If it is not possible to establish effective national security forces in Afghanistan within a relevant period of time, does the U.S. have a Plan B for Afghanistan? Also in today's Wall Street Journal (and also subscription only) is an op-ed by Jack Devine, a former deputy director of operations at the CIA and chief of the CIA Afghan task force in 1986-1987.
In his first paragraph, Devine dismisses any chance of victory under the current program. He unfavorably compares the current U.S. strategy to the Soviet campaign in the 1980s which he helped defeat. Devine recommends planning now for the worst case scenario. His solution is a large CIA covert action in support of the remnants of the Karzai regime, tribal leaders, and other warlords whose interests in the region overlap with the U.S. government's.
Devine's recommendation gives up on the idea of supporting Afghanistan as a functioning nation-state. He also discusses the requirements of an effective CIA covert action: a clear Presidential Finding (required by law), bipartisan congressional support, U.S. public support, competent indigenous partners, and sound policy objectives.
Could President Obama, the Congress, and the American public support a large CIA program that directed cash, weapons, and air support to anti-Taliban tribes and warlords? The result would be U.S. complicity in Afghanistan's continuing chaos, a policy that would seem to be a political non-starter. A non-starter unless all other U.S. plans had failed, the Taliban and al Qaeda were again on the march, and the U.S. found its back against the wall.
Comments
MAJ K:
Regarding this statement:
"If the Taliban control AFG now, so what. An AQ HVT is an HVT is an HVT and there are ways to deal with them in which the CIA and SOF are well versed in."
The CIA and SOF have had years and years to find Osama and Mullah Omar and haven't been able to do it. Since 2001 the they have been in just a part of Pakistan and the spooks still haven't been able to get them. If they had the whole country of Afghanistan to hide in perhaps that would make it even less likely that the spooks would be able to do what they haven't done. The CIA and SOF wouldn't be on the ground in Afghanistan if the Taliban won so how good would the intel be? The Pak Army/ISI throws them a bone once in awhile now but if the Taliban won, why would they continue? They could just say that's Afghanistan, not our affair. We would be back to the year 2000.
kdog: During the 80s the Saudis and the Pakistani Army/ISI were also working against the Soviets. Plan B wouldn't have their support, it would be working against them. In 2001 we were so upset that we scared hell out of everybody and they got out of the way. We aren't scaring anybody now. And anyway what is the ultimate goal of Plan B? If it was to win and it succeeded we would be right where we are now. If it isn't what's the point?
Jason Thomas, I do not think the article is saying the CIA alone would be the sole implementers in Plan B, but it does advocate a much smaller, behind the scenes involvement of our forces.
The article says:
"the strategy should focus on forging the kind of relationships necessary to keep Afghanistan from re-emerging as Al Qaeda's staging ground once our forces depart, and also continuing the hunt for Osama bin Laden"
The article says:
"the large and visible occupying army" "is simply the wrong force"
The article says:
"we need to do is be more like ourselves in the 1980's and months follow the attacks of 9/11"
"small band of CIA operators restored old ties to Afghan tribal leaders, teamed up with Special Forces, and backed with US air power, toppled the Taliban in weeks"
kdog101
The inference in the article is that the CIA alone would be the sole implementers in the Plan B stratedy because they succeeded in the past. I may be wrong so please correct me.
In 2001 and during the campaign against the Soviets, there were other players involved.
This included a growing, not weakening, political will and a clear objective.
kdog101,
You said, "<i>In retrospect, what do you think we should have done differently as far as supporting the Mujahideen fight against Soviet Union?</i>
In retrospect to 1979, and just as applicable to the current situation, <b>nothing</b> should have been done in Afghanistan vis-a-vis the Soviets just like nothing needs to be done in AFG against al-Qaeida now. Using the muj to fight a domino effect in Central Asia (in actuality, simply to 'embarrass' the Russians and immaturely get some payback for Vietnam) was as poorly a thought out strategy as the current fight in AFG is to combat the spread of AQ and limit their use of AFG as a safe haven. Well, strike that...at least Operation Cyclone <i>was</i> a strategy compared to what we're pursuing now.
