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The World Hears Us:

George Bush's Rhetoric in the Global War on Terrorism

by Scott Cullinane

Nearly a decade after the September 11th attacks and the declaration of a War on Terrorism¹ America is still struggling to more accurately define the nature and scope of this war. Debate continues because fundamental questions still remain: with who is the US at war, is it a war, and if so, how should it prosecute such a war? This ambiguity has many contributing factors, but one that is significant and has yet to be examined closely enough is the role and influence of rhetoric. The rhetoric of President George W. Bush shaped the perception of the American public and influenced US military actions and foreign policy. Likewise, events such as the sectarian and insurgent violence in Iraq influenced the words President Bush used. As the War on Terrorism developed the President's rhetoric changed in some ways, but it never sufficiently address *al-Qaeda*'s motivations nor counter its narrative.

Words and phrases often carry multiple meanings and can have connotations that change with their context. Words people do not use or avoid using can equally carry weight by their absence. In an environment as complex as the War on Terror, words are no simple matter. During a conventional interstate war, rhetoric does matter, but it is ancillary to the use of force and the exercise of will. In conventional warfare the central and indispensable factor is the imposition of one nation-state's will on another by force. The words a leader speaks only matter so far as they affect force. Yet, in America's current situation, rhetoric matters a good deal more because the US is not in a conventional war, but something else entirely.

Whom are We Fighting: Insurgents or Terrorists?

When President Bush stood on the pile of debris, which had a few days prior been the World Trade Center, and announced through a bullhorn: "I can hear you. The rest of the world hears you. And the people who knocked these buildings down will hear all of us soon"² he was committing America to a conflict, but one that most people were too shocked by the events of 9/11 to immediately understand. Many still cannot. The search to comprehend the reasons for why 9/11 happened and what appropriate actions should be taken in response has lead to a growing body of opinion that the attacks were committed by more than just a terrorist group. Rather, 9/11 was an attack by an insurgent movement using a specific tactic—terror.

To a casual observer, this may seem to be a moot point, but it is not. If the rash of Islamic terrorist groups around the world is thought of by America as a global insurgency rather than as isolated terrorist groups, the difference is significant. It changes how America should best

¹ The White House. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," (September 20, 2001) <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html> (accessed April 2010).

² CNN. "President Tours New York Devastation," (September 14, 2001), <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/14/america.under.attack/> (accessed March 2010).

respond and what factors matter the most. Terrorism can be defined as “substate actors targeting the innocent for propagandistic effect by ways intended to achieve political goals.”³ Terrorists operate “divorced from the people [and] come to see the people as part of the enemy.” In contrast, an insurgency is an “armed political movement that mobilizes a mass base.”⁴ Insurgencies employ terrorism as a tactic, but only as a tool to achieve larger and greater ends. On the surface Insurgent activity may look similar, but because insurgencies are mass movements terrorism and other tactics are employed with the goal of exploiting or exacerbating grievances which lead to incorporating more people into their particular movement. With this distinction, *al-Qaeda* can be understood as an insurgent group that uses terrorism “to draw attention to its insurgent cause and to separate the people in multiple nation-states from the counterinsurgents.”⁵ Terrorism and insurgency are not mutually exclusive, but neither are they the same. The label of terrorist group alone is hardly sufficient to describe the full scope of what is *al-Qaeda*.

The CIA’s definition of insurgency separates insurgents from terrorists based on the insurgent’s goal of creating “an alternative government capable of controlling a given area.”⁶ Osama Bin Laden’s 1996 *fatwa* specifically calls for Muslims to undertake “jihad... in order to re-establish the greatness of [the] *Ummah*,” the community of the faithful.⁷ The following year Bin Laden stated in an interview that the *Ummah* should be united into a “pious *Caliphate*,” an Islamic government.⁸ *Al-Qaeda*, with this desire to create a united *Ummah* and bring about a new *Caliphate*, comes under this definition of insurgency.⁹ If *al-Qaeda* is indeed an insurgent group, then in that context, President Bush’s rhetoric becomes an even more critical factor in America’s fight.

