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Measuring Defense Reform

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Nation building is not a new mission for combat forces, but it has become critically important today as conventional forces struggle to defeat insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Military pundits predict that small wars and combating insurgency are the wave of the future as national and religious groups use more and more sophisticated asymmetrical means to defeat well armed conventional forces. Mao Tse-tung likened guerillas (insurgents) who swim among the people as fish in the sea and noted that “the fish out of its native element cannot live.”¹ Therefore, it is an accepted tenet of counter-insurgency that the insurgent must be separated from the people from whom he needs support and the accepted means of separating the insurgent from popular support is to improve the lives of the people while at the same time increasing their safety and security. This is one goal of full spectrum operations,² but it is a goal whose end state is difficult to define. This article argues for a mechanism to refine and define at least one major aspect of nation building – reform of the target nation’s defense structure.

The initial combat mission in Iraq quickly shifted from defeating the Iraqi Army to dealing with a virulent and growing insurgency fed by lowered standards of living brought on by the collapse of the Iraqi social and physical infrastructure after the invasion. Consequently, U.S. and NATO forces took on the mission of rebuilding a broken society at the grass roots level, while also transforming government institutions and military structures to more closely mirror western standards. The intent is to create self-sustaining, effective organizations that will free U.S. and NATO to reduce in-country presence. Of course, this institution building must work in cooperation with political efforts at multiple levels to craft alliances of tribes and parties that will not engage in self-defeating fratricide. The complexities of the institution building mission have been recognized in the publication of U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*, under the rubric of “Security Sector Reform”³.

¹ “Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy's rear. Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together? It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of its native element cannot live.” Mao Tsetung “On Guerrilla Warfare,” 1937, in Chapter 6, ‘The Political Problems of Guerrilla Warfare.’ Found at <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/ch06.htm>, accessed 12 April 2010.

² The goal of full spectrum operations is to apply landpower as part of unified action to defeat the enemy on land and establish the conditions that achieve the joint force commander’s end state. The complexity of today’s operational environments requires commanders to combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support tasks to do this. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, Chapter 3, February 2008. Page 3-1

³ United States Government, “Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations,” United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., October 2008.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO countries have engaged in security sector reform. These efforts have been largely applied to new NATO members who were formerly part of the Warsaw Pact or of the Soviet Union in an effort to prepare those members to fulfill NATO's primary role as a defense establishment and to contribute to the collective security of the alliance. Similarly, transformation efforts have been undertaken to bring the militaries of prospective members, usually NATO Partners for Peace, in line with NATO operating norms and therefore better aligned to assume member responsibilities. Beyond the obvious goal of expanding the military capability of the Alliance, NATO members also ascribe to the belief that the democratic tenets of civilian control of the military and transparency in the development of national military capabilities produces a more stable international community.

NATO has developed several programs to further security sector reform and to provide assistance to new members and to partners in the transformation process. Some of these programs, such as the Defense Institution Building (DIB) program assess the several recipients in order to establish an overall baseline against which to measure the progress of the several recipient nations¹. Other programs assess and provide assistance to specific areas of the defense establishment of the recipients, such as the Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP)² that provides curriculum building assistance to defense education and training institutions. Some countries provide advisors to defense establishments on either a sporadic or permanent basis. For example, the United States, through its Foreign Military Funds grant program, provides or has provided teams of defense advisors in nine Former Communist States: Albania, Czech Republic, Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, as well as in Afghanistan.³

What is Security Sector Reform?

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is variously defined but generally relates to making more democratic and transparent the national organizations that provide for the security of a country. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the concept of SSR has more recently expanded "to include not only state security and the stability of nations but also the safety and well being of their peoples."⁴ Consequently, security sector reform becomes an important element of any counter-insurgency campaign, as it is in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Those who have been involved in security sector reform for many years, however, recognize that while efforts to improve, transform and modernize security sectors of

¹ "NATO Partnership Action Plan for Defense Institution Building"(PAP-DIB) is based on principles adopted at the Istanbul Summit in 2004, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-38020F1A-2CF2CA8E/natolive/topics_50083.htm, accessed 6 February 2010.