I appreciate the argument that 'it was different during the Cold War' and the Russians were an existential threat which somehow translates into the necessity to fight them militarily everywhere we could. But that's as much as a falsehood as the claim that hindsight makes the mistakes of '79 all seem clear now. It should have been seen then just like the failure of our long-term policies in AFG should be seen right now as we follow the current campaign plan. Stopping the spread of communism in the Cold War with direct military confrontation (proxy war or not) was *not* the original 'commander's intent' nor policy of the day...to fight them militarily. It was the simple, fast way out of the intellectually rigorous endeavor postulated by NSC-68. Similar aversion to intellectual rigor inhibits our foreign policy today. Armed nation building sounds like the easiest and fastest way to ensure AQ can't remain in Afghanistan but the past 9 years say otherwise. The past 9 yrs were simply a course of action which allowed all the other instruments of national power and departments of the government to take a back seat to the DoD who was assumed to be the right tool for the right job. Well, its not. Nor is the job one which we need to work at anyway. Like someone posted earlier, if all of Vietnam went Red in the 1950s or the 1960s, so what? If the Taliban control AFG now, so what. An AQ HVT is an HVT is an HVT and there are ways to deal with them in which the CIA and SOF are well versed in.
I guess I'm getting around to the fact that getting the muj to do our dirty work in AFG was not a national interest beyond one-upsmanship with the Soviets. It was a detached game for suits in DC to play with millions of people's lives in Central Asia. The Soviet Union was getting to its last legs anyway. We knew economic and diplomatic COAs were working but we chose the another proxy war as the sexy, easy way out to the long, boring, drawn-out process of containment. We just killed over a million and a half people (conservatively) to speed it up. Worth it?
Is it worth it to force Afghanistan to adopt changes in their government and culture as a quick way to speed up our denial of safe-havens to AQ (which is entirely debatable anyway)? Or is the slow, boring, drawn-out process of HVT targeting, a "Muslim Enlightenment", other diplomatic and economic sticks and carrots aimed at the Arab and C. Asian states who export it to AFG, and containment of a radical threat a better use of our resources and talents?
Jason Thomas you said: "But a CIA led program as a Plan B will not succeed and seems quite short sighted considering the vast experience that is behind the initial recommendation in the WSJ"
Why won't a CIA led program as Plan B not succeed? It was successful against the Soviets when we supported the Mujahideen. It was successful in 2001 when we supported the Northern Alliance. What makes you think it will fail this time?
Major K you said "There's absolutely nothing new here. This 'new' Plan B is just a tired, dusted off copy of OP Cyclone's playbook from 1979. I still submit that's what got us into this mess in the first place, hindsight or not."
I will grant you that supporting the Mujahideen may have been a major factor leading to Al Queda. In retrospect, what do you think we should have done differently as far as supporting the Mujahideen fight against Soviet Union?
Maj K
I second that. The suggested Plan B is also too simplistic given the complex nature of AFG and the intractable interference by Pakistan.
There needs to be an evaluation by the US as to the state we are prepared to accept AFG. The current goals and expectations are still way too high. The objectives set out at the Kabul Conference were made for a country that had come through a revolution seeking to enter a new chapter in its national transformation.
The CIA have a defined role in working towards this objective (whatever that maybe) that includes a tactical operational presence in Pakistan. But a CIA led program as a Plan B will not succeed and seems quite short sighted considering the vast experience that is behind the initial recommendation in the WSJ
<i>Devine recommends planning now for the worst case scenario. His solution is a large CIA covert action in support of the remnants of the Karzai regime, tribal leaders, and other warlords whose interests in the region overlap with the U.S. governments. </i>
There's absolutely nothing new here. This 'new' Plan B is just a tired, dusted off copy of OP Cyclone's playbook from 1979. I still submit that's what got us into this mess in the first place, hindsight or not.