David Kilcullen explains the global insurgency model as a conflict “with a vanguard of hypermodern, internationally oriented terrorists... applying a strategy of transnational guerrilla warfare while seeking to organize, aggregate, and exploit the local, particular, long-standing grievances.”¹⁰ Kilcullen is not the only person to come to this conclusion. In recent scholarly articles it has been written that the US is “not fighting a war on terrorism... [but] a global insurgency against an extremist brand of Islam.”¹¹ Elsewhere the War on Terrorism has been relabeled as an “outsurgency,” that is an insurgency that is global; outwardly facing from the country where it is home based.¹² Even General David Petraeus said that *al-Qaeda* is a “new kind of globalized insurgency.”¹³ Petraeus cites *al-Qaeda*’s ability to feed off of “local

³ Thomas Marks, Sebastian Gorka, and Robert Sharp. “Getting the Next War Right.” *Prism*, vol, 1, No. 3 (June, 2010): 86.

⁴ *Ibid*, 85.

⁵ Daniel Cox. “The Struggle Against Global Insurgency.” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, issue 56 (first quarter, 2010): 139.

⁶ Central Intelligence Agency, “Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency.” (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency), 2.

⁷ Osama Bin Laden. “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places.” http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html (accessed April 2010).

⁸ Congressional Research Services. “Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology,” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA470199&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> (accessed April 2010) 3.

⁹ Rohan Gunaratna. *Inside Al Qaeda* (New York, NY: Berkeley Books, 2002), 116.

¹⁰ David Kilcullen. *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (Oxford, England: University Press, 2009), xiv.

¹¹ Jonathan Morgenstein and Eric Vickland. “The Global Counter Insurgency: America’s New National Security and Foreign Policy Paradigm,” *SmallWarsJournal.com* (2008): 2.

¹² James Roberts. “Addressing the Zawahirist Outsurgency,” *SmallWarsJournal.com* (2010): 1.

¹³ Jonathan Morgenstein and Eric Vickland. “The Global Counter Insurgency: America’s New National Security and Foreign Policy Paradigm,” *SmallWarsJournal.com* (2008): 2.

grievances” and then through their ideology and global communication links form these distinct grievances into a sustainable global movement. Petraeus continues that “as in other insurgencies, terrorism, subversion, propaganda, and open warfare are its tools.”¹⁴ Even FM 3-24, the Army-Marine Corp manual on counterinsurgency, calls *al-Qaeda* a “well-known example” of an “insurgency, one that seeks to impose revolutionary change worldwide.”¹⁵

Rhetoric: Dominating the Strategic Communications Narrative

In a counterinsurgency, the President’s rhetoric should form a narrative—a story or strategic message—that not only counters the insurgent’s narrative but also overwhelms it with the necessary communication required to win the confidence and support of targeted populations. FM 3-24 describes a narrative as an “organizational scheme” that expresses ideology and identity.¹⁶ That manual explains how actions, intentions, and consequences are linked. Constructing and communicating a narrative is crucial to gaining legitimacy and leveraging actions to persuade a population to favor one side over another. The President’s rhetoric by virtue of his stature and ability to communicate with vast audiences is important to the US’s ability to form a coherent and effective narrative.

An American serving in Vietnam four decades ago explained why narrative and the basis of legitimacy it creates are so vital for a successful counterinsurgency. Jeffrey Race, an Army officer who served as an advisor to a South Vietnamese district chief, observed that all sides of an insurgent conflict draw their power, resources and people from the same general population.¹⁷ This is exceptional, Race noted, because in most wars opposing forces operate with distinct bases of support and then meet for battle. This is not so in an insurgent/counterinsurgent campaign. Insurgents and counterinsurgents both strive to achieve the loyalty of the same population (In contemporary America’s case this may not mean loyalty to the United States Government directly, but to US supported aims or other friendly governments); narrative is a more powerful tool for achieving this than kinetic operations. The ability to attract people to the legitimacy of your cause enables success. As the counterinsurgent expression goes, “You cannot kill your way to victory.” President Bush’s rhetoric, in the context of 9/11, failed to provide the American people or the world with a clear narrative to counter the reality of the global insurgency.

