Small Wars Journal

Economist Debate: Afghanistan

Mon, 05/17/2010 - 10:38am
The latest Economist Debate is on Afghanistan; with opening statements by John Nagl, President of the Center for a New American Security, and Peter W. Galbraith, Former Deputy UN Envoy to Afghanistan.

Nagl:

The war in Afghanistan is winnable because for the first time the coalition fighting there has the right strategy and the resources to begin to implement it.

Galbraith:

The war in Afghanistan is not winnable because America does not have a credible Afghan partner and there is no prospect that one will emerge.

Join the debate and vote at The Economist.

Comments

Anonymous (not verified)

Wed, 05/19/2010 - 1:37pm

"The powers involved must agree to over a long period of conflict against Al Qaeda and the Taliban to finally stabilize the region to a degree where it doesn't spill over into parts of the world where it is not desired, i.e. East Asia, Africa, Europe, North and South America."

...

Or they should just kill and help anyone willing to kill Al Qaeda and not play a blind and elaborately stupid game of risk with other people's blood and money.

TD Baker (not verified)

Tue, 05/18/2010 - 4:21pm

For historical context: Priot to 9-11, the U.S. would likely have continued ignoring the Taliban in Afghanistan and continued to simply voice their objections to the destruction of ancient cultural icons and human rights by the Taliban in the UN forums. All of that has changed... Considering the policies of the current U.S. administration, Mr. Galbraith's view seems more likely. When the Taliban decided to align with and shelter Osama Bin Laden and his band, that instigated the long conflict with the western powers which are currently discussing how to "win" in Afghanistan. The question of winning may be more of what international policies might be formulated by what organization that keep the interest of western powers. The powers involved must agree to over a long period of conflict against Al Qaeda and the Taliban to finally stabilize the region to a degree where it doesn't spill over into parts of the world where it is not desired, i.e. East Asia, Africa, Europe, North and South America. Afghanistan and the actors involved will remain a "wicked problem" in the medium term. It should no be a problem for those with a weakness of will.

Malak (not verified)

Tue, 05/18/2010 - 3:45am

<i>"What is it exactly that we are going to win?"</i>

More endless "responsibilities" and power politics charity cases.

jp (not verified)

Mon, 05/17/2010 - 10:06pm

Galbraith, isn't he the Kurdistani oil mogul? He's bullish for Kurdish autonomy, bearish on Afghan freedom.

Guess he hasn't received any natural gas deals yet from Karzai. If he does gain entry to a sweeet Afghan gas deal, I'm sure he will be all for a Talib-free Afghanistan at the expense of America's tax dollars and soldiers.

Ralph Sisson (not verified)

Mon, 05/17/2010 - 8:39pm

Could we change the word winning to finishing? I like most of Nagl's argument better, but he does sort of slide over the issue of how we form any kind of functioning Afghan government. Even in his best case scenario, what happens 5 years after we are gone? Is it worth the cost?

Steve

And to go a bit further, what actually constitutes "winning" or "success" in Afghanistan? I hear a lot of vague references to "stable government" being thrown about, but how stable were Afghanistan's stable times? The most "stable" prime minister, though instituting a series of liberal democratic reforms, was replaced in a coup in 1973. The Soviet invasion (while certainly not beneficial for Afghanistan), was a response to a coup in Afghanistan.

Does reconciliation with the Taliban and Taliban incorporation into the Afghan government constitute winning?

Does winning simply depend on the definition of success?

Anonymous (not verified)

Mon, 05/17/2010 - 1:48pm

What is it exactly that we are going to win?

Chiken little (not verified)

Mon, 05/17/2010 - 1:40pm

The debate does not get to the heart of the issue as NATO has lost the initiative while at the same time NATO have lost the will to see the war concluded.

The center of gravity has been tipped and, I asses, that there is no going back.

The political will does not exist, within the USA, to contiue the mission. Both the executive and legeslative branches will seek reelection both this year and 2012. In order for them to get reelected, they must fullfil the major campain of removing USA troops from Afghanistan and therefore it is highly unlikely that the resources, refrenced by Nagl, will remain there.

I am not optimistic Afghanistan simply because I do not expect both Afghans and the USA government to act agianst their own best intrest. Afghans know that we are leaving and so there is no incentive to start cooperating now.

Schmedlap

Mon, 05/17/2010 - 12:14pm

Nagl seems to have the less weak argument. Most of it we've heard or read before. But one thing stuck out to me as somewhat new from the CNAS clique...

<blockquote><em>... the coalition and its Afghan partners must build a state that reconciles a degree of centralised governance with the traditional tribal and religious power structures that hold sway outside Kabul.</em></blockquote>

All right! Nice to see that acknowledged. However, I don't understand how he justifies the "how to" part of it...

<blockquote><em>Achieving these minimal goals will require continued support for an increasingly capable Afghan army and much more effort in building a police force that can earn the trust of the people, as well as a greater Afghan commitment to good governance and to providing for the needs of the people wherever they live.</em></blockquote>

That sounds like a very western approach to wooing public opinion. The second half of it is pretty vague, which gives me some hope that this is an idea in development. As for the first half, I don't see how it reconciles the sharp differences between urban elites who wish to assert authority over the rural communities, and the rural community members whose values and perceived interests lead them to reject that authority. It almost seems like saying, "you don't like us asserting authority over you? Well then, do you like it now that we're attempting to do so with more firepower and now that we're attempting to displace even more of your customary practices?"

Galbraith seems to have an even weaker argument, asserting that we cannot defeat the insurgents unless the government obtains the loyalty of the people and then turns the people against the insurgents. He provides no evidence for why this chain of events must unfold in this manner. Indeed, he ignores evidence for why it does not need to.