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The Clash of the Caliphates: Understanding the Real War of Ideas

by Tony Korn

There are plenty of reasons to view with skepticism the claim that the current turmoil in the Middle East constitutes a progressive “Arab Spring.” In Egypt alone, 82 percent of the population today support stoning for adultery, 84 percent are in favor of the death penalty for apostasy, and 79 percent would view the emergence of a nuclear Iran as a positive development.¹ If that qualifies as an Arab Spring, one has to wonder what an Arab Fall would look like.

But the one issue that the West should not be unduly concerned with is the fact that 67 percent of Egyptians are in favor of the restoration of the Caliphate.²

For one thing, within the global umma, there appears to be as many conceptions of the ideal Caliphate as there are Muslims. This grass-roots longing for a symbol of unity should be heard with the proverbial Freudian “third ear,” and seen for what it really is, i.e., a symptom rather than a disease. For another, by agreeing to establish diplomatic relations with the 57-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), America and Europe have, in essence, already granted the OIC the status of a Quasi-Caliphate.

More important still, it is time for Western policy-makers to realize that the ideological rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran that has been going on since 1979 constitutes nothing less than a Clash of the Caliphates. Through a soft power strategy blurring the distinction between “public diplomacy” and “political warfare,” “humanitarian aid” and “religious propaganda,” the two states have been the main drivers of the re-Islamization process throughout the Muslim world. The one-upmanship dynamic generated by the rivalry between these two fundamentalist regimes is the main reason why, from the Balkans to Pakistan, the re-Islamization of the global umma has taken a *radical*, rather than *moderate*, dimension.

The bad news is that this Saudi-Iranian Cold War has the potential to escalate today into a hot war in the Gulf (Bahrain). The good news is that the Saudi-Iranian ideological duopoly is being increasingly challenged by the return of Turkey on the Muslim stage. The global export of “Turkish Islam” has the potential to rollback Saudi and Iranian fundamentalisms and significantly alter the “theo-political balance of power” in the Muslim world.

Within the U.S. national security community, the Islamic Resurgence has so far been framed either in terms of a *Leaderless Jihad* (the CT approach) or of a *Global Insurgency* (the

¹ Pew Global Attitudes Project, *Most Embrace a Role for Islam in Politics*, December 2, 2010, <http://pewglobal.org/2010/12/02/muslims-around-the-world-divided-on-Hamas-and-Hezbollah/>; Zogby International, *Egypt: 92 percent say US is their greatest threat*, March 3, 2011, (www.zogby.com/soundbites/ReadClips.cfm?ID=19843)

²As of 2007, support for restoration of Caliphate ranged from 49 percent in Indonesia to 74 percent in Pakistan. Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, *Attacks on Civilians and Al Qaeda*, PIPA Poll, April 24, 2007 (www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/START_Apr07_rpt.pdf).

COIN approach). While useful at the tactical and operational levels, this approach gives too much importance to non-state actors at the expense of state actors. Reframing the Islamic Resurgence in terms of a *Clash of the Caliphates* is a necessary, if not sufficient, prerequisite for a better understanding of the strategic challenge ahead, and for the elaboration of an effective communication strategy.

Whose Caliphate Is It Anyway?

Whenever the question of a hypothetical restoration of the Caliphate arises, Western observers invariably tend to either condemn it as inherently toxic, or dismiss it as downright fanciful. Yet, however fuzzy their perception of the historical Caliphate, and however divergent their conceptions of a future Caliphate, radical and moderate Islamists alike *actually have a point*: the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate by Mustapha Kemal in 1924 was indeed a misfortune from which the Muslim world has yet to fully recover.

While this claim will be met in the West with disbelief among Protestants, it is bound to get a more sympathetic hearing from Catholics – for a good reason: had Benito Mussolini, following his 1922 March on Rome, decided to abolish the Papacy, one billion Catholics today would be longing - with varying degrees of intensity - for a restoration of the symbol of Catholic unity for two thousand years.³ As it turned out, Mussolini proved wiser than Kemal and, in 1929, concluded the Lateran Accords between the Italian Kingdom and Vatican City, thereby putting an end to all the political, religious and financial conflicts that had plagued the relations between the two parties ever since the annexation of the Papal States in 1870.

Over time, the same Vatican that had condemned “modernism” in 1907 eventually reconciled itself with modernity and, in the form of the Vatican II Council (1962-65), undertook its most sweeping renovation since the Council of Trent (1545-63). Not only was anti-Semitism officially and irreversibly repudiated, but the Catholic Church soon became a force for good in the “third wave” of democratization that swept Latin Europe and Latin America in the 1970s, before becoming one of the leading actors in the final collapse of Communism during the “Second Cold War.”⁴ Had the Caliphate been allowed to survive, there is good reason to believe that it would have followed a similar course - if at a slower pace.

The “Papalization” of the Caliphate

During the first six centuries of its existence, to be sure, the Islamic Caliphate actually resembled a Muslim Holy Roman Empire more than a Muslim Papacy. But beginning with the era of the “Shadow Caliphate” (1258-1517), the Caliph loses his temporal power and only retains a spiritual authority. With the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517 and the death of the last Abbasid Caliph, the Ottoman Sultans are in a position to claim the title of Caliph, yet until 1774, the title will be claimed only sporadically.

It is not until after 1774 that the Ottoman “Sultan” will re-invent himself as “Sultan-Caliph” in an attempt to compensate the declining political power of the Sultanate proper by

³ The degree of intensity is key: in the four countries surveyed by the PIPA poll mentioned above, only 36 percent on average agree “strongly” with Al Qaeda’s goal “to unify all Islamic countries into a single state or Caliphate,” while 29 percent agree only “somewhat.”

⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Oxford University Press, 1993, and George Weigel, *The Final Revolution: The Resistance Church and the Collapse of Communism*, Oxford University Press, 2003.

promoting the religious influence of the Caliphate beyond the borders of the ever-shrinking empire.

From 1876 until 1909 in particular, Sultan-Caliph Abdul Hamid II will try to make up for his territorial losses in Southern Europe by expanding his religious influence among the Muslims of South Asia. After his deposition by the Young Turks, his first two successors will retain the title of Sultan-Caliph, but they will be essentially figure heads with no temporal power. This “Papalization” of the Caliphate will only accelerate after the abolition of the Sultanate proper in 1922. The last Caliph (*tout court*) will end up having as little temporal power as the Pope after 1870, and the institution itself will be altogether abolished two years later.⁵

From 1909 until 1924, then, the institution of the Caliphate was in fact not that different from the Papacy, and its abolition – an entirely intra-Muslim affair in which the West had no part – may well have been Ataturk’s biggest blunder. Though calls for its restoration have practically never ceased since 1924, the two main obstacles to date have been, on the one hand, the theological incompatibility of the competing conceptions of a renovated Caliphate and, on the other hand, the political rivalries among rulers and states for the spiritual leadership of the Muslim world.

In the interwar period, a succession of pan-Islamic Congresses will convene to discuss the issue of the Caliphate in Mecca (1924), Cairo (1926), Mecca (1926), Jerusalem (1931), Geneva (1935), and Cairo (1938) – to no effect. Intellectually, the disagreement centers on whether there should be a *restoration* or, as some progressive legal scholars argue at the time, a *renovation* along the lines of an “Oriental League of Nations.” Between the progressive conception of liberal Westernizers (Sanhuri) and the retrograde vision of the Muslim Brotherhood (Rida), there was no possible common ground. Politically as well, the negotiations will go nowhere as various monarchs prefer to torpedo the project of a restoration altogether rather than take the risk of seeing a rival elected as Caliph.

After WWII, another such conference will be held in Karachi (1949). In 1954, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan will begin talks about a General Islamic Conference which will lead to the establishment of a short-lived “permanent headquarters” in Cairo (1956-58), and the appointment as secretary-general of Anwar Sadat (Egypt’s future president). It is not until 1969 that the rising Saudi Arabia will enlist the support of 25 countries (today 57 members) for the establishment of an Organization of the Islamic Conference (1969) – the closest thing to a modern Caliphate to date.⁶

⁵On the Caliphate, see Thomas W. Arnold, *The Caliphate* (Clarendon Press, 1924; reprinted 1966) and Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, second edition, Oxford University Press, 1968. On the perception of the Caliphate among the Muslims of India (i.e. including today’s Pakistan and Bangladesh), see Azmi Ozcan, *Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain, 1877-1924*, Brill, 1997.

⁶The three indispensable accounts are Martin Kramer, *Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses*, Columbia University Press, 1986; Elie Kedourie, “Egypt and the Caliphate: 1915-1952,” in *The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies*, Ivan R. Dee, 1970; and the recent book by Turkish historian (and current Secretary-General of the OIC) Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, *The Islamic World in A New Century: The Organization of the Islamic Conference, 1969-2009*, Columbia University Press, 2010.

The Rise of the Saudi Caliphate:

In the field of International History, the importance of “enduring rivalries” (between dynasties, city-states, nation-states, empires) as engines of change has long been recognized: Athens vs. Sparta, Rome vs. Carthage, Hapsburgs vs. Valois, Ottomans vs. Safavids, America vs. Russia, etc.⁷ In the field of Middle Eastern history, though, historians continue to write as if the only enduring rivalries that mattered in the last two centuries were all exogenous. Nothing illustrates better the stagnation of the field than the fact that the “master narrative” of 20th century Middle Eastern history today remains the victimization narrative put forward in 1938 by George Antonius in his sub-scholarly tract “The Arab Awakening.”⁸

In Antonius’s morality play, an innocent and pure “Arab nation” is betrayed by Western villains who go on “carving” the Ottoman empire and creating “artificial” borders that will fatally hamper Arab development. The historical truth is somewhat different: 1) from 1876 to 1924, the main villains of the story (whether Hamidians, Unionists or Kemalists) were mostly Ottoman; 2) what the Arab part of the Ottoman empire experienced during those years was not so much a grass-root Awakening as an elite Bickering; 3) the borders of the successor states of the Ottoman empire drawn by Western powers were not any more or any less “artificial” than those of the successor states of the Hapsburg empire, and that (along with fifty years of Communism) did not prevent the latter from eventually catching up with the West.⁹

A grown-up re-interpretation of modern Middle Eastern history is long overdue. As Efraim Karsh pointed out, it must give its proper place to the struggle for mastery among regional players themselves - especially those who, like Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey, were not colonized:

Twentieth-century Middle Eastern history is essentially the culmination of long-standing *indigenous* trends, passions, and patterns of behavior rather than an externally imposed dictate. Great-power influences, however potent, have played a secondary role, constituting neither the primary force behind the region’s political development nor the main cause of its notorious volatility. Even at the weakest point in their modern history, during the First World War and its immediate wake, Middle Eastern actors were not hapless victims of predatory imperial powers but active participants in the restructuring of the region.¹⁰

⁷ See e.g. William R. Thompson, ed. *Great Power Rivalries*, University of South Carolina Press, 1999; Paul F. Diehl, ed. *The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries*, University of Illinois Press, 1998.

⁸ This narrative was initially peddled by T.E. Lawrence, though Lawrence was at least aware that the Arab Revolt of 1916 in which he played a leading role was nothing but “a sideshow of a sideshow.” On Antonius, see Martin Kramer, “Ambition, Arabism, and George Antonius,” in *Arab Awakening and Islamic Revival: the Politics of Ideas in the Middle East* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1996, www.martinkramer.org/sandbox/reader/archives/ambition-arabism-and-george-antonius/).

⁹ In what way was the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, created in 1918 (and renamed Yugoslavia in 1929) less “artificial” than the Kingdom of Iraq created at the same time? The discourse about the artificiality of Arab borders is parochial, and forgets that, in post-Hapsburg Europe, rump-Austria was forbidden by the Allies from unifying with Germany, Hungary lost one third of its ethnic Hungarian population to Romania, Czechs and Slovaks were lumped together into an artificial state that no longer exists today, etc.

¹⁰ Efraim Karsh, *Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789-1923*, Harvard University Press, 1999, page 2.