Before 9/11 President Bush’s speaking style and malapropisms were fodder for late night comedians, but after 9/11 his words took on a new dimension of importance. After the attacks, Bush had the opportunity to frame 9/11 from among a number of diverse options: as a criminal act; as an act of war; as an act by an isolated group; as a state sponsored act; as an act by a religious group; or, as an act by insane misfits. These differing options would alter how America would understand and respond to the conflict. After nearly a decade it is easy to forget how different America’s world outlook was before the attacks; concepts that are taken for granted now, did not even exist then in popular consciousness. In August 2001, UBL, IEDs, *al-Qaeda*, and *Taliban* were all virtually unknown words to the public, let alone within the beltway. Bush had an inordinate amount of power to shape America’s narrative in response to the crisis.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Gen. David Petraeus, Gen. James Amos, and Lt. Col. John Nagl. *Joint Army – Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007) 8.

¹⁶ Ibid. 25.

¹⁷ Jeffrey Race. *War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1972), 227-228.

In the aftermath of 9/11, with emotions strong, President Bush's language was evocative. The instinctual speech of the President fit the mood of America. A systematic evaluation of his words helps to bring into perspective what they achieved and what they did not do. The rhetoric of Bush's argument can be divided into three categories: grounds, warrants, and conclusions. Grounds being the facts cited which form the foundation for the sought conclusion. Warrants are at the heart of the argument; they are a "bridge" between the facts and the conclusion that authorizes the steps the conclusion calls for. The final piece is the conclusion, the merits of which rely on the previous two components.¹⁸

On September 20, 2001 the President addressed Congress and the country to explain why 9/11 happened, who was responsible, and how the United States would move forward. Deconstructing the speech it is evident that Bush's words provided a stark distinction between America and *al-Qaeda*, but not a clear explanation of what *al-Qaeda* was. Bush was not inaccurate, but key concepts were omitted. The President laid out the grounds of his argument by framing the attack as coming from "enemies of freedom" that desired "to kill all Americans" because they "hate our freedoms."¹⁹ These were the basic facts as presented to the world. Today those words sound very blunt, and perhaps even simplistic, but given the shattering nature of 9/11 Bush's absolutism is more than understandable. America was attacked, facing a new enemy and a new world outlook that had been thrust upon it in the space of a few hours.

Bush's argument, the conclusion he was driving for based on these grounds, was that a state of war existed in the world, a Global War on Terrorism, which would not end "until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated."²⁰ The rhetorical warrants for that conclusion were based on specific points that made good sense to the domestic American audience, which was essential, but the words did not go far enough. The first of these was that if the US did not act, more attacks would follow. Bush placed 9/11 in the context of the USS Cole attack and the 1998 embassy bombings to show the historical trend and that ignoring the problem was not a viable option. Secondly, Bush drew attention to the fact that this was the first time in over a century that American civilians had been targeted on the home front – an unprovoked moral outrage. Thirdly, Bush places the Islamist ideology in the same waste bin as "fascism, Nazism, and totalitarianism,"²¹ using the legitimacy of those conflicts lend support for the War on Terror. Lastly, Bush places America squarely in between *al-Qaeda* and their end desires when he said "we stand in their way."²² That begged that obvious question that if America would not oppose *al-Qaeda*, than who would?

The part of the speech that was incomplete was when Bush addressed the Muslim world specifically. Having stated the conclusion of his argument, that America was now engaged in the War on Terrorism, Bush fell short in stating America's warrants that refuted *al-Qaeda*'s claims in a way which spoke to the historical and religious contexts of the Arab and Islamic worlds. The closest Bush came was when he offered that *al-Qaeda* was trying to "hijack Islam,"²³ but then did not explain what that meant. Naturally Bush could not say everything in one speech, but because he was not able to do more at this key moment years of uncertainty have been the result.

¹⁸ Joel Best. "Rhetoric in Claims-Making." *Social Problems*, vol. 34, No. 2 (April, 2010): 102.

¹⁹ The White House. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," (September 20, 2001) <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html> (accessed April 2010).