The CIA and Mr. Devine should be kept far, far away from any future "strategic" planning in Afghanistan. If Plan 'A' fails to generate enough ANSF and non-corrupt GIRoA capacity by the time domestic politics make us leave anyway, Plan 'B' should entail strategic withdrawal and a realization that nothing in AFG under our current campaign plan relates to national interests. I especially liked Nicholas Kristof's recent article about school vs. soldiers in the NYT. Makes much more sense than 140,000+ boots on the ground chasing our tails.
RT you said "How exactly would this be different from the US officially supplying aid to the Karzai regime, or any other faction(s) the US supported?"
RT, I think the CIA with the military supporting them would be the best configuration. I think the CIA is trained to think beyond a military focus, and just naturally fits this kind of role.
I do not think anyone knows what will happen, but in the beginning of this conflict the CIA was successful at working with the Northern alliance tribes. More importantly getting the US soldiers out of site and out of harms way is a good thing for both us and the Afghans. I imagine the US soldiers attract violence and insight anger no matter how careful we try to be.
I do not know if things will turn out better with the CIA, but at least we are less invested in the region and we transfer the ownership and responsibility to the people that actually live there.
After the flotilla incident the US Administration called the blockade of Gaza unsustainable. Yet Israel still was able to managed the situation and I kept my open air prison. Just like we will be able to counter CENTCOM Red Teams report.
CENTCOM said that Deputy Foreign Minister Ayalon had been stupid in relation to his comments, yet your boss Secretary of Defense Gates used similar terms in relation to the syndicate, Afghan Taliban, TTP, LeT, al-Qaida. Your own boss must be stupid then with his comments, in your professional view. "Putting Hizbullah, Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaida and others in the same sentence as if they are all the same is just stupid." There you go CENTCOM says former CIA Director Gates is stupid.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/gallery/2008/feb/13/terrorism?picture=3…
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imad_Mughniyah
Don't you all worry about Khowst, people can laugh. I keep Islamic Jihad in the world largest open air prison and during OP Cast Lead 1,300 hostages were liquidated, Christmas/New Year so the public would pay less attention, government departments on skeleton staff. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_War
"Why would we be looking to the CIA for a "plan" in the first place?"
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defens…
It is called inter-agency cooperation.
Why would we be looking to the CIA for a "plan" in the first place?
A while back I read Robert Baer's GQ article regarding the need for an effort to re-organize, remodel, and remake the CIA "from the studs" in the wake of the attack on their Khost base. Interesting article until he made the end of piece quip: "The military cannot be trusted to oversee all intelligence-gathering on its own..." Equally, the CIA should not be trusted with the responsiblity for prosecuting combat/war fighting on its own. Especially when they feel that interagency cooperation is beneath them.
CIA as lead agency, I vote no.
http://freedomwatchonfox.com/2010/07/10/07102010-freedom-watch-w-ron-pa…
Slide the control bar over to around 25:30 seconds and goes to around the 30:00 even mark. You will hear Jack Devine(former CIA) describe the CIA plan for after General Patraeus is done! and he believes he will meet with some success in bringing some stablility to A'stan,but we need a longer term plan for afterwards.
Slap, I have to disagree about the CIA. They have effectively been the fools of the Pak Army/ISI for years and years and to give them the prime role would just stimulate creative mischief making on the part of the Pak Army general staff. by carl
carl,I don't think the CIA is a fool to anybody,however their Political masters often are.
RT - Our support for the mujahideen in the 1980s was widely known at the time, and I assume that "covert" in this discussion is just shorthand for intelligence-run. It could hardly be kept secret.
