Insurgency and Counterinsurgency—What are they?
LTC John M. Paganini
Director, US Army Counterinsurgency Center
On 9 January Small Wars Journal published an article entitled “A Rose By Any Other Name.” MAJ Michael Coote argued that the current definitions of insurgency found in military doctrinal publications are inadequate. The US Army Counterinsurgency Center and the USMC Center for Irregular Warfare Integration Division currently are revising FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, otherwise known as the Counterinsurgency manual. As part of the revision, we are drafting an issue paper on whether the definitions of insurgency and counterinsurgency found in the current manual, the joint and DoD dictionaries, and the US Government COIN Guide are adequate.
Counterinsurgency doctrine will be effective only if based upon an agreed upon definition. That definition can neither be so broad as to dilute the solution and, thus, allow for mission creep, nor can it be so narrow that it restricts our national civilian and military response to crises.
I encourage all readers of Small Wars Journal to provide what they consider to be better definitions. It is essential when recommending alternatives that your rationale for the changes be explained in as much depth as possible. You can also comment directly on this topic by responding to the questionnaire posted on our website http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/FM3-24Revision.asp. Question 3 specifically addresses the definition issue. We look forward to your suggestions.
Comments
"Countries now have the means and desire to reject our narrative and pursue modernization without paralleling our political and value systems."
Questions:
If countries are able to, and do, continue to reject our narrative -- and are able to, and do, continue to pursue modernization on their own terms -- then would this be considered a positive or a negative development, re: the interests of the United States and the possibilities for continued great power/world peace and prosperity?
Based on our answer (as this being considered a positive or a negative development), then how should the United States respond?
a. By working toward a "best-case" scenerio (countries are convinced to "round-out"/complete their modernization process; they adopt our political and value systems)? While, simultaneously,
b. Preparing for the worst-case scenerio (countries continue down the path of what we might call incomplete, "half-baked," illegal, illegitimate and/or competing/adversarial/confrontational modernity; this leading to the enhanced potential for great power/world war)?
(Items "a" and "b" above, respectively, pretty much mirroring American foreign policy and defense planning today?)
Could this (to wit: the interests of the United States) help explain why:
a. The United States tends to view only the "western" version of modernity as "premier" and, therefore, as the only true "sovereign" today and, accordingly,
b. Why the United States sees those entities (governments and/or population groups) who would reject modernity generally -- and/or the "western" version of modernity specifically -- as today's challengers of the realm and, therefore, as today's "insurgents?"
Bill C., if you haven't read it yet I recommend you read Fareed's "Post American World" where he intelligently addresses the rise of the rest as more than the rise of states and peoples economic status, but he clearly state that a key aspect of the rise of the rest is than modernization no longer means westernization. Countries now have the means and desire to reject our narrative and can pursue modernization without paralleling our political and value system.
A (possibly) more succinct explanation:
What is considered "sovereign" today are not governments -- nor populations -- but, rather, modernization-westernization itself.
Accordingly, today an "insurgency" occurs when any entity -- be this any government -- or any population group -- challenges or stands against modernization-westernization.
Counterinsurgency?
Actions undertaken by any government -- and/or by any population group -- to overcome those who would oppose/stand in the way of modernity (to wit: the adoption, expansion and/or preservation of western values, practices and institutions).
Should our definition of "insurgency" -- not be generic -- but be based primarily upon, or at least take serious consideration of, our interests?
Herein, let us suggest -- only as an example -- that the purpose of the United States is to achieve a world in which all states and societies have political, economic and social systems similar to our own. (This, we think, will provide for a more peaceful and more prosperous world.)
With this (or some other, more-correct statement of our interests) as our starting point, could we then define "insurgency" accordingly, for example:
a. As being "legitimate" and "legal" if the grievance of the population (or significant segement[s] thereof) is that the government will not move -- as the population desires -- to adopt political, economic and social structures similar to those of the United States? And,
b. As being "illegal" and "illegitimate" if the grievance of the "significant segment(s)" is that the government, against the will of the populace, is moving to institute the "reforms" that the United States desires?
If not this "crafting," then some other that would do more than just define "insurgency" generally and, instead, would move to bring the definition and understanding of insurgency to be more in-line with our goals and our wants, needs and desires?
