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Throwing the Book at the Taliban: Undermining Taliban Legitimacy by Highlighting Their Own Hypocrisy

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Dear Mujahedeen Brothers!

“Hope all of your activities and thinking comply with Quran and Sunnah.

Stand like a rock in front of enemy and never lose your heart! You should have positive attitude towards your fellow mujahedeen and the public; it will have a good impact on their response.

The enemies are trying to create a rift amongst you but never provide them an opportunity. While punishing a person, never hurry and keep aside your personal interest and feelings.

During fighting, try your best to avoid civilian casualties”

With best wishes,
Amir-ul-Momineen

My language assistant, Hamid came to me just the other day to express a safety concern he had for both he and his family. I paid attention because in the five plus months I have known him he never seemed to worry about security. In fact, one of the first things I noticed when arriving in Afghanistan was the lack of fear our Language Assistants, Cultural Advisors and local partners showed when working with us. This is in marked contrast from my observations during three years in Iraq where we lost more than a few interpreters to assassination. Hamid and I have traveled to various provinces throughout the country with the Deputy Minister and we have walked the streets of Kabul, in relative safety. What suddenly changed this? What did I see in his eyes that day that I had seen in the faces of my Iraqi Interpreters? I recognized it as fear and at last the real possibility that the enemy could and would take reprisals on those Afghans who assist us whom they most loathe – interpreters.

“Sir they changed the rules!”

He brought to my attention a communiqué allegedly released by Mullah Mohammad Omar, the leader of the Afghan Taliban, issuing new orders to his commanders in Afghanistan, and obtained by NATO. A NATO spokesman stated that Omar issued the orders from Pakistan, calling on Taliban commanders to capture or kill Afghan civilians working for foreign forces or the Afghan government. This would represent a reversal of a previous order issued by Omar in

2009 directing the Taliban to avoid targeting civilians. In Hamid's words, "Sir they changed the rules!" I had no idea what he was talking about; rules for terrorists and insurgents? I then remembered that I had first heard about the Taliban's so called Rule Book from Dr. David Kilcullen, the noted Counterinsurgency theorist and adviser, over lunch at the Army Navy Club in Washington a few weeks prior. He also made mention of it in his book *Counterinsurgency* but only as a passing reference. The idea of a Rule Book for insurgents so intrigued me I decided to find out just what was in it, why it was issued, and how (knowing our experience with the Afghan National Security Force's [ANSF] habit of disregarding or selectively apply rules) how the Taliban was doing in the compliance arena. I also had to ask myself that if a 25 year old ethnic Tajik living and working in downtown Kabul "knew" the rules, how pervasive among the population was this knowledge and how could it be leveraged?

There are several perspectives here. First is the propaganda and information operations (IO) struggle in which both sides are trying to paint the other as the primary culprit when it comes to civilian casualties. Though some progress has been made by the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), this is an area it inherently struggles with, and so even if NATO's claim about the new guidance is accurate, it may not be widely believed. But at the same time, the Taliban does appear to have, at least at a local commander-level, been more aggressive in some ways against civilians - especially in their core territory in the country's southeast. This guidance predates Commander ISAF Gen. David Petraeus' decision to push local community police initiatives, but the implementation of Omar's new orders will take place in that context - and the struggle to convince or compel local Afghans to choose sides continues to be a central dynamic of the war.¹

Layeha: Taliban Code of Conduct

The guidance that the NATO spokesman was referring to was the "Jihadi Layeha" or "Regulations for Jihad." This document, first obtained by Coalition Forces in 2006, was contained 15 pages and 29 strictures. In 2009, the now 61 page document was updated and supplemented by additional rules for the conduct of Mujahedeen. It is now divided into 13 chapters outlining 67 sections for individual department and organizational conduct.

The rulebook's 13 chapters delve into peace, treatment of prisoners, espionage, logistics, booty, strategies, Taliban internal affairs, education, organization, social issues, prohibitions, worship, and recommendations to field commanders for items not specifically covered in the document itself.