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

Unfortunately this was an area that became glossed over with statement such as “you’re either with us or against us”²⁴ which served rhetorically to close the door on discussion and cede some ideological ground as not worth discussing.

Bush’s rhetoric portrayed the circumstances as America alone versus the terrorist organization, *al-Qaeda*. There were passing references to US allies, but it was largely an “us versus them” portrayal of the situation. Freedom was the alternative to *al-Qaeda*, but *al-Qaeda*’s exact ideological position was not repudiated. In a counterterrorism mind set this makes sense, but in a counterinsurgency context, Bush’s speech substantively left out the biggest players: the “at risk” populations of civilians in countries where *al-Qaeda* was pressing its narrative. Bush’s words focused too narrowly on *al-Qaeda*’s organization specifically; skipping attempts to address fundamental issues which *al-Qaeda* had built itself upon and used to mobilize support.

Even two years after 9/11, Bush’s description of *al-Qaeda*’s motivation had not evolved appreciably. He stated that terrorists opposed “democracy and tolerance.”²⁵ While true, this fact did not provide a context for understanding *al-Qaeda*’s actions. The President’s seemingly simplistic message in this case does not necessarily indicate that he was uninformed or ignorant, but does illustrate that a more complete view was not a focus of his public speeches. *Al-Qaeda*’s narrative was never postulated; hence, it could not effectively be refuted by an American counter-narrative. It was an ideological battleground that Bush never effectively contested.

Limits to a War for Freedom?

In 2003, firm in a counterterrorism mind set, Bush trumpeted kinetic operations saying, “We are taking direct action against the terrorists in the Iraqi theater, which is the surest way to prevent future attacks on coalition forces and the Iraqi people.”²⁶ To those that were attacking Coalition forces after Saddam’s fall Bush said “bring ‘em on,” putting the focus on the insurgents rather than on the numerous other aspects involved in the more vital battle to secure the population.²⁷ As the president phrased the situation in Iraq as something other than an insurgency, not articulating an effective counter-narrative, Iraq deteriorated into violence.

As fighting in Iraq increased from 2003 onward, the President’s rhetoric became more strident, if not effective. In his second inaugural address Bush proclaimed that there is “only one force of history that can break the reign of hatred... freedom.”²⁸ If freedom and democracy play as large a role in motivating terrorism, or fending it off, as Bush claimed, why did Iraq and Afghanistan form insurgencies? Both of these countries were liberated from incredibly oppressive regimes, their people given the option of forming a popular government by consent,

²⁴ CNN. “You are either with us or against us,” *CCN.com* (November 6, 2001) <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06gen.attack.on.terror/> (accessed March 2010).

²⁵ The White House. “President Addresses the Nation,” (September 7, 2003) <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030907-1.html> (accessed April 2010).

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Loughlin, Sean. “Bush warns militants who attack U.S. troops in Iraq” *CNN.com* (July 3, 2003) <http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/07/02/sprj.nitop.bush/> (accessed April 2010).

²⁸ The White House. “President Sworn-In to Second Term,” (January 20, 2005) <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html> (accessed April 2010).

but still insurgencies formed. The problem was that Bush's words were disconnected from the reality on the ground and did not address issues seen as immediate or relevant by civilians living in Iraq and Afghanistan. Bush explained how the US offered "freedom," but that was not necessarily translated into improvements in the lives of Iraqi or Afghan citizens. Since Bush's rhetoric offered little more in the way of a counter-narrative, this left a wide opening for the insurgents to exploit.

Bush's focus on the freedom agenda,²⁹ from an American point of view, made good sense. After 9/11 it was explained that America was attacked because freedom and tolerance were the antithesis of *al-Qaeda*. Hence, since *al-Qaeda*'s definitive characteristic was opposing freedom, America's answer was naturally to spread freedom as the antidote. This counter-narrative may have somewhat sufficed for the domestic audience, but not for all audiences. The rhetoric of the freedom agenda was lofty, noble, and inspiring; however it was also often disconnected from actions on the ground. America had brought "freedom" to the Iraqis, yet counter to Bush's narrative, it did not bring the security and prosperity he claimed it would. The freedom agenda was not necessarily untrue, but it was an incomplete narrative.

