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Stabilization and Reconstruction of Nations:

Where, When, and Why Should the U.S. Intervene?

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Abstract. Despite the backlash from American involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq during the presidency of George W. Bush, the administration of President Barack Obama is finding its international stability and reconstruction involvements expanding. But the U.S. currently possesses neither the resources nor the political will or the public support to maintain sufficiently large military and civilian forces for lasting S&R in more than a few key locales. So why does intervention benefit the U.S.? What are the factors most effective in predicting where S&R may become necessary? How can the U.S. assess the degree of threat when deciding whether to intervene or not?

During October 539 BCE, the Achaemenid Persian leader Cyrus II (the Great) sent his troops into Babylonia (now Iraq) to oust a hegemonic leader and reestablish stability in the Middle East. Cyrus' endeavor was both swift and effective for not only did his forces enter "in friendship" to "reestablish the seat of government" but his troops were able to prevent "anyone from terrorizing the country" and so people "walked around in peace." The reconstruction teams he deployed "rebuilt homes" and "put an end to misfortune" (Finkel 2010). Cyrus' intervention liberated not only the local population but also Jews who had been held captive there – securing the Persian king praise in the Bible as well. Cyrus' hyperbole aside, his approach to intervention succeeded because it excised a clear and present danger, rebuilt a failing administration, mitigated internal conflict, ensured health and welfare, and reintegrated people and resources while respecting and working within the mores of the society which was being stabilized.

As Cyrus knew two and a half millennia before U.S. military boots hit the ground in Baghdad and nearly twelve centuries before Islam arose, conflicts and calamities, whether man-made or natural, are characterized by conditions leading to the breakdown of governance and the rule of law, illicit economic activities and networks, societal disintegration, decline in health including occurrence of epidemics, distortion of educational institutions through addition of ones which spread ideologies of intolerance, and the rise of militancy, terrorism, and piracy. Despite the backlash from American involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq during the presidency of George W. Bush, the administration of President Barack Obama is finding international S&R involvements unavoidable and even expanding rather than contracting even though the U.S. does not seek the roles of global policeman and rebuilders (Reid and Evans 2010). Many of the world's weakest countries "are not just falling behind, they are falling apart" (Collier 2007). Worse, they are falling into the hands of separatists, other militants, and criminals including anti-American terrorists. It is becoming quite clear that the U.S. in cooperation with its allies among "the world's (other) great powers must collectively remain willing to intervene" to "get in front of these powerful forces" that cause conflicts and calamities (Barnett 2010). Such is the case in Somalia, where the E.U. trains soldiers whose salaries are paid by the U.S. (Langfitt 2010 A).

Indeed, destabilizing conflicts and calamities whether in Afghanistan owing to the Taliban insurgency, in the Arabian Peninsula due to al-Qaeda terrorism, in Iraq owing to Baathists and other militias, or in Somalia from al-Shabaab Islamicists, undermine order and hinder economic development while generating health and welfare crises. Conflict and calamity is perpetuated not only by deteriorating conditions but also through disinformation and malicious communications. Yemen is feared by both local and U.S. authorities to be on the verge of collapse to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and tribal insurgents. Equally dangerous is the tendency for conflicts to be spread first regionally, as from Afghanistan to Pakistan and more recently from Somalia to Uganda and Kenya by ideologues and their followers (Langfitt 2010 B), and then globalized through multinational terrorist attacks including the recent attempts at suicide bombings on U.S.-bound airlines and explosive packages aimed at U.S.-based institutions.

The U.S. intervenes uninvited, as in Panama, Afghanistan, and Iraq, when a failed, failing, or fragile nation poses a clear and present danger to its strategic needs. It intervenes more indirectly and by invitation too, as in Haiti after the earthquake and in Pakistan after the floods of 2010, when crises impact American national interests. Deciding to intervene is the initial step. If an intervention is to be successful for all legitimate parties involved, however, the country should be chosen carefully, and the approach to stabilization, reconstruction, and eventually handover has to be appropriate and thorough (Dorsey, U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy Boomerangs in Yemen, Somalia 2010). Moreover, because such efforts are needed in crisis and calamity situations, while stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) must go hand in hand, the inception of stabilization needs to commence prior to reconstruction to ensure success of the rebuilding effort and safety of the personnel involved in it (hence S&R is a more appropriate acronym than R/S).

Events involving Somali pirates in the Horn of Africa are a recent case in point where American warships plus their E.U. counterparts are spread too thin to ensure maritime trade stays completely safe. Despite the vast resources allocated, Transition Initiatives have not succeeded in Pakistan because they are not focused on eradicating the Taliban-inspired insurgency. Government-in-a-Box proved futile in Afghanistan as it failed to mitigate corruption. Another example is the outcome in Panama. Until 1989 when the U.S. intervened militarily, sociopolitical power lay in the hands of a narcokleptocracy headed by Manuel Noriega. Panama holds strategic interest to the U.S. because of the Panama Canal. Noriega had created a clear and present danger for the U.S. by trafficking in narcotics and threatening global maritime trade. After stabilizing that country politically, however, the U.S. did not engage in much-needed socioeconomic reconstruction. So Panama, despite becoming a democracy, continues to be a fragile state buffeted by drug lords from Columbia and warmongers from Venezuela. Likewise if the U.S. had sustained its stability and reconstruction partnerships with Pakistan after the Russia withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, militancy and terrorism in that part of the world could have been mitigated (Crocker 2010).

Enduring stability can only be established by building up local abilities for governance and the rule of law, facilitating leadership skills to implement nation-wide policies, ensuring economic reconstruction and development, enhancing informatics and communications, and augmenting health, welfare, and secular education. America's large-scale and small-scale involvements with the challenges posed by conflicts and calamities – from the Barbary Wars against piracy in the early 1800s to assisting the Government of Mali against al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb now – make this quite clear. Residents of Pakistan's militant-plagued Federally

Administered Tribal Areas back counterinsurgency (COIN) but want it spearheaded by their country's own forces. They also stress that economic, educational, and health infrastructures need to be reinforced to keep extremism from returning (Bergen and Doherty 2010). The French experience in the Sarobi district of Afghanistan underscores this point as well (A. J. Rubin 2010). In other words, for S&R to be successful and durable, it needs to build up the host nation's capacities so those are sustainable after U.S. involvement ends. Moreover, the degree of direct U.S. intervention needs to be geared at least in part on an accurate assessment of the host populations' reactions to such involvement. Nor can it only be self-serving.

Concomitant to this build-up, conflict management through COIN, irregular warfare, suppressing civil unrest, and reconciliation may be necessary. For all these reasons, knowledge of the strategic languages and cultures of regions in which stability is sought has become an absolute necessity to communicate effectively and cordially with each country's leaders and residents. Such knowledge prevents and mitigates miscommunication between those individuals providing assistance and those who are recipients of the aid. Such knowledge can be deployed appropriately to counter disinformation and propaganda spread by hostile persons and organizations as well.

But the U.S. currently possesses neither the resources nor the political will or the public support to maintain sufficiently large military and civilian forces for lasting security, stabilization, and reconstruction in more than a few key locales internationally. What are the factors most effective in predicting potential areas of the world where intervention may become necessary so that the U.S. can prepare its taskforces logistically, strategically, and culturally to ensure S&R will be effective and lasting? And how can the U.S. assess the degree of threat posed to its strategic and national interests by conflict and calamity when deciding whether to intervene or not?

Failed, Failing, and Fragile States

Across the globe there are numerous nations in various stages of crisis or calamity which could cause them to fail. At present, the ten most fragile nations are thought to be: Somalia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, Chad, Myanmar (Burma), Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Burundi. Violence-plagued Ethiopia and Iraq rank 12th and 13th (Marshall and Cole 2009).

