Why Civilian Integration is Essential in Post-Stability Operations

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Power is one thing. The problem of how to administer it is another.\(^1\)

--Douglas MacArthur

After the euphoria of the removal of Saddam Hussein from power had abated in April of 2003, disorder and chaos became the order of the day. It became apparent that the United States had failed to plan for the restoration of the political and economic order after major combat operations had ended. U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan have amply shown that America’s national security structure is still engrained in the Cold War mind set and not adequately prepared to meet the challenges of a post Cold War environment. Civilian and defense leaders failed to understand that combat operations and governance are integral parts of warfare and do not end on a set timetable. The result was a strategic failure on their part to effectively plan for the reconstitution of the Iraqi governmental structure. The current national security strategy is badly flawed and a total reorganization of how the U.S uses its immense power is long overdue. The U.S. will face many types of contingencies in the future, and how we respond will have repercussions beyond the region that the U.S is engaged. For the U.S. to avoid a repeat of Iraqi Freedom it must reform its national security structure, have a designated unity of command in the initial post stability operations, and finally integration of civilian agencies into the military command structure.

Since the end of the Second World War, the nature of warfare has evolved to 4\(^{th}\) generation warfare or irregular operations. Unfortunately the U.S. national security apparatus is deeply embedded in the bygone era of the Cold War and not suited for the challenges that confront the U.S. in the 21\(^{st}\) century. The root of Washington’s failure to anticipate the political disorder in Iraq rests precisely in the characterization of these challenges as “postwar “ problems, a characterization used by virtually all analysts inside and outside of government. The Iraq situation is only the most recent example of the reluctance of civilian and military leaders, as well as most outside experts, to consider the establishment of political and economic order as part of war itself.\(^2\)

The Department of Defense, in National Security Presidential Directive 24 (NSPD was given responsibility in Iraqi reconstruction. It also established the Office of Reconstruction and

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Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) and defined its objectives. Broadly speaking, ORHA has two mandates: (1) to provide humanitarian assistance and (2) facilitate reconstruction operations. Once ORHA deployed to the field, its subordinate organization changed and its mandates grew in number to include: addressing humanitarian assistance; reconstruction of Iraqi infrastructure; establishing civilian administration/governance; and providing for its own operational needs. After a short period ORHA transitioned to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), it numbered more than 1,100. In retrospect, the insular planning within DOD failed to fill potential gaps in Stabilization & Reconstruction requirements, both in terms of substance and process. The primary focus of DOD was on winning the war and only secondarily (or subsequently) on securing post-war Iraq.  

Civil unrest is undoubtedly going to follow any action in which the existing government is removed, and in this case military and defense strategists never realized that the task of governance would have to be addressed. The governance of Phase IV of Operation Iraqi Freedom never factored in the realities of how public administration, public works; legal, and the judiciary systems were going to be established. Previously former CENTCOM Commander, General Zinni initiated combat operations against Iraq in December of 1998 with Operation Desert Fox. During that period General Zinni developed a strategy for a post Saddam Hussein environment, by initiating a series of war game exercises named “Desert Crossings” to plan for this eventuality.

General Zinni stated, "And it struck me then that we had a plan to defeat Saddam's army, but we didn't have a plan to rebuild Iraq. And so I asked the different agencies of government to come together to talk about reconstruction planning for Iraq. . . . I thought we ought to look at political reconstruction, economic reconstruction, security reconstruction, humanitarian need, services, and infrastructure development. We met in Washington, DC. We called the plan, and we gamed it out in the scenario, Desert Crossing.”

Many of the situations encountered during the eventual occupation of Iraq by U.S. forces had been studied during these various war games. Regrettably General Zinni tried in vain to get cooperation from either military leaders or the Clinton administration. Realizing that this would not just be a military matter, he quickly realized that the military would bear the burden of responsibility.

The national security apparatus of this nation failed to heed the warning of Clausewitz, when he wrote, “The First, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, that is alien to its nature.”