War on a Tactic: Are We Limiting Ourselves?

Further explanation for this failure to form a more complete narrative can be found in America's strong and innate reaction against terrorism and its supposed justifications. The 2003 US Counterterrorism Strategy states firmly that "no cause justifies terrorism."³⁰ This is an understandable, even likely, sentiment following 9/11. The attacks in New York and Washington were so horrendous to America that no reason could ever be strong enough to explain or justify it. The attackers were "evil-doers,"³¹ period. Hence, like the Counterterrorism Strategy did, America simply dismissed the causes of terrorism, if Americans could not comprehend the reason then there must not have been one. In counterterrorism, maybe this is a workable outlook, but not for the successful counterinsurgent. A counterinsurgent must have the ability to, at some level, empathize with the insurgent and understand their outlook. This level of intimacy is required to defeat insurgents. FM 3-24 states it is required for counterinsurgents to have "an understanding of the motivations... of the insurgents."³² If the counterinsurgent does not know what the insurgency is motivated by he cannot effectively counter it.

As events in Iraq evolved through the second Bush administration the President's language changed as well. At a 2006 speech at Kansas State University, Bush's rhetoric showed a transition. The change was subtle but substantive. Before, Bush was very focused on killing terrorists who were attacking US soldiers in Iraq; but in this speech Bush said "The way to defeat the enemy is for the political process to marginalize the rejectionists, and for us to train the Iraqi forces so they can find the few that want to dash the hopes of the many."³³ Furthermore, Bush correctly highlighted *al-Qaeda*'s violence against not only US military personal, but against the

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ The White House. "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," (February 2003) http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf. (accessed April 2010).

³¹ Manuel Perez-Rivas. "Bush vows to rid the world of 'evil-doers,'" *CNN* (September 16, 2001), <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/16/gen.bush.terrorism/> (accessed April 2010).

³² Gen. David Petraeus, Gen. James Amos, and Lt. Col. John Nagl. Joint Army – Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007) 41.

³³ The White House. "President Discusses Global War on Terror at Kansas State University," (January 23, 2006) <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060123-4.html> (accessed April 2010).

Iraqi people. Now, building host nation capacity was America's goal. Building the legitimacy of the central government through elections was America's goal. This was a far more developed outlook from the bravado Bush had earlier displayed and paved the way for the successful Surge that Bush announced in January 2007.³⁴

Whom Are We Fighting Now?

While this was an improvement, still no counter-narrative to the overall motivation of *al-Qaeda* was offered, at most Bush pointed out how the attacks on civilians showed how “democracy stands for the exact opposite of their vision.” When 9/11 came up in that same 2006 speech at Kansas State University *al-Qaeda* was not even mentioned. Bush simply said “we didn't ask for the attack, but it came.” Bush's rhetorical approach to the motives behind 9/11 and the insurgency in Iraq treated them as if they were either beyond explanation or extremely self-evident. By continuing to not clearly define *al-Qaeda* America left a gaping hole in its counter-narrative and larger counterinsurgency effort.

While during his second term Bush's rhetoric changed to more accurately reflect that America faced more than just terrorism, his rhetoric remained incomplete. In his January 2009 farewell address he said, “The battles waged by our troops are part of a broader struggle between two dramatically different systems. Under one, a small band of fanatics demand total obedience to an oppressive ideology... The other system is based on the conviction that freedom is the universal gift of Almighty God.”³⁵ Bush words remained stirring, but ultimately too vague.

Over Bush's years in office some of his rhetoric clearly evolved and grew more sophisticated, but the parts regarding *al-Qaeda*'s narrative and motivations atrophied. His stagnate leadership on this one aspect affects the US outlook to this day. A simple search of political magazines and the internet shows how US understanding of *al-Qaeda*'s narrative is still less developed and more debated compared to understanding *al-Qaeda*'s financial networks or other operational aspects.³⁶ Bush never grappled with *al-Qaeda*'s world view in his public speaking, he characterized *al-Qaeda*'s effects, but did not elaborate. A good deal of the current lack of understanding and ongoing debate about the motivation for the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent events can be traced back to this failure.

