

## A Tale of Two Countries: Counterinsurgency and Capacity Building in the Pacific

**Dr. Russell W. Glenn**

It is sometimes said that “Small is beautiful.” That does not imply that small is simple or easy. Two ongoing Pacific region contingencies - one in Solomon Islands, the other in the Southern Philippines and neither with over 500 military personnel on a typical day - provide many lessons for those conducting, planning, or studying counterinsurgency (COIN) and capacity building undertakings regardless of size.<sup>1</sup> Those lessons validate many drawn from historical events of the past. Others reflect challenges more characteristic of insurgency in its evolving, twenty-first-century form. Though the soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, and civilians of nations participating in the two operations have seen considerable progress, those individuals share a common realization that success during such operations is a never a given. The outsider complementing previous triumphs is ever reminded that any thoughts of success apply only to actions “so far.” This unwillingness to presume seems another trait shared with predecessors of ages past. Success, it seems, is a description that only historians should feel comfortable applying to a counterinsurgency.

### Recent Histories

After years of unrest, militia violence, and corruption, the Solomon Islands government called for outside assistance in 2003. The Australian led, ten-nation Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was the result.<sup>2</sup> Landing on July 24, 2003, RAMSI was unusual in its being led at the operational and strategic levels of war by Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) while it was the police contingent in charge at the tactical level. This was the state of affairs despite between 1,700 and 1,800 of those initially deployed being soldiers in a total commitment of some 2,000. Command relationships worked well nevertheless. Effective interagency operations extinguished what may well have been a budding insurgency. Militias were

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<sup>1</sup> The material in this article comes from a forthcoming study of these two operations: Russell W. Glenn, *Counterinsurgency and Capacity Building: Lessons from Solomon Islands and the Southern Philippines*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008.

<sup>2</sup> For an initial RAND study regarding RAMSI, see Russell W. Glenn, *Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands (RAMSI)*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007. Also available for free download at [www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG551](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG551).

disarmed, corruption addressed, and stability returned to a grateful population, all within a matter of several months. Cooperation and unity of both message and effort have consistently characterized operations throughout the undertaking. The effective synchronization of political, diplomatic, aid, law enforcement, and military capabilities continues despite some indigenous politicians seeking the mission's termination in hopes of returning to the graft of pre-RAMSI days.

The situation in the Southern Philippines thousands of miles to the north is much different. Arriving in the near aftermath of September 11, 2001, U.S. aid and military representatives struck Filipino insurgents a swift and effective blow on the island of Basilan. The combination of civic assistance and military advisors subsequently continued to prove beneficial when the Abu Sayyaf, Jemaah Islamiyah, and other elements continued insurgent activities on Mindanao, Tawi Tawi, and elsewhere - particularly on the island of Jolo. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) personnel demonstrated great flexibility in evolving from a force reliant on sometimes indiscriminant indirect fire and aerial bombardment to one so disciplined in its use that civilians who once dreaded the presence of the AFP returned to their abandoned homes, began providing information on insurgent activities, and at times volunteered to fight alongside Philippine soldiers and marines.

### **Insights from Operations in Solomon Islands and the Southern Philippines**

These two contingencies together offer lessons of value regardless of a deployment's size. Many reinforce observations from previous or other ongoing commitments. Twenty-two such lessons appear under the following headings; each is discussed in turn:

- Deciding to Go or Not to Go, to Stay or Not to Stay: Confronting the Glass Ceiling
- Causing Social Change is Unavoidable: The Way We Were is Not the Way We Will Be
- All Actions and Decisions Potentially Influence End State Accomplishment: Everything is Shaping
- Maintain Constructive Contact with the Population: Gain Traction
- Counterinsurgency, Stabilization, and Capacity Building Require Special Talents: One Size Leader Doesn't Fit All
- The Past Will Influence Present Operations: History Has a Say
- It is Not Intelligence as Usual
- Counterinsurgency and Capacity Building Take a Team Effort
- Do Not be Unduly Constrained by Traditional Structures: Hurdle Boundaries; the Foe Will
- Conducting Counterinsurgency or Capacity Building Without a Campaign Plan is Like an Orchestra Without a Conductor
- Choosing Appropriate Metrics: It is Difficult to Measure Art
- Continue to Adapt: You are Going to Get it Wrong at First
- The People Don't Want to Take Sides
- Counterinsurgency is Always About the People

