In this age of sophisticated, cheap anti-ship missiles, I understand why one might question the need to assemble hundreds of ships for an Inchon-style beach assault or thousands of ships for another D-Day. As The Times reported in its June 21 article, "U.S. rethinks a Marine Corps specialty: storming beaches," assaulting a defended beach is seen as a thing of the past. If that is the only perceived mission for the Marine Corps, then why do we even need a Corps? Well, if not a Corps, then what do we need?
Our nation - a maritime nation - will always need to be involved with populations and crises across seas. What kind of crises and what kind of crisis response force (CRF, for the purposes of this article) will be required to carry out our nation's interests? What will the nation want to do? Americans are a law-abiding, free-trading, caring lot, and we like to exhibit these behaviors in our foreign affairs. We want a CRF that can respond to provide humanitarian assistance within a few days of a tragedy to have the greatest chance of saving life and limb. Because many humanitarian crises are caused by armed conflicts, the CRF will need an ability to provide its own security as well as create an umbrella of security for others in a city or small nation...
I am reminded of the last time our nation had a crisis response force like this: We called them "Marines."
More at The Los Angeles Times.
Comments
<i>"Placing CRFs at those distances around the globe gives you a necessary number of <strong>five to seven CRFs</strong>. Then <strong>multiplying the number of CRFs times three</strong> to give an adequate ratio of at-sea time to training and rest time gives you the structure of the total strength of the new crisis response force needed.
So we have done it. We have created a new crisis response force that <strong>economically transports itself over the sea</strong>, can provide humanitarian assistance and security, can provide for its own transportation and resupply until more help arrives, and can connect the lowest levels of command in the field with national goals and objectives."</i>
Hmmm.. "Economically"...
Each CRF requires three amphibious ships, totaling $6+ billion to build.
Each CRF requires an air component that will cost upwards of $2.7 billion or more to buy.
Oh and each has to actually field a ground force.
So each CRF will cost around $9-10 billion, just for equipment.
Five to seven deployed CRFs, times three is fifteen to twenty one CRFs total.
Or between $135 billion and $210 billion for the entire force, just for equipment.
I have a hard time calling that "economical".
There are other types of operations, other than humanitarian, where sea-borne or sea-based, force would be preferred. A great many of NEOs and raids in the littorals come to mind and any type of operation where a large footprint ashore is not desirable. The later could be in initial support or securing a foothold in stability operations, offense or defense that could include COIN and FID.
Citing the Haiti response doesn't really deal with the issue, though. Haiti was easily within reach of CONUS-based aircraft.
A better mission to cite would be the response to the 2006 tsunami in Indonesia, where only a seaborne force could promptly carry out the humanitarian mission.
You forget, too, that we potentially face armed crises in places where you cannot land a C-17, cannot jump in sufficient airborne forces, and SOF types are insufficient in numbers to affect a change.
For those instances, you need maritime forces to project power without needing anyone's permission to base aircraft or overfly territory.
Sounds like the Navy-Marine Corps team to me.
In theory there shouldn't be any "branches" of DoD, just one service with all the missions, air, land, sea, space. But each has a tradition, so there is something for that. As far as Marines, there will be a need for the "naval infantry" (as it is called in some other countries) mission will still be a possibility, since we are a maritime power and thus need to project power from the sea to land. Although I would say there would need to be more integration of Marine and Army structures since these days they both are tasked with many similar mission sets.
Duck: I stand corrected on the Haiti issue. Thanks for squaring me away, my friend.
I do stand by my original comments concerning the single-service CRF issue. It truly is a joint effort, and I believe that articles such as Roger's (albeit very well-written and well-argued) only serve to build up service parochialism at the expense of that synergy. But, in this new era of constrained budgets, I suppose we're all trying to grab our piece of the ever-shrinking pie....
Check my facts? No problem, here's a few facts for you:
http://www.marines.mil/unit/22ndmeu/Pages/22ndMEU,BataanAmphibiousReady…
http://www.usmc.mil/unit/22ndmeu/Pages/22ndMEUdeliversaidtoHaiti'ssouth…
http://www.usmc.mil/unit/22ndmeu/Pages/22ndMEUdeliversaidtoHaiti'ssouth…
http://www.marines.mil/unit/24thmeu/Pages/24thMEUassessessituationinnor…
http://www.marines.mil/unit/24thmeu/Pages/24thMEUdeliversfoodandmedical…
Who are you kidding? Two MEUs are "little to no involvement from the Marine Corps"?
Duck: Not trying to push an agenda per se, other than the recognition that contigency and expeditionary operations are truly a joint effort and not the sole province of the Marine Corps.
As for intellectual honesty, I respectfully ask that you check your facts. The task organization for the recent Haiti operations was composed almost entirely of Army and USAF---based primarily on a JTF built around the 2d Bde, 82d Abn Division. During Provide Comfort, the 24th MEU did, in fact, get in on the action---initially with rotary wing support to 10th Special Forces Group's efforts to save Kurdish refugees in the mountains and then in creating a security zone in Northern Iraq along with British Royal Marines and a US Army airborne task force. 24th MEU's contributions, however, comprised a supporting effort to the SOCEUR/10th SFG mission of saving Kurdish lives (I recommend reading Gordon Rudd's excellent book on the subject "Humanitarian Intervention"---Rudd, BTW, taught at the Marine Corps University).
I'm not a Marine basher---quite the contrary. And as an Army SF Soldier, I am well versed in the powerful combinations that a joint task force can generate. So, if there is an 'agenda' I am trying to push, then it is the idea that a joint force is the true "force of choice' for these types of operations.
I would remind the author that our Nation does not have a single-service "crisis response force." Rather, the President and SECDEF have a toolbox of force packages, each with its own set of capabilities and response/ loiter times. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force is just one set of tools in this toolbox, along with Army airborne forces, USAF, SOF, and other elements. One need only look at our response to the Haiti earthquake and Operation Provide Comfort----two recent historical examples of successful U.S. humanitarian response with little to no involvement from the Marine Corps. I'm a big fan of the Marines (this from an Army SF officer!) and they certainly bring a lot to the table, but they are by no means our sole "911" force.