The U.S. does not, need not, and cannot intervene to stabilize and reconstruct all those countries. The U.S. has very light footprints in Chad and Nigeria, both ranked as extremely fragile nations, and none at all in Myanmar. When Pakistani terrorists attacked Mumbai, India, in 2008, the U.S. could not and did not intervene, despite the fact that Pakistan is considered a highly fragile nation from which militants spread. On the other hand, in Djibouti, another seriously fragile state, U.S. intervention has begun, albeit on a limited scale through Camp Lemonnier which houses an expeditionary base for Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). This initiative, by invitation from the Djiboutian government, is aimed at humanitarian aid and landmine removal yet has growing COIN and counterterrorism components. Djibouti's location along the strait connecting the Suez Canal via the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea clearly bring that nation's fragility within America's national interest.

So a country's being fragile, or even failing or failed, is not the sole or even the most important criterion for U.S. intervention. Like Panama, Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Djibouti, man-made or natural events in a nation must present a clear and present danger to U.S. interests for intervention to take place. Pakistan with its reluctance to deal with long-term terrorist problems and vulnerability to natural disasters is inching closer to the threshold of becoming a major threat to U.S. interests; hence the growing American intervention there (Entous and Gorman 2010 B).

Major Indicators of Fragility

Fragility is multifaceted, so calamity, rogue states, and violent extremists are not the only factors for when, why, and where the U.S. may need to intervene.

Where future conflicts or calamities requiring S&R will occur cannot be predicted using only terrorism and insurgency, corruption and illicit trafficking, or even the presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in a non-democratic nation. Those issues are, in fact, the major threats arising from fragility. While predictable and random natural disasters too can shake any nation's stability, existing factors at the time a crisis strikes determine whether or not a nation can cope effectively. The best indicators of ongoing and future national fragility are government structures, local wars and insurrections, mortality rates, poverty rates, and the capability to respond effectively to natural calamities. Those factors when combined with major threats arising from political instability help determine if a destabilizing nation will have a major impact on U.S. strategic interests. Essentially, it is only through utilizing a diverse array of measures that the U.S. can determine which troubled country will become a clear and present or future danger and so emerge as a potential partner for U.S.-led S&R.

Failure of the Central Government

One important feature of fragile, failing, and failed nations is the inability of the government to provide basic services such as security, law, food, and health services. In many cases, there may be no identifiable central government at all. The crumbling of central governance in the Swat Valley of Pakistan, for instance, paved the way for Taliban attempts to seize that region (Luras and Aziz 2010).

Many of those crumbling countries have governments that are anocracies and autocracies based on factionalism – where politics is dominated by ethnic or other parochial groups that regularly compete to promote their own members and agendas to the exclusion and detriment of shared, mutually beneficial, national agendas (Goldstone 2010). An anocracy (a country where the central government can no longer provide basic services to citizens), autocracy, or even a democracy plagued by political factionalism is much more likely to collapse and become a threat to other nations. Particular regions of the world have substantial anocracies and autocracies, especially in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia (Figure 1) (Marshall and Cole 2009).

So lack of functional governance in those regions suggest that future U.S.-led interventions to quell conflict and calamity, undertake reconstruction, and ensure stable democratic governments are most likely to take place in Africa, followed by the Middle East and Asia. Somalia is one current example for the regime there cannot ensure law enforcement, economic opportunities, and welfare necessary to make piracy and militancy unattractive to its citizens. Intervention by the U.S. and E.U. is currently limited to the Somali coast. Even the

U.N., IGOs, and NGOs find S&R very difficult everywhere in Somalia. The chaos there permits terrorist organizations and drug cartels to flourish, generating funds and plans for attacks on neighboring states like Uganda and on American military and civilian targets. For these reasons, Somalia ranks high among African countries as possibly requiring direct intervention to eradicate violent groups, reconstruct the society, and restore functional national governance.




Figure 1

Conflict Within and Around Nations

When factionalism along sectarian, ethnic, and civil lines occurs within a country, it sets the stage for criminals, insurgents, terrorists, and other troublemakers to claim swatches of territory and begin regulating commerce, customary behavior, and most other aspects of society. The Taliban’s control over the North West Province (recently renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan is a distressing instance of such developments. Again, like anocratic and autocratic regimes, warfare and other violent conflicts are most prevalent in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia (Figure 2) (Goldstone 2010).

Not only does violent conflict significantly increase the possibility of a nation failing, being bordered by other countries engulfed in warfare can lead to internal instability as well due to conflicts spilling over and becoming indigenized. Most susceptible, are anocratic states with 4 or more violence-ridden neighbors (Goldstone 2010). Panama in 1989, for instance, was surrounded by failing and hostile nations – Sandinista-governed Nicaragua, Marxist-Leninist terrorists in Honduras, a civil war in El Salvador, unprecedented cocaine trafficking from Colombia, and Maoist terrorist groups in Peru – whose problems spilled over and fueled a lack

of democracy and the growth of a narcotics trade which produced the international threat that forced U.S. action.




Figure 2

At the present-time, Africa followed by Asia and the Middle East emerge as the loci of conflicts and challenges that will test American and European capabilities for S&R during the twenty-first century. Nations in the Horn of Africa like Yemen, Ethiopia, Somalia, and even Kenya and Uganda, in West Africa like Western Sahara, Mauritania, Senegal, and Mali, in the Eastern Mediterranean like the Palestinian Authority (Gaza and West Bank), and Lebanon, and in South Asia like Afghanistan and Pakistan are unfortunate cases in point. Not all may need intervention by the U.S. and its partners. However, many will need indirect U.S. assistance in COIN training, reconstruction aid, and civilian technology transfer for job creation.

Mortality Rates and Lack of Healthcare

Mortality is another major indicator of whether a nation has failed, is failing, or is likely to fail. This measure should not be surprising, for it serves as an indicator of whether or not a country's health and welfare systems are functioning efficiently. Yet mortality rates generally and infant mortality rates specifically are most meaningful for assessing which foreign states could need intervention if those rates are considered in conjunction with a particular nation's system of government and presence or absence of warfare.

When the factors of anocracy or autocracy, internal or neighboring conflict, and rise in mortality or similar welfare deterioration come together there is an 80 percent or better chance of

a nation collapsing (Goldstone 2010). As a country's central governance deteriorates warlords, insurgents, and other criminals (homegrown and expatriate) find opportunities to wrest power and extend violence to other nations as well. The result is death of innocent persons, who either happen to be in the way of criminal networks' plans or are targeted for ideological reasons as happened on 9/11.

Once more, the evidence points to specific regions and countries (Figure 3) (WHO Infant Mortality Rates 2010). Western, Central, and Eastern Africa followed by South Asia and the Middle East emerge as the hotspots of present and future nation collapse that may demand American and European attention. Current trouble spots like Myanmar (Burma), Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Mali, and Mauritania loom large as nations whose infant mortality rates correlate with governance failure, factionalism, and violence – indicating those countries are failing rapidly and could need U.S. assistance if not intervention.




Figure 3

Diseases that routinely claim the lives of infants and adults in those regions include malaria, tuberculosis, dysentery, and polio. Those diseases pose limited danger to Western societies and so are easy to overlook as troubling factors. Yet AIDS, Ebola, and antibiotic resistant strains of common illnesses mutate and disseminate widely across Sub-Saharan Africa, and are transmitted by carriers to their American and European counterparts. The spread of HIV in epidemic proportions still creates health crises in African and Asian nations (WHO HIV/AIDS 2010), raising the possibility of new, retroviral drug resistant strains affecting Western societies. Poor and nonexistent health services permit virulent mutations of common diseases like tuberculosis to become widespread as well and become indigenous in metropolises like New York and London. So again the strategic and national interests of the U.S. and its citizens are negatively impacted.