Anonymous 11:14 AM - You're right that al-Qaida does operate in Afghanistan already and probably never completely left. But I think it would be a change from the current situation if the AQ leadership in Pakistan is able to move back, or if AQ is able to extend its base areas from Pakistan to eastern and southern Afghanistan.
Probably nothing else would change except that the nominal front would move west from the Durand line to a tribal boundary running down the middle of Afghanistan. But with US regular forces gone, drone strikes and commando assaults would no longer be adjunct to a larger effort and would be the scope of our entire activity (and would have to be based in other countries) if they continue. We would have to decide if this activity should continue under the new conditions.
Oh the Agency has a plan B alright: just as they did dating back to Air America and the Nationalist Chinese Army in the early 1950s, heroin laboratories in Laos in the 70s, Noriega in Panama, the Contra support in C. America, cooperation with the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan in the 1980s (those mules didn't come back empty), and with the Haitian Service dIntelligence National in the 1980s to 1990s. It seems there's always collusion between the CIA, in heroin and cocaine production and distribution in these regions, which eventually finds its associated misery onto U.S. shores. . .the byproduct of covert action?
That is always the problem with the CIA's Plan B.
First, I don't have a WSJ subscription and haven't read the two articles cited by Mr. Haddick.
The first article is said to state that very highly trained Afghan soldiers do well and veteran Afghan soldiers do well. Newly recruited soldiers and poorly trained police don't do well. That seems consistent with the history of all military and pare-military forces and shouldn't be a surprise to anybody.
I am line with RT and kdog. Why would this be better done with the CIA than the Army and Marine Corps? If Mr. Devine's requirements for "an effective CIA covert action: a clear Presidential Finding (required by law), bipartisan congressional support, U.S. public support, competent indigenous partners, and sound policy objectives." were met, the thing would be doable with the same slate of actors starring in the play now.
Slap, I have to disagree about the CIA. They have effectively been the fools of the Pak Army/ISI for years and years and to give them the prime role would just stimulate creative mischief making on the part of the Pak Army general staff.
Mr. Devine's plan is extremely distasteful for the reason mentioned by Mr. Haddick. It won't ever come to be anyway because if "the Taliban and al Qaeda were again on the march, and the U.S. found its back against the wall.", it would be because we would have been thoroughly cowed by the Pakistani Army/ISI and wouldn't have the spirit to do anything but leave and blame others for our failure.
Not sure why people are constantly saying if al Aqeada is coming back when it fact it never left Afghanistan and it is now in what appears to be the conducting of an advisory and training role in a "live environment". So why do not we simply drop the pretense that there are only a 'few" remaining Aq personnel inside Afghanistan.
Really think the argument for a Plan B is outdated as I have not even seen Plan A in effect as no one wants to address that the fact that a majority of the Taliban are Pashtun and the Pashtun make of 60% of the population controlling the majority of the southern major cities---so really just where is Plan A? And now that the latest poll shows 6 out 10 Pakistani's are anti US---where do we go here?
I'm afraid I am somewhat confused by the discussion here. How exactly would any CIA aid be covert? Everyone would know we were providing aid to them--the Afghans would tell people themselves, if it was not already apparent. How exactly would this be different from the US officially supplying aid to the Karzai regime, or any other faction(s) the US supported? Why excatly would the CIA need to have the lead for this--especially since a greater vareity of aid could be gained through using DOD and State?
I would vote for it in a heartbeat and I didn't even read the article. The CIA are the only ones that have been given a Mission in Afghanistan not once but twice and both times they accomplished it. Having bumped into a couple of CIA types in my time I can only say that they were smart,tough and dedicated.And they don't need a COIN/Unconventional Warfare manual because they are the ones that wrote the original one!
Turn them loose!
narciso you said: "Didn't we try that with Somalia, some years back, and we ended up with the Islamic Courts regime in power"
I do not think so. I think our Somalia intervention was through the UN and was largely a food program. I do not think we actively chose a side to support. Please correct me if I am wrong.