The primacy of endogenous factors ought to be all the more obvious that intra-Muslim rivalries are as old as Islam itself, beginning with the Sunni-Shiite schism. At regular intervals, the legitimacy of “the Caliphate” itself will be challenged by rival claimants (Cordoba, Fatimids, etc.) and, in the classical age, the Ottoman-Persian rivalry will actually be more significant than the conflicts between the Ottomans and a disunited Europe.

Within the Ottoman empire itself, beginning with the occupation of Mecca and Medina by the Saudis in 1803, the Arab peninsula will become the object of a rivalry between the Egyptian dynasty and the House of Saud. Though Egypt under Muhammad Ali (1805-1849) seemed destined to become the engine of change in the Muslim world, a century later, it is the Saudi Arabia of Ibn Saud (1902-53) which, against all odds, will become the engine of regression in the region.

It would be no great exaggeration to argue that the “master narrative” of the Middle East in the 20th century could be summarized in one sentence: “The Fall of the Ottoman Caliphate and the Rise of the Saudi Caliphate.” Just like the 20th century has been the “American century” at the global level, one could argue that it has been the “Saudi century” at the regional level, in that the Saudi Kingdom managed to emerge victorious of three consecutive rivalries with the Hashemites, the Nasserites, and the Khomeinists.

The Saudi Saga: A Tale of Three Rivalries

Rather than re-hash the fairy tale pitting Western wolves against Arab lambs, a grown up “master narrative” for Middle East history in the 20th century would take the form of a tale of three rivalries: the Saudi dynasty vs. the Hashemite dynasty within the Arab Peninsula proper, Saudi Arabia vs. Egypt within the broader Arab Middle East, Saudi Wahhabism vs. Iranian Khomeinism within the Muslim world at large.

Saudis vs. Hashemites (1909-1925): As descendant of the Prophet, the Hashemite family of Hussein, the Sheriff of Mecca, was initially seen as the legitimate guardian of the Holy Sites; by contrast, the Saudi dynasty, linked as it was to the Wahhabi sect, was perceived as a “rogue dynasty” in much of the Muslim world. As the leader of the Arab Revolt in 1916 against the Ottoman empire, Hussein will be recognized internationally as King of Hejaz in 1917 and will actually proclaim himself as the new Caliph a week after the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924. We will never know if, over time, his claim would have been recognized throughout the Arab/Muslim world: by 1925, abandoned by the British government in his war against the Saudis, Hussein loses control of the Holy Sites to his rival Ibn Saud.¹¹

This first rivalry between the pro-Western Hashemites and the fundamentalist Saudis is largely forgotten in the West today. Even among contemporaries, it might have come across as a sideshow, overshadowed as it was by the Young Turk Revolution (1908), the Egyptian

¹¹ For a concise overview of the Saudi-Hashemite rivalry, see Saad Omar Khan, “The “Caliphate Question”: British Views and Policies toward Pan-Islamic Politics and the End of the Ottoman Caliphate,” *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, 24:4, 2007, http://i-epistemology.net/attachments/922_ajiss24-4-stripped%20-%20Khan%20-%20The%20Caliphate%20Question.pdf. See also Haifa Alangari, *The Struggle for Power in Arabia: Ibn Saud, Hussein, and Great Britain, 1914-1924*, Ithaca Press, 1998; Joshua Teitelbaum, *The Rise and Fall of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Hijaz*, New York University Press, 2001; Joseph Kostiner, *The Making of Saudi Arabia, 1916-1936: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State*, Oxford University Press, 1993.

Revolution (1919), the Turkish War of Independence (1920-22), the proclamation of the Kemalist Republic (1923), and the abolition of the Ottoman Sultanate and Caliphate (1922-24).

Yet, in hindsight, the importance of this first rivalry for the future of the Muslim world cannot be over-estimated. For the net result is that a dynasty associated with a sect considered heretical not only gains control of Mecca and Medina, but that the discovery of oil in 1938 will, over time, give the new kingdom an economic clout that larger Arab states can only envy. Samuel Huntington's claim that the trouble with the Muslim world is the fact that there is no "core state" in Islam does not stand scrutiny: any country that happens to control both the Holy Sites and the Oily Lands is a core state, especially when its dynasty happens to be associated with a messianic clergy.

From 1925 on, the House of Saud will waste no time trying to co-opt the Salafi movement abroad as a way to legitimize the Wahhabi creed. Eighty years later, and despite the Al Qaeda blowback effect, it is clear that the Saudi strategy has been a huge success overall. In much of the Sunni world, what passes for *mainstream* Islam today is mostly the *Wahhabi/Salafi* version of Islam. Just like Prussia over time managed to contaminate the Germanic world with its militarism, Saudi Arabia has managed to contaminate the Muslim world with its fanaticism.

Saudi Arabia vs. Egypt (1958-1979): After the establishment of the Egypt-led Arab League in 1945, the question of the restoration of the Caliphate will recede as the Arab states focus their efforts on state-building (yet, on the very eve of the Nasser revolution, Egyptian King Farouk was still toying with the idea of being recognized as Caliph). Attempts to give institutional form to Muslim unity do not disappear altogether but, as mentioned earlier, the idea of creating a permanent General Islamic Congress will be short-lived, and Nasser, disillusioned with pan-Islamism, will shift to secular pan-Arabism.

From 1958 until 1979, Egypt and Saudi Arabia will wage a Cold War of sorts for the leadership of the Middle East, the former promoting pan-Arab socialism through the Arab League, the latter promoting pan-Islamic fundamentalism through the World Muslim League and the OIC.

Under the charismatic Nasser, Egypt created in 1953 the Voice of the Arabs ("Radio Cairo"), the first transnational radio in the Arab world and the ancestor of today's Al-Jazeera, which will play an instrumental role in supporting the cause of the FLN during the French-Algerian War (1954-62). Nasser's increasingly radical message will become so popular in the Arab world that, to counter his appeal at home, the Saudi government will have no choice but to reluctantly agree to introduce television in the kingdom in the 1960s.

On the ideological front, Saudi Arabia will also provide refuge and financial support to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood persecuted by Nasser. Over the years, the Saudi state will even manage to "contaminate" the millions of Egyptian guest workers in the Gulf with its puritanical brand of Islam, and to re-shape Islamic theology worldwide by co-opting the Cairo-based al-Azhar university, the oldest and most prestigious university in the Muslim world.

On the military front, the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Egypt will become such that the two countries will spend the better part of the 1960s fighting in Yemen a proxy war which will end in an Egyptian failure and which, along with the Arab defeat in the Six-Day War, will contribute to discredit Nasser in the eyes of the Arab street.

On the economic front, Saudi Arabia will further enhance its power by establishing a Saudi-led *Arab* oil cartel (OAPEC) out of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) created in 1960. On the political front, while Egypt's efforts to create with Syria a United Arab Republic will go nowhere (1958-61), the Saudis will outflank Egypt by successfully creating a web of transnational organizations like the World Muslim League (1962), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (1969), the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (1972), and the International Islamic Relief Organization (1975) - to name but a few.¹²

By 1979, with pan-Arabism thoroughly discredited in the region and Egypt temporarily excluded from the Arab League due to its participation in the Camp David accords, the newly-enriched Saudi Arabia, at the head of the OIC, has all the reasons to believe it has become a modern-day Sultanate-Caliphate. Yet, that same year, the advent of the Iranian revolution and the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by extremists will quickly reveal the limits of Saudi power. The year 1979 is a pivotal year in the region and, from then on, the main rivalry will pit the Saudi kingdom and the Iranian republic, this time on a global scale.¹³

Saudi Wahhabism vs. Iranian Khomeinism (1979-present): One of the first acts of the Khomeini regime will be to call on the Saudi population to overthrow its corrupt royal family. The enmity between the Sunni-Arab Kingdom and the Shia-Persian Republic will reach a new height in 1984, when thousands of Iranian pilgrims will riot in the streets of Mecca, calling for the overthrow of the Saudi dynasty. King Fahd will counter the Iranian challenge by creating the Gulf Cooperation Council (an economic and security alliance including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and UAE) in 1981, adopting the title of "Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques" (used by former Caliphs) in order to re-assert his legitimacy (1986), and supporting Baghdad in the Iraq-Iran war (1980-88).

The Saudi-Iranian rivalry will extend to Pakistan and Afghanistan in the 1980s, and to Lebanon and the Balkans in the 1990s. During the Balkans wars in particular, the existence of this rivalry over what had traditionally been Ottoman territory will be a decisive factor in Turkey's decision to become active in the region for the first time since the end of the Ottoman empire.

Though Saudi Arabia and Iran were on the verge of reaching a *modus vivendi* on the eve of 9/11, the invasion of Iraq of 2003 has significantly increased the Clash of the two would-be Caliphates, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan.

While the overall Saudi-Iranian rivalry is far better documented than the previous two rivalries, it has yet to be the object of a comprehensive analysis in terms of an ideological Cold

¹² On the Arab Cold War, see Malcolm Kerr, *The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd al Nasir and his Rivals, 1958-1970*, Oxford University Press. On Nasser's Radio Cairo, see Laura M. James, "Whose Voice? Nasser, the Arabs, and 'Sawt al-Arab' Radio", *Transnational Broadcasting Studies* 16, 2006, www.tbsjournal.com/James.html. On al-Azhar, Laurent Murawiec, "The Saudi Takeover of Al-Azhar University," *Terrorism Monitor*, vol.1, issue 7, The Jamestown Foundation, December 04, 2003, www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=26185. On the Wahhabization of Egyptian Salafism and the Salafization of Saudi Wahhabism, see David Dean Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, I.B. Tauris, 2006.

¹³ David W. Lesch, *1979: The Year that Shaped the Modern Middle East*, Westview Press, 2001.

War.¹⁴ There is to date no systematic “mapping” of the informational and educational grand strategies pursued by the two countries.

In the “soft power projection” game, Saudi Arabia today appears to have remained the lead player, in part because Sunnism is the religion of 85 percent of the Muslim world, in part also because the Kingdom’s political, religious and media reach makes Saudi Arabia a “kingdom without borders.” Between 1975 and 2002, the Saudi government has spent an estimated \$70 billion on “international aid,” two-thirds of which went to Islamic related purposes such as building mosques and religious schools and promoting Wahhabism.

In addition, private Saudi citizens donated billions more for Wahhabi projects overseas through “private charities” headed by Saudi government officials and closely tied to the government. Last but not least, Saudi Arabia is in a hegemonic position when it comes to controlling (directly or not) Arab satellite televisions and buying influence in Western media through either corruption of journalists or indirect financial control.¹⁵

It is worth noting that, while the Saudi kingdom since 2003 has cracked down on homegrown terrorists threatening the royal family, it nonetheless continues to disseminate its ideology of hatred outside its borders through its multiple propaganda networks. Official promises to the contrary notwithstanding, the curriculum of intolerance in Saudi schools has not significantly changed, and it is safe to assume that Saudi propaganda abroad has not changed its nature either.¹⁶ In an ideal world, the Saudi princes would realize that the time has come for the Saudi Caliphate to have its “Vatican II.” But the gerontocracy in power appears unable to grasp the profound wisdom of their distant cousin, the Sicilian Prince of Lampedusa: “In order for things to remain the same, everything will have to change.”

If Saudi Arabia has the lead on “soft power” proper, Iran has proven particularly skillful in projecting “smart power.” Though Shia Islam is practiced by only 15 percent of the world’s Muslims (and Farsi is not nearly as widespread as Arabic), the shrewd instrumentalization of Hamas and Hezbollah by Tehran has increased Iranian influence beyond the Shia Crescent proper, just as Tehran’s defiant pursuit of nuclear power has increased Iran’s prestige in the eyes of the Sunni street.¹⁷

¹⁴ See for instance Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, *Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order*, Oxford University Press, 1996; Henner Furtig, *Iran's Rivalry with Saudi Arabia Between the Gulf Wars*, Ithaca Press, 2002; Frederic Wehrey et al., *Saudi-Iranian Relations since the Fall of Saddam: Rivalry, Cooperation, and Implications for U.S. Policy*, RAND March 2009. Joshua Teitelbaum, *Saudi Arabia and the New Strategic Landscape*, Hoover Press, 2010.