Poverty

Abject poverty in countries like India and the Dominican Republic is not sufficiently problematic to U.S. interests to trigger intervention because such nations are relatively stable democracies. Poverty alone does not seem to breed unrest in nations like Nigeria (Iriogbe 2010) and Kyrgyzstan (Hurriyet Daily News 2010), but the dissatisfaction it creates is aggravated by ethnic and religious factionalism (Campbell 2010). Yet even poverty-fueled local insurgencies have been insufficient cause for American intervention. The U.S. did not get directly involved during the 26-year insurgency by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), despite significant poverty exacerbating ethnic tensions (the LTTE's cadres were drawn from the poorest classes of Tamil society), and despite the LTTE's ties to the world drug trade and to violent Palestinian organizations. The U.S. did not get involved because Sri Lanka, unlike Yemen and Somalia, is not on the verge of collapse and most importantly because Sri Lanka's internal problems had no major impact on U.S. security or economics (Kronstadt and Vaughn 2009).

But poverty often goes hand in hand with deteriorating governance and healthcare, and is exacerbated by warfare. In those cases, where a state is failing or has failed, poverty provides opportunities for strategic and economic threats to take root and eventually target U.S. interests. Poverty coupled with corruption created substandard living conditions in Haiti that exposed its people to unnecessary deaths from the earthquake and generated sufficient fragility that the U.S. had to intervene (Williams 2010). Poppy cultivation for opium in Afghanistan (Schweich 2008), drugs and arms smuggling through Pakistan and Iran (Owen 2010), and human trafficking in Yemen (IRIN 2010) are all linked to poverty. Each of those illicit developments is a substantial indicator of a society's rising fragility (McMichael 2010). When those factors come together in places like Pakistan and Somalia, a nation is in great peril to itself and the First World.

Poverty creates opportunities for terrorism and insurgency to arise and trigger the breakdown of legitimate governance through the rise of conflict and the deterioration of basic humanitarian services like healthcare. Conditions in Africa best illustrate the downward spiral, through poverty, of societies that have or are becoming threats to the U.S. With one exception, the world's 26 poorest countries are located on that continent (Alkire and Santos 2010). African states make-up 22 of the 23 countries classified as having "low human development" (UNDP 2010). Poverty-stricken nations that are plunging into anarchy around the Horn of Africa, in particular, have become the main source of modern piracy (ONI 2010).

So poverty, when clustered together with failing governmental institutions and rising violence in specific geographic locations, does provide an important indicator of ongoing and potential state failure. Again, the available data (Figure 4) (OPHI 2010) points to nations in the Horn of Africa and in West Africa as most likely to experience conflicts and calamities that will affect the U.S. in sufficient measure to warrant at least assistance and at most intervention.

Violence generated in those desperately-poor nations often spills over and ignites troubles in other states – triggering collapse of many societies. A case in point is Sudan which harbored Osama bin Laden before his followers and he moved their terrorist organization to destroy another poverty-plagued country, Afghanistan. Eritrea, often compared to North Korea in its official behaviors and national problems (Bengali 2009), has become fertile ground for providing both safe haven and training to a motley assortment of terrorists and insurgents who spread ideas and methods of hate throughout East Africa (Shaheen 2010). Uganda experienced twin bombings in its capital city of Kampala by al-Shabaab, a group originally from Somalia

(Kron 2010), which has begun attracting recruits and support from individuals in Egypt, Libya, and even the E.U. and U.S.




Figure 4

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is one of the most successful groups at developing multinational ties from destitute settings in Yemen outward to Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the “underwear bomber” grew up in Nigeria and Kenya where, despite coming from an affluent background, he encountered fundamentalist Islam spreading through those poor nations. Following the inter-African routes of terror, he went on to complete his radicalization in Yemen under senior al-Qaeda operatives like Anwar al-Awlaki (Hosenball 2010). Al-Awlaki, originally from New Mexico, also followed the path to Yemen, going on to become a prominent internet champion of Jihadism. His electronic followers include the Fort Hood gunman Major Nidal Hasan (Roggio 2010). The government in Sana’a has proven ineffective in quelling both the internal insurgency triggered by Muslim militants and the external attacks engineered by them (Walt 2010). So the U.S. has become increasingly involved in security, and S&R efforts there (Alterman 2010).

Natural Calamities

Calamity is unpredictable, but the results and possibility of recovery from any particular natural disaster are predictable. This is because human activities create vulnerabilities within the population that put some individuals at greater risk than others when calamity arises (Blaikie 2004).

Good housing standards and inspections, avoiding the temptation not to replace temporary housing from a previous disaster, practiced and responsible disaster response, effective and widespread healthcare, adequate nutrition and sanitation, and pre-planning for rapid responses to disasters like floods and earthquakes are necessary precursors for avoiding large-scale death and destruction after a natural calamity. Many deaths in Bam and Port au Prince

resulted not just from earthquakes but from substandard construction of homes and office buildings. Poor S&R coordination is another major cause of added-on problems after calamities (as also happened within the U.S. in the wakes of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita),

The response also should be proportionate to the problem. The number of countries and spread of destruction by the 2004 tsunami was too great for any one superpower or organization to master. Yet, through coordination between affected nations, foreign donor nations, the U.N., IGOs, and NGOs, massive human disasters in Southeast and South Asia were avoided and rebuilding toward stable societies commenced quickly. On the other hand, through lack of coordination for prevention, mitigation, recovery, and stabilization, Pakistan's recent flooding not only inundated 20 percent of the country's land, it displaced 20,000,000 people many of whom face years of poverty, malnutrition, poor healthcare, and declining life expectancy.

Countries in the Horn of Africa and the eastern part of Sub-Saharan Africa have experienced decades of slow collapse under the forces of droughts, insect swarms, and epidemics. Each disaster added to the poverty and malnutrition in Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia. Factionalism and corruption arose and spread as groups competed for increasingly scarce natural resources. As national economies collapsed, illicit activities like piracy replaced traditional businesses. The rise of criminal gangs, insurgent movements, and eventually terrorist groups to fill the economic and sociopolitical vacuums further deprived each nation's government of resources necessary to re-establish central control. In 2009, the Government of Somalia operated on a national budget of approximately U.S. \$11 million – including \$6 million earned from the port at Mogadishu and \$2.9 million in foreign aid (Dickinson 2010). At the same time, Somali pirates took in an estimated U.S. \$200 million in ransoms payments for maritime vessels, cargo, and crew hijacked in costal and international waters, using some of that loot to pay al-Shabaab terrorists for training and safety (McIntyre 2009). No wonder, Somalia's Transitional Federal Government is unable to maintain law and order or undertake reconstruction at home.

Events in Pakistan are another case study of how and why insurgent and terrorist organizations can use natural calamities to their own ends. Blaming the outcomes on a corrupt, failed, national government the Taliban opposed even foreign aid aimed at alleviating disease and malnutrition among local populations displaced by catastrophic floods (Tiedemann 2010). In so doing, they sought to increase dependency of citizens upon militant organizations to provide security, food, shelter, livelihoods, and reconstruction. The Taliban's response is an excellent example of how natural disasters become an important factor in destabilization if a nation already lacks a well-established and efficient administrative structure and of why it is in the U.S. strategic and overall national interests to have agencies and plans in place to deploy swiftly into regions collapsing under natural forces.

Attending to affected populations quickly and efficiently after a natural disaster prevents discontent, mortality, poverty, corruption, illicit economies, and overall instability from arising. Rapid S&R also keeps insurgent and terrorist ideologies and organizations at bay by preventing power vacuums from developing.

Major Threats from Fragility

Terrorism, insurgencies, and even the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are funded and spread through illicit networks that utilize corruption and dirty money to achieve the

goals of regimes and organizations benefiting from a country's or a region's instability. It is the illegal flow of currency, for instance, that funds terror networks which not only harm the residents of regions as diverse as Columbia and Kashmir but pay for al-Qaeda attacks from Afghanistan and Yemen on the U.S. and its allies. Illicit dissemination of weapons technology through shell corporations and laundered money enables North Korea and Iran to continue developing weapons of mass destruction.

