How Not to Lose Afghanistan at NYT Room for Debate

Ralph Peters provides an alternative take over at the NY Post "Afgan-Nam Blues". One thing I like about Mr. Peters, there is never any doubt where he is coming from, he is plain spoken and direct.

His thoughts on the prospects (and pitfalls) of "nation building" in Afghanistan, extending centralized authority in Afghanistan and our constrained policy thinking with respect to the utility of violence make it a good article to contrast against some of the others.

As Ken points out, Paraq Khana's observation is a good one to contemplate where our proposed "cure" may make for a stronger infection that spreads beyond what we've anticipated.

Paraq Khana:
"Even if an additional 30,000 American and NATO troops were deployed in southern and eastern Afghanistan, the Taliban problem would not be reduced. It would merely be pushed back over the Pakistan border, destabilizing Pakistans already volatile North-West Frontier Province, which itself is more populous than Iraq. This amounts to squeezing a balloon on one end to inflate it on the other"

A nervous India about Pakistan's future fueled by some future event along the lines of Mumbai with a hint of Pakistan involvement (even the perception matters) may be one possible outcome we unwittingly set the stage for by our actions in Afghanistan.

As Ken noted, Khana goes on to say:

"At the same time, America will have to accept Afghan and Pakistani negotiations with Taliban commanders, who have emerged from a deep Punjabi and Pashtun social base that cannot be eradicated anytime soon.

Just as needed are provisional reconstruction teams in Pakistans tribal areas, like those that have been established in parts of Afghanistan. These Pakistani-led teams should be provided with the cash and supplies to install power generators, to give local police officers more pay and to hire thousands of local Pashtun to build roads, hospitals and schools."

No easy answers here either. I don't know how willing Pakistan is to have our "PRTs" in an area that is going to require security to operate in, and I don't know how much capability we have to train Pakistanis to form their own PRTs - and I don't think anyone else has both the capability and the desire to operate there.

Maybe with respect to our regional concerns, containment using an approach that initially sets the stage for such an effort while doing something along the lines of what Peters suggests in the outlying areas, and also building some degree of increased capability and capacity into the Afghan Security Forces in select areas might make for a balanced approach with greater flexibility.

My thoughts are that this (our involvement with Afghanistan)will not end with the Obama presidency (even assuming he has back to back terms). Better to lay out a 10 year timeline and consider if its feasible, desirable and sustainable vs. adhocing our way through it from election to election and budget to budget. Lets be up front so we can build it into the baseline budget, support the commanders and planners and have more options with respect to communicating with our various partners. Better to lay out a serious campaign and consider the consequences that might allow us to get out of a 1 year supplemental installment plan that constrains commanders and staffs, as well as diplomats - and one that has supports the sometimes opposing views of regional players greater latitude in gaining advantages and playing off our perspective partners against one another - to our detriment.

Best, Rob

Best, Rob

Nagl writes: <I>"... 20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every 1,000 people, or some 600,000 for all of Afghanistan..."</I>

Is that 20 to 25 counterinsurgents who actually patrol, fight, and gather intelligence? Or is it a rough ratio of total troops in-country? If it is the former, then that would translate into a million, or more, in-country. What is our tooth-to-tail ratio these days? What about our allies' ratios? Also, if 4 American advisors are supervising 30 ANA/ANP, do you count the 4 advisors as counterinsurgents, since they're busy advising, rather than countering?

Obviously, we don't go walking around counting each Soldier individually, according to who is doing what. I just wonder how applicable that historical standard of 20 to 25 is, given how we operate now. I also wonder if the numbers even matter.

I love experts.

Professor Kori Schake: <blockquote> "More American troops isnt enough to succeed in Afghanistan... (The US should spend effort) diversifying the potential leadership and setting rules in the political domain that will produce a less corrupt, broader-based government."</blockquote>No they isn't. The more knotty problem is how does one go about practically implementing her valid suggestion, My suspicion is that the time to effect that change exceeds most of our lifetimes.
-
Bruce Reidel:<blockquote>"We should seek more troops from our NATO allies but also from Muslim allies like Morocco and Indonesia that have a common interest in defeating Al Qaeda. It can be done; already the United Arab Emirates has a few hundred troops in Afghanistan."</blockquote>Always good to hear from Langley alumni. More NATO troops would be nice but the Nations willing to let their people engage are already maxed out or close to it. Those with some troops left to commit are not disposed towards combat employment. Afghans distrust other Muslims for several reasons. Many Muslim nations will make an issue of fighting other Muslims in conjunctiion with westerners and the UAE Engineers and Hospital aren't fighting (unless attacked) but they are helping. Not some of the best advice I've seen.
-
John Nagl:<blockquote>"The essence of success is counterinsurgency, which requires boots on the ground, and plenty of them -- 20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every 1,000 people, or some 600,000 for all of Afghanistan, a country larger and more populous than Iraq. The additional 30,000 American forces on tap for deployment to Afghanistan over the next year are sorely needed, but obviously insufficient to protect all 30 million people in the country."</blockquote>Acknowledging that foreign forces cannot do that job, he suggests an Afghan army of 250K. That ratio is a rough rule of historical provenance, it has no real practical value and those who use it often forget to count some player. In any event, the questions become: Affordability? Afghan National Police effort? Time? Costs? Other players actions?
-
Some good came forth. Andrew Exum with some common sense:<blockquote>"There is little reason to believe that the current Afghan political class -- even if provided with a window of security similar to that created in Iraq -- would be able or willing to push through the necessary reforms to make Afghanistan a stable and secure place in which terrorist networks, including the Taliban, are incapable of presenting a threat or a safe haven for other groups."</blockquote>Probably true. If so what are we doing?
-
Lastly comes the one who truly seems to understand the problem. Paraq Khanna:<blockquote>"Even if an additional 30,000 American and NATO troops were deployed in southern and eastern Afghanistan, the Taliban problem would not be reduced. It would merely be pushed back over the Pakistan border, destabilizing Pakistans already volatile North-West Frontier Province, which itself is more populous than Iraq. This amounts to squeezing a balloon on one end to inflate it on the other. ...

At the same time, America will have to accept Afghan and Pakistani negotiations with Taliban commanders, who have emerged from a deep Punjabi and Pashtun social base that cannot be eradicated anytime soon.

Just as needed are provisional reconstruction teams in Pakistans tribal areas, like those that have been established in parts of Afghanistan. These Pakistani-led teams should be provided with the cash and supplies to install power generators, to give local police officers more pay and to hire thousands of local Pashtun to build roads, hospitals and schools."</blockquote>The policy makers should pay attention to the last two in the changed order in which I placed them and calculate the costs. They probably won't and, rather, will listen to the first three. Then what?