The rulebook is a rich area for analysis. It provides observers with insight into Taliban weak points, vulnerabilities and fears currently entrenched within the Taliban organization and its top leadership. It also provides Coalition Forces a handy reference document to catalog Taliban transgressions against the very people they are trying to win over. This document reveals the Taliban's attempt to wage a guerrilla campaign implementing a rudimentary population-centric strategy; while calling upon elements of the Pashtunwali and Shariat (Islamic) Law into their

¹ Brief: Mullah Omar Issues New order to Taliban Commanders, Retrieved from: <http://www.stratfor.com/analysis> , 19 July 2010.

doctrine.² This document, if properly analyzed and understood by Coalition and Afghan authorities, presents a compelling opportunity to exploit an organizational control weakness within the Taliban structure and create a focused and comprehensive IO campaign against them by pointing out to the Afghan people Taliban hypocrisy in each and every instance of barbarity that expressly contradicts their own doctrine.

Lack of Full Spectrum Control

The Taliban make excellent use of the media by highlighting civilian casualties that result from Coalition and Afghan operations. They point to the “inept and corrupt” Karzai-led government security forces and offering up the Taliban as the ideologically pure and morally validated alternative. The truth is they clearly are neither. While Taliban leaders may propagate clear rule sets and codes of behavior the common rank and file stray from this guidance and engage in behavior that counters the group’s strategic interests and is non-aligned with their doctrine. These common lapses must be highlighted and broadcast widely to the population - doing so will undermine the credibility Taliban leadership so desperately seeks.

We are in a struggle for legitimacy. While the government of Hamid Karzai was democratically elected, our enemies deny its legitimacy and refer to country as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. They also point out credibility gaps due to endemic corruption, police brutality and lack of capacity to deliver legal services. The Taliban make the most of the message that *the government cannot protect them*. While these instances occur within the Afghan Security Forces, the Taliban by no means, have clean hands. Our message must focus on the illegitimacy of the Taliban not only in their origins (Pakistani Madrassas and the Quetta Shura and the elements of foreign influences), but more importantly in their actions. We have been astonishingly quiet on this front – and that must change.

Kilcullen, in *Counterinsurgency*, describes this existential struggle with insurgents - the need to establish legitimacy and control over the non-combatant population. He refers to this as the “Theory of Competitive Control.

“In irregular conflicts (i.e. conflicts in which at least one warring party is a non-state armed actor), the local armed actor that a given population perceives as the most able to establish a normative system for resilient, full-spectrum control over violence, economic activity, and human security is most likely to prevail within that population’s residential area.”³

In other words, whoever does better at establishing a resilient system of control that gives people order and a sense of security where they sleep is likely to gain their support and ultimately win the competition for governance. As Bernard Fall, noted author, war correspondent, and counterinsurgency commentator observed in a 1964 speech to the Naval War College:

² Captured Taliban 2009 Mujahideen Rules and Regulations (2010) Retrieved from: <http://publicintelligence.net/ufouo-layeha-taliban-2009-mujahiden-rules-and-regulations-booklet/> 19 July 2010.

³ Kilcullen, David, 2010, *Counterinsurgency*, New York, Oxford University Press. p153.

“I have emphasized that the straight military aspects, or the conventional military aspects of insurgency, are not the most important. Tax collections have nothing to do with helicopters I would like to put it in an even simpler way: When a country is being subverted, it is not being outfought; it is being out administered....[W]e can win the war and lose the country.”⁴

That is, “governments lose to insurgents, not because they are being outfought, but rather out-governed”. This is a competition for control and the side that best establishes a resilient, full-spectrum system of control that can enable security, rule of law, and economic activity at the local level is most likely to prevail. The term full spectrum control in this context refers to the broad array of control mechanisms the insurgent organization employs across the spectrum of societal interactions. For example, in this case not only will the Taliban attempt to provide security for the population, but they will mete out justice, solve economic and social disputes with judgments that are perceived to be fair, transparent and most importantly enforced. In full spectrum control, ideally the government or proxy in these cases also provide social goods the established government otherwise does not such as hospitals, schools and charities. This is a strategy employed by Hamas and Hezbollah for example and one that is noticeably absent in the Taliban. Their cruelty in local enforcement and ideological abhorrence of any type of science, education or even in some cases modern medical techniques, structurally prevents them from being able to engage in full spectrum control. This is their first vulnerability.