Since Bush left office in 2009 President Barack Obama has stopped using the term Global War on Terrorism and John Brennan, Obama's senior counterterrorism advisor, said that he was glad to move beyond “the inflammatory rhetoric” of the Bush administration.³⁷ Yet the Obama administration itself has not been able to find a more apt expression. His administration has used “man-caused disasters,” “countering violent extremism” or “overseas contingency

³⁴ The White House. “President's Address to the Nation,” (January 10, 2007) <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html> (accessed April 2010).

³⁵ The White House. “President Bush Delivers Farewell Address to the Nation,” (January 15, 2009) <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2009/01/20090115-17.html> (accessed April 2010).

³⁶ Thomas Friedman. “America vs. The Narrative,” (November 28, 2010) http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/29/opinion/29friedman.html?_r=2&partner=rss&emc=rss (accessed September 2010). Robert Windrem and Richard Engel. “Hatred of U.S. drives al-Qaida recruiting,” (October 16, 2007) <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21312504/> (accessed September 2010).

Khaled Abu Toameh. “What Drives Arabs to Hamas and Al-Qaeda?” (January 19, 2010) <http://www.hudson-ny.org/999/untitled> (accessed September 2010).

³⁷ Office of the Press Secretary, the White House. John Brennan's speech to CSIS, “A New Approach to Safeguarding Americans” (August 6, 2009) http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-John-Brennan-at-the-Center-for-Strategic-and-International-Studies/ (accessed April 2010).

operation” as replacement terms.³⁸ The fact that Obama is still looking for the best term speaks to how hard forming presidential rhetoric is. While President Bush’s rhetoric and the phrase Global War on Terrorism were not perfect, it is important to keep in mind the momentous challenges that were faced following 9/11. Writing a decade later gives the benefit of time which the Bush administration in 2001 lacked.

More recently, national security expert, J. Michael Waller, has published an insightful critique of US Strategic Communications and proposed constructive steps to improve America’s rhetoric in the war against *al-Qaeda*. Waller focuses on how Muslim populations, not aligned with *al-Qaeda*’s ideology, have not been cultivated, but alienated by the US. In Waller’s view the US has “unwittingly framed the conflict of ideas on the enemy’s terms”³⁹ by accepting *al-Qaeda*’s definitions and using their terminology. The result of this has been to validate “the enemy’s ideological worldview by appearing to declare war on Islam.”⁴⁰ To rectify this, Waller believes a new vocabulary for US leaders is in order, one which is “geared toward depriving radical elements of their ability to dominate religious semantics and rhetoric.”⁴¹ This vocabulary change would help place the US on the side of non-radical Muslims as they perceive it. If the US government were to adopt such recommendations it would build on the strong tones Bush set in place while improving the rhetoric’s effectiveness in countering the *al-Qaeda* insurgency.

Looking back, Bush’s words were an important factor in countering *al-Qaeda* because the President is a leader; his words impart legitimacy to certain ideas and drive policy directions. This is especially true for areas that are generally unknown, like *al-Qaeda* right after 9/11. The narrative Bush formed for the Global War on Terrorism shifted, changed, and progressed over his time in office. It needs continual improvement. If the US government can move forward to put together counterinsurgency methodology with a comprehensive strategic communications plan major setbacks for *al-Qaeda* are sure to follow.

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³⁸ Wilson, Scott and Al Kamen. “‘Global War On Terror’ Is Given New Name” The Washington Post (March 25, 2009) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032402818.html> (accessed April 2010).

Hot Air Blog. “Good news: Obama administration coins new euphemism for war on terror” (April 6, 2010), <http://hotair.com/archives/2010/04/06/good-news-obama-administration-coins-new-euphemism-for-war-on-terror/> (accessed April 2010).

Bret Baier. “Is terrorism a “man-caused disaster?,” (March 17, 2009) <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,509597,00.html> (accessed April 2010).

³⁹ J. Michael Waller. *Fighting the War of Ideas like a Real War* (Washington, DC: IWP Press, 2007), 53.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 60.

⁴¹ Ibid, 65.

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