I think it is worthwhile revisiting Galula's reasoning for choosing the terms. Also, for thinking conceptually about whether some of his logical claims merit attention, and about the class of objects that are included and excluded, and finally what insight it might offer for reformulating the present definition(s).
1. Galula states that Clausewitz errs by stating that violence is the exclusive addition to policy that moves beyond politics per se, since all means--including violence--are instruments in the type of warfare we are about to define.
2. Galula states that Mao correctly defines revolutionary war, but objects on two grounds to the term 'counter-revolutionary' war. First, it is emotively and propagandistically used by Mao to refer to 'reactionaries,' and 'enemies of the people'. Communist propaganda has tainted the term and undermined its manifest use by those who seek to counter Mao. Second, and more important, it implies symmetry and mirroring the tactics of the revolutionary. It is the assymetry required to defeat Mao and Mao-type revolutionaries that Galula discovers, and bequeaths.
3. Galula proposes an alternative less emotive and in his mind more analytic couplet--insurgency/insurgent; counterinsurgency/counterinsurgent--as a novel move beyond Clausewitz and Mao. To be sure, Clausewitz remains the brilliant godfather, but has little to offer specifically in the analysis of what would emerge as an alternative to guerra (war) in the form of guerrilla (small wars). The Napoleonic defeat, and the problem of responding without a genuine theory for opposing adversaries in this type of war, turns out to be the great question facing states facing internal opponents who embrace all instruments to challenge, subvert, and eventually overthrow.
4. So we are left with these terms insurgent and counterinsurgent, and a sketch--brilliant in its simplicity, owing to a year's reflection spent at Princeton--of the assymetric assets and liabilities involved. The counterinsurgent must understand these to even have a chance to 'win'.
5. Galula's analysis of the major factors associated with winning do not downplay violence, coercion, or forcible military action.
6. An alternative term, 'internal war,' is also advanced.
7. Galula does not, however, grapple with the emergence of state collapse and dysfunction; transnational criminal and terrorist ambitions; and other forms of actor. He does, however, outline conditions that if not met, are likely to undermine any possibility of success for counterinsurgency. Amazingly prescient is his discussion of the star-shaped, land-locked country that has sanctuary and signficant external support (Afghanistan, anyone?). Galula also does not deal with situations like Iraq, and even Afghanistan, where we go in and decapitate a regime thus spinning its constituent elements out into a free-for-all to fashion a new state or states privileging various interests.
I believe that evolution, not revolution, is how viable, long-term concepts advance. We will reinvent the wheel if we do not milk for all its worth, the careful thought that has gone into thinking this asymmetric, internal, type of warfare.
I strongly disagree with this statement,
"Counterinsurgency doctrine will be effective only if based upon an agreed upon definition. That definition can neither be so broad as to dilute the solution and, thus, allow for mission creep, nor can it be so narrow that it restricts our national civilian and military response to crises."
It is faulty logic to assume that if we have a definition for insurgency, then we will have the right doctrine to respond to it. While I do not agree with MAJ Coote's proposal of expanding the definition of insurgency to make it embrace the reality of the security environment we frequently operate in, I did agree with his larger point about addressing the broader spectrum of security issues. In many situations there are multiple groups of actors that destabilize an environment such as insurgents, transnational terrorists, criminals, separatists, and even ethnic groups battling one another where the state is immaterial to them. These various elements intermingle and interact in ways that results in a security environment that cannot be defined by insurgency alone. It is very much a hybrid situation that will require a more comprehensive approach than just COIN, and attempting to isolate one group while the others has failed again and again. Even if the proposed definition for insurgency is accurate it will inadequately describe the overall security environment. LTC Paganini seems to suggest that if there is an effort to expand the definition of insurgency, then we will “dilute” the solution. One can embrace definitions as the key to solving problems if they wish, but they risk interpreting the situation in a way that fits their definition instead of accurately defining the problem. Another view is if you misdiagnose the problem/security issues you will definitely fail to come up with the right solution.