In essence failed, failing, and fragile states provide political, social, economic, and ideological conditions in which plans are hatched and from which harm is inflicted upon innocent groups and individuals. The ultimate goal of those troublemakers is to impose their values, ideas, and lifestyle upon others by subverting life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness that Americans and all other freedom-loving and opportunity-seeking peoples cherish.

Corruption, Narcotics, and Other Illicit Economies

Corruption and the illicit economies it fosters is a major negative consequence of a country being fragile. Yet corruption often is difficult to separate from other criminal and commercial crimes. Essentially, this measure of instability focuses on illicit financial activities (Naím 2005). It considers monies generated by the nexus of criminal behaviors and economics at both national and regional levels. Corruption, crime, and cash produce "dirty money" (R. W. Baker 2005). Dirty money drains a nation's resources, renders its bureaucracy partial to factions, and fuels further criminal actions. It links anocracy, autocracy, and political factionalism to sectarian and ethnic conflicts, to terrorism, and even to full-scale warfare. It funds narcotics and human slavery. It is widespread in much of Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Asia. Tracking dirty money helps trace and stifle activities that pose credible danger to U.S. persons and interests. For instance, tracking payments to the 9/11 hijackers from accomplices in Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia facilitated the rupture of al-Qaeda networks.

Foreign bribes and money-laundering have been illegal in the U.S. since 1977 and 1986, respectively, but those laws were not enforced until after September 2001 except in drug cases. However, in the name of national security, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) still maintains fiduciary relationships with foreign officials, including most recently members of the Afghan government (Rozen 2010). European countries did not begin legislating against foreign bribery and money-laundering until the late 1990s. Moreover, dictators, drug lords, and terrorist leaders still are aided by tax shelters and banking secrecy regulations in Western countries such as Switzerland and Ireland. For example, in 2005, Riggs Bank which is headquartered in Washington, DC, pleaded guilty to criminal charges of failing to report suspicious transactions for accounts of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet and Equatorial Guinea's autocratic president Teodoro Obiang (New York Times 2005).

Venezuela has emerged as a modern narcokleptocracy in Latin America. It is now not only the main transshipment locale for Columbian narcotics entering the U.S. and the E.U., but also emerged as the node of most cocaine flown to the nations of West Africa (UNODC 2010). Profits from that drug trade enable Hugo Chavez and his supporter to stifle democracy in Venezuela, to promote anti-American sentiments and actions, and to sustain illicit arms deals with nations like Iran (Choksy and Choksy 2010). Iran has become the main transshipment point for opium and heroin produced in Afghanistan; Pakistan is the other major transshipment location (UNODC 2010). These drug trades, the monies they generate, and the underworld networks they create, have brought disparate insurgencies and terrorist organizations into contact

with one another. So the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency now believes that Columbia's FARC have contacts with the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and with al-Qaeda offshoots in Yemen, Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger (Bronstein 2010).

Like narcotics, weapons' trafficking is enabled by corruption. A prime example involved Russian arms dealer Victor Bout. His actions revolved around and fueled the major threats that America and its foreign partners will need to face in twenty-first century conflicts and calamities – warfare, rising mortality, and collapse of governments. In Bout's case it also connected the First and Third Worlds through terrorism against the American mainland: "His fleet grew to about sixty aircraft registered in a variety of permissive jurisdictions – Ukraine, Liberia, Swaziland, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea ... Flying from second-tier airports like Ostend in Belgium, Burgas in Bulgaria, and Pietersburg in south Africa, Bout's operation shipped mortar bombs, assault rifles, rocket launchers, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, and millions of rounds of ammunition ... On the [flights'] return legs, Bout helped move diamonds from civil war zones – the infamous 'conflict diamonds.' By 1993, his planes were flying out of Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates ... a convenient base from which to serve a particularly sensitive client, the Taliban" (Naím 2005, 48-49).

Those weapons plus assistance from Pakistan (which wanted a pliant regime there) helped the Taliban gain control of Afghanistan by 1996, establish a rabidly anti-Western and intolerant system of government, and invite Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda comrades back. Although the Taliban did suppress Afghanistan's drug production while in power, they continued to deal in weapons, other smuggled goods, and dirty money with Iran to the west, Pakistan to the east, and Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan to the north. Now, with the ouster of the Taliban, drugs have added to the dirty money paying for weapons and fighters in the terrorism and insurgencies of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran.

As with factors predicting conflict and calamity, nations in Africa and the Middle East plus a few in Latin America loom large in studies of corruption and illicit behaviors (Figure 5) (Transparency International 2009). The violent threats through terrorism and insurgencies from failed states like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen are all too real now. Violence against the U.S. and its allies in the process of arising from countries like Iran, Somalia, Sudan, Mali, and Mauritania can be predicted by the prevalence of corruption, drugs, and other illegal economic activities there. In some cases, especially when factors like a lack of central governance, internal strife, and failure of healthcare also contribute to a country's fragility, the U.S. may determine it needs to intervene for its own national security.




Figure 5

Terrorism and Insurgencies

Terrorism is a method for conducting small-scale conflict using a strategy based on psychological impact. It is regarded as unacceptable under internationally accepted rules of war (Merari 2007). In other words, it refers to how conflict is performed. Many localized and national insurgencies involve tactics of terror, and so are categorized by nations as terrorist ones.

Post-colonial conflicts in the Middle East and Africa have been characterized by terrorist attacks rather than traditional warfare. The Rand Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RAND Database 2010) (which is the source from which Figures 6-7 and 9-14 were compiled) lists no less than 1,500 terrorist incidents in Africa alone (approximately 800 across Sub-Saharan Africa; about 500 across North Africa, mainly in Algeria; and the remaining 200 in southern Africa) since 1969. It counts 6,925 such incidents within the Middle East, even excluding all those in Iraq since the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003.

The Rand Corporation’s data of terrorist attacks within Sub-Saharan Africa between January 1992 and June 2008, so after the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of al-Qaeda, reveals that while nearly every country had at least 1 attack, several countries are plagued by terrorist violence often related to or growing out of insurgencies (Figure 6) (RAND Database 2010). Ethiopia, Uganda, and Nigeria experienced 40, 55, and 72 assaults respectively. Somalia’s terrorism problem was exponentially larger – 352 violent incidents over the same 16 ½ year period (and so is not included in Figure 6)! More recently, in August 2010, al-Shabaab terrorists launched a suicide strike in Somalia’s capital city of Mogadishu killing six members of parliament and further weakening that nation’s so-called “infidel-sponsored” transitional government (Baldauf 2010). In July 2010, that same al-Qaeda sponsored group bombed soccer fans in the Ugandan capital of Kampala also for alleged “un-Islamic” activity (Washington Post

2010). Al-Shabaab is a notable example of insurgency and terrorism going hand in hand. Somalia is definitely a failed state and there is little doubt the U.S. and E.U. will have to intervene directly and on a massive scale (Museveni 2010). Failure to do so will permit that nation, located along economically vital sea routes, to become another Afghanistan-style launching pad for globalization of problems.




Figure 6

Yet until recently (Figure 6), most terrorist activities in Sub-Saharan Africa stemmed from ethnic and religious factionalism and from struggles over control of natural resources – largely fueled by corruption and illicit economic activity. Many began as criminal and separatist groups. Before 2008, al-Qaeda could not exert a great presence in the region and so was responsible for only four attacks. Even in Somalia prior to 2008, al-Shabaab accounted for only about 27 percent of terrorist activities. Most important, the majority of Sub-Saharan terrorist groups still operate within the countries in which they arose – drawing upon anti-government

sentiments triggered by poverty, lack of basic services, and religious fervor. Only since late 2008, has al-Qaeda been able to influence, mobilize, and extend the aim and reach of organizations like al-Shabaab beyond individual nations in Sub-Saharan Africa. Having done so, however, al-Qaeda and its regional wings have turned once localized militias like al-Shabaab into deadly cross-country terrorist forces that threaten not only local or regional interests but increasingly are impacting America's strategic needs and goals. The upward trend in number, frequency, and multinational location of Sub-Saharan terrorist activities may warrant U.S. partnerships for S&R not only in Somalia but also in Nigeria, and Uganda in the near future.