¹⁵ Alex Alexiev, “Wahhabism: State-Sponsored Extremism Worldwide,” Testimony, United States Senate Committee on the judiciary, June 26, 2003, http://kyl.senate.gov/legis_center/subdocs/sc062603_alexiev.pdf. See also Douglas A. Boyd, “Saudi Arabia’s International Media Strategy: Influence through Multinational Ownership,” in Kai Hafez, ed., *Mass Media, Politics and Society in the Middle East*, Hampton Press, 2001; Mamoun Fandy, *(Un)civil Wars of Words: Media and Politics in the Arab World*, Praeger, 2007, and Madawi al-Rasheed, ed. *Kingdom Without Borders: Saudi Arabia's Political, Religious, and Media Frontiers*, Columbia University Press, 2009.

¹⁶ See Center for Religious Freedom and Institute for Gulf Affairs, *Saudi Arabia's Curriculum of Intolerance with Excerpts from Saudi Ministry of Education Textbooks for Islamic Studies*, Washington DC, Freedom House, 2006; 2008 Update: *Saudi Arabia's Curriculum of Intolerance*, Freedom House report, 2008. For Iranian textbooks, see SAIC Report, *Iranian Textbooks: Content and Context*, 31 December 2007, www.fas.org/irp/dni/osc/irantext.pdf.

¹⁷ On Iranian propaganda abroad, see John L. Esposito, ed., *The Iranian Revolution – Its Global Impact*, Florida International University Press, 1990, and Christopher Deliso, *The Coming Balkan Caliphate – The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and the West*, Praeger, 2007. See also Vali Nasr, *The Shia Revival. How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future*, W.W. Norton, 2007, and Suzanne Maloney, *Iran's Long Reach: Iran as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World*, USIP, 2008.

Whether in Iraq, the Gulf, or Central Asia, Iran is today more ideologically active than at anytime before 9/11. As Senator Lugar pointed out, Iran “has opened some 60 Iranian cultural centers in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe that offer Persian language courses and extensive library resources-and a platform for anti-American propaganda.”¹⁸ The importance given by the Iranian government to the war of ideas is reflected in the fact that the Culture and Islamic Communications Organization, which manages its cultural centers abroad, is under the direct supervision of Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.¹⁹

There is no reason to believe that the rivalry between (America-backed) Saudi Arabia and (China-backed) Iran is going to lessen in the coming years. In fact, this Cold War has the potential to escalate in the not too distant future into a shooting war in the Gulf. As of this writing, Saudi troops are rolling in neighboring Bahrain (a Shiite country ruled by a Sunni minority). Tehran, which views Bahrain as historically part of Iran, has withdrawn its ambassador in protest, and the Iraqi Shias are demonstrating their support for their Bahraini “brothers.” Like Serbia in 1914, tiny Bahrain in 2011 has the potential to lead to the kind of epochal conflict unanticipated by all the players. That’s for the bad news. The good news is the rise of Turkey as a new player in the War of Ideas.

The Rise of the Neo-Ottoman Caliphate

While Islam is not the pure *monolith* decried by some, it is even less the sheer *mosaic* complacently portrayed by others. Since 1979, oil-rich Saudi Arabia and Iran have acted as *de facto* Caliphates of the Sunni and Shiite worlds respectively. For the first time in thirty years, this duopoly is being challenged by the return of Ottoman Turkey on the world stage.

The re-Islamization of Turkey since 2001 is a Janus-like phenomenon that remains largely misunderstood in the West. On the one hand, the creeping re-Islamization of Turkish society under the leadership of Prime Minister Erdogan constitutes a regression threatening to pull Turkey away from the West. Official rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding, the centers of gravity of Turkey’s grand strategy are the ECO and the OIC, not the EU and NATO.²⁰ On the other hand, Ankara’s export of Turkish Islam throughout the Muslim world has the potential to significantly alter the “theo-political balance of power” within the global *umma*, away from Saudi and Iranian extremisms, and closer to the kind of moderate Islam traditionally associated with Morocco and Indonesia. To make a long story short:

After 9/11, Saudi Arabia withdrew its money from the US and started investing it not only in the Turkish economy, but also in Turkish politics – hence the election a year later of the Islamist AK Party.²¹

¹⁸ Richard Lugar, “To win hearts and minds, get back in the game”, Foreign Policy, Feb 26, 2009, http://experts.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/02/26/to_win_hearts_and_minds_get_back_in_the_game.

¹⁹ Mehdi Khalaji, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Iran,” Policy Watch 1476, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 12, 2009.

²⁰ For an outline of Turkey’s grand strategy, see Tony Corn, “The Real Plan B in AfPak: Keeping China Out, Bringing India In, Calming Turkey Down,” *Small Wars Journal*, February 2011, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/669-corn.pdf>

²¹ Michael Rubin, “Green Money, Islamist Politics in Turkey,” *The Middle East Quarterly*, vol. XII, no1, Winter 2005, www.meforum.org/684/green-money-islamist-politics-in-turkey.

At home, the top-down re-Islamization of Turkey has been particularly visible in the judiciary, the media, and in education. In the judiciary, Erdogan has moved to reduce the retirement age of judges so as to replace 4,000 out of 9,000 professional civil servants with AK party supporters.²² In the media, 50% of the formerly state-owned media has been transferred to, or is now owned, by publishers sympathetic to the AK party; the remaining 50% has reportedly become too cautious to pick a row with Erdogan.²³ In the education sector, the re-Islamization process ranges from changes in textbooks to the appointment of 4,500 AK party followers as school principals and transfer of hundreds of bureaucrats from the Religious Affairs Directorate to the Education Ministry.²⁴

Abroad, the Turkish government has been developing its own information and education networks. Turkish state-run TRT has launched a new Arabic TC channel (At Turkiyya). Through both governmental and para-governmental networks, Turkish Islam has become increasingly present in the education system of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

- In Afghanistan, the Turkish International Cooperation & Development Agency (TIKA) has built 35 new schools, rebuilt seven schools and provides assistance to another 42 schools. Turkish presence offers a welcome counterweight to Iranian activists, who have trained more than 1,200 Afghan teachers, librarians and diplomats, and spent millions of dollars for a network of Shiite religious schools and charities in Western Afghanistan since 2001.²⁵
- In Pakistan, the Pak-Turk International Schools and Colleges programs created in 1995 has opened schools for boys and girls in Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, and Peshawar and Quetta. Turkish schools in Pakistan have earned the praise of the *New York Times*, who quote a Pakistani teacher to the effect that “Private schools can’t make our sons good Muslims. Religious schools can’t give them modern education. Pak-Turk does both.”²⁶
- In 2004, the 57-member OIC, for the first time in its history, elected a Turkish national as a Secretary-General of the Organization – an epochal event which failed to register in the West. Turkey has since gone “global” in the soft power game. Among the numerous initiatives coming out of Ankara, two in particular have both a

²² Michael Rubin, “Turkey’s No Casual Dining,” *Middle East Forum*, December 12, 2005, www.meforum.org/873/turkeys-no-casual-dining.

²³ Asli Aydintasbas, “Erdogan’s Davos Outburst is Nothing New,” *Forbes.com*, January 30, 2009, www.forbes.com/2009/01/30/erdogan-turkey-davos-opinions-contributors_0130_asli_aydintasbas.html.

²⁴ For more details on these reforms, see Sabrina Tavernise, “Islam Taking Root in Turkey’s Bureaucracy,” *New York Times*, May 29, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/world/europe/29iht-turkey.5.5917136.html?pagewanted=1&r=1; Frank Gaffney, “No to Islamic Turkey,” *Washington Times*, September 27, 2005, www.washingtontimes.com/commentary/20050926-092005-9547r.htm. Michael Rubin, “Mr. Erdogan’s Turkey,” *Wall Street Journal*, October 19, 2006, <http://www.aei.org/article/25027>. For a more detailed account, see Zeyno Baran, *Torn Country: Turkey between Secularism and Islamism*, Hoover Institution Press, 2010.

²⁵ In 2005, “the Iranian Embassy opened the Iranian Corner, a room in Kabul University’s main library filled with computers, books and magazines from Iran, promoting Iran’s ancient culture and modern achievements. Librarians say it is more popular than the adjoining American Corner, sponsored by the United States Embassy, primarily because it has a better Internet connection.” David Rohde, “Iran is Seeking More Influence in Afghanistan,” *New York Times*, December 27, 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/12/27/world/asia/27afghan.ready.html?_r=1

²⁶ Sabrina Tavernise, “Turkish Schools Offer Pakistan a Gentler vision of Islam,” *New York Times*, May 4, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/05/04/world/asia/04islam.html. See also the Pak-Turk website, www.pakturk.org.

domestic and a diplomatic dimension, and deserve careful monitoring: the Gulen Network and the Hadith Project.

The Gulen Network: Fethullah Gulen emerged on the radar screen of Western observers only in 2008. But the enigmatic, Pennsylvania-based, billionaire preacher-educator has been active in Turkish educational politics for decades. Though influenced by Sufism, Gulen is not a “spiritual” leader. In the words of one Turkish observer:

“Gulen is first and foremost a Turko-Ottoman nationalist... Although the Arabs were parts of the Ottoman Empire, Gulen is critical of the Arab and Iranian understanding of Islam. He accuses the Arabs of collaborating against the Ottoman empire and creating a negative image of Islam by reducing Islam to an ideology... For these reasons, most Gulen schools are either in the Balkans or in Central Asia, and very few exist in the Arab Middle East.”²⁷

With his worldwide educational activism, Gulen seems to be following the blueprint of the Jesuits who, fifty years after the foundation of their order in 1540, had established hundreds of schools throughout Europe and Latin America (this similarity may explain why American Jesuits have a soft spot for Gulen). Unlike the Saudi and Iranian networks, whose focus is on indoctrination, the originality of the Gulen network is to deliver an elite education while emphasizing what could be call the ethical “propaganda of the deed” on the part of educators (another Jesuit feature):

Although Gulen's teachers are devoted Muslim believers, they do not teach religion at school and strictly observe Turkey's state-sponsored secular curriculum. They are also open to non-Muslim students, including representatives of ethnic Slav minorities. Better standards of education and a strict entrance selection process have both contributed to maintaining the prestige of Gulen's schools and universities. Yet comparatively high admission fees make them mainly elite institutions.²⁸

As of this writing, the nature of the relation between the Gulen movement and the Erdogan government are still very opaque. What is sure is that the influence of the Gulen movement, through both information and education activities, extend beyond civil society proper and is reportedly gaining in the military and security forces. The 64,000 dollar question, which cannot be answered at this point, boils down to this: is Gulen a Muslim Gandhi, or an Islamist Gramsci?

The Hadith Project: The Thematic Hadith Project, launched in 2006 by the Diyanet, Turkey's Directorate of Religious Affairs (and the direct heir to the Caliphate), is being conducted with the assistance of 85 hadith scholars drawn from several Turkish universities. Though viewed by fundamentalists as a “Jesuit conspiracy,” there is, at first sight, nothing particularly subversive in the revisionist hermeneutics of the Ankara scholars, who stay away from first-order questions regarding the Koran itself. Yet, it would be a mistake to dismiss the Hadith Project as a merely cosmetic aggiornamento.

²⁷ M. Hakan Yavuz, “The Gulen Movement: The Turkish Puritans,” in M. Hakan Yavuz and John L. Esposito, eds, *Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gulen Movement*, Syracuse University Press, 2003, p.24.

²⁸ Jean-Christophe Peuch, “Turkey: Fethullachi Schools – A Greenhouse for Central Asian Elites?,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, June 8, 2004.

