As we fight the current IED fight, we need to look to the future. Next-Gen IEDs will lose the I. North Korea and others with fears of US invasion and occupation will manufacture state of the art platter-charge type devices with all sorts of unique designs to blend in any environment, counter-US electronic warfare technology, and increase lethality. With vehicle killing "panzerfausts" in unlimited numbers for urban and other terrain, adversaries may be able to create formidable web defenses when coupled with other attriting technology.
Manufactured or Military Explosive Devices might be a nice term. Irregular no longer, MEDs will be a permanent part of the defensive landscape. We need to start investigating MEDs now, as they develop, and determine doctrinal and technological responses.
Comments
The issue of MEDs have been a challenge throughout history, but it is simply another element of the legal and illegal international weapons trade. MEDs were provided to proxies throughout the Cold War for example.
There are at least two categories of MEDs, overt (there is no real effort to conceal which state or organization they are coming from) and clandestine (where the State or organization attempts to disassociate itself from the MED by providing non-standard munitions that can't be tracked back to them, or munitions from the black market that cannot be traced back to them).
While MEDs may be more dangerous (though I think that point can be argued, we have already seen some very sosphisticated IEDs in use, as they tend to evolve with our counter measures [co-evolution]) than your typical IED, it presents a problem set that easier (I didn't say easy)to address, because it is more centralized. In this situation you truly can map a somewhat centralized system that you can target (State, production centers, policies, etc.). The problem with IEDs, is that the problem set is distributed due to knowledge dissemination, so there are multiple IED systems, and most organizations can adapt if a particular element of their system is neutralized based on the open global market (parts, labor, knowledge). The non-MED threat will remain a greater challenge based on its liquid like properties. You can reach in with a cup and remove a cup's worth of water, but it will quickly fill back in and return to a somewhat normal status unless you can rapidly and repeatedly keep dipping your cup into the water effectively distrupting that "particular" mini-IED system, knowing that several others exist.
The global market (parts for IEDs) and knowledge proliferation (know how on IED production and use) are not new, but the speed of knowledge transfer and the number of global trade opportunities (legal and illegal) are unprecedented. A state providing a MED to a proxy assumes great risk, while on the other hand they can provide knowledge on how to produce advanced IEDs that counter our latest armor edition and electronic counter measures with almost no associated risk.
I don't disagree with MG (R) Lambert's point, but I think we have a more pressing threat based on knowledge proliferation versus actual MED transfers. If a State can use a proxy effectively without getting their hands dirty, why would they risk going to war? In some cases they will, but since we're all guessing what the future will bring, I suspect State sponsored knowledge transfer will remain the greatest threat.
Sir,
Great to hear from you and I think you are spot on. As Cohen and Gooch wrote in their book Military Misfortune all military failures can be attributed to failure to learn, failure to adapt, and failure to anticipate. I think we are learning and adapting post 9-11 but your point should be well taken as we need to ask if we are anticipating.
V/R
Dave