I won’t argue against the need for a COIN doctrine, but we may be better off focusing on more holistic doctrines such as FID and Stability operations where COIN is a subset of a larger whole. We’re too enamored with COIN and COIN doctrine, and are too hesitant to face the truth that our doctrine has been largely ineffective, or ineffectively put into practice, take your pick. In the end the only thing that produced results were aggressive security operations that temporarily suppressed the adversaries. This is inadequate; we need doctrine that informs a more holistic strategy that leads to more enduring results for our investment. That doesn’t mean being misled by the false promises of development and human terrain mapping to achieve our ends, but more along Bob’s proposal of identifying appropriate political settlements. At the Army/Marine level our doctrine should focus on counter guerrilla and counter criminal operations and so forth that are conducted in a way to achieve viable and sustainable political ends.
If this definition is correct, then the ANC and Nelson Mandela were waging an "illegal political challenge?" Does it also mean that thousands of American citizens provided material support to "an illegal IRA political challenge?" Does this mean that we supported an illegal political challenge when we supported the forces fighting the Afghan government in the 80s? Was Paul Kagame's RPF "an illegal political challenge?" Were the anti-Qaddafi forces an illegal political challenge?
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/understanding-insurgency-the-condi…
"The conflict of insurgency is an illegal political challenge to government, rising from a base of support within some significant and distinct segment, or segments, of the populace; and employing any mix of violent and non-violent tactics."
John,
Would love to come out and engage with your team. Your thinking is absolutely on the right track. Any definition must define a class of problem that suggests a family of solutions. Too many want to group conflicts by how they manifest rather than by how they form, which leads to efforts aimed much more at the symptoms of the problem, rather than at the root causes.
DOL,
Bob
Guerilla warfare is not necessarily used to try to overthrow a government. It can also be used to resist an invading army, or in a conflict between or among non-state actors, etc.
The definition of insurgency has I think been a bit of a problem for the US. Our insistence on throwing resistance to foreign invasion/occupation into the same basket as homegrown resistance to an unwanted domestic government, combined with certain assumptions about how "insurgency" can be countered, has led some to believe that an occupying power can make itself loved and accepted by throwing lots and lots of money around. This tactic is (IMO of course) likely to be expensive and unsuccessful.
IMO, this is a dangerously symptomatic approach, that assumes the government is not just the legal actor, but also fully in the right and must be preseved as is; and that the challenger as the illegal actor must simply be removed and the problem solved. It also appears to lump resistance against a foreign invader in the same buckets as politically motivated challenges to governments where no effective legal options exist; or with purely power or profit motivated movements such as what occured in Sierra Leone on the first part, or the current challenges Mexico has with drug cartels on the second.
Such problems may look the same on the surface, but one must deconstruct them and understand their roots to address them effectively. There will be shared tactics, but the strategies and operational designs would be radically different by type, and then tailored to the unique aspects of the particular situation one is seeking to address.
Guerrilla Warfare
Subversion
Insurgency
All three terms mean the same thing. Guerrilla Warfare is using small groups of Indigenous people to overthrow the gov't by violent means.
Subversion in criminal terms means to overthrow the gov't.
Insurgency means the same as the other two. A revolt against the gov't.
As an Advisor/Mentor to the Afghan National Police and currently working
on the counter insurgency, there is not a difference. Since the US has claimed this to be a war, and not a low intensity conflict, words have been changed to make this a full blown war. The Taliban are criminals as well as many insurgents. It would appear that the correct term to use would be subversion, since they are breaking the law. They are criminals.
Counter guerrilla warfare
Counter subversion
Counter Insurgency
All three mean the same. As stated above, the counter subversion is the law enforcement term. This is what is most applicable to what is happening in Afghanistan currently. There are other ways to looks at this issue. It's either a military problem or a law enforcement issue. I'm looking at this as a criminal issue. Even the tactics now used as far as Community Oriented Policing is concerned comes from law enforcement.
When Taliban, insurgents, narcotics traffickers are arrested, they are charged with criminal charges. This is a law enforcement effort as the police are on the frontline when encountering these criminals. It's actually a police/intelligence agency problem. It's not so much a military issue. The use of human intelligence(HUMINT) is paramount in any counter insurgency/ counter terrorism operation. The people are the biggest factor
on whether or not we actually are successful in Afghanistan. How we train our police or Afghan military to deal with the public for that matter.
The majority of the practices from the security side in COIN come from law enforcement. To make COIN more effective, the police and intelligence agencies need to be in the lead.