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We are unequipped to handle the challenges that confront this nation if we do not reform U.S. national security apparatus. Often the strength of a nation is measured by its ability to influence foreign policy in order to achieve its own strategic objectives. The United States has many tools that can be utilized to achieve its strategic objectives. These tools are most effective when used in conjunction with one another toward a common purpose. They can be divided into four broad categories, which comprise the elements of national power. These categories include the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of national power.6

The situation in Iraq had its origins in Vietnam, Somalia, Bosnia/Kosovo, and finally Afghanistan. In each of these countries the various elements of national security structure were never used or incorporated into the planning phase of post reconstruction. Instead of lukewarm cooperation or benign ambivalence to stabilization operations other U.S. agencies need to be mandated to have an involvement. These include Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Treasury, National Security Council, USAID (United States Agency for International Development), and Justice Department.

The re-organization of the U.S. national Security apparatus needs to take the same structural change that reshaped the Department of Defense in the mid-80’s with the introduction of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, sponsored by Sen. Barry Goldwater and Rep. Bill Nichols, caused a major defense reorganization. Operational authority was centralized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as opposed to the service chiefs. The chairman was designated as the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council and Secretary of Defense. The act established the position of vice-chairman and streamlined the operational chain of command from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the unified commanders.7

The Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004, which was co-authored by both Senator Richard Lugar and Senator Joseph Biden, is a step in the right direction. This act addresses the need for better coordination of both military and civilian agencies to work in conjunction with each other in post stabilization operations. The Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2007, working off the previous act of 2004, states that the purpose of this Act is to provide for the development, as a core mission of the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), of an expert civilian response capability to carry out stabilization and reconstruction activities in a country or region that is in, or is in transition from, conflict or civil strife. This act amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 that authorize the President to furnish assistance and permit the export of goods and services. It also established the ability to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing a country or region that is in, or is in transition from conflict or civil strife.8

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The integration of civilian and military efforts is crucial to successful counterinsurgency operations. All efforts focus on supporting the local populace and host nation government. Political, social, and economic programs are usually more valuable than conventional military operations in addressing the root causes of conflict and undermining an insurgency. Counterinsurgency participants come from many different backgrounds. They may include military personnel, diplomats, police, politicians, humanitarian aid workers, contractors, and local leaders. All must make decisions and solve problems in a complex and extremely challenging environment.9

Future conflict or humanitarian intervention will require the vast array of military capabilities integrated with the full capabilities of our national power. In order to maintain our status as a leading nation and to defend and extend our interests, the United States must integrate military strategies with other national capabilities to create a robust counterinsurgency capacity comprised of all elements of national power, economics, politics, information, and military.10

Facing the complexities of the changing post Cold War world, where the clash of armies has been negated by adversaries who have adopted 4th generation warfare or irregular conflict. The United States must rethink its collective national strategy that focuses on utilizing all elements of its enormous power, by integrating both civilian and military agencies into one cohesive organization that reflects the policy direction of this nation. 4th generation warfare will be the nature of conflict in the future that will confront the United States. The reality of the “long war,” however, is that counterinsurgency, stability operations, and nation-building—the essence of the small war—will dominate the future of warfare.11

A new national security reorganization modeled after The Goldwater’s-Nichols Act of 1986 is essential if the U.S. is to confront the challenges of the future that places a premium on unity of command in the initial phase of post stabilization operations.