² The Partnership for Peace Consortium (PfPC) of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes "Defence Education Enhancement Program" (DEEP), <https://consortium.pims.org/>, accessed 6 February 2010.

³ These teams are all from Cubic Defense Applications, Inc., Defense Modernization Division, and have been working in several of these countries since the late 1990's.

⁴ OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice, 2007 Edition, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/25/38406485.pdf>, p. 13, accessed 6 February 2010.

many developing countries is ongoing, the ability to define and measure progress in reform is sorely lacking. The OECD Development Assistance Committee Handbook on Security System Reform¹ laments:

“The main challenge facing donors is the lack of a coherent strategy to support SSR, a strategy that encompasses the different resources available from across government. Donors continue to take an *ad hoc* approach to SSR, viewing the different sectors in isolation and not as an interconnected system. . . . Donors collectively need to view the system as a whole, to have a shared understanding of SSR, and to work collectively to provide coherent and co-ordinated support to partner countries. At the heart of this is establishing clear, shared desired outcomes . . . and integrated strategies for achieving these outcomes.”²

United States Army Field Manual 3-07 states: “Effective SSR requires unity of effort and shared vision among the agencies, organizations, institutions, and forces contributing to the process – a comprehensive approach.”³ The manual sets out six principles of Security Sector Reform: Support host-nation ownership; incorporate principles of good governance and respect for human rights; balance operational support with institutional reform; link security and justice; foster transparency; and do no harm, but does not set out a common vision of the end state.

Likewise, the United Nations Peacekeeping Institute recognizes Security Sector Reform as an emerging field in peacekeeping operations but finds that:

“While the international community has managed to achieve some occasional and limited successes, it has not to date been able to sustain a record of consistent and sustainable change in this area. It is in part due to the absence of a clear understanding or consensus of what security sector reform (SSR) is or how to carry it out . . . also a result of the fact that the international community has yet to develop a coherent strategy for the execution of SSR. . . . Furthermore, even as it approaches the design of a standard approach (i.e., a doctrine), the international community finds itself without the necessary instruments and tools to implement a coherent strategy.”⁴

If SSR is so widely supported why is there an unaddressed consensus that implementation – and completion -- of Security Sector Reform suffers from the lack of an agreed framework for execution and lack of a common vision of what a ‘reformed’ security sector looks like? Reform or transformation of any sector of government is a

¹ Idem.

² Op. Cit., page 14.

³ United States Government, “Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations,” United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., October 2008, Chapter 6, Paragraph 6-33, Page 6-6.

⁴ Edward Rees, “Security Sector Reform and Peace Operations: ‘Improvisation and Confusion’ from the Field,” United Nations Peacekeeping Institute, NY, NY, 2006, p.4 (www.dpkp-pbpuwebmaster@un.org)

long term process that often goes through iterative steps and is never truly finished, and reform or transformation of the security sector often exists only in the mind of the beholder because of the lack of an accepted framework for security sector reform.¹ This frustrates planners, and especially budgeters, in those countries who pay for reform assistance.

This paper does not attempt to encompass the whole framework of security sector reform but is limited to reform in the defense sector – which is often described as the heart of security sector reform because it is the defense establishment that provides the national security without which no nation can exist as a sovereign state. This paper argues for a method for tracking progress and measuring defense reform against a logical framework that assists in determining an end state for defense reform and in framing a definition in order to determine when reform is sufficient to be considered ‘finished.’

A Framework for Defense Reform

In order to meet sovereign security needs, every country must have a functionally effective defense establishment, usually a Defense Department or Ministry of Defense (MoD). Under the concept of defense sector reform the role of a Ministry of Defense is to provide civilian oversight and management of military resources. This role begins with national defense planning based on a national threat assessment, a national security concept to meet assessed threats, and a national military strategy to describe the ways that military force is used to execute the national security concept.