Brutality

The second key Taliban vulnerability is their brutality. This aspect of their control modalities is so deeply engrained in Taliban sub-culture that despite strictures in Layeha to avoid civilian casualties and conduct themselves in such a way as to find favor with the population, their violence will continue to evoke fear and hatred of them. This is a key IO lever. The Layeha proscribes “unnecessary” barbarity and violence and encourages Taliban to engage communities in positive ways.

A significant difference in this document as compared to the 2006 *Layeha* reflects the new code of conduct and specifically addresses detailed rulings concerning prisoners, dividing war booty, suicide attacks, organizational structure, prohibited behavior, command and control, particularly the transmission of orders and directives, and “guerilla fundamentals.”:

#59-“The Mujahedeen must have a good relationship with all the tribal community and with the local people, so they are always welcomed and are able to get help from local people.”

#41. Conditions for 'Fidayeen' suicide bombers are: They should be well skilled. Their target will be high valued. They will avoid unnecessary civilian casualties and will have to seek the regional head's consent.

⁴ Ricks, Tom (2010) *From Saigon to Kabul: What Bernard Fall might say about Afghanistan Today*, Retrieved from: http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/06/from_saigon_to_kabul_what_bernard_fall_might_say_about_afghanistan_today

#46. Almost all Taliban commanders should try their best to avoid civilian deaths during fighting. If someone did not pay heed, he will be punished.⁵

Importantly, this Taliban doctrine is highlighted from a directive by Mullah Omar written on the back page of the 2009 manifesto. It reads as follows (italics added for emphasis):

Dear Mujahedeen,

“Everything you do should be according to Islamic Law and only for God.
Stay like a rock to face the enemy and never go back.

Keep *good relationships with your friends and the local people*, and do not let the enemy divide/separate you.

Always be careful during your operations *avoiding harming the local population*.
Do not give anyone difficulties because of your personal issues.

This is our mission: *to keep people and their property safe*. Do not let those people that love money take out people’s property and cause them problems.” (Admonition against extortion and thievery)

---Amir ul-Mominin⁶

Taliban directed attacks against Coalition and ANSF forces have had a cascade of negative effects on the population. Indeed, in some instances Taliban attacks have been directed at local communities such as attempts to poison students at girl’s schools, burning down or otherwise destroying municipal structures such as hospitals, schools and charities and most often killing and maiming innocent locals through the employment of VBIED and individual suicide bombers. Any or all of these are in direct contradiction to articles 41, 46 & 59 (shown above) and Mullah Omar’s personal decree as well as indirectly in violation of general article #35 which states:

“A leader would have to be honest, skilled, pious and generous.”

This last rule is very general but through proper Islamic authoritative interpretation could be applied across a broad swath of Taliban tactics to positive effect.

To exploit this particular vulnerability, the Coalition and Afghan Government need to specifically examine the details of violent acts perpetrated by Taliban, know the facts, path those incidents and their details directly to the Layeha and demonstrate for all that they do not follow their own stated doctrine, techniques, and procedures. Certainly their actions are not in keeping with the spirit of their own stated goals with respect to protecting the population. Immediately

⁵ A New Layeha for the Mujahideen (2006) Retrieved from: <http://print.signandsight.com/features/1071.html> 2010-07-23

⁶ Ibid.

seizing this opportunity soon after or immediately following an incident and employing this method head on and forcefully will have the effect of demonstrating to the public, while the incident is “fresh,” the hypocrisy of the Taliban and the cynical nature of their methods.