From a philosophical-theological standpoint, the center of gravity of Islam as a religion may be the Quran; yet, from a political-legal standpoint, the center of gravity of Islam as a civilization is the Hadith. As one Turkish scholar explains:

While the Koran provides broad guidelines on how Muslims should lead their lives, the hadith contain all the details on how these guidelines should be interpreted and practiced in daily life. *More than 90% of Islamic law (Sharia) is based on the hadith*, including the very controversial practices such as stoning adulterers and banning the fine arts. Their authority, however, has often been called into question. This is mainly due to the fact that they were compiled two centuries after the Koran was first handed down, long after the Prophet Mohammed's death in the 7th century. It is often argued that during this time, various sayings and actions that do not belong to the Prophet were attributed to him by those seeking to exercise social control. Newly emerging customs and social norms and the need to justify them in Islamic terms are also found to be reasons behind these false attributions. This is where the significance of the [Hadith] project lies. It is the first substantial attempt to prepare a revised, extensive (six-volume) collection of hadith, purged of those words and deeds that do not belong to the Prophet, including those that blatantly discriminate against women.²⁹

The future effects of the Hadith Project, which will touch on some five hundred topics, cannot be over-estimated, at least within Turkey itself, where the Dyanet is in charge of administering 76,000 mosques, appointing the clerics, and instructing them on what to say during the Friday prayer.

The effect of the Hadith Project in the non-Turkish world is more open to question. To begin with, Turkish Islam follows the Hanafi school which predominates in the Balkans, Central Asia, Pakistan and Asia, but not in Africa, the Arab Peninsula, let alone Iran. In addition, in the Arab world proper, Turkey faces an uphill battle: despite the popularity of Erdogan's anti-Israel posturing, Turkey is still perceived as a former colonial power by most of the Arab world.³⁰

In particular, it remains to be seen what the effects the Ankara-based Hadith Project will be on the Cairo-based Al-Azhar University. Al-Azhar is not just the oldest and most prestigious university of the Muslim world, it is also the training school for would-be imams from 100 countries. Its Islamic Research Council has a major say in what can and cannot be published in Egypt, its alumni sit on the board of all Muslim banking networks, its fatwas influence legislators throughout the Muslim world.

At the political-legal level, Al-Azhar is the closest thing to an informal Supreme Court of the Muslim world, with the authority to deny (1965) or grant (1979) legitimacy to a peace treaty with Israel. The Saudi takeover of al-Azhar has so shifted the center of gravity of the Muslim political discourse that the rhetoric of al-Azhar today was until recently indistinguishable from that of the Muslim Brotherhood, its former nemesis. Since March 2010, however, Al-Azhar is

²⁹ (29) Senem Aydin Duzgit, *Just How "Revolutionary" is Turkey's Hadith Project?* Commentary, CEPS, Brussels, 17 March 2008. <http://aei.pitt.edu/11596/1/1626%5B1%5D.pdf>. Emphasis added.

³⁰ On Turkey's image in the Arab world, see Dietrich Jung, "Turkey and the Arab World: Historical Narratives and New Political Realities", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 10, No 1, March 2005; Omer Taspinar, *An Uneven fit? The "Turkish Model" and the Arab World*, analysis paper, n. 5, Washington DC: Brookings, August 2003; Ussama Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," *The American Historical Review*, Vol.107, issue 3, 2002.

under new management, and can be expected to influence (and, in turn, be influenced by) the ongoing revolution in Egypt.³¹

The Hadith Project may not quite rise to the level of a Muslim “Vatican II.” That said, in contrast to the routine “battle of fatwas” which only has a tactical, local and short-lived effect, the initiative to revise the Hadith has the potential to raise the counter-offensive against Global Jihad to the operational and strategic levels. Though the Hadith Project was expected to be completed by 2009, there has not been any noticeable progress in the past two years. In December 2010, the new director of Diyanet, Mehmet Gormez, adopted a resolutely “internationalist” program, prompting some observers to speculate whether Turkey was planning to resurrect the Caliphate.³²

There is no question that Turkey is positioning itself to be an Islamic “superpower” in terms of soft power projection. In addition to the Hadith Project, the Diyanet has recently launched a program of translation of the Quran “into all the languages and dialects spoken around the world” – a surprising initiative coming from a government agency of an alleged secular country, but one that has a genuine strategic significance. Since only twenty percent of the 1.5 billion Muslims speak Arabic, most Muslims relate to the Quran through translations - which can be eminently politicized. Until now, the Muslim world has been flooded with Saudi translations of the Quran. It will be interesting to see how the Turkish version differs from the Saudi version on the question of women, Jews and Christians among others.³³

As PM Erdogan’s increasingly unbalanced performance demonstrates, Turkey has yet to acquire the maturity required to be a regional power broker in terms of *foreign policy* proper. In terms of *public diplomacy*, though, Turkish initiatives like the Gulen Network and the Hadith Project show definite promises in the ongoing global “battle for hearts and minds.” At the end of the day, so-called Turkish Islam might well prove the most effective way to “roll back” the influence of Wahhabism and Khomeinism in the Muslim world.

While the prospect for the West of “losing Turkey” remains a distinct possibility, it cannot be ruled out that, under the right conditions, this loss for the West could turn out to be such a gain for the Muslim world as to prove positive for the West itself.

The OIC as Quasi-Caliphate:

In his *Clash of Civilizations*, Samuel Huntington argued that while clashes among civilizations at the micro-level would take the form of “fault-line wars,” clashes among civilizations at the macro-level were more likely to be political rather than military. Like military warfare itself, political warfare has evolved over time: today, with the emergence of the

³¹ On the Saudi/Al-Azhar connection, Franklin Foer, “Moral Hazard: The Life of a Liberal Muslim,” *The New Republic*, November 18, 2002, www.indopubs.com/am2.html;

Laurent Murawiec, “The Saudi Takeover of Al-Azhar University,” *Terrorism Monitor*, Jameston Foundation, December 2003; and Malika Zeghal’s indispensable *Gardiens de l’Islam: Les Oulemas d’Al Azhar dans l’Egypte Contemporaine*, Paris, Presses de Science Po, 1996).

³² Nicholas Birch, “Could a Caliphate Make a Comeback?,” *Eurasianet.org*, December 3, 2010, www.eurasianet.org/node/62500

³³ Khaleel Mohammed, “Assessing English Translations of the Quran,” *Middle East Quarterly*, Spring 2005, www.meforum.org/717/assessing-english-translations-of-the-quran. It is worth noting that translating the sacred book of the “religion of peace” can be a risky business: as recently as 2007, two Afghan men were condemned to death for having published a translation which did not include the original text in Arabic.

phenomenon known as “the judicialization of politics and the politicization of law,” political warfare takes primarily the form of “lawfare,” i.e. the weaponization of law for strategic purposes. International law, whether “soft” or “hard,” has become both the main battlefield and a weapon of choice in the ongoing clash of civilizations.³⁴

In that respect, there is no better vantage point than the United Nations today to see the Clash of Civilizations in action. Despite the increasing anti-Western activism of the OIC at the UN in the past twenty years, Western public opinion remains ignorant of the fact that, as its membership grew from 25 to 57 states, the OIC has become a pivotal “Islamic Caucus” within the UN General Assembly. As Andrew Muravchik explains in a nutshell:

In the General Assembly (...), the 22-nation Arab League constitutes a decisive bloc within the 56-nation Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which is decisive in turn in the 115-nation Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which constitutes nearly two-thirds of the UN and is the organization’s main bloc.³⁵

Three centuries after the Siege of Vienna, we are witnessing today the Siege of New York. Only this time, warfare has been replaced by lawfare. This evolution was certainly not anticipated by the Western idealists who, a century ago, predicted that Western-inspired international law would someday become the “Gentler Civilizer of Nations.”³⁶

What went wrong? In a nutshell: in 1945, the 48 nations present at the creation of the UN were mostly Western; by 1971 (the year of the first OIC summit) the 128 nations present in the UN General Assembly were mostly non-Western, and the “world peace through world law” process had already reached its culminating point. At the time, Western idealists like Louis Henkin found it convenient to put the blame on the Cold War itself.³⁷ More prescient, Western realists like Adda Bozeman warned that in the coming “multicultural age,” the Western-inspired legal order would be tested by what was not yet called a Clash of Civilizations.³⁸

³⁴ On lawfare, warfare, and the judicialization of politics, see Tony Corn, “From War Managers to Soldier Diplomats: The Coming Revolution in Civil-Military Relations,” *Small Wars Journal*, June 2009, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/259-corn.pdf>

³⁵ Joshua Muravchik: *The Future of the United Nations: Understanding the Past to Chart a Way Forward*, AEI Press, 2005.

³⁶ Martti Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations – The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960*, Cambridge University Press, 2001.

³⁷ “In relations between nations, the progress of civilization may be seen as movement from force to diplomacy, from diplomacy to law. The hope of civilized men has long been that nations would cease to pursue their interests by force, and attempt instead to negotiate in quest of agreement.” If the “progress report” of international law left much to be desired, it is in part because the bipolar world of the Cold War had “frozen” the natural progression of this iron law that leads from war to law. But “international society “works; at least it “muddles through”...Slowly, slowly, technology will begin to meet its promise; poor nations will be less poor; new nations will be less new and have more of a stake in stability, order, and law; increase welfare will attenuate even ideological conflicts and translate them into acceptable channels and forms.” Louis Henkin, *How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy*, Praeger, 1970, pp. 3 and 270-271.

³⁸ “The United Nations and related international organizations had been called forth by [Western] confidence in the moral unity of mankind and the enduring transnational appeal of law and peace. Today, a quarter of a century later, it is clear that this trust is unredeemable: the United Nations is neither an effective collective security organization nor a morally compelling mechanism (...) The realities of peace, war, and neutrality can no longer be circumscribed authoritatively in the official terminology of international law and international organization. For as the concepts of the “state” and “government” are being eroded, and as combat-oriented internationalist ideologies, proclaiming the principle of “the permanent revolution,” “protracted war,” or “the just war of liberation” are gaining ground, old distinction between aggression and defense, civil war and foreign war, and the status of belligerence and that of neutrality are also fast becoming blurred if not defunct, leaving vast regions in the throes of chronic strife, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, or counterinsurgency. Under the impact of these developments, “war” and “peace” can no longer be viewed as polarized, mutually exclusive conditions, each susceptible of an internationally valid definition.” Adda B. Bozeman, *The Future of Law in a Multicultural World*, Princeton University Press, 1971, pp183-185.

Throughout the 1970s, the OIC remained in the shadows of AOPEC (the main actor behind the quadrupling of oil prices in the 1970s) and was so inactive that the OIC acronym was said to stand for “Oh, I See.” In the 1980s, the role of OIC became more active on the educational front, but remains politically frozen due to the Cold War between Saudi Arabia and Iran. By 1989, the victory of the Saudi-backed Iraq over Iran and of the Saudi-backed Afghans over the Soviet Union raised Saudi prestige in the Muslim world to an all-time high. Hence Ayatollah Khomeini’s decision that year to put Iran back on the map with his infamous fatwa against Salman Rushdie, the author of *Satanic Verses*. Iran took the Rushdie affair to the OIC, and the Saudis’ only objection was that Rushdie should not be killed automatically but rather should stand trial in an Islamic court. As one observer put it:

The crisis over Rushdie’s novel revealed the extent to which Muslims in Europe were tied directly to the politics of the Muslim world, as Saudi Arabia and Iran fought to dominate Islamic communities beyond their own borders (...) At the same time both the Saudis and the Iranians sought to mobilize support through the OIC. Despite Iran’s hard lobbying to get the OIC to endorse Khomeini’s *fatwa*, at its meeting of foreign ministers in March 1989, it instead called on members to prohibit Rushdie’s entry in to all Muslim countries, implicitly marking a Saudi Arabian victory.³⁹

A few years later, Samuel Huntington would be among the first Western observers to acknowledge that “the Westphalian separation of religion and international politics, an idiosyncratic product of Western civilization, is coming to an end.” And indeed, while the year 1989 is best remembered today as the time when Germany “overturned” Yalta, it also marks the beginning of the “overturning” of Westphalia by the Muslim world.