The role of the military departments within the Ministry of Defense is to identify appropriate unit structures and weapons systems, and to develop doctrines and tactics to effectively apply military force in the interests of national security. There is a natural tension between the ‘purse holders’ in the Ministry of Defense and the ‘trigger pullers’ in the armed forces – the military always wants more resources than the Ministry can provide. To resolve this tension, detailed short-, mid- and long-range planning is required. Defense planning considers all aspects of the use of the military – personnel, equipment and training – and the total life-cycle costs of every element of the system. This planning is particularly important in a resource constrained environment in which most nations, NATO members included, depend on some form of collective defense.

Former Communists States (FCS’) and former dictatorships are almost uniformly burdened with unworkable governing and planning legacies. The inefficiency of the Soviet planning system and its centralized control and execution of plans is legendary and still haunts countries that grew up in the Soviet generation. Soviet military systems were long on directives and short on detailed planning, long on establishing

¹ The most commonly used term in this area of assistance is Security Sector Reform that encompasses a larger segment of society than just the military. The OECD DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform addresses nine areas of society: Democratic oversight and accountability, Defence Reform, Intelligence and security service reform, Integrated border management, Police reform, Justice reform, Prison Reform, Private security and military companies and Civil Society. OECD DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform: Supporting Security and Justice, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/25/38406485.pdf>.

accountability and short on giving authority, long on checks and balances and short on encouraging ingenuity – in short, a system that strangles itself and kills the enthusiasm of its inhabitants. Likewise, states that have never had a strong central government, such as Afghanistan, generally are organized around personalities rather than systems, and when those personalities leave there is no structure that addresses planning needs. Breaking these habits is difficult, and adopting a “NATO compatible” defense establishment is just as difficult because there is not one accepted model among the 28 sovereign member states. Consequently, there are many methods to establish an effective defense establishment, but every defense establishment must be able to accomplish similar basic functions in order to operate effectively.

Measuring defense reform must start with a baseline. The baseline may be different in each country, but the template described below covers the ten critical functions that an effective defense establishment must perform. The specifics of how the functions are organized into systems, how they interrelate and the specific products or processes, will vary from nation to nation, but the functions must be performed and analyzing the systems that perform these functions provides a basis to evaluate progress in defense sector reform. Within each system are a series of programs that collectively form the whole of the system. These are integral parts of each system and must be effectively addressed if reform is to proceed. Finally, there are specific tasks within each program. The systems, programs and tasks cannot be fully discussed in this paper, but the full template contains over 60 programs and more than 310 separate tasks.




Figure 1. Defense Management Template Systems Integration

Functional Systems of an Effective National Defense Establishment

This paper proposes a model that identifies ten functional systems that are necessary for any national defense establishment to meet sovereign security needs. The systems cover the full spectrum of defense management needs; they are interrelated and must be integrated into a functional whole in order for the defense structure to function. Because of this close integration, no system can be removed or ignored without

adversely affecting the operation of the whole structure. Consequently, establishing where to start, especially within an existing military organization, is difficult. In the theoretical sense, it would be easier to 'create' a defense establishment rather than 'reform' it. Because the defense establishment must continue providing for national security while it is in the process of 'reforming,' it is like building a bridge while crossing it – not an easy task under the best of circumstances and critically difficult if the reforming country is facing active threats to the nation's sovereignty. The functional systems identified in the template are: Strategic Planning, Force Development and Management, Defense Resource Management, Intelligence, Training and Education, Command and Control, Personnel Management, Defense Logistics, Infrastructure Management, and Public Information. These ten systems are not prioritized because they are all instrumental to a functioning defense structure and the most difficult task of the transformation process is integrating each system and program into the whole. A brief description of the systems and programs in the template follows:

I. STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM

A defense structure requires a properly organized and functional Ministry and Joint/General Staff as well as subordinate component headquarters. The Ministry staff provides civilian oversight and policy guidance to the Joint/General Staff. The Joint/General Staff is responsible for developing implementing directives and orders and subordinate headquarters are accountable for executing these directives and orders. Inherent in this process is the development of defense planning and management systems that ensure efficiency and effectiveness in accomplishing all specified and implied tasks necessary to ensure the security and safety of the nation.

II. FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

This system describes the overall methodology for developing and managing a military force: deriving force capability requirements based on national security risks and threats; identifying required military capabilities to meet those risks and threats; identifying a constrained force structure that balances required capabilities against constrained defense resources; and, a force integration process that addresses manning, equipping, training, and sustainment issues. The force management process also includes processes and procedures to address modernization of the force.

III. DEFENSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Defense resource management is an integral requirement for a functioning Ministry of Defense. A modern defense resource management system includes processes and procedures that describe how defense requirements are developed, prioritized and resourced. The system is based on developing required capabilities, addresses a multi-year period, and identifies specific management responsibilities, including budget execution and control procedures, to ensure that resources needed for manning, equipping, training and sustaining the force are used in an efficient and effective manner.

IV. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

This system describes the methodology for planning, collecting, processing, disseminating and safeguarding military information that is necessary for national security decision making and the release of which would be detrimental to the security of the country. It also encompasses collecting, analyzing and processing that information from subordinate military units and disseminating it to other relevant government agencies.

V. TRAINING AND EDUCATION SYSTEM

An effective defense structure requires a training system that supports a training and education process focused on those skills and missions necessary to carry out critical wartime missions and characterized by doctrine-based principles and standards. This requires significant work in developing capstone, joint and service publications, modern doctrine and training literature within a formal doctrine development process that identifies the most critical doctrinal publications necessary. The training and education system must have sufficient resources from the Ministry of Defense, coherent policies and oversight by the Joint/General Staff, direction and enforcement of individual, leader and collective training standards by all commanders, and a lessons learned process and a doctrine development process that keeps training and education current and relevant.

VI. COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM

No military system is more critical to operational success than an effective command and control system that permits leaders to guide the performance of military forces. An effective command and control system provides the capabilities – personnel, procedures, equipment and facilities - necessary to support national defense requirements. Additional command and control elements are required if the military participates in international operations and in such cases, the nature of multi-national operations adds complexity to interoperability requirements.

VII. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

These are integrated systems, developed and managed by a MOD Human Resources Department and a Military Personnel Management Department that incorporate all aspects of force sustainment: accession, professional development, assignment, compensation, and separation. Both civilian and military personnel management systems must provide for the selection and assignment of quality personnel with correct skills to the right organization at the required time.

VIII. DEFENSE LOGISTICS SYSTEM

A Defense Logistics System is a system of systems comprised of interrelated, interdependent programs that support the planning and execution of the movement and maintenance of forces. This system deals with those aspects of military operations that

relate to the logistics functional areas of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services and field services.

IX. INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Military infrastructure encompasses those elements that provide the framework to support the day-to-day operations of the armed forces. These elements include command and control facilities, training facilities, logistical facilities, mobility and deployment assets and bases. Military infrastructure is a subset of national infrastructure that includes telephone and Internet networks, roads, railroads, seaports, airports, and airspace equipment.

X. PUBLIC INFORMATION SYSTEM

A public information system provides current and accurate information to several audiences to build trust and support and to provide transparency of the public functions of the defense structure. Audiences are both external and internal to the defense structure. External audiences include national leadership, the legislature, citizens, international organizations including the media, and allied and competing nations. Internal audiences include leaders and employees of the defense structure and service members and their families of the services and operating agencies.

Programs and Tasks

The template is build upon more than sixty programs and over 300 tasks that are necessary to build each of the ten functional systems. Reviewing all of these is beyond the scope of this paper, but the following discussion examines a sampling of two programs and eight tasks that make up the Strategic Planning System:

STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM PROGRAMS AND TASKS

PROGRAM: Develop a Ministry of Defense Structure. A Western oriented Ministry of Defense is an integral structure of a civilian controlled democratic society. The mission of the MOD is to manage the resources provided to it by the National Government for the defense and security of the nation. The head of the Ministry is a civilian appointed or selected by the President, and who serves at the pleasure of the President. The senior MOD staff members are also generally civilians appointed by the President or by the Minister. Below the senior level staffs are career civil servants whose tenure provides continuity and institutional memory to the Ministry.