North Africa also is becoming a hotspot of terrorism spreading from one nation to another, fueled initially by several governments in the region being unable to maintain law and order, provide health and other services effectively, or alleviate widespread poverty. Corruption in the public and private sectors, drug smuggling, and utilization of ill-gained profits to fund armed groups for small-scale insurgencies exacerbate the problems. The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) emerged in early 1992 after a secular government voided the Islamic Salvation Front's electoral victory in Algeria. Accusing the incumbent regime of collaborating with the West – especially with the French government – against Islam and Algerian nationalism, GIA began killing expatriate European workers and even hijacked an Air France flight in 1994 (CFR 2009 A). A small organization estimated at no more than 100-200 operatives, its members were absorbed into the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) by 1998 (FAS 2004). Funded by Osama bin Laden, GSPC attacked Algerian state targets and European civilians in Algeria until the end of 2003 when it merged with an even deadlier group: al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).




Figure 7

Originally intended to serve as a vehicle for establishing governance by Sharia law within Algeria, AQIM initially focused largely on terrorism within that country. Since 2008, however, AQIM's role in al-Qaeda's global jihad has grown (CFR 2009 B). Its violent actions began targeting domestic and foreign interests including aid workers not only in Algeria (Figure 7) (RAND Database 2010) but in Mali and Mauritania too (Figure 6). France declared war on AQIM after French nationals were specifically selected for execution (Reuters 2010 A). As yet, AQIM is neither as well-funded nor as active as al-Qaeda branches in Afghanistan, Arabia, and the Horn of Africa. Its cadre is estimated at around 400 terrorists. Yet its global reach has been expanding, especially through internet-based sites that facilitate recruitment and fundraising. Given AQIM's known links to jihadist groups in Europe, and its followers' involvement in attacks against U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq (Stewart and Burton 2009), making the U.S. mainland a target may not be too far in the future either. Likewise, AQIM is expanding its reach into uranium mining towns in Niger (Dorsey, Niger Abductions Draw France, EU into Northwest African Conflict 2010). So combating AQIM in Algeria, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania has gained greater importance in U.S. foreign policy in addition to fostering regional inter-governmental cooperation (RFI 2010). As a consequence, the U.S. may have to expend additional resources for S&R in North and West Africa during the decades ahead (Filiu 2009).

Al-Qaeda's strategy in Africa would appear to be one of allying itself with country-based insurgent and terrorist groups who have a proven track-record of violence and an established infrastructure. So having forged relations with al-Shabaab and AQIM, al-Qaeda has provided those organizations with additional means and motivation to venture beyond their original goals and country borders, spreading ideologies of hate and techniques of terrorism to European and U.S. targets. It has proved remarkably adaptive and resilient in terms of manpower, finances, and ideology, becoming the major purveyor of transnational terrorism and the creator of a terror network that stretches from the AfPak border to Africa and Latin America (Riedel 2010). Increasingly under attack in South Asia, Al-Qaeda's focus has become Africa – from the Horn across the Sahel to far west coast. Its spread is aided by failures of governments, sectarian and ethnic conflicts, lack of health care and rising poverty, natural calamities which further alienated populations from regimes they see as failing to respond to peoples' needs, corruption, drug trafficking, and local insurrections. In many cases all those factors play parts in the rise of militantism and the collapse of African nations. The situation may become even more complicated as the Muslim Brotherhood, which forms the main opposition to pro-American regimes in Egypt and Jordan, has now affirmed that waging *jihad* or holy war against the U.S. and Israel is "mandatory for all Muslims" (B. Rubin 2010).

Terrorism in the Middle East, other than for violence in Iraq, often displays similar patterns to that of militant organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa using violence primarily for country and issue specific goals. Political issues such as Kurdish and Palestinian desires for statehood propel terrorism in Turkey, Iran, Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank. Yet when Palestinian, Turkish, and Kurdish organizations are filtered out, the average lifespan of many other issue and territorial based organizations, as measured by the ability of an organization to commit acts of terror, does not exceed 10 years (Figure 8) (Connable and Libicki 2010). Intelligence-gathering and dissent-suppressing activities by autocratic regimes within the Middle East are largely at the forefront of ensuring such separatist and insurgent groups do not endure long enough to merge with others and become robust national or transnational terrorist organizations.

As mentioned in the African context, Al-Qaeda has proven unique because it alone of terrorist organizations originating in the Middle East is able to create enduring ties that cross national, linguistic, ethnic, and cultural boundaries. Indeed, al-Qaeda has been able to endure in the Middle East precisely because of its ability to move beyond boundaries. Its survival has been aided too by citizenry and governments there proving ambivalent in denouncing and quashing it. Al-Qaeda's fanatical sectarian message continues to attract those interested in annihilation of self and others because members often enjoy the support and encouragement of family and friends. However distasteful that message may seem to the West, understanding the underlying grievances against regional governments that are failing to meet the needs and aspirations of citizens would go far in combating al-Qaeda. Moreover, even if the U.S. is successful in crushing al-Qaeda's violent wings, the underlying issues will resurface through other insurgent and terrorist groups unless the U.S. and its partners are able to successfully stabilize and reconstruct failing nations like Yemen where the militant ideologies have taken root.




Figure 8

Saudi Arabia tacitly attempted to solve a threat to its ruling class by banishing rather than countering Osama bin Laden and his ideas of hate. It exported his brand of conflict – first to

Sudan and then Afghanistan. Tolerated by the Taliban and the Pakistanis, and still funded by Saudi sympathizers, he went on to use the political, social, and economic morasses of two failing nations to hone his organization, message, and methods to the detriment of thousands of innocent people across four continents. Eventually, the problem returned ever more virulently to the Arabian Peninsula, destabilizing Yemen far more than Saudi Arabia itself while impacting the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and other Persian Gulf states negatively too (Figure 9) (RAND Database 2010). Only when faced with the homecoming of its terrorists did Saudi Arabia begin to react appropriately (Lacey 2010). This reaction provided an opportunity for the U.S. to collaborate further with the Saudi government in joint training of military and civilian forces not just for COIN and counterterrorism but for building of stable civic institutions in that oil-rich but fundamentalist-ridden nation.




Figure 9

Yemen is grappling with tribal insurrections and al-Qaeda sponsored terrorism. In a pattern which is repeating across Africa and South Asia too, insurgents and terrorists are finding common cause. Fundamentalist Muslim ideologies have taken root and are instigating violence against domestic and foreign targets (Swami 2010). The problems within Yemen struck the USS Cole in October 2000 with a lethal suicide attack while docked at Aden. Bombing of the USS Cole demonstrated not only al-Qaeda's virulence in Yemen but also the transnational scope of planning and executing terrorist plots. The protagonists and their ideological, fiscal, and

technical resources stretched from Yemen to Saudi Arabia and Sudan (9/11 Commission 2004). Yemen has launched terrorist rehabilitation programs but those have experienced mixed results (Harnisch 2010). The CIA has concluded that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is expanding its ranks and resources, becoming more agile and resourceful (Miller and Finn 2010). Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's attempt to blow up an Amsterdam to Detroit bound Northwest Airlines flight in December 2009 has been traced to Yemen-based al-Qaeda strategicians as well. AQAP's ties to al-Qaeda groups in Somalia, Sudan, and Pakistan have grown too. As a result, the U.S government is currently considering an expansion of operations in Yemen (Entous and Gorman 2010 A). The presence of inadequate state control, ineffective governmental administration, fervent tribalism and other forms of factionalism, coupled with poverty, high mortality rates, sparse secular educational opportunities, corruption and other criminal behaviors, places Yemen very high among the ranks of countries urgently needing S&R. Not surprisingly, the U.S. military's Central Command (CENTCOM) seeks to augment Special Operations teams with extensive training of Yemeni national forces and increasing its involvement in rural development projects in areas where DOS and USAID officials are unable to operate safely (Gorman 2010).