- Force and Restraint are the Yin and Yang of Counterinsurgency
- The People May Not Understand the Concept of National Government
- Know the Population, Know Yourself
- Be Patient; Progress is Often Slow
- Police in Counterinsurgency and Capacity Building: Recognize the New Guy on the Block
- Develop a Force Responsive to “Non-traditional” Operations: Structures and Command Relationships Lag Reality
- Plan for Failure
- Constantly View the Campaign from all Relevant Perspectives: Maintain a God’s-eye View

*Deciding to Go or Not to Go; to Stay or Not to Stay: Confronting the Glass Ceiling*

Some problems are insoluble. Ultimate success in other cases incurs such expense as to be foolish to pursue. It behooves a government’s leaders and those advising them to contemplate whether a commitment of assets holds reasonable promise of achieving sought-after ends before undertaking any such obligation. If deploying assets is the choice, it is then necessary to periodically reaffirm that the end remains a feasible one.

Overcoming an insurgency ultimately requires the support of the population and the existence of a reasonably effective indigenous government. The former is rarely completely out of reach...unless the latter is so distant a possibility that the causes underlying insurgent resistance will continue long into the future. Nation state leadership so corrupt or uncaring of one or more segments of its society that dissatisfaction is likely a permanent state of affairs presents a virtually impenetrable glass ceiling. Some progress toward purging a society of an insurgency’s underlying causes might be possible, but that will be the limit of success. Local or national politicians and their militias, social norms that perpetuate violence and disruptive external influences that promote divisiveness are all possible plates in the ceiling. At times an individual steps forth and shatters the barrier despite seemingly insurmountable odds. Philippine Ramon Magsaysay was such a leader; his dynamism and imagination were crucial to the defeat of the Communist Huks after World War II. More often progress is a slow process of scratching away at one or more plates, perhaps finally achieving a breakthrough only after years of patient toiling. Yet there are times when the glass is tougher than the tools at hand or too thick to pierce in the time available. If the desired change is attainable only at extraordinary cost (if it is attainable at all), it behooves responsible leaders never to commit their resources or - if they are already committed - to end a hopeless pursuit rather than perpetuate losses.

*Causing Social Change is Unavoidable: The Way We Were is Not the Way We Will Be*

There is a reticence on the part of many to bring about change in societies. Justifications include those ethical (“We have no right to impose our way of life on others”) or practical (“We are here to defeat an insurgency. Otherwise we seek to ‘Live and let live’”). There is merit in both approaches, but in the extreme the two are collectively unethical and

impractical. Social change during contacts between dissimilar peoples is inevitable. Attempting to avoid influencing a people is itself a judgment; inaction constitutes tolerance. Decisions regarding the extent to which a coalition should seek to change an indigenous society are often difficult. They are inevitably politically sensitive. Perhaps that is why specific guidance is so rarely forthcoming when a coalition deploys into a foreign environment. Leaders who choose to provide none simply leave the difficult choices to subordinates. The result is inconsistency over both space and time that undermines the ultimate ends sought.