TASKS:

- **Establish a Functional Organizational Structure.** Establishment of an effective MOD requires a structure containing appropriate departments that provide the policy necessary to guide the overall management of the defense portfolio including external relations with the national government and other ministries/agencies, interaction with international agencies, execution of personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, financial, acquisition, public affairs,

reserve affairs and legal functions. The defense structure also provides an internal audit/assessment capability such as an Inspector General to perform systemic inspections and/or assessments.

- Implement a Defense Planning System (DPS). A legally based DPS is necessary to define responsibilities, describe the overall process and identify the required documents that make up the system. This process encompasses strategic documents that identify national security interests and goals, as well as the specific military objectives that the defense establishment uses to guide its internal planning processes. The planning process includes strategic documents (published by the national government) such as a National Threat Assessment and National Security Concept/Strategy. Based on this guidance, the defense structure develops a National Military Strategy that provides specific goals, objectives and capability requirements to implement national guidance. The Defense Structure also provides strategic guidance to the General/Joint Staff in developing military plans based on threats to national security as well as capabilities required to meet other national obligations such as support to international peacekeeping.
- Develop and Implement an Organization and Functions (O&F) Regulation for the MoD. Development of an O&F Regulation provides a basis for ensuring that assigned organizational functions and roles and missions are clearly defined, properly staffed, and fully integrated into a common management process.

• PROGRAM – Develop a NATO compatible General/Joint Staff Structure. A General/Joint staff, comprised of members from all branches of each service, provides the planning knowledge to assist the Chief of Defense in carrying out his responsibility to advise the senior civilian defense leader to effectively and efficiently manage defense resources of the nation. The Joint Staff, as opposed to a General Staff, is a planning body that has little or no execution responsibility. Execution of policies, plans and orders is carried out at the unit level. The Joint Staff has general supervision over the execution of operations and can issue orders in the name of the Chief of Defense, when authorized.

TASKS:

- Establish a Functional Organizational Structure. Establish a General/Joint Staff structure to support appropriate responsibilities, including the effective command and control of military forces, as well as management of personnel, intelligence, operational planning, training (individual, unit and educational institutions), force development, communications, logistics and financial control functions.
- Develop and Implement an Organization and Functions (O&F) Regulation for the General/Joint Staff. Development of an O&F Regulation provides a basis for ensuring that organizational functions and roles and missions are clearly defined, properly staffed and fully integrated within a common management process. General/Joint Staff functional areas traditionally include personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, planning, communications, education and training, and financial planning and management.

- Develop and Implement a Staff Procedures Guide. The use of modern staffing practices is essential for the efficiency and effectiveness of the staff by decentralizing routine administrative work. Such practices free senior leaders to focus their time on planning and directing the overall organization to achieve critical objectives.
- Develop and Implement a Strategic Command and Control System. Establishing a formal strategic command and control system is essential in defining the roles and responsibilities of senior civilian leaders, Joint/General Staff and subordinate component headquarters. A Command and Control Concept identifies how strategic and operational planning is conducted in accordance with specified roles and responsibilities and describes how these roles and responsibilities will be executed to support peace, crisis and war time requirements. The system must be practiced in peacetime and appropriate planning conducted for supporting its execution in crisis and wartime.
- Develop and Implement a Strategic Planning System. Based on MOD guidance, and in accordance with established procedures, the General/Joint Staff prepares strategic plans for the use of military forces to address specific threats to national security. This advance (or deliberate) planning process addresses most dangerous and most likely military threats. Planning may also include contingencies such as support to civil authorities during natural and/or manmade disasters. Strategic planning includes the development of a General Defensive Plan based on a National Military Strategy to provide for the security of the country.
- Develop and Implement a Unit Readiness Reporting System (URRS). A unit readiness reporting system allows senior leaders to maintain awareness of the readiness status of subordinate structures. It includes reporting criteria concerning the status of assigned personnel, maintenance of equipment and unit training, which is used by the Defense Structure and General/Joint staffs to address both routine and systemic readiness related problems.