Youth in the Persian Gulf States, well-educated yet unemployed and disenchanting with the autocratic regimes that run their lives, often find al-Qaeda's brand of Wahhabi Islam quite appealing. Their governments have responded to the steady rise in violent incidents with repression, choosing to treat only symptoms rather than causes of terrorism. Moreover, state-regulated news media rarely report terrorist incidents within the UAE in a futile attempt to convey an air of peace and harmony (hence the few reports in Figure 9). The Persian Gulf states have become central locations through which resources and personnel are channeled to al-Qaeda and its worldwide affiliates. Basically when countries abet terrorists by looking the other way as their citizens fund such illicit activities, such inaction is tantamount to sponsorship.

Of the four countries listed by the U.S. Department of State as state sponsors of terrorism – Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria – Iran is the only one providing training, arms, and funding. The others provide more passive forms of support including voluntary sanctuary, support for arms smuggling, and political support. Iran trains, equips, and funds Shiite militant groups targeting the U.S. in Iraq. During its 2006 war with Israel, Hezbollah was equipped and funded by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the same military wing that is now re-equipping these militant Shiite coreligionists. Iran also has provided assistance to Sunni insurgents like Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). As relations with the U.S. have deteriorated even further due to its nuclear ambitions, Iran has begun providing material assistance to Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan. Several al-Qaeda leaders and even members of Osama bin Laden's family have resided in Iran since U.S.-led coalition forces entered Afghanistan (J. K. Choksy 2009 B). Yet despite its pandering to Sunni terrorists, Iran has not been able to ensure its own immunity from internal and cross-border terrorism, having experienced 148 incidents from 1992 to 2008 (Figure 9) and many more during the past 18 months. Kurdish separatists in Iran's northwestern and Baloch Jundallah fighters in the southeast continue to murder government officials and ordinary citizens (J. K. Choksy 2009 A).

The Iranian situation (Figure 9) also demonstrates that countries involved in supporting terrorism and insurgencies beyond their borders reap very tangible negative consequences to their own citizens and societies. Insurgent and separatist groups within Iran like the Sunni Kurds

in the northwest and the Sunni Balochi in the southeast have begun seeking local power. Al-Qaeda paraphernalia and propaganda have begun radicalizing the Sunni Arabs of Khuzestan province in the southwest. Sunni madrasas have become hotbeds of secessionism in the east. Iran has reacted by executing Sunni rebel leaders like the Rigi brothers of Jundallah and by banning foreigners from attending Iranian religious schools. Narcotics have poured into Iran, as well, creating a large population of addicts. State-subsidized gasoline is smuggled and sold for profit in Pakistan (J. K. Choksy 2009 B), creating fuel shortages at home – a problem now compounded by American-led economic sanctions on refined gasoline imports. Despite the harm from instability outweighing the benefits, nations like Iran continue their involvement with illicit, destabilizing, organizations for geopolitical reasons. In Iran’s case the goals include gaining influential roles in both Iraq and Afghanistan after the U.S. departs.

| Perpetrator | Countries | |
|---|-----------|-------------|
| Al-Faran | India | Kashmir |
| Al-Nasireen | India | Kashmir |
| Jaish-e Mohammad (JeM) | India | Kashmir |
| Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front | India | Kashmir |
| Lashkar-e Islam | India | Kashmir |
| Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT) | India | Kashmir |
| Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami | India | Pakistan |
| Taliban | Pakistan | Afghanistan |
| Harkat ul-Mujahedin | Pakistan | Kashmir |
| Purbo Banglar Communist Party (PBCP) | India | Bangladesh |
| Communist Party of Nepal Maoists (CPNM) | India | Nepal |
| United Revolutionary Front of Bhutan | Bhutan | Nepal |

Figure 10

Examination of terrorist and insurgent incidents in South Asia indicates there too the trend in cross-border and transnational conflict is on the rise. Between 1992 and 2009 at least 12 groups caused incidents in two separate countries (Figure 10) (RAND Database 2010). In Afghanistan and Pakistan, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their offshoots and auxiliary entities have conducted thousands of violent attacks on domestic and foreign targets, both civilian and military, moving with little difficulty from one nation to the other. The other major focus of cross-border insurgency has been Indian-controlled Kashmir. Well beyond those hotspots, Lashkar-e Taiba, a Pakistani extremist group linked to al-Qaeda and the Taliban, attacked a

series of civilian targets in Mumbai in November 2008 intending not just to instill fear or cause economic pain but to fuel intercommunal tensions in India's multi-ethnic and multi-religious society (J. K. Choksy 2010). These incidents though troubling do not make India unstable or a threat to the U.S.; rather it provides opportunities to strengthen alliances through intelligence, military, and S&R cooperation. Those opportunities should be utilized to generate information and resource sharing for India will make a stable ally of the U.S. in South Asia. Such cooperative ventures are vital to stifle the globalization of terrorism and its attendant crises and calamities.

Perhaps the most notable feature of Islamic terrorism on the Indian subcontinent – in Pakistan, India, Indian-held Kashmir, and even Bangladesh – is its steady rise in frequency and violence since early 2001 (Figure 11) (RAND Database 2010). In essence, that upsurge was feeding off the same illicit resources that brought on the New York and Washington attacks of 9/11 shortly thereafter, followed by the Madrid 3/11 and the London 7/7 bombings. It may be useful to view future outbursts of regional terrorism as similar harbingers. The data serves as unequivocal evidence that Pakistan warrants becoming a central focus of American S&R efforts more than has occurred to date because that nation is connected directly or indirectly through al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other violent organizations to almost every Islamist terror attack since 2001 (Sen 2010). Pakistan's military and civilian governments at times have lacked the foresight to avoid complicity in terrorism, to the detriment of their own nation and its neighbors (Ganguly 2010 A). New generations of Pakistani terrorists are dismembering their country and disrupting other societies (Bajoria 2010). The U.S. cannot let those situations endure (Henderson 2010).




Figure 11

By contrast, although the number of Naxalite Maoist attacks in India exceeds the number of Muslim attacks by an order of magnitude it is an indigenous insurrection caused by the failure of provincial administrations to alleviate factionalism, poverty, and corruption (Miklian 2010). Sri Lanka's LTTE-led Tamil insurgency also arose from weak governance, ethnic and confessional factionalism, and poverty. It drew substantial resources from corruption, money laundering, and illicit trade in drugs and weapons, and became closely interlinked with other violent groups including ones in Lebanon and Palestine (Jayasekara 2007). Indeed, the LTTE played a major role in honing the lethality of suicide bombers and the suicide bomb vest itself. The LTTE even carried out occasional cross-country murders such as assassinating Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Yet, for the most part, the LTTE and other Tamil terrorists were a problem indigenous to Sri Lanka. The most visible effect on European and North American nations from the now-ended conflict on that island was illegal and legal refugees.

So neither of those two terrorist groups poses any grave danger to the U.S., its Western partners, citizens, or economic. Even though the groups do not share America's basic values, they do not contest them on the global stage either. The Naxalite and LTTE cases are good examples of localized conflicts that do not really concern the U.S. This is especially so since they

and others like them are being contained by national governments and so do not rise to a level warranting U.S. intervention. Nonetheless it may prove valuable for bilateral relations if America provides aid and guidance in COIN plus S&R to those nations. Such assistance also will ensure these conflicts do not ever destabilize those nations.




