government during a peacetime or disaster is *clearly duplicating* the tasks of FHA or Nation Assistance. The other, civil administration in an occupied territory is tricky. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority's main goal¹² of creating a democratically elected government consumed much of the energy of the next several years. Those efforts were primarily lead by the Department of State, with the DoD providing the secure environment in which the politicians could function. Civil security was eventually achieved, with its most brilliant success evident in the 2007 'surge,' with its center of gravity around Baghdad. The nexus of the DoD and DoS operations was the Stability defined task of Establish Civil Control, in which the carefully choreographed handshake of civilian control over security forces was completed. The bottom line is that a military government is a thing of the past- The USG has codified this successful partnership with Unified Action.¹³

The Problem With Population/Resource Control (Prc) And Civil Information Management (CIM)

While FHA, NA and Stability Operations become the new missions, it is difficult to rationalize PRC and CIM as missions in the new hierarchy. Long seen as a necessary adjunct to Support to Civil Administration, PRC was conceptualized as military forces controlling vast numbers of civilians displaced by the shock of war or separating them from insurgent activities. Images of successful post war Germany and Japan are remembered¹⁴, while the failure of the strategic hamlet program in Vietnam is forgotten.¹⁵

Today in Iraq and Afghanistan, the purpose of PRC is consumed in a maneuver task force's stability tasks of Establish Civil Security (ESC) and Establish Civil Control (ECC) (see fig 2)¹⁶. It would be redundant for the commander to be executing ESC and ECC as part of an SO mission, and assign his CA forces to conduct PRC. Instead, the maneuver commander would probably utilize his CA forces to provide C² for the execution of the SO tasks, or commit his CA forces to implementing the key target or project that would achieve the decisive point.

With the publication of the transformational COIN manual in 2006, the Army realized the importance of *tactical* civil information and its dynamic effect on the operational environment.¹⁷ Despite so much effort devoted to Civil Information Management (CIM) over the past half-decade, including the Joint CIM test at SOCOM, and perhaps *because* of it, CIM is not a separate CA task. However, CIM is still a key supporting activity to the other CA tasks. You can't do FHA without doing CIM- you can't do SO without doing CIM. It is conducted in order to determine the best allocation of scarce resources against the most effective nodes. CA is not deployed to conduct CIM, unlike FHA or Stability Operations. If this new activity paradigm is adopted, the explanation of CIM should clearly elucidate that is a supporting task to all tasks.

¹² Regulation 1, Coalition Provisional Authority, Paul Bremer, Baghdad, Iraq, 16 May 2003.

¹³ JP 1, Doctrine For The Armed Forces Of The United States, Joint Staff, Washington DC, 20 March 2009.

¹⁴ The Road Ahead: Lessons In Nation Building From Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan For Postwar Iraq, Ray Salvatore, Jennings Peaceworks No. 49, United States Institute Of Peace, April 2003.

¹⁵ The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2, "The Strategic Hamlet Program 1961-1963," Beacon Press, Boston, 1971.

¹⁶ FM 3-07, Stability Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington DC, October 2008, pg 3.2.

¹⁷ FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington DC, December, 2006, pgs 3-1, 5-15.

Again, additional analysis and ‘blueprints’ would probably need to be generated in order to lay out the *actual mechanics* of CIM- The acronym itself has been bandied about with abandon; Acronyms are cute, but rarely win wars.

The ‘new’ core tasks are taken from 3-07 and 3-29. They are better suited as tasks for Army forces to execute because they, unlike the missions, can have a defined purpose and endstate. While the graphic may seem to indicate that some tasks are suited only for certain missions, it is the reverse that is true. For example, Support to Governance, a long term Stability Ops task taken from FM 3-07, can be for the longer duration Nation Assistance. Conversely, establishing civil security may be the crucial facet of a short term disaster response/FHA intervention. Because of the complexity of the modern battlefield, it is likely that at task force commander will be executing many of these core tasks simultaneously as lines of operation/effort. During the staff’s problem solving and operations planning, different tasks can be assigned to the forces which can best effect the change needed for success. That force may not be Civil Affairs, or in the context of Unified Action, even a military unit. In this case, it is likely that Civil Affairs teams will perform the role of interagency coordination and synchronization, much like Civil Affairs Planning Teams.