Addressing some societal norms is inappropriate for a counterinsurgent force. Religious missionary work is an example. (This becomes a problem when other outside groups not formally associated with the coalition operate in the same area. Often members of the indigenous population will not distinguish between outsiders, meaning any such group can be perceived as representing coalition initiatives.) Other social practices seem to demand interceding. Child molestation and honor killings are such candidates. Excessive corruption is another. Unaddressed, rampant corruption may very well deny a coalition missions accomplishment; retaining security once the coalition departs is likely impossible if indigenous leaders steal so much of their subordinates' pay that creating a viable police or military force is unattainable. Other changes are no less essential: improving the educational level of government bureaucrats and instilling a sense of professionalism in security forces are foundation stones to long-term improvement. Coalition leaders are obligated to determine what changes their organizations will inescapably bring about and those that they should seek to produce. Choosing not to do so is itself a choice.

### *All Actions and Decisions Potentially Influence End State Accomplishment: Everything is Shaping*

Just as influencing social change is inevitable, virtually every action taken and decision made by a coalition representative impacts popular perceptions. Positive interactions with a population are therefore essential to success during counterinsurgencies and efforts to build social and governmental capacity. The aforementioned Ramon Magsaysay ordered military patrols to carry extra food during their operations in Huk-controlled territories. The policy was a two-fold success. Not only did AFP members stop requisitioning food from citizens, they gave provisions to those suffering deprivation due to Huk taxation.<sup>3</sup> The turnaround has a more modern counterpart. Soldiers who "taxed" citizens traveling through their checkpoints in the Southern Philippines as recently as 2005 have ceased the practice and are now viewed as providers of wells, schools, and other public facilities. In contrast, the insurgent terrorist group Abu Sayyaf coerces money from travelers along roads on the Southern Philippine island of Sulu, sometimes in conjunction with threats of kidnapping.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Napoleon D. Valeriano and Charles T.R. Bohannon, *Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience*, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006, 167-68.

<sup>4</sup> Roel Pareño, "Abus set up roadblocks in Sulu," *The Philippine Star*, January 26, 2008, <http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/storypage.aspx?StoryId=106911>, (accessed January 30, 2008).

### *Maintain Constructive Contact with the Population: Gain Traction*

Positive friction born of good coalition-population relations - traction - is how a force gains the support of a people and denies it to adversaries. One of the most ill-advised decisions made in Iraq was that to consolidate units in large forward operating bases, an action taken in part to avoid the negative friction caused when soldiers and marines overreacted when dealing with civilians at vehicle checkpoints, were overly aggressive during home searches, or caused ill will in other situations. Avoidance is the incorrect response. The intelligence essential to the counterinsurgent is not forthcoming when its potentially most effective ambassadors are denied access to the people who can best provide it. The appropriate way of avoiding negative friction is to ensure a force has good leadership, individual discipline, and a willingness to live amongst the population as is done by those serving RAMSI, in the Southern Philippines, and – fortunately – once again in many Iraqi communities.

### *Counterinsurgency, Stabilization, and Capacity Building Require Special Talents: One Size Leader Doesn't Fit All*

George Patton was a great combat leader. He had less success when governing after World War II. Different operations demand various leadership and management skills. The man or woman who seems to view every mission from the perspective of looking over the sights of a rifle is not what a counterinsurgency calls for. The skills essential to leading soldiers in combat do not guarantee success when dealing with a city mayor or tribal leader. Some individuals are adept across the spectrum of conflict; a considerable number are not. Nick Warner, DFAT's senior representative during the opening year of RAMSI and the operation's special coordinator, was effective in large part because he perceived his job more as one of coordinating the talents of his able subordinates than asserting his personal authority. Lieutenant Colonel J. J. Frewen was Warner's senior subordinate military commander during the operation's opening months. Frewen was comfortable with his role of supporting the police, DFAT, and aid organizations just as Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) Commanders David S. Maxwell and James B. Linder understood that U.S. personnel were ever in an advisory status when working with their Philippine counterparts. Assigning the right leader to the job is no less important during a counterinsurgency or capacity building effort than in war. Arguably the range of talents demanded of the counterinsurgent and capacity builder is far greater. Progress in Solomon Islands and Southern Philippines is in considerable part attributable to the posting of exceptional personnel in key positions. Political and senior military leaders have, with rare exception, been very careful when making their choices. Given the interagency and interpersonal demands of these undertakings, picking the right person for the job demands more than relying on evaluation systems anchored in war fighting standards.