As far as the reference to the CIA article (don't have WSJ subscription) it sounds like this was our plan A, and didn't it work pretty well? Lets support Karzai in Kabul, Northern alliance tribes in north, anti-taliban tribes in the south. If they get some resistance, maybe that will bind them together. The Afghans Karzai recently visited in Kandahar seemed very motivated to take back control. Lets support them in this.
Afghanistan and Pakistan are likely to engage our covert attention as long as al-Qaida has a covert presence. If I understand his argument, Mr. Devine suggests that after our regular forces leave Afghanistan, we might employ covert action to prevent al-Qaida from coming back. He argues that our role in Afghanistan in the 1980s shows that covert action can be successful if the American people support it and the action has a realistic political aim.
In the 1980s, our covert action in Afghanistan had the finite aim to evict a foreign power and did not otherwise try to influence the internal politics of the country. Following a US withdrawal today, we might still pursue a finite albeit different aim. The Taliban will try to crush those opposed to them. If we send covert aid to this opposition, and if it has the unity and effectiveness to achieve a negotiated outcome or an armed standoff, our role could be limited in both degree and time. However, if the opposition is not united or effective, a more open-ended conflict would result, and it could widen if the Taliban allow al-Qaida back into their parts of Afghanistan and we respond by waging a covert war on those who shelter them.
If the northern peoples of Afghanistan can defend their parts of the country with outside help and not fall into strife among themselves, Taliban momentum can be stopped. The threat or reality of American covert action might induce the Taliban to keep al-Qaida out of their areas. But covert action by us under these conditions would not be the same as it was in the 1980s and the differences need to be underlined as much as the similarities.
It looks like there are a tad more al Aqeada in Afghanistan than has been mentioned in the mainstream media.
Analysis: Al Qaeda maintains an extensive network in Afghanistan
By Bill Roggio July 29, 2010
There better be a Plan C!
On May 21 there was a suicide attack in Paktia province in Afghanistan that was initially claimed by the Taliban, but was later traced back to al Qaeda. The facts surrounding that strike and others, as well as information gleaned from US military press releases, paint a picture of al Qaeda that contradicts recent statements by top US intelligence officials who estimated al Qaeda's strength in Afghanistan as being limited to between 50 and 100 operatives.
"I think at most, we're looking at maybe 50 to 100 [al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan], maybe less," Panetta said on ABC News This Week on June 27. "It's in that vicinity. There's no question that the main location of al-Qaeda is in tribal areas of Pakistan."
Explicit confirmation of al Qaeda's recent activity in Afghanistan came in a propaganda video released by As Sahab, al Qaeda's media arm, stating that the May 21 suicide assault against an Afghan border police outpost in Urgun in Paktia province was carried out by four al Qaeda operatives.
The video, titled "The Raid of the Two Sheikhs; Abu Hamza al Muhajir and Abu Omar al Baghdadi, may Allah have mercy on them," shows the four al Qaeda operatives giving their martyrdom statements before carrying out the assault. The four al Qaeda operatives are identified as Luqman al Makki, from Mecca in Saudi Arabia; Na'imallah al Swati from the district of Swat in Pakistan; Mus'ab al Turki, from Turkey; and Musa al Afghani, from Afghanistan.
While the attack by the four al Qaeda operatives was a failure, as three of the suicide bombers were killed in a firefight with Afghan police and only one policeman was killed, the attack demonstrates that al Qaeda is still actively conducting operations inside Afghanistan.
Within the past eight months, Al Qaeda is known to have carried out several suicide attacks along the border. The most prominent attack was executed by Humam Khalil Muhammed Abu Mulal al Balawi, a Jordanian who was also known as Abu Dujanah al Khurasani, on Dec. 30, 2009. The Jordanian suicide bomber killed seven CIA agents and security guards and a Jordanian intelligence official at Combat Outpost Chapman in Khost. COP Chapman was used to aid in the covert US Predator campaign that targets al Qaeda and Taliban operatives inside Pakistan's tribal areas.