In 1990, the foreign ministers of the OIC began in earnest their offensive against the Western-inspired international legal order established in 1948, and symbolized by the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, by adopting a Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam in which the concept of human rights is “bounded” by the Koran and sharia law - a giant step backward for the Muslim world.⁴⁰

By 1999, the OIC had become - often with China’s support - a lean, mean anti-Western machine within the UN. As one Western observer put it at the time:

In recent years, representatives of some Muslim states have demanded, and often received, special treatment at the United Nations mostly via the Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). As a result, non-diplomatic terms such as "blasphemy" and “defamation of Islam” have seeped into the United Nations system, leading to a situation in which non-Muslim governments accept certain rules of conduct in conformity with Islamic law (the *Shari`a*) and acquiesce to a self-imposed silence regarding topics touching on Islam. This pattern of behavior has emerged with regard to a host of issues—Salman Rushdie, Muslim anti-Semitism, Islamic alternatives to

³⁹ Alison Pargeter, *The New Frontiers of Jihad – Radical Islam in Europe*, 2008, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008, pp.25-27.

⁴⁰For the text of the Cairo Declaration, see www.religlaw.org/interdocs/docs/cairohislam1990.htm.

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), a "defamation of Islam" resolution, and the actions of the Sudanese government.⁴¹

By 2001, this attempt to "roll-back" of the Western-inspired legal order culminates in the infamous Durban Conference, held two days before 9/11, during which the OIC turned the UN World Conference Against Racism into an anti-American, anti-Israel hate-fest.⁴²

In 2006, the OIC played an instrumental role in the Cartoon Jihad - an incident manufactured through the most sophisticated coordination to date of Muslim states, Muslim IGOs and Muslim NGOs.

By 2007, the same OIC which had not hesitated to resort to Judeophobia during its infamous 2003 summit⁴³ outdid itself by declaring solemnly that the "greatest form of terrorism" today was none other than – Islamophobia. That same year, on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the UN Declaration, the OIC succeeded in having the UN, for the first time in its history, pass a resolution on the "defamation of religions" (in which only Islam is mentioned by name). Less than two decades after the Cairo Declaration of 1990, "blasphemy" thus became a concept recognized by a UN resolution.

By 2008, it had become obvious to UN watchers that the OIC had turned the UN General Assembly into a UN-istan:

The OIC is silent on putting the blame for the slaughter of innocent Muslim pilgrims precisely where it belongs — on other Muslims. Instead, the OIC squanders most of its energy condemning the West for defaming Islam whenever terrorism is in any way linked with adherents of their religion. . . . While as a group they pay less than 3 percent of the regular annual budget of the United Nations, they have managed to exercise an outsized amount of influence in the General Assembly and its subsidiary bodies over how the UN deals with such issues as Palestine, terrorism and human rights and terrorism. Next on their agenda is a permanent Islam seat on the Security Council. . . In short, the Organization of the Islamic Conference bloc has been able to manipulate the UN's machinery to turn the liberal vocabulary of racism, oppression, genocide, tolerance and multiculturalism against the critics of reactionary Islam.⁴⁴

At its March 2008 Dakar summit, the OIC called for a "binding legal instrument to fight Islamophobia" and adopted a ten-year action plan which is essentially a blueprint for judicial terrorism.

Far from being confined to a UN framework, Islamist lawfare takes many forms. At one extreme, the rather crude "libel tourism" strategy, i.e. proliferation of lawsuits against books critical of the Saudi monarchy. At the other extreme, the more sophisticated "global swarming"

⁴¹ David Littman, "Islamism Grows Stronger at the United Nations," *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. 6, issue 3, September 1999, www.meforum.org/477/islamism-grows-stronger-at-the-united-nations

⁴² On Durban, Tom Lantos, "The Durban Debacle: An Insider's View of the Un World Conference Against Racism," *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, vol. 26.1, Winter/Spring 2002, <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/forum/archives/pdfs/26-1pdfs/Lantos0.pdf>

⁴³ On anti-Semitism at the 2003 OIC summit, see Manfred Gerstenfeld, *The Mahathir Affair: A Case Study in Mainstream Islamic Anti-Semitism*, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2 November 2003, www.jcpa.org/jl/vp506.htm.

⁴⁴ Joseph Klein, "UN-istan," *FrontPageMagazine.com*, March 12, 2007, <http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=25635>, and "UN Gag Order", *FrontPage Magazine.com*, January 11, 2008, <http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=29487>.

(in the street and/or the media) campaigns along the lines of the Cartoon Jihad, through which Muslim IGOs, states and NGOs pressure vacillating Western governments to pass national laws against the “defamation of Islam.”⁴⁵

In the past twenty years, the OIC has been very skillful in exploiting all the follies of Western judicial activism, including the idea of “universal jurisdiction.” The net result of both the Western and the Muslim subversions of the existing legal order is at times surreal. As one Western observer recently remarked:

There are strange happenings in the world of international jurisprudence that do not bode well for the future of free speech. In an unprecedented case, a Jordanian court is prosecuting 12 Europeans in an extraterritorial attempt to silence the debate on radical Islam. The prosecutor general in Amman charged the 12 with blasphemy, demeaning Islam and Muslim feelings, and slandering and insulting the prophet Muhammad in violation of the Jordanian Penal Code. The charges are especially unusual because the alleged violations were not committed on Jordanian soil.⁴⁶

Today, the grand strategy of the OIC seems to boil down to this: politically, the silencing of criticism of Islam in general (sharia law in particular) through lawfare; economically, the use of sharia finance as a tool for financial warfare.⁴⁷

As it now stands, the 57-member OIC appears closer to an Islamist Comintern than to the kind of Muslim League of Nations envisaged by Egyptian liberals in the interwar era. That may explain in part why, even though it is *institutionally* the closest approximation to a Caliphate, the OIC has failed to be perceived *spiritually* as a genuine Caliphate by the global umma. Still, it is undeniable that, encouraged by the OIC at the global level, Sharia law in the past twenty years has been making a comeback from Sudan to Pakistan, and from Nigeria to Malaysia.⁴⁸

It is time for Western observers to wake up to the fact that, since the end of the Cold War, the OIC is an actor, not just an arena, and that the Global Dawa waged by the OIC actually predates the Global Jihad waged by al Qaeda.

The House of Saud and the House of Said

During the Cold War, beginning with the adoption of the National Defense Education Act in 1958 and for two crucial decades, U.S. government agencies played an instrumental role in shaping the development of Area Studies in general, and Russian Studies in particular, in American universities. For the past twenty years, by contrast, Middle East Studies on American

⁴⁵ See Jamie Glazov, “Islamist Lawfare,” *FrontPageMagazine.com*, May 12, 2008, <http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=30937>

⁴⁶ Elizabeth Samson, “Criminalizing Criticism of Islam,” *Wall Street Journal*, Sep 10, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122099204692716155.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

⁴⁷ See Elizabeth Samson, “Warfare through misuse of international law,” *Viewpoints*, Winter 2009, www.hudson.org/files/publications/WarfarethroughMisuseofIntlLaw09.pdf,

and Rachel Ehrenfeld, “The Fifth Generation Warfare,” *Front Page Magazine*, June 20, 2008, <http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=31374>. On “Islamic economics” as a 20th century invention, see Timur Kuran, *Islam and Mammon: The Economic Predicaments of Islamism*, Princeton University Press, 2005.

⁴⁸ Paul Marshall, ed., *Radical Islam’s Rules – The Worldwide Spread of Extreme Shari’a Law*, Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.

campuses have been mostly funded by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.⁴⁹ Needless to say, had Soviet Studies been financed by the Soviet Union, we would still be fighting the Cold War.

Given the importance of Saudi Arabia in shaping the American academic research agenda, it is no surprise if today's American academics seem to have the hardest time acknowledging what the American Joe-Six-Pack understands instinctively: namely, that a religion whose Prophet is also a warrior – and a pretty good one too⁵⁰ – will have a different rapport to war and violence than a religion whose Prophet allowed himself to be crucified in order to redeem mankind's sins.

If self-censorship is one of the two problems plaguing Middle East studies in America, the other is intellectual terrorism. Ever since the publication of Edward Said's *Orientalism* in 1978, the party line of the academic lumpen-intelligentsia has been that only Muslim natives can "authentically" talk about the Middle East, and that any Western discourse on the Muslim world should be dismissed as a manifestation of Orientalism. In Europe, where intellectuals can still tell the difference between a Foucault and a Lyssenko, Said was quickly dismissed as a buffoon. In America, though, the "House of Said" has become over the years a vast tent which extends beyond universities and teachers' college and includes high school textbook publishers and even segments of the public diplomacy bureaucracy.

From the Ivory Tower to the Pentagon

The combined effect of the House of Saud and the House of Said is the first reason why the Ivory Tower has done such a poor job identifying the nature of Muslim Exceptionalism. A more indirect, yet more insidious, reason is that, unlike in the early days of the Cold War, American academics across the board today are "trained" in social sciences rather than "educated" in the humanities. For social scientists, Explanation (*erklären*) and "theory-building" take precedence over Understanding (*verstehen*) and "policy-making." The victory of the "numerates" over the "literates" in the 1970s has produced a generation of scholars who show a certain virtuosity when it comes to "research design," but display an amazing lack, not just of historical literacy, but of "historical empathy" as well. Not to make too fine a point: the Long War is being waged by a generation of policy-makers who, however articulate, never learned anything about history in their college years. As Henry Kissinger warned on the eve of 9/11:

Most great statesmen were less distinguished by their detailed knowledge (though a certain minimum is indispensable) than by their instinctive grasp of historical currents, by an ability to discern amidst the myriad of impressions that impinge on consciousness those most likely to shape the future. [Today] the study of history and philosophy, the disciplines most relevant to perfecting the art of statesmanship, are neglected every where or given such utilitarian interpretations that they can be enlisted in support of whatever passes for conventional wisdom (...). The problem is

⁴⁹ On Saudi funding, see Lee Kaplan, "The Saudi's Fifth Column on our Nation's Campuses," *Frontpagemagazine.com*, April 5, 2004, <http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=13551>; Stanley Kurtz, "Saudi in the classroom," *National Review Online*, July 25, 2007, www.nationalreview.com/articles/221607/saudi-classroom/stanley-kurtz, and "Following the foreign Money," *National Review Online*, March 26, 2008, www.nationalreview.com/articles/224017/following-foreign-money/stanley-kurtz. On the sorry state of Middle East studies, see Martin Kramer's indispensable *Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in America*, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001.

⁵⁰ Richard A. Gabriel, *Muhammad: Islam's First Great General*, University of Oklahoma Press, 2007

not the inadequacy of individual leaders but rather the systemic problem of their cultural preparation.⁵¹

Why does it matter? Because the problem with Muslim Exceptionalism is that it cannot be fully grasped through the lens of any “social movement theory”: its true nature can only reveal itself through the study of history, and from the perspective of the *longue duree*.⁵²

At the risk of greatly simplifying, today’s Muslim Exceptionalism results from the cumulative effects of three major historical factors (in comparison to which the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 is of secondary importance):

- Relative to all major religions, Islam is a latecomer. It may be 2011 in the Western calendar, but it’s only 1432 in the Muslim calendar. When it comes to first-order questions, there is no such thing as a “Common Era.” Westerners have had five hundred more years than Muslims during which to debate the proper place of religion in the public square – and to massacre each other in the process. From the time of the Concordat of Worms of 1122 (which put an end to the power struggle between the Pope and Emperor) to the time of the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 (which established the separation between religion and politics at the interstate level), it took Christendom more than five hundred years to solve a problem that the Muslim world has only begun to grapple with.
- When Islam emerged as a *Corpus Juris Canonici* in the Arab peninsula (632 AD), there was no pre-existing *Corpus Juris Civilis*. In contrast, by the time Christianity became the official religion of Roman Empire (380 AD), Europeans had had nearly a thousand years of experience with Roman law. As a result, canon law had no choice but to adapt itself to civil law. The history of the medieval West from 500 to 1500 is the history of a gradual re-assertion of civil law over canon law, culminating with the emergence of constitutional law – a process which has barely begun in Islam today. In the West, this re-assertion was made possible institutionally by the rise of universities conceived as “neutral spaces” in which both law and philosophy, science and theology, could flourish – and there is still no equivalent of that today in most Muslim countries.
- If the absence of free universities is one of the reasons why Islamic civilization, after centuries of dominance, began to lag scientifically behind the West,⁵³ the other reason is the banning of the printing press in the Ottoman empire between 1485 and 1784 – a fateful decision from which Islam has yet to fully recover. In the West, the printing press was an enabler as critical for the rise of the Reformation and Enlightenment as the university had been for the Middle Ages. Its absence in the Muslim world meant not only no production of local knowledge, but also no transmission of foreign knowledge through translation. As the now-famous UNDP

⁵¹ Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001, pp.285-286. See also Francis Fukuyama’s powerful indictment, “How Academia Failed the Nation: The Decline of Regional Studies,” *SAISPHERE*, Winter 2004, www.campus-watch.org/article/id/1507.

