In May 2004, I was hired for an unusual job: The U.S. State Department contracted DynCorp International, a private military company, to build Liberia's army. I was tapped as an architect of this new force. Previously I had worked for both the U.S. military and Amnesty International. I was a rare bird -- an ex-paratrooper and human rights defender -- and thus a good fit for this unprecedented task. When I arrived in Liberia in 2004, the country's army was, at best, a mess. After decades of civil war, soldiers' hands were as bloodied as any rebels'. The troops were undisciplined, unpaid, and undertrained. They were a motley crew that protected no one in a country where pretty much everyone was vulnerable to violence. And it was our job to turn them into a professional military.
Today, just five years later, Liberia's soldiers are among the best in the region. They have been vetted, trained, paid, and readied for action. The difference was the impact of that little-known U.S. initiative -- the first of its kind -- that literally rebuilt the Liberian army from scratch. Our goal was for the Liberian army to fill the role of U.N. peacekeepers as the latter were slowly phased out, and it worked astonishingly well. Now that model might be of use again...
Much more at Foreign Policy.
Comments
Great job in Liberia and I am sure many Liberians will thank Mr McFate for years and even decades. But I can see some obvious differences when it comes to Afghanistan (which doesnt mean some lessons wont apply, they surely will):
1. Interested neighbours with the ability to make trouble. Afghanistan is not Liberia. Pakistan, Iran, India, Russia, China, all have much more capable secret services and ambitions than Sierra Leone.
2. The average Afghan village can probably fight off a company of the new Liberian army without too much difficulty. They are already armed, trained, organized, etc.
3. Well developed insurgency, with foreign support.
4. Relatively more developed motivational software. Taliban Islam may or may not be able to overthrow the modern world, but its well beyond the West African level in terms of cultural capability to organize populations, impose laws, imagine nations and conquer others.
I think the biggest lesson is that good old American ingenuity is not dead. This country can still find people who can go and do a job with imagination and ability. But the size of the job is very different in Afghanistan..
Wim:
The last part of the article presents 5 points that would directly apply to Afghanistan. They are not dependent on scale.
More importantly, the article stresses learning about and understanding as best you can the people you will work with and the place in which they live. Then adapting your efforts to work best in that environment. That will work anywhere.
Easy to say but harder to do. Perhaps body armor for the Afghan Army is an example.
I have been very much impressed by this article. I was working in Liberia in 2001 and the Taylor's boys were all what you fear. I left Zwedru on December 2001 and in March/April 2002 (if I do not mistake the dates), the MODEL, coming from Ivory Coast, took the place. My replacement was extracted by them to IC. Fortunately, they treated them well but did not give news for at least 2 weeks. That is one of the onlt times I saw an African rebel group treating well NGO workers expatriates and national staff.
I really wonder how you can train an African army to respect civilians. The notion of separation between civilian and military and the obligation to respect civilian seems to be something the African Armies have huge difficulties to integrate. Any all made solution are welcomed.
Response on FP.com:
Afghanistan applicability and SF-FID points
I would agree with two points already raised:
- there are tremendous differences between Liberia and Afghanistan and therefore what was used in one will have limited usefulness in the other
- Having said that, it wouldn't be smart to discard all the lessons learned from Liberia. Some districts in Afghanistan may be closer to the Liberian example- and therefore be useful. Additionally, one day Afghanistan may be closer to the Liberian example and preparing for that eventuality now could be beneficial.
One huge difference not mentioned is what is driving our presence in Afghanistan: the threat from AQ. Because that is an internal-U.S. interest (and arguably the highest priority in the short-term), what we are willing to do and can do politically in terms of training and deploying the Afghan Security forces is limited. In Liberia it seems the highest priorities were to set up the security forces and make life better for Liberians- only indirectly related to U.S. interests. If one does not understand what drives the train (resources, goals, focus, etc.), then coming up with comparisons is easy (and dangerous).
As far as SF goes- I think the usual "FID vs. DA" argument is both valid and over-simplified. The main problem with comparing SF with using State Department contractors is that SF is beholden to the DoD and policies that have been crafted at the NCA level. Very rarely do they take a part in molding the overall-strategy and objectives (outside of the TSOC- which may or may not be "SF"). They receive a mission from a combatant command that has either crafted the policy almost wholly without SF input or is just passing the mission on from the JCS with little to no input itself.
In contrast- a contracted company would not only bid on the contract (voluntarily), but also would most likely submit a proposal on how to best accomplish U.S. strategic interests in the target country. This greatly flattens the mission analysis process and puts the "doers" much closer to the "dreamers". State- in my experience- many times takes the contractor's plans as their own or modifies their own objectives as needed based on what the contractors propose (seeing as how State doesn't have the massive planning capability that DoD has).
Therefore, using SF to do FID is not only very limited in terms of short-term strategic gain, but it isn't really an efficient use of U.S. special operations forces (SF doing FID outside of denied and politically sensitive areas is a waste of resources unless there is nothing else going on). The current love-affair of all things Direct Action is arguably a mixture of a misunderstanding by conventional forces of the use of SF and the historical focus of SOCOM on kinetic activities.
Grant Martin
MAJ, US Army
-the opinions expressed are the author's own and do not reflect the position of anyone or any organization in the U.S. government-