Other recent attacks that can be directly traced to al Qaeda include an attack in the spring by Abi Zaid al Makki (another Saudi) on a Afghan outpost in Khost, and a failed attack by Abu Dijana San'aani, a Yemeni who served as a bomb maker for al Qaeda, near Kabul on May 9.
Further demonstrating al Qaeda's presence in Afghanistan, over the past year Coalition and Afghan forces have killed numerous al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan, as well as several other commanders who fought in Afghanistan but were based in Pakistan.
On May 25, Coalition and Afghan forces killed a "key al Qaeda leader" during a clash in the eastern province of Paktia. On Jan. 19, the Turkistan Islamic Party admitted that 15 of its members, including 13 Uighurs and two Turks, were killed during a Predator airstrike in Badghis province in northwestern Afghanistan. The group, which is closely allied to al Qaeda (Abdul Haq al Turkistani, the leader of the Turkistan Islamic Party, sits on al Qaeda's top shura), issued a statement confirming their deaths. And on Oct. 6, 2009, three al Qaeda embedded military trainers (these are al Qaeda operatives sent to Taliban units to impart tactics and skills) were killed in Herat.
As recently as June 27, in a single incident a total of 15 al Qaeda operatives, "including eight Arabs, five Pakistanis and two Afghans," were killed after an IED detonated prematurely in a compound in Paktika province in eastern Afghanistan.
In an attempt to disrupt al Qaeda's operations in Afghanistan, the US has also utilized targeted Predator strikes in Pakistan's bordering tribal areas to kill several top al Qaeda military leaders who fight in Afghanistan. Mustafa Abu Yazid, al Qaeda's top leader for Afghanistan, was killed in a strike in North Waziristan on May 21. Al Qaeda quickly replaced Yazid by naming Sheikh Fateh al Masri as the new commander af Afghanistan.
More recently, on June 10, two Arab al Qaeda military commanders and a Turkish foreign fighter were killed in North Waziristan. Sheikh Ihsanullah was an "Arab al Qaeda military commander"; Ibrahim was the commander of the Fursan-i-Mohammed Group. On June 19, an al Qaeda commander named Abu Ahmed and 11 members of the Islamic Jihad Union were killed in North Waziristan.
Al Qaeda's extensive reach in Afghanistan is documented in the body of press releases issued in recent years by the International Security Assistance Force. Looking at press releases dating back to March 2007, The Long War Journal has been able to detect the presence of al Qaeda and affiliated groups such as the Islamic Jihad Union in 45 different districts in 15 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces.
Al Qaeda operates in conjunction with the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and the Hizb-i-Islami Guldbuddin network throughout Afghanistan. Al Qaeda operatives often serve as embedded military trainers for Taliban field units and impart tactics and bomb-making skills to these forces. Al Qaeda often supports the Taliban by funding operations and providing weapons and other aid, according to classified military memos released by Wikileaks.
This picture is vastly different from the one painted by top Obama administration intelligence officials including CIA Director Leon Panetta and Nation Counterterrorism Center Director Michal Leiter.
Read more: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/07/analysis_al_qaeda_ma.php…
Even when it hasn't been articulated or actively contemplated, this has always been the logical "Plan B" (as I've argued in the past on SWC). It's also one that has tragic consequences for Afghans, whatever its attractions to outside powers.
One additional thought--the US isn't the only player in this, and this will likely be the alternative course of action by other regional actors regardless of what the US does. The Russians will certainly, as they have in the past, throw support to the former Northern Alliance. The Iranians may find limited support for the Taliban a useful counter to ISAF, but don't want to see them in power and would step up support to their Hazara allies. India would, as part of its ongoing strategic rivalry with Pakistan, augment its support for anti-Taliban elements... etc, etc.
See also: Lebanese civil war, 1975-90 (a very similar dynamic).