### *The Past Will Influence Present Operations: History Has a Say*

The past is never an empty canvas, though what that canvas contains differs depending on the angle from which it is viewed. Those assisting during counterinsurgency and

capacity building engagements must understand how the past influences current or contemplated operations. Australians were never a colonial power in Solomon Islands, but they realized that their past ties with Great Britain, which granted Solomon Islands independence in 1978, could influence perceptions when they responded to the call for assistance. Their insistence on working within the construct of the standing government structure and recognition of how valuable representatives from other island countries would be demonstrated the requisite level of understanding. Knowledge of history can be as important as comprehending culture when readying for an operation.

### *It is Not Intelligence as Usual*

Operations in both the Southern Philippines and Solomon Islands are notable for the extent to which participants share intelligence. The successes in this regard did not come naturally. Police and military intelligence sections in RAMSI's headquarters initially set up in separate locations. Their respective leaders brought them together and worked with DFAT representatives to meld the very different approaches to information collection and analysis practiced by member organizations. Further, all recognized - as do those in JSOTF-P - that intelligence focused on the foe alone is woefully inadequate. Knowing who the local civilian power nodes are and how they are interconnected may prove more important in defeating an insurgency than detailed knowledge of the enemy. Understanding how best to influence the population underlies effectively selecting civic action projects, designing psychological operations initiatives, and separating civilians from insurgents. Military intelligence alone may prove insufficient; police, civilian organizations, and a system set up to facilitate exchanges between them without undue delays will likely prove invaluable.

### *Counterinsurgency and Capacity Building Take a Team Effort*

The same orchestration of capabilities key to intelligence operations enhances chances of success in other areas. Synchronizing aid organization initiatives with actions related to law enforcement, military operations, and diplomatic enterprises are characteristic of RAMSI and JSOTF-P daily activities. Finding ways to plan, communicate, and maintain unity of effort become challenges when organizations come from different agencies, nations, and professional arenas. Agendas will differ and often conflict. Frustrations are inevitable. Leaders from top to bottom will need to compromise and break down barriers between their and other organizations. Such tasks are time-consuming. They can be exhausting. Team building and maintenance will demand stamina and patience, two additional characteristics demanded of the counterinsurgency leader and capacity builder. Giving interagency positions the equivalent status of joint assignments for military officers would be one step toward improving whole of government functioning. Similarly requiring exchanges between other agencies and linking those civilian assignments to promotions is a second.

*Do Not be Unduly Constrained by Traditional Structures: Hurdle Boundaries; the Foe Will*

Intelligence boundaries are but one type leader and led will have to overcome. Counterinsurgency is the realm of imagination, initiative, and innovation. Old norms can prove to be harmful obstacles if not challenged. At times the issue will literally be boundaries. Some U.S. military units assisting California authorities during the 1992 Los Angeles riots initially established unit boundaries along easily identifiable terrain features just as taught in staff colleges.<sup>5</sup> The result was a need to coordinate with large numbers of police, fire, and other officials; a far wiser choice would have made sure areas of operation coincided with precinct and district bounds, thereby easing liaison requirements. Reflecting that many lessons learned are those relearned, the exact same problem hindered operations in Baghdad for a period. In other instances the need to “think outside the box” is less literal. A U.S. commander in Afghanistan expressed displeasure that leaders from another country’s military were negotiating with “Tier 2 Taliban,” enemy less fanatical and more willing to cooperate with allied forces. Australian Federal Police leader Ben McDevitt’s negotiations with militia leader Harold Keke, backed by the firm resolve of the mission’s strategic lead, Nick Warner, were key to RAMSI’s early success. History’s counterinsurgencies are rife with examples in which such willingness to discuss issues paid dividends. Sometimes the most effective obstacles to progress are self-constructed.