Figure 12

2001 was the year in which violence gained pace rapidly in Tajikistan (Figure 12) (RAND Database 2010). Again, Muslim insurgents and terrorists are involved. Neither the date nor the parties are any surprise. Tajikistan's southern border provides a poorly-controlled conduit for Islamic militants from Afghanistan to infiltrate local populations. Only a narrow sliver of territory, the mountainous Wakhan Corridor, separates Tajikistan from Pakistan's northern provinces. Once more the influence of al-Qaeda is unmistakable, this time in the form of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) which operates partially from Tajikistan (Burgess 2002). Consequently, Uzbekistan has witnessed increasingly frequent cross-border attacks since 2009 plus growing instability, despite suggestions to the contrary (Kapila 2010). Yet, it is Tajikistan, an American ally in the region, which remains most vulnerable to societal instability due to the presence of terrorist bases on its soil. The ultimate goal of Central Asian insurgent and terrorist groups, like their counterparts in the Middle East and South Asia, is to create a pan-Islamic state to replace the separate national ones there. So the U.S. has stepped up COIN, counter-narcotics, and anti money-laundering assistance to Tajikistan as appropriate preventive

measures against conflict and collapse (DOS 2009). Russia too is feeling, and so reacting to, the impact of those factors via Islamic terrorism emanating from Central Asia (Chan 2010).




Figure 13

Finally, a few words are in order about the threat to regional stability in Latin America from terrorist activity. Insurgency in Colombia is a pressing issue, especially due to its connection with cocaine growth and export and with transnational terrorist groups. Venezuela appears to be sponsoring al-Qaeda influenced actions in Latin America generally and Colombia specifically for its own goal of challenging U.S. influence in the region (Bronstein 2010). As Colombian criminal organizations such as FARC, and to a lesser extent Mexican drug gangs, look for ways to import chemicals to process narcotics and then to export the finished products, they have begun utilizing Venezuelan airfields and aircraft that fly directly to West Africa. In Africa, Muslim terrorists help distribute the drugs both locally and to the West, as mentioned previously. Ideology, tactics, and weapons find their way back to Columbia from Mauritania, Mali, and Niger, with dirty money to pay for more drug production and to staff armed groups, adding constantly to the corruption and factionalism already tearing Colombian society apart through increasingly-frequent terrorist attacks (Figure 13) (RAND Database 2010).




Figure 14

Through this illicit commerce, Columbia's FARC rebels consolidated ties to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Bronstein 2010). Indeed, both FARC and ELN display upswings in violence after 2001. As with groups in Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia, this negative turn of events cannot be mere coincidence. The data points to Islamic terrorism invigorating and coopting hitherto localized insurgencies into an international threat to global stability. Indeed FARC is tied to the Lebanese Hezbollah and its Iranian sponsors, especially within the tri-border region between Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, as part of the globalization not only of terrorism but also of conflict, crisis, and instability (Miryekta 2010). That terrorism which began ideologically in the Middle East and then blossomed into a cross-border threat in South Asia extended its transnational sway to Latin America after 2001 (Figure 14) (RAND Database 2010) demonstrates starkly why the U.S. needs to be most concerned and constantly vigilant not just about terrorism but about vulnerable states within whose borders militant organizations find safe haven, resources, and recruits. Transnational terrorism is also one major

reason why S&R of foreign nations is definitely in the interests of all Americans – for it can halt attacks against U.S. citizens, organizations, and interests long before such incidents arise.

In sum, the most tangible and dangerous threat to fragile nations occurs when failure of a central government, conflict within and around that country, and increases in mortality rates and poverty are made worse by corruption, dirty money, and the narcotics and weapons such cash can buy. As a society disintegrates through lack of law and basic services, factionalist insurgent groups fill the power and administrative vacuums. Those groups begin to sustain themselves through furtherance of illicit economic and sociopolitical activities. Such activities bring them in contact with terrorist organizations, most notably and frequently al-Qaeda. As the distinction between a failed or failing state, an insurgency, and terrorism dissolve, the net result is a chaotic situation with considerable propensity to spread not only to neighboring countries but connect continents in a downward spiral of intolerance, violence, suffering, and anti-Americanism. Terrorism thus becomes a major outcome of national fragility in addition to furthering such fragility as well. Therefore it is necessary to utilize the predictive measures discussed herein to be proactive in the struggle against persons, groups, and mechanisms that bring about societal collapse. S&R, undertaken before a nation has failed, will prove the best defense for the U.S. (Dobbins 2010).

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Weapons of mass destruction pose a very serious danger to the U.S., every other nation, to the global order, and to the survival of humans. Yet possession of WMDs by itself is not a reason for intervention, nor does it require S&R. The problem arises when WMDs are possessed by fragile, failing, and failed countries for under those conditions these weapons could be proliferated to other unstable nations or fall into the hands of terrorist, insurgent, and other criminal organizations (Figure 15). So although China is a WMD-possessing autocracy it is a stable nation. Yet, for its own geostrategic reasons, China did exchange WMD technology with Pakistan (Albright, Brannan and Stricker 2009 B). Israel, on the other hand is a relatively stable democracy which, although outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards its arsenals from the terrorist groups that surround it.

Corrupt fragile or failing states with WMDs pose a particular problem as terrorists, particularly al-Qaeda, have not only expressed an interest in obtaining the technology to produce such materials but have actively sought the completed weapons and systems by which to deliver those weapons into innocent populations. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal may be under its military's control, but corruption did lead to proliferation by its leading nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan (Langewiesche 2005). The Pakistani nuclear underworld provided the essential knowhow for atomic programs in Libya, Iran, and North Korea using a network of smugglers that operated through shell corporations in Southeast Asian and the Persian Gulf states. So weakness of a central government, namely Pakistan, combined with regional conflicts, national and personal ambitions, corruption, dirty money, and illicit networks to generate and sustain the largest known WMD proliferation scheme to date. While the Libyan WMD program ended after negotiation between its relatively stable yet autocratic government and the U.S., North Korea continues WMD development and Iran is strongly suspected of doing so too.

| Country | NPT Signatory | Nuclear | Biological | Chemical |
|----------------|---------------|------------|------------|------------|
| China | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Egypt | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ |
| France | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ |
| India | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | Destroying |
| Iran | ✓ | Developing | ✓ | ✓ |
| Israel | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Libya | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | Destroying |
| Myanmar | ✗ | Developing | ✗ | ✗ |
| North Korea | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Pakistan | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ |
| Russia | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | Destroying |
| Syria | ✓ | Developing | ✓ | ✓ |
| United Kingdom | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ |
| United States | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ | Destroying |

Figure 15

Two countries that have not signed the NPT possess nuclear weapons, the ability to deliver those weapons to devastate their neighbor, and a longstanding conflict between themselves – Pakistan and India. However, India is a stable democracy so is unlikely to attack its western neighbor with WMDs; nor are such weapons and technology likely to slip through Indian government safeguards and fall into the wrong hands. Pakistan, however, although currently following the democratic process has a history of autocratic rule by military dictators. Many provinces of Pakistan display little if any functioning, democratic, administrative structures, however. So, large-scale anocracy permits insurgent and terrorist rule to flourish there. That instability, plus possible involvement of rogue elements in the Pakistani army and intelligence service, facilitates attacks on India by Pakistani nationalist, insurgent, or terrorist agents (Ganguly 2010 B). That terrorists could use future political instability in Pakistan to gain access to the country's nuclear and missile arsenals cannot be ruled out either (Narang 2009). Because the U.S. is already involved in long-term stabilization efforts there, it is imperative that both negotiating Pakistan into the NPT and then monitoring its compliance to the treaty be tied to COIN and S&R assistance.