⁵² As Turkish-American scholar Timur Kuran demonstrated in his study of the relations between law and economics, *The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East*, Princeton University Press, 2011.

⁵³ Toby E. Huff, *The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China, and the West* – second edition, Cambridge, 2003.

Arab Development Report revealed in 2002, the number of books translated in the Arab world in the past *thousand years* amounts to the number of books translated by a country like Spain in *one year*.⁵⁴

To be fully understood, the Muslim *Sonderweg* requires a minimum of historical literacy. When historical ignorance combines with intellectual laziness and un-reflexive “political correctness,” it is not unusual for American policy-makers and/or opinion-shapers to go as far as to deny the very existence of Muslim Exceptionalism. Thus, in 2006, two dozen Princeton academics – some of whom went on to serve in the Obama Administration - did not hesitate to argue with a straight face, that in order to understand Islamic extremism, one has first of all to “take Islam itself out of the equation”!⁵⁵

If “Bringing History Back In” is a necessary prerequisite for a better understanding of Muslim Exceptionalism, “Bringing the State Back In” is the mandatory second step if one is to avoid the distorted accounts of the Islamic Resurgence. Here again, the Ivory Tower is ill-equipped for the challenge:

- Area Studies specialists not only lack basic strategic literacy, they also display an excessive infatuation with post-modern shibboleths about the decline of the nation-states and the rise of “transnational networks” and “global civil society.” It does not take a rocket scientist to realize that the re-Islamization of the global umma is clearly a state-engineered phenomenon, whether in Saudi Arabia or Iran, Malaysia or Pakistan. In post 9/11 Turkey as well, it is the money of the Saudi state that was present at the election of the AK Party, just like in Egypt in the 1920s, it was the money of the Saudi state that was present at the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood.⁵⁶ Yet, for the past thirty years, area studies specialists have invariably portrayed the Islamic Resurgence as being primarily a grass-root event. On the basis of their “ethnography” of non-state actors alone, area studies specialists do not hesitate to make sweeping pronouncements to the effect that “there is no Comintern of Islam” or “there is no geostrategy of Islam,”⁵⁷ without ever bothering to examine

⁵⁴ *Arab Human Development Report*, United Nations Development Programme, 2002, www.arab-hdr.org/publications/other/ahdr/ahdr2002e.pdf

⁵⁵ “We must also be wary of equating terrorists with Islamic fundamentalists, jihadis, Islamists, or even Salafists or Taqfiris. Each of these categories includes many non-violent practicing Muslims – just as some violent Christian or Jewish sects are fundamentalists, but the vast majority of Christian or Jewish fundamentalists are not violent. Pushing into contentious religious territory to borrow various terms for sub-groups or apostates is precisely to wade into the realm of religious war that we seek to avoid. Since 9/11 the Bush administration has sought to convince ordinary pious Muslims around the world that America seeks no quarrel with them. The *best way to start is to take Islam itself out of the equation.*” G. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter, eds., *Forging a World of Liberty under Law – U.S. National Security in the 21st Century*, The Princeton Project Papers, 2006, page 41 (emphasis added), www.princeton.edu/~ppns/report/FinalReport.pdf.

⁵⁶ On Pakistan and Malaysia, see Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power*, Oxford University Press, 2001. In Egypt in the early 1920s, the Saudi king was already providing funds to promote Wahhabism abroad to leading opinion-makers like Rashid Rida, the publisher of the Cairo-based al-Manar. As Dore Gold points out: “Rida’s espousal of Wahhabi doctrine, and his admiration of the Saudis’ Muslim warriors, would have profound consequences. For it was Rida’s student Hasan al-Banna (1905-1949), following his mentor’s call for radical reforms, who would emerge as the main figure behind the revival of Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt.” Al-Banna’s desire to emulate the Wahhabi Ikhwan led him in 1928 to create the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimun), and to take over Rida’s al-Manar after the latter’s death in 1935.” Dore Gold, *Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism*, Regnery Publishing, 2003, p.55.

⁵⁷ See respectively Gilles Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West*, Harvard University Press, 2004, and Olivier Roy, *The Politics of Chaos in the Middle East*, Columbia UP, 2008.

the activities of leading state actors (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey) – let alone of the OIC.

- International Relations specialists are by definition more sympathetic to a state-based approach to politics. But as their reaction to Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* amply demonstrated, Neorealists are incapable of moving from structural realism to cultural realism. As for Neoliberals, their interest in international organizations does not extend to non-Western international organizations. The OIC is a de facto UN of the Muslim world, with its own specialized agencies ranging from a Muslim IMF (CIBAFI) to a Muslim World Bank (ISD), and a whole array of informational, educational and cultural specialized agencies used to project Muslim soft power worldwide; yet, forty years after its creation, there is not a single scholarly study of the OIC galaxy by a Western academic.⁵⁸

In fairness, the distorted image presented by the academic world is due not only on professional and generational quirks of individuals, but also to the methodological and political *parti-pris* of institutions like the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), whose financial clout plays a decisive role in shaping the academic research agenda. The *realpolitik* of academic research being what it is, there is little chance that the Ivory Tower will ever be willing and/or able to conduct policy-relevant research. Left to its own devices, the academic world will continue to cultivate policy irrelevance at best, or to play the role of “useful idiots” of the House of Saud at worst. Hence the establishment in 2008 (on the fiftieth anniversary of the NDEA) of the Minerva Initiative by Defense Secretary Gates.

A scholar-practitioner, Gates went out of his way to present the Minerva Initiative's research agenda in the most benign light: “Rather than one, single entity – the Soviet Union – and one, single animating ideology – communism – we are instead facing challenges from multiple sources: a new, more malignant form of terrorism inspired by jihadist extremism, ethnic strife, disease, poverty, climate change, failed and failing states, resurgent powers, and so on.” Though such a bland laundry list can hardly be said to constitute a controversial research agenda, it quickly became the object of heated controversy among a number of academics who, incidentally, find nothing objectionable in the fact that Saudi money is corrupting Middle East studies in America.⁵⁹

If the Minerva Initiative is to become as effective vis-à-vis Islamism as the NDEA was with regard to Communism, it will have to bring policy relevance back in, fill the gaps of academic research agenda, and in particular bring a better balance between the socio-political and the geo-political approach to Muslim Exceptionalism.

⁵⁸ The few existing monographs on the OIC should be handled with caution: Saad S. Khan, *Re-asserting International Islam: A Focus on the Organization of the Islamic Conference and Other Islamic Institutions*, Oxford University Press, 2001; Naveed S. Sheikh, *The New Politics of Islam: Pan-Islamic Foreign Policy in a World of States*, Routledge, 2007; Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, *The Islamic World in A New Century: The Organization of the Islamic Conference, 1969-2009*, Columbia University Press, 2010.

⁵⁹ Robert Gates, Speech at the Association of American Universities, Washington, DC, April 14, 2008, www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1228. On the current state of the Minerva Initiative, see <http://minerva.dtic.mil/>. On the controversy, see <http://essays.ssrc.org/minerva>.

Concretely, the Minerva Initiative should have three priorities. First, a detailed “mapping” and monitoring of the soft power strategies of the Would-be Caliphates (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey) and of the Quasi-Caliphate (OIC). Second, a comprehensive study of the relations between Muslim IGOs, Muslim States, and Muslim NGOs (be they charity associations, terrorist networks, or media organizations). Third, a rigorous analysis of the relations between Insurgency (Military Jihad) and Subversion (Political Dawa).

As Cold War veteran Robert Gates knows full well, Communism was neither a “single entity” nor a “single ideology”: the Russian-Chinese rivalry yesterday was not unlike the Saudi-Iranian rivalry today, and Communist non-state actors, like their Islamist counterparts today, covered the whole spectrum from the terrorist Red Army Fraction (Al Qaeda) to the Trotskyite Fourth International (Hizb ut-tahir) to Euro-Communist parties (Muslim Brotherhood). Today as yesterday, the apparent diversity of the phenomenon should not mask the fact that, just like Communism was the “Islam of the Twentieth Century” (Russell, Monnerot), Islamism is the “Communism of the Twenty-First Century.”

From the Clash of Civilizations to the Age of the Muslim Wars

In his otherwise formidable *Clash of Civilizations*, Samuel Huntington himself failed to capture the dynamics of the historical evolution of Muslim Exceptionalism by taking as axiomatic that “core states” are conducive to regional stability. Unwilling to think in terms of “enduring rivalry,” and unable to find “core states” in the Muslim world, Huntington oscillates between treating Islam as a cultural monolith (the problem is not Islamism, it is Islam) and as a political mosaic (the problem is not Islam itself, it is the Balkanization of Muslim states-system).

Along with geopolitics, demography is the other factor put forward to explain why Islam is conflict-prone. For Huntington, Muslim Exceptionalism results from the cumulative effect of these two factors: on the one hand, “the absence of an Islamic core state is a major contributor to the pervasive internal and external conflicts which characterize Islam”; on the other hand, “Islamic population growth is thus a major contributing factor to the conflicts along the borders of the Islamic world between Muslims and other peoples.”⁶⁰

The first problem is that there is no evidence of a historical correlation between the existence of core states and the question of War and Peace. For several centuries, core states actually did exist in the Muslim world (the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal empires), and that did not prevent pervasive internal and external conflicts. Today, countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran are de facto core states and, if anything, the existence of these two core states has aggravated tensions.⁶¹

Huntington appears on firmer historical grounds when mentioning the existence of a youth bulge - a phenomenon which historically has often been conducive to greater instability, be it in the form of war or revolution. Yet, there is another problem, in that the Muslim youth bulge is presented as an effect without a cause. What Huntington fails to acknowledge is that this “exceptional” youth bulge is due in part to the fact that Islam confines women to reproductive

⁶⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996, pp. 177 and 119.

⁶¹ In Europe itself, where the nation-state first gained legitimacy as a polity, the most destructive war (Thirty Years War) emerged from within the core state itself (Holy Roman Empire). Conversely, Europe enjoyed its longest period of peace when there was, not a couple of core states, but a pentarchy of states (Concert of Europe).

roles at the expense of productive functions, and in part to the pro-natalist policies deliberately implemented by Muslim governments against the recommendations of Western institutions. Far from being an accident of nature (or simply the result of an improvement in health care, as Huntington argues), the exceptional Muslim youth bulge is both “culture-specific” and “socially constructed.”

Hence the Huntington paradox: though religion in general is said by him to be the most important factor in shaping civilizations, the role of Islam in particular is constantly minimized in his discussion of Muslim exceptionalism. Instead, demographic and geopolitical factors combine to portray the Muslim Exception as a sort “accidental exceptionalism.”

The other problem is that Huntington can never quite make up his mind as to the historical significance of what he calls the Islamic Resurgence.