Measuring Progress

The Defense Management Template provides a model to envision the end state of a fully functional national defense structure. But it is only a framework for implementing reform or transformation of any national defense establishment. In every nation there are many guidelines for establishing, developing and managing the national defense structure. Proscriptions and guidance is contained in the national Constitution, in laws and regulations, as well as in pronouncements of national leaders. Because this guidance is unique to each nation, the Template must complement national guidance, so the systems, programs and tasks in the Defense Management Template do not vary from country to country, they are generic. But they must be conformed in each country to the national guidance to assure that the resulting defense structure complies with national laws and regulations.

becomes more refined. From the assessment, a value is assigned to each System, Program and Task using red - amber - green scale that indicates if the system is not currently functional (red), partially functional (amber) or fully functional (green) (See Figure 4). The key to the assessment is to realize that no system, even in modern U.S. or European defense structures, is perfect and a defense structure transforming from a former dictatorship or Soviet system can seldom hope to match the decades of training and experience that has gone into the creation of a “western” military establishment.

DEFENSE MANAGEMENT TRACKING CHART

System	Program and Task	Status	Related Policy Documents	Key Findings and Comments	Future Milestones
Defense Planning System		Amber			
Defense MOPC		Green			
Defense MOPC		Amber			

Figure 3. Defense Management Tracking Chart

The initial assessment of the Systems, Programs and Tasks provides a color coded visual of what remains to be done to transform the defense structure with the goal of making all Systems, Programs and Tasks green. Few defense structures will ever reach all green status, but at least assessing the systems in the Template provides an end state picture toward which the national government and donors can move.




Figure 4. Assessment Standards

Setting Assistance Priorities

Defense sector reform is carried out within sovereign countries and even though the U.S., NATO and other donors may have significant influence over the target government, a sovereign government retains the right to determine in what order and to what intensity reform efforts will be accepted. And because all Systems are integral to a fully functioning defense structure it is not possible to develop one system independently from the development of all Systems. One benefit of the Defense Management Template is that the refusal or inability of the target government to implement reform doesn't negate the value of the Template. The color coded assessment of Programs and Tasks gives the national government and donor States an objective picture of what needs to be done and keeps priorities focused on all Programs. When one System, Program or Task does not progress, attention can be devoted to those areas in which the target government is willing to accept reform assistance without losing sight of the end state. This is important in order to maintain reform momentum in face of target state intransigence.

Within each system, however, there will be some natural priorities as well as national priorities that drive the transformation process. By color coding the assessment it is easier to see and to explain how reform assistance can proceed in the near, mid- and long-terms. A priority task that is already green should not garner more assistance than a priority task that is red – the most important work needs to be done first. Color coding assists the national government and donors in deciding where to devote limited resources to provide the most appropriate assistance in the most critically needed areas of defense management.

Setting National Defense Priorities

The Defense Management Template, used in conjunction with the Defense Management Tracking chart, provides an end state model toward which defense reform should move, and also provides a tool that the target government can use to set priorities in its defense planning. Because the Defense Management Template provides a current assessment of the status of each functional system, as well as a framework to determine an end state, national leadership only has to review the tracking chart periodically to identify the priority areas that need work on in the future planning period. This is easily translated into national planning documents that fully support an end state vision and reduce the *ad hoc* nature of many planning decisions often are made by national leaders (sometimes encouraged by donors) without a true understanding of the affect of those decisions . Requests for Alliance or bilateral assistance can be organized using the Defense Management Template and the Template can provide the basis for donee nations to politely decline assistance that it doesn't need because the offered aid doesn't meet national priorities as identified in the Defense Management Template.

Conclusion

The Defense Management Template model presented in this article is not perfect – no system that deals with such subjective concepts as 'national security' ever will be – but it provides a logical framework that should be used by U.S. and NATO forces to

measure progress in defense sector reform assistance in all nation building efforts, including in Iraq and Afghanistan. This template can be used in any nation where defense sector reform is proffered and similar templates can be developed for police reform and other sectors of a society. This article argues for the key concept that reform should not be a 'pick up' process that meanders through a game that ends simply because the players are exhausted. Reform can and should be organized and a management template provides that organization.

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