As troubling are countries whose leaders have threatened to use WMD weapons against their neighbors, as is the case for North Korea against South Korea and Japan. North Korea is both an autocracy and an anocracy. It exhibits most of the characteristics of failed states and so is likely to become a major concern to the U.S. especially as it possesses WMDs. Its nonfunctional government engages in nontraditional warfare against South Korea while poverty and mortality rise steeply among its own citizens and state bureaucrats engage in corruption and illicit economic activities. The Pyongyang leadership has been linked to WMD development in Pakistan, Iran, and now Myanmar (Burma) (Albright, Brannan and Stricker 2009 A). The U.S. is presently working on a negotiated resolution to North Korea's nuclear development and proliferation. Because it possesses so many of the dangers associated with failed states, the U.S. and South Korea should be prepared to jointly undertake S&R north of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) if the regime in Pyongyang collapses. Even if government collapse does not occur, S&R aid may prove necessary to avert a massive humanitarian disaster there (Sung-ki 2010).

While Iran and Syria threaten Israel, neither has the capability as yet although Iran may be close to achieving breakout capacity (Reuters 2010 B). Iran is a fundamentalist autocracy; Syria is a secular autocracy. Both are fragile nations due to government structure, corruption, and internal terrorism. Both are suspected of developing WMDs including nuclear bombs (Arasli 2010). Iran does have three bordering nations wracked by major internal conflicts – Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, countries for which the U.S. determined that varying degrees of intervention is necessary. Syria has two neighbors – Iraq and Lebanon – that are not effectively functioning nations due to internal factionalism, terrorism, and corruption. Yet neither country is likely to collapse into chaos even if regime change occurs from internal protest. Iran, however, has been linked not only to nascent nuclear programs in Syria but also to one in Venezuela (Noriega 2010).

Egypt is believed to possess a few chemical and biological WMDs, but has no nuclear capability. Although autocratic in government structure, plagued by widespread corruption, and experiencing Islamic fundamentalist threats from the Muslim Brotherhood, it is unlikely to become a failed state in the near future. The U.S. and Egypt have collaborated for over three decades in American-funded S&R programs. So the main concern in Egypt's case is its failure to develop into a nation with free and efficient institutions.

Finally there is Myanmar (Burma), ruled by a xenophobic military junta. The regime in Yangon (Rangoon) presides over a nation that is a failed state in every sense. It suffers from autocratic administration, small-scale terrorist activities especially along its border with Thailand, high poverty and infant mortality rates, endemic corruption, and a rapacious illicit economy. Its leaders are suspected of attempting to develop nuclear weapons (Albright, Brannan and Stricker 2009 A). Yet its leaders' goals are directed more at ensuring the regime's self-preservation than threatening other nations or proliferating WMDs beyond Myanmar. The main danger that Myanmar holds for the U.S. is a possibility that any future nuclear weapons could fall into criminal hands if the regime there collapsed.

It is clear that preventing proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons warrants being an important focus of any S&R efforts undertaken by the U.S. in failing nations that possess such ordnances. Indeed, the U.S acted proactively by providing non-proliferation assistance to Russia and the Newly Independent States when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 (Jasinski 2002). This precedent should serve as an example when dealing with twenty-first century conflict and calamity challenges in failed, failing, and fragile states like Pakistan, Myanmar, and North Korea.

Overall Baselines for Selective Intervention

This analysis indicates that the two baselines – strategic or other compelling national interest, and clear and present danger – usually utilized by the U.S. to determine whether or not a particular country, organization, or issue poses or will become a S&R intervention-warranting threat remain valid. Many major threats are easy to identify because their danger is clearly manifest, like al-Qaeda attacking America directly or Pakistan's western border serving as a breeding ground for terrorists. Others, like Venezuela's role in destabilizing Columbia, are less obvious (Committee on Foreign Relations 2008). Sometimes the long-term danger may not be clear for decades, such as the slow collapse of nations in Africa, until the draconian outcomes of instability begin to impact America's people and economy (Grunstein 2010). The data suggests that U.S. administrations, departments, and agencies should be pro-active in applying the

relevant criteria discussed earlier to determine both the likelihood of a country failing and the impacts of such an event on American interests and safety. Nation rebuilding or even building anew is not impossible – but it does take vigilance, planning, resources, and careful choices (P. Miller 2010). A similar approach has been initiated by Britain, utilizing its £7 billion (U.S. \$11.1 billion) aid budget, to stabilize and reconstruct “fragile and conflict-ridden countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia” because that U.S. ally realizes “consequences of overseas conflict represent a real and present danger, a danger that cannot be dealt with exclusively by staying at home” (Redfern 2010).

Essentially then, twenty-first century conflict and calamity challenges necessitating American intervention for S&R are ones which pose major threats U.S. citizens, businesses, infrastructure, and democracy. Countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan with non-state actors like the Taliban who attack or kill American citizens are both strategic threats and clear dangers to the U.S. So are attacks by such groups on U.S. agencies and corporations (Khan 2010). Middle Eastern oil is an essential part of the American and global economies and so falls under U.S. strategic national interest as well. Groups like the Somali pirates who could interrupt the flow and relatively-stable price of commodities also pose a clear and present danger to the U.S. This problem compounds when brigands like them link up with Islamic militants like al-Shabaab (Gettleman 2010). Indeed, it has been commented that a new S&R initiative to rebuild Africa’s maritime trade and so counter the lure of piracy is desperately needed (M. L. Baker 2010). Countries and non-state militias like North Korea and FARC that threaten American and global markets and societies through violence and narcotics threaten U.S. national interests. Countries like Pakistan whose fragility threaten the global order through fostering militants’ attacks on neighboring states and proliferating nuclear technology to rogue regimes also create clear and present dangers to U.S. national interests. Diseases that spread quickly such as SARS or prove lethal like HIV, and so affect the health of numerous American citizens abroad and at home, provide a compelling interest for the U.S. to correct conditions in countries like those in Africa from which such natural threats originate.

The U.S. Army War College approaches intervention for national strategic and other compelling reasons similarly: “Security of the homeland” including “protection against attack on territory and people ... in order to ensure survival with fundamental values and political systems intact;” “Economic wellbeing” including “attainment of conditions in the world environment that ensure” national benefit; and “Promotion of the fundamental values of the nation such as democracy and human rights” (Bartholomees 2008).

American policy is defined by National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44 as: “The United States has a significant stake in enhancing the capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and market economies. The United States should work with other countries and organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law. Such work should aim to enable governments abroad to exercise sovereignty over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests” (U.S. Government 2005).

This policy provides appropriate guidance including that the U.S. should not feel constrained to limit its responses to S&R after conflicts and calamities have occurred or wait until problems have reached crisis situations. Most distressing is the increasing frequency with which once localized conflicts are globalizing – the Pakistani Taliban’s sponsoring an attempted attack at Times Square in New York City and IMU recruits of German citizenship training on the AfPak border to spread violence in Europe, are two recent examples. Consequently, the U.S. may no longer enjoy the luxury of waiting to see whether problems dissipate but might have to take appropriate action as quickly as possible based on achievable goals and utilizing comprehensive approaches. When so doing the U.S. should remain focus on the ultimate goal of S&R: to create conditions under which populations will come to be administered by representative and lawful governments who are responsible partners in global endeavors. American endeavors should not focus on eradicating only a few symptoms of the underlying problems so that American interests are protected for the short-term. The U.S. needs to take a holistic approach to ensure overall institutional, societal, and national functionality, so that everyone’s legitimate needs are ensured over the long-term (C. E. Choksy 2010).

Foreign nation rebuilding and building will continue to be an inescapable reality and a constant challenge to the U.S. in the decades ahead. The problems generated by failing nations may not be completely stoppable, but the outcomes can be shaped favorably (Barnett 2010). Restoring stability and governance to crumbling countries and wellbeing, and hope to local residents, would contribute greatly toward U.S. and global security and comfort. So the payoff for undertaking intervention for stabilization and reconstruction during twenty-first century conflicts and calamities will be well-worth the effort.

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