Theft and Banditry

The third vulnerability is the Taliban proclivity toward theft and banditry. Clause 16 states clearly that it is absolutely forbidden for any Mujahid to confiscate weapons or money from the homes of individuals without direct order from those in authority in the tahrir or budget committee loosely translated. According to Clause 17, the Mujahideen do not have the right to confiscate people’s private property or money. The Taliban remain conscious of the damage done to the movement’s political capital by the incorporation of criminals into the movement during the “open door” recruitment policies enacted in 2003.⁷ The Taliban has had severe problems with banditry, extortion, bribery and all out criminality within their ranks. Opportunistic predatory behavior is interfering with Taliban tactics and strategy and corrupting the organization from the district level on up and likely infecting provincial level leadership as well. News reporting this summer speculated a financial drain on the “central treasury” was partially due to corrupt and greedy tactical- and district-level commanders who helped bleed resources for their own self-interests and causing inter-Taliban rivalries.⁸

We would do well to remember that the Taliban in terms of cultural predispositions and “mental maps” are really no different than the Afghans we partner with. Let me explain this potentially caustic statement. All organizations are comprised of people and are characterized by a certain human dynamic. These cultural and individual weaknesses that frustrate us with some of the ranks among our Afghan partners also manifest themselves as strongly among the Taliban.

Corruption, graft, salary skimming and extortion are all actions that the Taliban accuse the local authorities (ANSF, courts, and district governors) of but their lower level operators engage in as well. We should focus not only on the actions of the *Taliban the insurgents*, for arrests and detainment, but also the *Taliban the criminals* committing crimes against the prevailing rule of law, their own stated law and in some cases crimes against humanity and Islam. When we portray them as common criminals who engage in common criminal behavior rather than “shadow officials” or insurgents, we remove their mantle of piety, ideology and nationalism and therefore their possible or perceived legitimacy and reduce them in the eyes of the public - who are they but *common criminals and thugs*.

Young Boys

Lastly on Layeha, there is a strict prohibition on young boys. In article 50 it states, “The mujahideen are not allowed to take young guys with no facial hair to battle, training centers and other places.” In a society where pederasty is common, this is an area which is proving hard to enforce and can also be spotlighted. We have captured youths as young as 14 years of age on the battlefield engaged in jihad – another violation.

⁷ Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, (2009) Analyzing the Taliban Code of Conduct: Reinventing the Layeha, Academic Paper, Program for Culture & Conflict Studies (CCS), 3.

⁸ Ibid.

At Odds with Pashtunwali

This now leads me to the fifth and probably the most significant vulnerability - the inherent inconsistency of Taliban Code (Layeha) and the Code of Pashtunwali. Pashtunwali means "the way of the Pashtuns" and refers to the pre-Islamic religion, honor code and *traditional lifestyle* of the *Pashtun people*. It is also regarded as an *ancient "code of life"* or a non-written code of ethics that traditional Pashtuns follow. There are nine main principles of Pashtunwali. Though Pashtunwali is believed to date back to the *pre-Islamic period*, its usage or practice *does not contravene basic Islamic principles*.

Pashtuns embrace an ancient traditional, spiritual, and communal identity tied to a set of moral codes and rules of behavior, as well as to a linear record of history spanning over five thousand years.

Pashtunwali promotes *self-respect, independence, justice, hospitality, love, forgiveness, revenge* and *tolerance* toward all and especially to strangers or guests. It is considered a personal responsibility of every Pashtun to discover and rediscover Pashtunwali's essence and meaning. As mentioned, the Taliban is primarily comprised of ethnic Pashtuns to whom Pashtunwali is a culturally embedded traditional guiding force. Highlighting these inconsistencies and "shaming" Taliban operators as lacking honor will resonate with the Pashtun community as Pashtunwali is indelibly embedded into their social DNA.