At times, this resurgence is presented as just one manifestation of a more global religious revival. A fashionable thesis put forward by academe in the 1990s as a way to deny the existence of Muslim Exceptionalism, the “global de-secularization” thesis has not aged very well, to put it mildly. The fact that a growing number of Roman Catholics prefer Latin Mass to the increasingly cheesy post-modern Mass may well be noteworthy from a socio-cultural standpoint; but it does not begin to compare with the Islamic Resurgence in terms of geo-political significance.⁶²

At other times, the Islamic Resurgence is presented as “at least as significant as the American Revolution, French Revolution, Russian Revolution,” and as “similar to and comparable to the Protestant Reformation.” While not necessarily false, this alternative view remains under-developed by Huntington. We are never told who the Muslim Puritans, Jacobins, or Bolsheviks are, nor what they specifically argue for or against.⁶³

As for the future evolution of this Islamic Resurgence, Huntington’s prediction is based on demography alone, as if theology was somehow soluble in demography:

No religious revival or cultural movement lasts indefinitely, and at some point the Islamic Resurgence will subside and fade into history. That is most likely to happen when the demographic impulse powering it weakens in the second and third decades of the twenty-first century. At that time, the ranks of militants, warriors, and migrants will diminish, and the high levels of conflict within Islam and between Muslims and others are likely to decline.(...) The Resurgence will also have shown

⁶² The closest that the academic establishment has come to obliquely endorse Huntington’s thesis was to argue that there is a growing theo-demographic “gap” between the West and the Rest: “Rich societies are secularizing but they contain a dwindling share of the world’s population; while poor societies are not secularizing and they contain a rising share of the world’s population (...). We predict, although we cannot yet demonstrate, that the expanding gap between the sacred and the secular societies around the globe will have important (sic) consequences for world politics, raising the role of religion on the international agenda.” Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular – Religion and Politics Worldwide*, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.25-26. This theo-demographic gap thesis constitutes in essence a sanitized version of Huntington thesis, one in which, through a contrived “research design,” the Muslim specificity is diluted in a broader Southern context, and the question of whether – and under what conditions - the “gap” can turn into a “clash” is left unanswered. On the natalist policies of the Arab world, see Onn Winckler, *Arab Political Demography: Population Growth, Labor Migration and Natalist Policies*, revised and expanded second edition, Sussex Academic Press, 2009. (It is said that, at its 1982 summit, the OIC adopted an “Immigrate, Populate, Dominate” long-term strategy).

⁶³ On the similarities between Puritans, Jacobins, and Bolsheviks on the one hand, and between Bolsheviks and Islamists on the other, see respectively Michael Walzer’s classic *The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics*, Harvard University Press, 1982, and Tim McDaniel, *Autocracy, Modernization, and Revolution in Russia and Iran*, Princeton University Press, 1993.

that “Islam is the solution” to the problem of morality, identity, meaning, and faith, but not to the problems of social injustice, political repression, economic backwardness, and military weakness.(119-121)

This rosy scenario assumes that the religious resurgence is powered mostly by demographic factors. But one could argue the demographic impulse itself is powered by religious indoctrination. Consider the case of Turkey, a country that gave the right to vote to women as early as 1934, and whose re-Islamization was already underway by the late 1980s. From 1990 to 2007, female participation in the work force has dropped from over 34 percent to just over 22 percent.⁶⁴ From 2002 to 2009, while PM Erdogan was pressuring Turkish women to “give birth to at least three children,” Turkey has slipped from 63rd place to 90th place on the U.N. Development Program's gender-empowerment index, and now ranks behind Saudi Arabia.⁶⁵ There is therefore no reason to assume that *Time* alone will put an end to the Islamic Resurgence.

While Huntington's Clash of Civilizations remains the best point of departure to apprehend the overall challenge, it is of little use for understanding the War of Ideas and, by extension, the dynamics of the Long War. For all his professed interest in culture and civilization, Huntington - arguably the finest social scientist of his generation - had little understanding of non-Western cultural history and, in his approach to international politics, was unable to make a decisive shift from structural realism to cultural realism.

Interestingly, barely three months after the 9/11 events, Huntington felt the need to reframe his earlier “Clash of Civilizations” thesis into a more pointed, yet more open-ended, “Age of Muslim Wars” thesis:

Contemporary global politics is the age of Muslim wars. Muslims fight each other and they fight non-Muslims far more often than do people of other civilizations. Muslim wars have replaced the Cold War as the principal form of international conflict. These wars include wars of terrorism, guerrilla wars, civil wars and interstate conflicts. These instances of Muslim violence could congeal into one major clash of civilizations between Islam and the West or between Islam and the Rest. That, however, is not inevitable, and it is more likely that violence involving Muslims will remain dispersed, varied and frequent.⁶⁶

Yet, curiously, Huntington clings to his demographic-geopolitical view of Muslim Exceptionalism, and fails to realize that, just like the Sino-Soviet rivalry after 1949 was the main driver in the process of globalization of Communism, the Iranian-Saudi rivalry since 1979 has been the main driver of the global re-Islamization of the Muslim world and, by extension, of the “Age of Muslim Wars.”

Two years later, Huntington will reach the heights of incoherence, by finally acknowledging that the rivalry between the two core states (Saudi Arabia and Iran) has been

⁶⁴ Zeyno Baran, “Fighting for Turkey's Soul,” *New York Times*, June 10, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/06/10/opinion/10iht-edbaran.2.13606570.html?_r=1

⁶⁵ Soner Cagaptay, “Turkey's Turn from the West,” *Washington Post*, February 2, 2009, <http://www.cagaptay.com/3408/turkeys-turn-from-the-west>). As Cagaptay comments: “It is difficult to take seriously the AKP's claim to be a liberal party when Saudi women are considered more politically, economically and socially empowered than Turkish women..”

⁶⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, “The Age of Muslim Wars,” *Newsweek*, December 17, 2001, www.hvk.org/articles/1003/48.html

conducive to greater violence, yet continuing to argue *in the same paragraph* that the emergence of two core states would likely lessen violence in the Muslim world!⁶⁷

That said, the past decade in general, and the ongoing turmoil in the Middle East today in particular, seem to have vindicated Huntington's view that ours is indeed the Age of ("dispersed, varied and frequent") Muslim Wars, to the point where the Pentagon itself now speaks in terms of "persistent conflicts" and "hybrid wars."

Beyond Leaderless Jihad and Global Insurgency

Since a moniker like the "Age of Muslim Wars" ran counter to the Bush Administration desire to portray Islam as "a religion of peace," official Washington opted to frame the challenge instead in terms of a culturally-indeterminate "Global War on Terrorism." The subsequent refinements in terms of Global Insurgency and Long War offered a more accurate definition of the spatio-temporal *magnitude* of the challenge at-hand, yet the continued lack of reference to any cultural specificity has so far precluded a serious reflection on both the *origins* of this epochal challenge and its likely *evolution*.

In Washington, where "the urgent always crowds out the important," the national security community since 9/11 has focused its attention on non-state actors at the expense of state actors. By doing so, Washington has remained stuck in tactical and operational issues. In a way, and however unintentionally, both the counterterrorism approach (CT) in terms of *Leaderless Jihad* and the counterinsurgency (COIN) approach in terms of *Global Insurgency* have even aggravated the tendency to treat re-Islamization as a phenomenon "from below."

There is no question that the CT community has done an outstanding job monitoring and analyzing Islamist networks, whether virtual or real.⁶⁸ When it comes to virtual networks, the question nonetheless remains whether the so-called "Virtual Caliphate" is primarily a transmission belt (*activism*) or a safety valve (*escapism*). As for social networks, the analyses in terms of "social movement theory" are undoubtedly indispensable in order to design effective programs of counter-radicalization. That said, the CT community suffers from three shortcomings:

- Today's Jihadologists do not always avoid the pitfalls of yesterday's Sovietologists, in that they get so mesmerized by grass-roots diversity as to lose sight of the strategic picture. The fine doctrinal differences between al-Suri, al-Zawahiri and al-Qaradawi (or Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin yesterday) should not blind us to their fundamental similarities. The ever-refined analyses of the myriad of non-state actors sometimes lead the CT community to miss the forest for the trees and forget that a state actor like

⁶⁷ "Islam is less unified than any other civilization. Tribal, religious, ethnic, political, and cultural divisions stimulate violence between Muslims. They also promote violence between Muslims and non-Muslims because different Muslim groups and governments, such as those of Saudi Arabia and Iran, compete with each other in promoting their own brand of Islam and have supported Muslim groups fighting non-Muslims from Bosnia to the Philippines. If one or two states dominated the Muslim world, as is the case with other civilizations but which has not been true for Islam since the Ottoman empire, less violence would occur among Muslims, and, probably, between Muslims and non-Muslims." Samuel P. Huntington, "America and the World," *The Hedgehog Review*, Spring 2003, http://www.iasc-culture.org/HHR_Archives/America/5.1CHuntington.pdf.

⁶⁸ See for instance Gabriel Weimann, *Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, The New Challenges*, USIP, 2006; Yaakov Lappin, *The Virtual Caliphate: Exposing the Islamic State on the Internet*, Potomac Books, 2010; and the various reports of the West Point Combating Terrorism Center, available at www.ctc.usma.edu.

Saudi Arabia spends more on propaganda abroad than the Soviet Union in its heyday (and definitely more than the United States on public diplomacy today).

- The CT Community tends to take Al Qaeda's *declaratory* policy like "restoring the Caliphate" at face value. It is more likely that Al Qaeda understands the "power of statelessness," and that the last thing its members want is to accept the accountability that comes with governing a territorial unit. The concept of "victory" is culture-specific: from the prism of Jihadi culture, the definition of "victory" is to make America bleed to death economically through a never-ending, global whack-a-mole campaign, while using America's military interventions to re-awaken the spirit of Jihad (the "neglected duty") among the faithful. In short, vis-à-vis the West, al Qaeda pursues a strategy of economic exhaustion; vis-à-vis Islam, a "Permanent Revolution" *a la Trotsky*
- Intra-CT controversies generate more heat than light, and tend to distract from real issues. It is true that Al Qaeda Central is no longer as "central" as it used to be; at the same time, there is less than meets the eye in a concept like *Leaderless Jihad* (if only because, as any junior officer knows, "unity of command" is not indispensable so long as there is "unity of effort."). A "leaderless" Jihad is not a "strategy-less" Jihad. In fact, the default grand strategy on which all state and non-state actors can agree is an "Econo-Jihad" that would bleed the West to death. In the grand scheme of things, the usefulness of a construct like *Leaderless Jihad*, while undeniable in the case of the Muslim diaspora, remains limited to the tactical level.⁶⁹

By contrast, the *Global Insurgency* paradigm, initially put forward by soldier-scholar David Kilcullen in 2004, represents a marked improvement over that of *Leaderless Jihad*, in that it helps reframe issues from the tactical to the operational level.⁷⁰

At the intellectual level, the *Global Insurgency* paradigm has brought to the fore the importance of the very dimension that Huntington, in his quasi-exclusive focus on demography

⁶⁹ Jakub Greygiel, "The Power of Statelessness," *Policy Review*, April 2009, www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/5568. Jeffrey Cozzens, "Victory from the Prism of Jihadi Culture," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, January 2009, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0KNN/is_52/ai_n31464181/; Bruce Hoffman, Gabriel Weimann, "Econo-Jihad," *The National Interest*, May 13, 2009, <http://nationalinterest.org/article/econo-jihad-3120>; Tony Corn, "The Art of Declaring Victory and Going Home: Strategic Communication and the Management of Expectations," *Small Wars Journal*, September 2009, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/294-corn.pdf>; Tony Corn, "Toward a Kicullen-Biden Plan?: Bounding Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan," *Small Wars Journal*, October 2009, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/312-corn.pdf>. Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad – Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008. On the controversy surrounding the *Leaderless Jihad* thesis, see Bruce Hoffman, "The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs*, May-June 2008, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63408/bruce-hoffman/the-myth-of-grass-roots-terrorism?page=2; Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman, "Does Obama Still Call the Shots?," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2008, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64460/marc-sageman-and-bruce-hoffman/does-osama-still-call-the-shots; Elaine Sciolino and Eric Schmitt, "A Not Very Private Feud Over Terrorism," *New York Times*, June 8, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/06/08/weekinreview/08sciolino.html?_r=1.

⁷⁰ David Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," 2004, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen.pdf>. For a more recent elaboration, see David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency*, Oxford University Press, 2010.

and geopolitics, overlooked: namely, the centrality of anthropology.⁷¹ There are 350 tribes in Iraq alone, Kilcullen reminds us, and at the operational level, tribalism tends to trump religion.⁷²

At the organizational level, the *Global Insurgency* paradigm has been instrumental in fostering better interagency synergies between domestic law enforcement agencies and national security agencies, as well as reminding the military bureaucracy itself that, in the past two hundred years, so-called “irregular warfare” has been in fact a more *regular* occurrence than “conventional warfare,” and that the Pentagon should be reconfigured accordingly.