Unity of command is the preferred doctrinal method for achieving unity of effort by combat forces. Unity of command should extend to all military forces supporting a host nation and civilian agencies involved in post stability operations. The Command and control of all U.S. government organizations engaged in counterinsurgency missions should be exercised by a single leader through a formal command and control system.12

At the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned a recurring theme emerged from interviews which were conducted. The U.S. military should be the lead position in the conduct of Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTRO), in relation to Department of State (DoS), United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other agencies involved. Despite a complex array of participants engaged in these activities, as of March 2007 there

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12 Petraeus, Pg 56.
appears to be no single department, agency, or organization clearly in charge throughout the whole of Iraq.\textsuperscript{13}

In the early stages of any counterinsurgency, the center of gravity is the civilian population, and security is of paramount concern in post stabilization operations. After initial stages of combat operations and post stability operations begin. Their security will be of paramount importance and will involve military forces. Addressing his experience in East Timor, Australian Major General Michael Smith noted that in complex peace operations where combat remains a real possibility, security must be provided by military forces that that have a strong warfighting proficiency with the addition of constabulary-type skills.\textsuperscript{14}

Civilian agencies will arguably comment that they were never given the proper resources in Iraq or Afghanistan to command such an undertaking. Unfortunately it goes far deeper then just a lack of resources, and into how the civilian and military organizations are organized and staffed. Civilian agencies by nature are all about reporting and observing, while the military culture is rooted in a fixed regimented command and control system. Civilian agencies cannot be compelled to deploy to a war zone as compared to the military personnel.

A clear distinction between governance operations that are integral to war and the myriad of missions referred to in peace operations discourse would be hugely beneficial. Such a distinction would allow US defense planners to focus on the political and economic reconstruction that is a part of war, while relegating humanitarian and nation-building missions to other organizations. Moreover, equating governance tasks that occur in all wars with the broader missions associated with peace operations and humanitarian assistance reinforces the tendency to avoid planning for governance operations in tandem with planning for combat operations. The essential point is this: Combat operations and governance operations are both integral to war and occur in tandem.\textsuperscript{15}

Civilian leaders are by nature reluctant to seed non-military governance tasks that have non-military applications to the military which they believe are uniquely entrusted to them. The question then becomes a fundamental issue of constitutional powers of civilian control over the military. The issue for the military is that civilian agencies operate in a vacuum that dictates policy on how reconstruction should begin, but they fail to understand that they have no logistical assets. Often civilian agencies implement a policy, without clear coordination of with military commanders who have knowledge of the security situation in the given area.

The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), created before the start of hostilities in February 2003, was charged with administration of the country, providing humanitarian aid, and rebuilding damaged infrastructure. ORHA’s relationship to CENTCOM seemed to create dual authorities, with ORHA technically under CENTCOM’s operational control, but with CENTCOM controlling critical resources (such as security), and ORHA itself charged with creating the conditions for Iraqi self-rule. This early organization illustrated the


ambivalence of civilian leaders about conceding too much control to the military. These concerns seemed to only increase with the replacement of Retired Lieutenant General Jay Paul Garner by a stronger civilian leader, L. Paul Bremer, to oversee the newly created Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). While the appointment of Bremer seemed to reflect an effort to improve unity of command in the theater, with Bremer reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense, the CPA remains dependent on CENTCOM for many of the resources needed by the CPA to accomplish its mission.\(^\text{16}\)

Civilian leaders will challenge the notion of the military in charge of all aspects of post-stability operations and often state the common historical precedent of civilian control over European reconstruction after World War II. US civilian and military leaders failed to appreciate the key difference in Germany at the end of World War II between General Lucius Clay and High Commissioner John McCloy. It was General Clay, serving as theater commander and military governor, who oversaw the toughest political and economic reconstruction tasks, including intensive denazification and demilitarization efforts as well as banking and monetary reform. The civilian leader, John McCloy, arrived in 1949, well after stability had been achieved. In Iraq today, the Army—with appropriate political direction—is the only organization that is capable of assuring the countrywide reach necessary for effective reconstruction to take root and evolve.\(^\text{17}\)

Interagency cooperation in Afghanistan was less impressive. The CIA was virtually an independent player, and often did not bother to coordinate its operations with military forces in the field, causing great confusion between both the US military and Afghans. Numerous smaller agencies, such as the Centers for Disease Control, actually had personnel on the ground in Afghanistan with no means of communication with the US military. USAID personnel could not effectively perform their missions outside of Kabul, as they fell under State Department responsibility which had no means of safeguarding them.\(^\text{18}\)