Three suggested themes that naturally extend from Pashtunwali follow:

Fight Evil - Evil is at constant war with good. Evil must be fought and good must prevail over evil. It is a Pashtun's duty to fight evil when he/she comes face to face with it.

Knowledge and History - Pashtuns seek objective knowledge in life, art, science, and culture, which are considered fruits granted by God. Great value is placed in Pashtun history, with all its depth and pluralism, tragedies and victories. It teaches Pashtuns "to keep the mind open, to continue the search for the truth, much of which has vanished under history itself".

Ghayrat and Nang (Chivalry) - These are defined by two sets of normative practices: honorable actions in battle and proper defense of honor. Norms of battle include rules about who may be attacked, e.g., not civilians, or the proper distribution of war spoils. Honor is given to those who e.g. show fighting skills. It is not unusual for women to engage in combat, although more often their role is to support the male fighters by displaying their head shawl (*poranai*) to spur on the fight. They also spurn dishonorable fighters and reward honorable fighters.⁹

⁹ Kakar, Palwasha, Tribal Law of Pashtunwali and Women's Legislative Authority (2005) Retrieved from: <http://law.harvard.edu/programs/ilsp/research/kakar.pdf>

The Ministry of Interior (MOI) Afghan Local Police Initiative and Pashtunwali

Apart from some local governance initiatives and the fine work of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the effort by the Coalition thus far has been a top-down rather than a bottom-up approach with regard to counterinsurgency. Kilcullen succinctly describes the differences between these two strategies.

“When the international community involved in reconstruction and stabilization, institutions like the UN, the World Bank, The IMF and governments tend to focus on top-down, state-centric processes that have a structural focus on putting in place the central, national-level institutions of the state rather than a functional focus on local-level governance functions. Bottom-up, civil society-based programs that focus on peace-building, reconciliation, and the connection of legitimate local non-state governance structures to wider state institutions may have a greater chance of success in conflict and post conflict environments than traditional top-down programs that focus on building the national-level institutions of the central state.”¹⁰

We have spent untold millions of man hours not to mention billions of dollars in the top-down approach. While these are necessary for the long-term sustainment of the central government a concomitant effort to build a bottom-up strategy is essential with the two perhaps meeting in the middle somewhere. The MOI Afghan Local Police initiative is just that. It is designed to empower local communities to provide for their collective defense to establish the security aspect of the rule of law in their tribal areas and villages connected and controlled ostensibly by the National Police Authorities. These local defense forces will have a security role only and it should be made clear that they will not possess any socially invasive policing powers which might exacerbate local family or tribal rivalries.

This initiative fits well with the Afghan tradition of decentralized local defense as well as the code of Pashtunwali “Nang” or defense of honor. The code of Nang should be part of the narrative accompanying all discussions and informational broadcasts dealing with the MOI Afghan Local Police initiative.

The code of Pashtunwali is an extremely strong artifact of Pashtun culture and should be exploited. Cultural artifacts, like cultures themselves, are dynamic and malleable. They change and evolve and based on a combination of endogenous and exogenous factors that interplay. To that point cultures themselves can and often do change and can be intentionally or unintentionally manipulated based on messaging input. While taking a positivist or activist role in manipulating culture may be antithetical to the anthropologist or social scientist, the opportunity nonetheless exists and we are not bound by such academic conventions. We should therefore make every attempt to co-opt and exploit it.

¹⁰ Kilcullen, David, 2010, *Counterinsurgency*, New York, Oxford University Press. p155.

Conclusion

By pointing out the hypocrisy of the Taliban by using their own stated guidelines as ammunition, we delegitimize them. By the constant narrative that Taliban neither observe the true tenets of Islam nor honor the sacred code of Pashtunwali so essential to the identity of Pashtuns, we call into question as to who exactly they are. With a steady drum beat of this message we may hopefully gain traction with the locals. It is quite clear that the Taliban leadership developed their Rule Book for a couple of reasons. The first was possibly to point out plausible deniability in view of some of the more heinous acts of its members. The second was to attempt to gain control of Taliban actions. This may indicate a perceived weakness by its leaders in controlling its various elements. By highlighting the schism between Taliban rules (and the “rulers”) and the rank and file we may draw out resentments and a feeling of loss of control by its leaders which may lead to increased internal organizational conflict.

