This week's state visit by Afghan President Hamid Karzai almost wasn't going to happen. The Obama administration, unhappy with Karzai's attempt to pack the Afghan Electoral Commission with supporters —to ignore voting fraud, briefly held the visit hostage this spring. This striking move also followed Karzai's threat to join the Taliban. In the ensuing brouhaha last month much of Washington wondered, loudly, whether Karzai was an adequate partner. This is the wrong question.
Local partners are almost never adequate at the outset -- this is why they face insurgencies in the first place. Almost by definition, counterinsurgency implies a problematic host government. If the local leadership were effective already, there would be no insurgency to fight. Nor is the leader the problem. Americans often want to "fix" things by replacing the leader...
More at The Washington Post.
Comments
I think it's a mistake to believe that we can compel partners in foreign cultures to act against their self interest--holding power and rewarding clients--if we just get the carrots and sticks right. That's akin to thinking that success in counterinsurgency comes naturally if we just get the exact right number of troops. It assumes a degree of complementary interests and perspectives that just isn't there.
We must remember that President Karzai and his patrons benefit from the existing situation and hence have a great interest in preserving it. Without an insurgency, he is the leader of a backward, impoverished state that no one cares much about.
Ultimately the problems lie deeper than just adjusting carrots and sticks.