The critical military error was abolishing unity of command in 2003. During the march to Baghdad, General Tommy Franks, commanding U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), fiercely warded off “suggestions” from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) prior to the war insisting that unity of command was essential in war. Prior to his retirement, however, Franks in May of 2003 supported the White House in removing Lieutenant General Jay Garner as the deputy in CENTCOM responsible for reconstruction. Franks fully endorsed the creation of an entirely new organization under Ambassador L. Paul Bremer.\(^\text{19}\)

Bremer’s appointment replaced unity of command with two chains of command. He was given the authority to decide policies and budget for all Iraqi security forces and retained responsibility for ensuring security until the Iraqis were capable of leading. This stripped Army General John P. Abizaid, who became commander in late June, of command over the Iraqi security forces.

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\(^\text{16}\) Ibid. Pg 88-89.
\(^\text{17}\) Ibid. Pg 90.
Authority was divided from responsibility, a breach of organizational commonsense compounded by the antagonism between the two separate staffs.\(^{20}\)

Unity of command is paramount in counterinsurgency! One individual has to have the reigns of authority, and be in charge of all phases of the operation working under a common goal and then working together toward accomplishing that goal. With the command of the initial operation given to the military, military commanders also bring a readymade staff section that can coordinate all activities under a single unified commander. After the maintenance of continuity of effort of major combat operations and the beginning of reconstruction efforts, it’s essential that a unity of command operate. In a counterinsurgency only the military can bring all elements of logistics, transportation, and security to sustain itself without relying on outside agencies for support. In Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority, military commanders were never brought into discussion with issues that would affect various military units. Clearly, more than any other kind of warfare, counterinsurgency must respect the principle of a single direction. A single leader must direct the operations from beginning until the end.\(^{21}\)

Civilians will always have a major impact in post stabilization operations. As in any counterinsurgency the important roles will not emerge from the military community, but from civilians. Importance’s in the early stages, as was the case in European reconstruction. The military is the only element of American national power that can provide the security that will make reconstruction happen. U.S. intervention in Kosovo showed us as the situation became more permissive, civilian agencies can move around the area with relative ease. As the security situation becomes more secure the military can then prepare to hand the reigns of command to the appropriate civilian authority. With security now more permissive the military operational commander then would relinquish the unity of command and the military term for this would be Relief In Place/Transfer of Authority (RIP/TOA).

Civilians and military agencies need cooperation between one another in order to accomplish the strategic goals of the United States. In a non-permissive environment civilian agencies will be unable to conduct reconstruction operations in non-secure areas. More importantly they don’t have the assets to move freely about a given area. The fundamental difficulty in both Iraq and Afghanistan was that civilian agencies lacked the capability to secure areas. Without access to security any type of reconstruction cannot begin. The central difficulty by the Coalition Provisional Authority is that it controlled few resources and the military controlled all the assets that would be needed in reconstruction activities such as vehicles, communication equipment, convoy support and others. CPA was heavily dependent on the military for many of their daily activities.

With the disbandment of ORHA, the task of Iraqi reconstruction was handed to CPA, also under the auspices of the Department of Defense. CPA was set up with the mandate of organizing reconstruction operations in Iraq. A Project Management Office (PMO) was established within the CPA in order to manage reconstruction projects. Acting as the occupational Iraqi

\(^{20}\) Ibid. Pg 3.
government, the CPA oversaw all reconstruction efforts occurring within Iraq while attempting to establish the conditions necessary for the transfer of power to an Iraqi governing body. \(^{22}\)

With the transfer complete, L. Paul Bremer was officially appointed to the position of presidential envoy to Iraq by President Bush and head of the CPA by Secretary Rumsfeld. Bremer had responsibility over all personnel from the Departments of State, Justice, and Treasury, and other executive branch staffs operating within Iraq.