It may not be enough to separate the Taliban from the people. We may also seek to separate the Taliban from the Taliban and therein may lay the key to their undoing.

Employing an effective, robust, repetitive and damning informational campaign will try them in the court of public opinion using their own their own Code of Conduct.

Let's throw the book at them.

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Annex A

The Taliban “Rule Book” Articles of Conduct

The rule book's 13 chapters delve upon peace, prisoners, espionage, helping enemies, logistics, booty, strategies, Taliban internal affairs, education, organization, social issues, prohibitions, worships and recommendations.

Those with bolded emphasis are clauses or articles that provide the greatest opportunities for exploitation.

1. We ask everyone working with infidels to quit their jobs. Whoever accepts this offer would be given amnesty. Those who, while working with infidels personally damaged the Taliban, do not fall under this category. Their case will be forwarded to the provincial Taliban head for consideration.

2. If those who have been given amnesty had harmed some individuals during their job, they should approach the affected persons for apology. If someone had accepted bribe during his job and he is now with the Taliban, he should return the money to the owners. If the surrendered person acquired any loan from the department where he served, he will have to return the amount.

3. If Taliban have warned a person working with infidels but he continues to serve them, his case would be decided by high Taliban commanders.

4. If a person who has been given amnesty is killed by a Talib, he would be punished as per Islamic law.

5. A person, who before joining Taliban, was a hardcore enemy of the Taliban but has now killed some high-ranking infidels or hands over some foreigners to the Taliban or if he brings in some sophisticated weapons, his case would be forwarded to the Taliban high command for consideration. (According to old Layeha, anyone with bad reputation or who has killed civilians during jihad may not be accepted into the Taliban movement. If the highest leaders have personally forgiven him, he will remain at home in the future).

6. If someone from the opponent group proposes to a Mujahid that he would not attack the latter if they would not attack him, no such agreement would be accepted. The Mujahid would inform his district head and he would forward the issue to the top for consideration. If the case was considered, then no mujahid could harm the person serving in the opponent group.

7. A mujahid, who takes a foreign infidel as prisoner with the consent of a group leader, may not exchange him for other prisoners or money.

8. If a soldier, staffer or contractor of the infidels is arrested, his case would be decided by the Taliban provincial commander. But he would never be freed just for money. Nobody can kill him without the consent of Mullah Omar or his deputy.

9. If the Taliban arrested a non-Muslim, his case would be decided by the two topmost leaders -- whether to kill him, make an exchange of prisoner or to free him; If the mujahideen needed money for a certain mission, it would also be decided by Amir or his deputy. If the hostage converted to Islam and if in his return some Muslim could be freed -- after knowing the willingness of the newly converted Muslim -- such an exchange could be made.

10. If the mujahideen arrested someone and are attacked while on their way to the 'markaz' (sub-division) with him, the mujahideen will decide whether they want to keep him or not; they are allowed to kill him. However, the mujahideen will have to be sure that the arrested person was a prisoner of war and not someone who has been picked up under doubtful circumstances -- the latter will then have to be freed.

11. If a soldier or policeman has surrendered to the mujahideen, nobody is allowed to kill him; Additionally, if he comes with some weaponry his deed would be lauded.

12. If a regional commander awarded a spy or some criminal with death penalty without the consent of the Amir or his deputy, the executer is not allowed to act upon the orders, as it is anti-Islam act.

13. Any person convicted of espionage will be considered the root of all vices. A regional chief can punish him or oust him from the area or try to keep him away from such acts in the future. But no one could award him death penalty apart from Imam (Mullah Omar) or his deputy.