*Conducting Counterinsurgency or Capacity Building Without a Campaign Plan is Like an Orchestra Without a Conductor*

The interagency nature of counterinsurgency and capacity building complicates planning. Police, foreign affairs personnel, aid providers, and men and women in the military seldom have identical planning processes. The ways decisions are made likewise differ. Whether due to these variations or other reasons, it is rare to find a reasonable semblance of a comprehensive interagency campaign plan. None exists in Solomon Islands at the time of this writing; RAMSI successes are largely attributable to the quality and commitment of its members and a reasonable understanding of what represent common ends sought. Similarly, campaign plans in U.S. combatant commands are military documents with at best some modicum of other agency input. They do not represent the result of a process in which full and adequate representation of all appropriate organizations is part of the writing, rehearsing, war gaming, and exercising of a plan. The causes for this shortfall are many. There is no interagency doctrine to guide planning. Political masters seldom provide well articulated strategic guidance. Funding is rarely consolidated, so each participant is by and large free to pursue its own interests. None of these problems are insurmountable given the desire - and authority - to overcome them. Relatively minor adjustments such as increasing the number of individuals on exchanges with other organizations and training programs would be a helpful first step.

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<sup>5</sup> James Delk, “MOUT: A Domestic Case Study – The 1992 Los Angeles Riots,” in *The City’s Many Faces: Proceedings of the RAND Arroyo-MCWL-J8 UWG Urban Operations Conference, April 13-14, 1999*, p. 85.

### *Control Funding to Retain Influence*

Allocating funding by operation rather than organization would give a lead agency tremendous leverage in gaining compliance regarding unity of effort and message. Barring this possibly bureaucratic bridge too far, careful attention to the selection of which organizations receive what funds can prove an effective way of granting some organizations authority they otherwise would not have. This could apply to the extended concept of interagency also, that encompassing nongovernmental and international governmental organizations (NGOs and IGOs). Given the positive influence such entities can have in a theater, federal funding that permits them to assume tasks that would otherwise fall to military or governmental aid providers could prove effective and efficient.

### *Choosing Appropriate Metrics: It is Difficult to Measure Art*

War is both art and science. The same is true of counterinsurgency and developing a country's capacity to sustain itself. That progress during the latter is less amenable to measurement supports an argument that there is in fact a greater proportion of art to science than is the case with war. There is no COIN equivalent to measuring battle damage assessment, degradation of enemy unit strength, or the foe's ability to supply itself. Not only are the adversary's (or adversaries') resources more difficult to gauge. Often their status is far less important than that of the noncombatant community and issues that directly affect the civilian citizen. Hard measures of coalition progress or lack thereof will often have to give way to subjective metrics much less comforting to those who must make decisions based on the information. Whether or not a pro-government flyer remains on a community bulletin board might be a reflection of insurgent influence. Whether or not a neighbor reports someone firing his weapon during a celebration can provide insight on whether a weapons turn-in program is popular or otherwise. Metrics will obviously at times be different than those for conventional conflicts. However, just as with those more quantifiable, they will suffer degradation over time. Re-measurement will be necessary just as is checking on the status of a foe that may have undergone reinforcement. The need for measurement is no less, but tolerance of ambiguity will be in considerably greater demand.

### *Continue to Adapt: You are Going to Get it Wrong at First*

One of the required readings for students entering the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth in the mid-1980s was *America's First Battles*. It was a sobering book; its authors asserted that virtually every initial battle in the country's wars was a loss, and often a catastrophic one at that. The real lesson to be learned was that military forces and their governments take time to adjust to new conflicts. Mistakes are likely, even commonplace. The same will be true of counterinsurgencies and related dealings with governments we assist. Just as *America's First Battles* spurred efforts to avoid losses in war, today's leaders must seek to minimize mistakes made in a conflict's aftermath and correct them as quickly as possible.