Bremer reported directly to Rumsfeld and DoD while the military in Iraq remained under CENTCOM’s control. CENTCOM continued to provide direct combat support to the CPA in order to enforce its authority during the period of formal coalition occupation control of Iraq. \(^{23}\)

Recent history showed us in Somalia the absence of an integrated strategy for achieving our objectives eventually yielded the battle of Mogadishu and the untimely withdrawal of the United States and the United Nations from the country. In Afghanistan, the failure to provide adequate international military and police forces to create a secure and stable environment and adequate civilian capabilities to jump start reconstruction has put the country’s political transition at risk. In Iraq, the failure to plan adequately for post conflict operations allowed a security vacuum to develop costing the U.S.-led coalition Immensely in time, credibility with the Iraqi people, and lives lost. In nearly every operation from Somalia to Iraq a lack of rapidly deployable civilian capabilities left military forces performing tasks for which they do not have a comparative advantage and extended the duration of their deployments. The failure to integrate strategy and develop needed capabilities for these operations has been shared, to a greater or lesser degree, by every administration in recent memory. \(^{24}\)

A reorganized national security structure modeled after the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, incorporating a defined unity of command, also insures the full integration of civilian agencies into the military command structures to ultimately prevail in counterinsurgency operations.

Since the end of the Cold War the United States has engaged in post stabilization operations, humanitarian interventions, and other similar operations. From humanitarian intervention in Northern Iraq after the Persian Gulf War, to intervention in Somalia, and other operations throughout the 1990’s, the U.S. military command structure hasn’t had staff experts in the area of governance and public administration as requested to fully operate in post stabilization.

In contrast to simply maintaining and marshaling massive assets to destroy enemy targets, 4\(^{th}\) generation warfare, or net warfare, requires the government focus on the intellectual capital of our people. We have to coordinate with the entire spectrum of agencies that have roles in these


\(^{23}\) Ibid. Pg 10.

complex wars. Rather than just winning the battles we must have a plan for winning the peace. As we discovered in Iraq & Afghanistan, to rebuild the enemy country as a democracy we have to be prepared to assist in establishing a fully functioning government. This requires experts in every field.25

U.S. national security strategists must understand that combat operations and governance inherently operate in the same tandem. War is not over, even though major combat operations have ceased and the hard part begins when reconstruction starts.

“The military probably since Vietnam, maybe before, became more and more saddled with conflict resolution -- strange conflict resolution -- peacekeeping, humanitarian efforts, nation building. The military has resisted this. They don't like it. They're not trained for it. But there's no one else to do it and it continues to be the mission that confronts us.

Now either we legitimatize it for the military, which means we would revamp civil affairs, have a large and more powerful, more robust capabilities, psychological operations, we would have the ability to reconstruct economies, reconstruct the political systems or we find other agencies of government to pick up that slack. It can't be dumped on a military that is not trained, equipped or organized for that mission.” 26

Post stability operations are going to be the futures of military operations, as our enemies have found the Achilles heel of the U.S. National security strategists need to adapt to the changing nature of war and begin by developing strategies that will insure success in post stabilization operations. The beginning will be to establish civilian integration into the military command structures. This integration needs to happen at all of the military regional commands as an essential task of providing the expertise that civilian agencies bring that is not in the military force structure. We do not only need armed forces better trained for the complex civil governance and stabilization tasks of post-conflict situations. We also need increased civilian capacity for rapid deployment and integration into post-conflict stability operations. More robust leadership and coordination mechanisms are needed to harness the capacity of military organizations to sustainable programs. Such programs should be able to continue after military forces depart.27

The full integration of all elements of our national power into the regional commands will bring the necessary expertise in economic development, diplomacy, and governance that will enhance the capability of post stabilization operations. Integration of civilian agencies will increase the cooperation of military and non-military agencies in effective planning in counterinsurgency operations by coordinating all efforts into one national strategy. Effective planning is essential in counterinsurgency operations, integrating the various elements of U.S. national power

including Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Justice, Department of Agriculture and others.