14. When someone is arrested on charges of being a spy, while deciding his case at least one of these conditions should be met: a) Two witnesses; b) A confession; c) Recovery of equipments being used in espionage; d) Statement by someone who possesses an untarnished religious reputation.

15. Confession of spying under torture, threat or use of some other force would not be considered and he would not be taken as a criminal. If someone is told that he will not be tortured or killed if he confesses his involvement, such a confession will have no worth. However, if someone is told that he will be given high posts or money in return for a confession, the mujahideen will have to keep their words.

16. If the mujahideen doubt that someone is a spy and the accused is not an employee of any secret agency, the mujahideen can still seek action against him; they will have to inform their regional chief.

17. If there is no evidence against someone who is suspected to be a spy in the eyes of the Taliban, the accused will still have to provide the regional head with an affidavit, or bring someone for bail.

18. If charges proved against someone, whether a spy or someone involved in some other case, and concerned authorities have issued his death orders, he would be gunned down. Nobody will be allowed to record video of the incident.

19. If infidels' vehicles are torched, their drivers would be freed under some agreement, but it is strictly forbidden to take any money for their return.

20. If a driver is arrested while carrying infidels' goods, regional chief has the authority to punish him; propose an exchange of prisoner or free him under certain reconciliation process. If a driver tried to run, the mujahideen are allowed to open fire on him.

21. If a contractor, involved in constructing bases for infidels and supplying fuel, did not stop his activities despite the mujahideen's warning and is arrested, the regional chief could punish or propose an exchange of prisoners in his return. The regional chief can also free him on bail. If the regional chief has to kill him, he will need consent of Amir or his deputy. If a contractor did not refrain despite the Taliban's warning, the mujahideen are allowed to kill him whenever he is found.

22. The materials snatched from the infidels are called 'Ghaneemat', 20% of the items would be sent to main Taliban treasury while rest of the 80% will be distributed amongst the mujahideen who fought that particular battle.

23. If the area of infidels is captured after resistance, materials recovered would be distributed amongst the fighters while if the opponent surrenders without showing any resistance then the goods would be sent to the mujahideen treasury.

24. If the goods of slaved organization is seized or if it is captured from the foreign occupant and would be sent to 'Baitul Maal' (treasury).

25. If an official took some money from a bank to distribute it amongst the workers and the mujahideen arrests him, they could take possession of the amount as it is still the property of the infidels. But if it was distributed amongst the workers, then the mujahideen cannot take it from them.

26. If the mujahideen tried to take possession of goods being carried to the infidel forces and a battle took place, it would distributed like 'Ghaneemat' while if there was no resistance, the goods would be sent straight to 'Baitul Maal'.

27. Provincial authority should form a commission of at least five highly religious persons at the provincial level to take care of the affairs of the Taliban. This commission would further form five members commission at the district level; all would remain in touch.

28. The commission will keep close watch to avoid bad elements from becoming a part of the mujahideen, will make conciliation if there was some rift inside the mujahideen and will solve problems between the mujahideen and the locals.

29. Those districts where mujahideen activities are visible, the provincial head should appoint a head and a deputy for that particular district.

30. No one is allowed to form a new group of his own while in case of extreme need, the provincial head can allow formation of a group; all splinter groups would be disarmed.

31. The Amir would appoint the main spokesperson; no other person is allowed to talk to the media.

32. A district head should form a judicial commission comprising a Qazi (judge). Whenever the district Qazis find it difficult to decide on certain cases, they would be forwarded to the commission.

33. Provincial head of the Taliban can make certain changes in the mujahideen set-up with the help of his deputy. In the same way, the district commander, after counseling with his deputy, can make changes. In both cases, if the head and deputy did not agree on an issue, it would be forwarded to the high Taliban.