### *The People Don't Want to Take Sides*

There is much written about “winning hearts and minds” during a counterinsurgency. The numbers of a population that care to be won are often few; most desire that their families and themselves be left out of the struggle. Preservation rather than awarding their support is of greatest importance. Insurgents will do what they can to coerce backing and deny it to the counterinsurgent. Forced requisitions, threats, and death are frequent tactics. Counterinsurgency forces, at least those of interest to us here, tend to avoid such approaches. Nonetheless, some senior leaders have as of late spoken of requiring the population to make a choice. Seldom has a counterinsurgency force been able to provide the security necessary to protect those that overtly make the commitment. The counterinsurgent should not attempt to compel the first unless it can assure the second.

### *Counterinsurgency is Always About the People*

The AFP's coming to rely less on artillery and air-delivery munitions that endangered the local population coincided with notably greater success in obtaining intelligence on Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah leaders in the following months. RAMSI's close working relationships with citizens gained it rapid support for anti-gun and other initiatives. The people are the key to overcoming an insurgency. Wise is the leader who realizes that the population is a heterogeneous group consisting of segments and individuals who sometimes favor one party, other times another. As mentioned, insightful leaders realize even the enemy camp contains those willing to negotiate and perhaps change sides. Removing the insurgent does not exorcise the cause of the insurgency. The root cause is generally in the soil on which the people depend; the insurgent is merely the most visible component of the resulting plant. The soil will continue to sprout weeds until it is properly treated. Often elimination is beyond the capacity of the military alone, and thus the need for an effectively orchestrated interagency team effort.

### *Force and Restraint are the Yin and Yang of Counterinsurgency*

Restraint in using force so as not to needlessly cause harm to noncombatants does not imply an absence of violence. The counterinsurgent seeks to suppress the insurgency so that it no longer presents a substantial threat to security and stability. Addressing the cause of disgruntlement requires both treating the soil and eradicating the weeds. The former will diminish insurgent ranks through surrenders and diminished recruiting. It is almost certain that there will remain weeds that only force can eliminate.

Pre-deployment training goes a long way toward establishing mindsets. Education at combat training centers, special operations facilities, and elsewhere that prepares units for Iraq, Afghanistan, or other locations by heavily emphasizing the combat aspects of pending missions while not giving equal or greater time to counterinsurgency and capacity building is imprudent. Even units being assigned direct action missions have to be aware of the influence their activities have on overarching objectives. Special operators doing back-to-back deployments to Afghanistan and the Philippines, for

example, confront dramatically varied tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. Breaks between such tours are essential for proper preparation if units are to meet the demands of the next assignment successfully.

### *The People May Not Understand the Concept of National Government*

Local and national governments can separately or together comprise a glass ceiling that forms a barrier between the counterinsurgent and eventual termination of an insurgency. Yet bolstering legitimate political processes and the authorities they bring to power is a fundamental element in the counterinsurgent's strategy, for his successful departure can come only in the aftermath of a viable government's establishment.

There can be difficulty when a coalition imposes the notion of nationality on a people little familiar and even less concerned with an entity that minimally influences their lives or does so only in a negative manner. Counterinsurgency must therefore enter the realm of public education. Government officials have to know how to provide the services obligatory in their position. So too must the citizen understand what to expect from the government those officials represent. Concepts such as national government and democracy may have to exist alongside those of familial, tribal, clan, or other social commitments. The nature of that coexistence will not always be obvious; assisting to bring about compatibility may be necessary. Coalition leaders, local authorities, and the people themselves must together come to a shared understanding in this regard.