CA Battalion commanders will also have to certify that their Civil Affairs Teams (CAT) are prepared to execute their missions. At some point, TRADOC will have to create an individual and collective task list matrix to support the new FORSCOM CA units. In the past, USASOC supported specialized training tailored to the CAT’s mission. This often was done by attaching the CAT or CA company to a supported Special Forces Group for pre-mission training (PMT). This kind of PMT is expensive and time consuming. With the connection to USASOC broken, and the coming DoD belt-tightening, dollars will be short. Rotations to the CMTCs will be the capstone collective training event for CA supported brigades. The collective tasks listed in the graphic are just the beginning, but those collective tasks, by a CAT or company, do support each of the core tasks listed. Developing the training that supports an established standard will no doubt remain the most difficult challenge facing the new brigade.

All Together

Taken all together, this missions-core tasks-collective tasks matrix provides a fairly complete crosswalk that retains important roles for Civil Affairs across the spectrum of conflict. As our current kinetic fights are transitioned, the future holds a plethora of Stability options. Angola, Columbia, Burma and Ethiopia are all places where GPF forces might be utilized to conduct SO.¹⁸ Already Civil Affairs is the force’s expert on the human terrain, and no operations depend on success in the civil element more than FHA, NA and SO. Already FM3-05.401¹⁹ writes that Civil Affairs is the primary coordinator of CMO; *designate Civil Affairs as the Army proponent for those missions*. This would require significant heavy lifting for the U.S. JFK Special Warfare Center (USAJFKSWC); reorganizing the United States Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) and giving that command the DOTMLPF requirements is one way of reducing that burden.²⁰

¹⁸ CRS Report For Congress, Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy, Liana Sun Wylar, Washington DC, 28 August 2008.

¹⁹ FM 3-05.401, CA Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, Headquarters, Department Of The Army, July 2007, pg 1.1.

²⁰ For a more in depth discussion on the problem of proponentcy, see “Divorce Counseling, Civil Affairs Proponentcy Under A New Support Paradigm,” Sean P. Walsh, Military Review, November-December 2010.

While FHA will remain planned and executed much as it is in its current form, some work remains with Nation Assistance and Stability Operations. Tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other and effective tactics translate combat power into decisive results.²¹ Future discussions should focus on the processes by which a GPF CA force adds that value to the maneuver commander's vision of battlefield, with that all important "C" in METT-TC. The challenge for CA commanders at all echelons will be to inject these changes into a predictable training regimen and yet retain the agility and versatility that has come to be expected of Civil Affairs forces.

As long as active duty CA primarily supported ARSOF, the force was able to get by- Intelligent, motivated 'out-of-the-box' thinkers highly trained for specific missions in which success was achieved by small units operating independently. These small units operated on the 'best practices' principle, generally eschewing established doctrine with its notoriously long 'flash to bang' time. Instead, they operated on the 'best practices' principle, developing TTPs that fit the situation. This was an excellent expedient for a force that grew rapidly and was heavily deployed across the globe, but is ill suited to the growth of Civil Affairs. Now is the time to capture the lessons learned during the past decade of conflict, cut away the overlap, clear out the confusion, and simplify Civil Affairs Operations.

DoDI 3000.05²² directs the Army to identify and track personnel with stability operations-relevant skill sets and capabilities, to include foreign language proficiency and area knowledge capabilities. Army doctrine is "a body of thought on how Army forces intend to operate as an integral part of a joint force"²³. It establishes how the army views the nature of operations and the fundamentals by which Army forces conduct operations. Doctrine also describes missions that have a definable purpose.²⁴ The new 85th CA BDE would be good spot to start doing both.

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²¹ FM 3-90, Tactics, Headquarters, Department Of The Army, Washington DC, July 2001.

²² DoDI 3000.05, Stability Operations, Michele Flournoy, OSD-Policy, Washington DC, 19 September 2009.

²³ FM 3-0, Operations, Headquarters, Department Of The Army, 27 February 2008, pg D-1

²⁴ Irregular Warfare Special Study, US Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfare Center, 4 August 2006, pg III-2