34. Every Talib is accountable to his group leader and the group leader to his district level leader.

35. A leader would have to be honest, skilled, pious and generous.

36. Any Mujahid found guilty can be expelled from the group by his head. His case will be sent to the provincial judicial commission, and if the charges were proved, then nobody can challenge the commander's decision. In case he repented his act, the provincial head and the judicial commission can review over the decision.

37. The head of a certain district or province can go to other districts or provinces for jihad but after the consent of host commander. A person who visited other provinces or districts will fight under the leadership of the host Taliban head.

38. If a Taliban provincial head has his men active in another province, he will introduce those to the current provincial head. All Taliban activities will be carried out under their present commander; nobody from outside can interfere.

39. If some Talibs rush to another province to carry out jihad there, the head of the host province will not allow them until he did not confirm their identity.

40. No Taliban head has the authority to take other group's men; if both Taliban leaders agree to let go a member, then that Talib will have to return their arms etc to their ex-head.

41. Conditions for 'Fidayeen' suicide bombers are: They should be well skilled. Their target will be high valued. They will avoid civilian casualties and will have to seek the regional head's consent. Suicide bombers assigned with special task by the central Taliban command do not fall under this category.

42. Central Taliban commission will introduce teaching and training courses. The provincial and district authorities would follow the central commission in all education related issues.

43. Foreign organizations and companies will seek the Taliban commission's consent.

44. If locals approached any Taliban commander to settle disputes, every commander is not allowed to make a decision. Only the head of province and his deputy could make any decision between the two groups -- For making any decision, a council of leading clerics will be invited.

45. Cases decided by Mullah Omar will not be reviewed.

46. Almost all Taliban commanders should try their best to avoid civilian deaths during fighting. If someone did not pay heed, he will be punished.

47. If someone misused the Mujahid name for his personal interest, on complaint, he will be expelled from the Taliban ranks.

48. The campaign of collection of arms was going on with zeal and zest, but now it is completed. Currently someone might not be forcibly asked to present his weapon in the name of Baitul Maal.

49. As mentioned in the previous Layeha, smoking is banned completely.

50. The mujahideen are not allowed to take young guys with no facial hair to battle, training centers and other places.

51. No one is allowed to deface someone by cutting his ear, nose and lips, as it is un-Islamic.

52. The mujahideen would not collect forcibly 'Zakaat', 'Ushar' and other donations from the public.

53. The mujahideen would not enter someone's house during search. If it is strongly needed, they will first seek permission of the regional head and will enter the target home accompanied by an imam and two old persons of the area.

54. No person would be picked for ransom and if someone was found involved, he would face the music.

55. Every faction's head is required to arrange classes teaching the mujahideen about religion, jihad and moral values.

56. If there is no danger, the mujahideen should visit a mosque for 'Jamaat'. If they are busy, they should arrange it at their own places.

57. Reciting of holy Quran and 'Zikr' (remembrance of the divine) is must, as with such practice a person becomes contented and patient.

58. All workers of Islamic Emirate should try to convince people working with opponent party to surrender. It would weaken the infidel forces and through this the mujahideen could also get some weaponry.

59. The mujahideen should handle general people politely. They could win hearts of people and would be welcomed everywhere.

60. The mujahideen should not indulge in ethnic and nationalism-related issues.

61. Every Mujahid would be accountable to his commander.

62. The provincial and district heads should arrange meetings to find the best way for fighting the infidels.

63. The mujahideen should follow local dresses like shoes, clothes and hairstyle. It will enable them to get into the public and know their problems.

64. Taliban Shura (supreme council of the Taliban) could only make changes in the Layeha, on other person having the authority.

65. Central, provincial and district commissions of the Taliban will circulate the Layeha amongst Taliban.

66. If some issues come before the Taliban, the solution to which is not present in the Layeha, the district council should solve it. If the district council also fails, then the issue should be forwarded to the provincial commission and thus onward to the central Shura.

67. Every Mujahid should abide by the above rules. Anyone who violated these codes must face trial under Islamic Emirates.

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