### *Know the Population, Know Yourself*

Finding solutions to challenges such as those immediately above implies knowledge regarding a population and its motivations, reservations, and trepidations. Both Solomon Islands and the Southern Philippines have tribal systems involving obligations to traditional leaders and groups. Democracy in the sense of that understood in developed nations is foreign. Elections can therefore seem an odd and unnecessary event; voting for the social group leader is a given as is his or her right to possess and distribute funds or other resources. Unfortunately the coincidence of voting and assumption of public office by those elected can result in the perversion of traditional responsibilities. Whereas a tribal leader may have a duty to share his *private* wealth in times of hardship, the elected official perverts this obligation by using *public* assets for personal gain, to include their use as leverage in supporting a return to office. The counterinsurgent must understand the nuances of the society served as well as the limitations of what he or she offers. Inherent in that understanding is avoidance of viewing situations only through the lens of the developed world.

### *Be Patient; Progress is Often Slow*

Scraping away the barriers in a glass ceiling takes time. Educating publics takes time. Success during counterinsurgencies and capacity building efforts is the dominion of patience and long-term commitment. The Australian government has consistently stated that RAMSI is at a minimum a five-year responsibility. It funded the operation for that

period even while stating that it expected to remain longer in order to complete its tasks properly. U.S. support for the AFP in the Southern Philippines has been unfailing since its origination soon after September 11, 2001. Both leaders in the two theaters and their masters at home assure and reassure that they will see the missions through. The time needed to educate governors and governed alike, build and bolster flagging economies, and excise the causes of insurgency are sure to test such commitments.

*Police in Counterinsurgency and Capacity Building: Recognize the New Guy on the Block*

Security and stability cannot be considered sustainable states until conditions are such that the military is able to surrender its primacy for domestic security to the policeman. The current, often largely ad hoc nature of deploying and developing police expertise in troubled nations is therefore somewhat surprising. Australia and RAMSI benefit from the existence of a federal police force; the emergence of competent policing in Northern Ireland after a false start was fundamental to the eventual restoration of relative normalcy. The U.S. lacks a federal law enforcement agency of similar orientation. Barring creation of an American national police force that could take on the mission, there is value in considering the FBI's assuming responsibility for contingencies in which the U.S. chooses to assist in creating police forces overseas. This capability would likely be a combination of deployable FBI representatives and those hired on a case-by-case basis to work under their supervision, both chosen after careful evaluation of specific theater needs. That the FBI itself would be responsible for the selection, screening, training, and support of these individuals is elemental to development of a successful international police training capability. Initiatives that rely on contractor-selected personnel to fill these roles in Iraq have been widely condemned. The individuals selected were often poor fits for the tasks at hand; age, physical condition, and expertise were unsuitable. Akin to federalization of airport security, this mission is too important to leave to the vagaries of the civilian contracting process.

The UN has no consistent procedures or programs for addressing law enforcement training during its capacity building efforts. Development of standards and creation of an organization capable of providing quality law enforcement and greater judicial system assistance – to include training – would be a major step toward enhancing UN capacity building capabilities.

*Develop a Force Responsive to “Non-traditional” Operations: Structures and Command Relationships Lag Reality*

JSOTF-P leaders do not have access to CERP [Commanders Emergency Response Program] funds, those being congressionally legislated only for Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, describes CERP funds in the following manner: “Beginning in November of 2003, Congress authorized use of a specific amount of operations and maintenance funds for a CERP in Iraq and Afghanistan. The legislation was renewed in successive appropriations and authorization acts. It specified that commanders could spend the

That organization's commander in no way formally influences the crew of the USAF aircraft that routinely supports his extensive intra-theater lift requirements, that despite his organization being a primary customer.