Decisions made by military units at the tactical level can often impact the strategic foreign policy goals of the U.S. Government. This tendency has been well demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq. Aware of the government’s policy priorities, a deployed DOS employee can provide increased direction to a unit as it confronts political, diplomatic, and civil-affairs problems. His guidance and input can be especially useful and important because the quick pace of military operations, especially during combat, often requires on-the-spot decisions that a U.S. embassy would be slow to make.28

The beginning of civilian integration is beginning to manifest itself with the establishment of Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT), in Afghanistan and now they in Iraq since winter 2005/06. The concepts of PRT’s are the combined integration of both civilian and military units that work at the provincial and local levels.

U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan were commanded by an Army lieutenant colonel and composed entirely of military personnel, with the exception of single representatives from the State Department, USAID, and the Agriculture Department. Each PRT comprised two Army civil affairs teams of four soldiers each. One team was responsible for building small, quick-impact development projects using local contractors, while the other ran the PRT civil military operations center (CMOC), which coordinated activities with the UN and NGOs. A U.S. Army National Guard platoon provided protection. The U.S. government established PRTs and then turned them over to coalition partners. All PRTs in Afghanistan are now subordinated to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and managed by NATO member states and coalition partners. Iraqi PRT’s during 2006 were led by a senior State Department official and comprised primarily with civilian officials.29

The main concept of PRT’s is to incorporate civilian and military cooperation in the provinces and local communities. With the integration of all elements of U.S. power, there exists the various agencies on each PRT, with a State Department foreign service officer, Justice Department officer, agriculture officer and others deemed necessary to carry out the mission in post stabilization.

There have been initial problems with the establishment of PRT’s. First, the State Department had to operate in a war zone which it was not accustomed to and, like all the other agencies involved, had a difficult time finding volunteers to staff PRT’s. Unlike the military, the State Department and other government agencies cannot compel anyone to serve in a warzone. The second issue became one of unity of command. In Afghanistan, PRT’s are led by military officers. Other agencies have essential roles, but because of unity of command the role resides with the military. This became a problem that led to slow implementation of the PRT’s in Iraq as both State & Defense Department fought over multiple issues that hampered its conception.

The staffing of the PRT’s needs less from volunteers, but staffing should be based on core level expertise definitely including language and culture expertise. Given the importance of the various agencies; it especially needs officials who have equivalent rank and experience with their military counterparts. Before civilians rotate into either Iraq or Afghanistan, cross training with military personnel would be essential to eliminating the friction between civilians and military.

Several factors have contributed to the poor performance of the U.S. government in recent operations. Unlike the military, which has doctrine and a standard approach to planning operations, the U.S. government (as a whole) lacks established procedures for developing integrated strategies and plans. Each new administration tends to reinvent this wheel, issuing new guidance on how strategy development and planning is to be done, often overlooking the best practices of and lessons learned by predecessors.30

For the United States to emerge successful in post stabilization operations it will need the combined wealth and experience that is offered from the vast array of civilian government agencies. The focus of effort in counterinsurgency operations is the citizens, and until we understand this basic premise we will continue to falter. A fully integrated civilian-military approach to post stabilization will insure success in the future.

The Cold War is now a distant memory, but U.S. national security strategy is very much rooted in the bygone era of the past. The U.S. will continue to face challenges of post stabilization of nation states that have little or no functioning government. For the U.S. to avoid a repeat of Iraq & Afghanistan in regard to post stabilization operations it must reform its national security structure, have a designated unity of command in any initial post stabilization operation, and finally the integration of civilian agencies into the military command structure. If we fail to learn from history, we are doomed to repeat the mistakes of the past.

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