Yet, the *Global Insurgency* paradigm also suffers from three inherent (and overlapping) limitations:

- By definition, any discussion in terms of “insurgency” will tend to give pride of place to non-state actors at the expense of state actors (in his 300-page book, Kilcullen himself devotes only 3 and 4 pages to Saudi Arabia and Iran respectively). In addition, the paradigm seems to take for granted that the common interests between Western and Muslim state actors are greater than those between Muslim state and non-state actors – an increasingly questionable assumption, as the Pakistan-Taliban nexus makes it clear. As the few studies on the question have shown, Al Qaeda and Saudi Arabia/Iran are as much Enemies as they are Bedfellows. The approach in terms of *Global Insurgency* tends to neglect the strategic importance of “deep coalitions” between state and non-state actors (be they terrorist groups, media organizations, or charity foundations).⁷³
- By definition also, the paradigm highlights “kinetic” Insurgency at the expense of “non-kinetic” Subversion. It may have not mattered that much until now, since the most immediate challenge for the U.S. in the past few years was to re-invent “counterinsurgency” in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the 2011 “Arab Spring” underway, though, the center of gravity at the non-state level is now shifting from the transnational Al Qaeda to the equally transnational Muslim Brotherhood, and, by the same token, from Insurgency to Subversion. Until now, the U.S. national security community has adopted the naïve view that anything that is not *violent* extremism should be considered “moderate.” Europeans, who have to live with a large Muslim

⁷¹ While the question of tribalism is not totally neglected by Huntington, the anthropological dimension clearly takes second place to demographic and geopolitical factors - possibly in reaction against the excessive “tribal determinism” of David Pryce-Jones’s influential *The Closed Circle: An Interpretation of the Arabs*, Harper & Row, 1989.

⁷² Kilcullen goes as far as to argue that “since the new threats are not state based, the basis for our approach should not be international relations (the study of how nation-states interact in elite state-based frameworks) but rather anthropology (the study of social roles, groups, status, institutions, and relations within human population groups, often in non-elite, non-state-based frameworks.” *The Accidental Guerrilla – Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, Oxford University Press, 2009, p.296. It would be more accurate to say that, while anthropology should remain the primary “lens” at the operational level, international relations theory (in the form of cultural realism rather than structural realism) remains the most valid approach at the strategic level.

⁷³ See John R. Bradley, “Al Qaeda and the House of Saud: Eternal Enemies or Secret Bedfellows?,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 2005, and Paul Hastert, “Al Qaeda and Iran: Friends or Foes, or Somewhere in Between?,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, no30, January 2007. As defined by Alvin Toffler, “A de facto deep coalition...might consist, for example, of three nation-states, fourteen civil society organizations, a *narcotraficante* here or there, a couple of private corporations with their own self interests at stake, an individual speculator, and who knows what other components.” Alvin and Heider Toffler, “The New Intangibles,” in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age*, RAND, 1997. See also Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connections – States that Sponsor Terrorism*, Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Street, know better than that, and have shown greater realism. It is time for the U.S. national security community to realize that – to paraphrase Clausewitz - military Jihad is only the continuation of political Dawa by other means.⁷⁴

- By definition, the paradigm highlights Information Operations at the expense of, so to speak, Education Operations (more on that later). In addition, the characterization of Al Qaeda's ideology as Takfirism (heresy) is ahistorical in that it obscures the fact that what passes for *mainstream* Islam in this day and age is, for the most part, a *Wahhabized* Islam that, until recently, was itself considered a form of Takfirism by mainstream Islam. Al Qaeda is not an effect without a cause, or even an effect of globalization. From a historical standpoint, Al Qaeda's Takfirism (if that's what you want to call it) is simply a "blowback" effect of Saudi Takfirism.

At the operational level, the *Global Insurgency* paradigm remains indispensable for those in charge of "fighting small wars in the midst of a big one." At the strategic level, though, it is time to realize that Al Qaeda is nothing more than a symptom (however lethal), and that the disease itself is Saudi Arabia. So long as the House of Saud is allowed to continue to export its ideology of hatred, there will be no shortage of recruits for Al Qaeda, and "strategic disaggregation" will increasingly look like an economically ruinous Sisyphean task. For those in charge of "fighting a big war in the midst of small ones," the *Clash of the Caliphates* constitutes a more useful paradigm than *Global Insurgency*.

Needless to say, a paradigm is just a paradigm. As Huntington himself put it, "the test of its meaningfulness and usefulness is not whether it accounts for everything that is happening in global politics. Obviously it does not. The test is whether it provides a more meaningful and useful lens through which to view international developments than any alternative paradigm." What is true for global politics remains true for Muslim politics. In that respect, and at this particular juncture, the U.S. national security community should consider that the most useful paradigms at the tactical (micro), operational (meso), and strategic (macro) levels are, respectively, *Leaderless Jihad*, *Global Insurgency* and the *Clash of the Caliphates*.

Public Diplomacy in the Age of the Long War

As this essay has tried to demonstrate, the "War of Ideas" is primarily an intra-Muslim affair. That does not mean that the West should stay on the sidelines and wait until the youth bulge shrinks and the competing would-be Caliphates become exemplars of modernism.

The famous 2002 UNDP Arab Development Report mentioned earlier identified three "deficits" responsible for economic backwardness: the Freedom Deficit, the Women's Empowerment Deficit, and the Knowledge Deficit. Given its limited resources, U.S. public

⁷⁴ As one academic student of Dawa put it, the conception of dawa as primarily referring to "education, information, commercial publication, inter-faith dialogue, charity and, in certain contexts, polemics and proselytizing" is too narrow. Dawa is also political warfare, and must be examined at two levels: "The relationship of *da'wa* to politics can be studied on two levels: on the level of non-governmental Muslim organizations engaged in *da'wa* and on the level of state-sponsored and -directed activities..." Egdunas Raciunas, *The Multiple Nature of the Islamic Dawa*, University of Helsinki, 2004, <http://ethesis.helsinki.fi/julkaisut/hum/aasia/vk/raciunas/themulti.pdf>.

See also the report of the Dutch Ministry of the Interior, *From Dawa to Jihad: The Various Threats from Radical Islam to the Democratic Legal Order*, December 2004, www.minbzk.nl/contents/pages/42345/fromdawatohihad.pdf.

diplomacy has done a reasonably good job about the first two deficits. The same cannot be said of the Knowledge Deficit. Though the two traditional pillars of public diplomacy are Information and Education, the public diplomacy bureaucracy was quick to equate Knowledge with Information at the expense of Education, for three reasons:

1) With the proliferation of satellite TV stations in the Middle East in the 1990s, Western observers initially expected this emerging “public sphere” to automatically hasten the emergence of political pluralism in Arab world. Today, it is clear that, while the ongoing “media wars” in the Middle East have put an end to the hegemony of Saudi Arabia, they also have failed to generate a truly pluralist public sphere. With too many stations chasing too few viewers, the electronic media have privileged sensationalism and extremism at the expense of serious debates. Talk shows featuring the rantings of “moderate” al-Qaradawi against the “radical” Bin Laden are just about as “enlightening” as were the mutual excommunications between Western Fascists and Communists in the 1930s.

What the information revolution in the Middle East has accomplished so far is to widen the gap between “talking the talk” and “walking the walk.” As even sympathetic observers concede: “For all its newfound prominence, the Arab public sphere remains almost completely detached from any formal political institution. The political significance of a transnational public sphere disconnected from any effective democratic institution has hardly begun to be theorized. . . . The public arguments and debates are disembodied from any grounded political activity, and cannot easily be translated into political outcomes.”⁷⁵

2) In Washington, where “the urgent always crowds out the important,” Information is always more valued than Education. This is particularly true in the context of ongoing wars. During the 1991 Gulf War, CNN enjoyed a global monopoly over information. By the time of the 2003 Iraq War, a host of non-Western TV stations, beginning with Al Jazeera, had put an end to this monopoly, and U.S. public diplomacy was under pressure to “surge” on the Information front (hence the establishment of Arabic-language TV and radio stations).

3) Last but not least, the role of “social media” in particular has proven to be increasingly important in mass mobilization. As one Egyptian activist put it recently, “We use Facebook to schedule the protests, Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the world.” But social media are a mixed blessing at best. Given the low level of political culture, these revolts are just as likely to lead to civil war as to sustainable democracy.

In the context of the Long War, Information Operations only have a tactical value. The strategic challenge is, so to speak, Education Operations - beginning with the creation of a knowledge base through a massive program of books in translation. Today, the U.S. government spends more than \$ 60 million a year on an Arabic-language TV channel that has little credibility

⁷⁵ Marc Lynch, *Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, al-Jazeera, and Middle East Politics Today*, Columbia University Press, 2007, p 25. As it now stands, the literature on communication the Middle East suffers from a surfeit of approaches from below (in terms of “transnational public sphere”) and a dearth of approaches from above (in terms of “state soft power projection”). The most useful studies are Naomi Sakr’s *Satellite Kingdoms: Transnational Television, Globalization and the Middle East*, IB Tauris, 2002, and *Arab Television Today*, IB Tauris, 2007; William Rugh, *Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio and Television in the Arab World*, Praeger, 2008; Mamoun Fandy, *(Un)Civil War of Words: Media and Politics in the Arab World*, Praeger, 2007. See also Tony Badran, “Syrian-Saudi Media Wars,” *Mideast Monitor*, vol.1, issue 3, September-October 2006, and Laurence Pintak, “Arab Media Wars: Hamas, Fatah, and the Arab Media world,” *Columbia Journalism Review*, January 23, 2009.

in the Arab world; meanwhile, the Arabic Book Program run by the U.S Embassy in Cairo translates only 8-10 books a year with a budget of \$50,000. ⁷⁶

As mentioned earlier, the UNDP Arab Development Report revealed in 2002 that the amount of books translated in the Arab world in the past *thousand years* is equivalent to the amount translated by Spain in *one year*. Unmentioned in the report is the fact that, unlike the Arab world, the Turkish Republic, from 1923 on, managed to catch up with the West thanks to a superb program of translation initiated by Atatürk and run by German Jewish émigrés. ⁷⁷

Ignorant of history, Western observers have opted to peddle the worst kind of “essentialist” Orientalism by arguing that “unlike Christianity, Islam does not recognize the distinction between public and private spheres.” Wrong approach: the truth is, so long as there is no expanding *knowledge base* that gradually pushes religion in the margins of public discourse, *any* religion in *any* society will occupy a hegemonic position in the public sphere. ⁷⁸ Muslim Exceptionalism should be neither *denied* nor *reified*, it should be *historicized* instead.

During the 50 years of the Cold War, the U.S. Department of State’s Book in Translation program translated 500,000 volumes in foreign languages, mostly for the benefit of the first and second worlds. In the words of sociologist Edward Shils, the program constituted “the greatest migration of knowledge since the fall of Constantinople [in 1453].” Today, there is nothing more urgent than to launch a similar program in the successor states of the Ottoman empire.

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⁷⁶ U.S. *Public Diplomacy –Time to Get Back in the Game*, A Report to Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, February 13, 2009, p.39, <http://ugar.senate.gov/sfrc/pdf/PublicDiplomacy.pdf>. To follow the vagaries of U.S. public diplomacy, the best blog is Matt Armstrong’s at <http://mountainrunner.us>

⁷⁷ Arnold Reisman, *Turkey's Modernization: Refugees from Nazism and Atatürk's Vision*, New Academia Publishers, 2006, and Arnold Reisman, “Bringing the Best Western Classical Culture to Turkish Masses,” *Translation Journal*, vol. 13, n2, April 2009 <http://translationjournal.net/journal/48turkey.htm>. There is obviously more to improving education than developing a book-in-translation program. For a review of some of the challenges, see Cheryl Benard, “Fixing What’s Wrong – and Building on What’s Right – with Middle East Education,” *SAIS Review*, vol. XXVI no2, Summer-Fall 2006.

⁷⁸ See Tony Corn, “World War IV as Fourth-Generation Warfare,” *Policy Review*, January 2006, www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6526.