Regulations and procedures (formal or informal) that fail to demonstrate the flexibility demanded of ongoing and future missions require the attention of policymakers and senior officers. The example of military rating schemes is but one example. With commands located far from their next-higher echelon, leaders can find themselves having to judge subordinates they have seen perhaps once or twice for but a few moments, if at all. Those best able to assess performance are sometimes not in rating chains at all (the above noted aircraft crew, for example). Fairness and efficiency demand modification of systems inappropriate for conditions unforeseen when they were developed. There are instances in which a senior rater should opt out on recognizing that he or she is insufficiently familiar with a subordinate, perhaps having the authority to give someone more qualified the opportunity to rate. There should be opportunity for those not formally in a chain of command to evaluate subordinates with whom they are familiar and who impact their command's performance. A "corporal's war," as counterinsurgencies often are, demands decentralization. Failing to adequately decentralize – whether in rating subordinates or allocating the funds needed to even less high-profile contingencies – hampers leaders on the ground and impedes operational success.

### *Plan for Failure*

The aforementioned likelihood that a coalition will "get it wrong at first" argues for plans that account for failure (as well as sudden success, such as that experienced by RAMSI when Solomon Islands' most notorious militia leader surrendered within a month of the operation's initiation). Proper plans and training provide a log to throw under the wheels of an operation as it begins to slip backward, thereby limiting the progress lost. Plans that incorporate the capabilities of all an operation's participants and that have been rehearsed, war-gamed, and tailored to address evolving situations will speed mobilization of the resources that will allow an undertaking to regain its momentum. Lack of an

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funds for urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects.... Congress did not intend the funds to be used as –

- Security assistance such as weapons, ammunition, and supplies for security forces.
- Salaries for Iraqi or Afghani forces or employees.
- Rewards for information.
- Payments in satisfaction of claims made by Iraqis or Afghans against the United States (specific legislation must authorize such payments).

The CERP provided tactical commanders a ready source of cash for small-scale projects. They could repair public buildings, clear debris from roadways, provide supplies to hospitals and schools, and meet other local needs. Because Congress had provided special authority for the program, normal federal acquisition laws and regulations did not apply. The reporting requirements were minimal." *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual No. 3-24, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 15, 2006, Appendix D; <https://atiam.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/23285-1/FM/3-24/appd.htm> (accessed October 1, 2007).

overarching campaign plan guarantees a suboptimal and perhaps even harmful response to the inevitable yet unpredictable backsliding that ever threatens success.

*Constantly View the Campaign from all Relevant Perspectives: Maintain a God's-eye View*

Such a campaign plan – one that truly represents full-spectrum interagency participation and the likelihood of occasional failures – demands that an extraordinary number of viewpoints be taken into account. In the two-sided war game of old, the intelligence officer represented the enemy while others played the role of the friendly force. That approach is inadequate for COIN or when seeking to enhance political, economic, or other capabilities. A proper analysis requires representation of a far greater number of perspectives. Consider RAMSI. An examination of the campaign or any major component thereof should include the following among the parties represented (and this is only a representative sample):

- The national governments of all participants
- Military, police, aid, and other functional representatives from each nation providing such assets, as well as Solomon Islands participants from these organizations
- The perspectives of various indigenous interest and political groups
- Ethnic, tribal, and individual island representatives as appropriate
- Local and international commercial interests
- Potential international investors
- Various adversaries or potential adversaries not included in the above

Representation need not mean someone actually comes from each organization or group, though that will probably be the preferred option. Regardless, the extent of expertise necessary to fully evaluate and perfect a plan is daunting whether taking that or another approach.

### **Concluding Thought**

Small does not preclude complex, difficult, or deadly. The extent of challenges is not reduced simply because the number of personnel committed to an operation is less. Insights from RAMSI and JSOTF-P are not directly transferable to Iraq, Afghanistan, or future efforts of the type that interest us here. Lessons from these Pacific contingencies are square pegs; professionals will have to shape them to fit the round holes of other operations. That molding will take study, thought, and patience, much as does virtually every aspect of a counterinsurgency.

*Dr. Russell Glenn, a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, spent twenty-two years in the Army, including a tour with the 3rd Armored Division Spearheaders during the Persian Gulf War. His military education included airborne, ranger, and pathfinder schools and the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). Since 1997 he has been a senior defense and political analyst with RAND.*

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