



Editor's Corner

Welcome to the second edition of *Small Wars Journal's* monthly newsletter - we hope you find it both useful and interesting. Have something you think our community of interest and practice should know about? Please send it along to comment@smallwarjournal.com.—SWJ

SWJ News

Journal. SWJ continues to receive quality article submissions from students and practitioners of Small Wars and related issues. Many thanks to all our talented authors.

Small Wars Journal, Vol. 7, No. 4 was published on 2 May and featured new (as of 30 April) articles as well as select reprints and an index of all articles from April. [Click here](#) for the full issue, or directly on these titles for single articles.

- *Iraq's Hard-Won Lessons for Future Transitions in the Middle East* by Peter J. Munson
- *Sandals and Robes to Business Suits and Gulf Streams: Warfare in the 21st Century* by MG Michael T. Flynn
- *Iraq: The Whole Thing Was Much Harder Than It Needed To Be* by Robert Tollast
- *The Pacification of Zaganiyah (Part One): Fighting for Intelligence to Overcome the Information Gap* by James Michael Few
- *The Philosophy behind the Iraq Surge: An Interview with General Jack Keane* by Octavian Manea
- *Book Review: The Ayatollah's Democracy: An Iranian Challenge* by Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein

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Vol. 7, No. 5 was published shortly after this newsletter was finalized and can be [found here](#).


A recap (with links) of single published articles over the last month follows:

Iraq's Hard-Won Lessons for Future Transitions in the Middle East (1 May) by Peter J. Munson. Lieutenant Colonel Munson writes that after eight years after the American-led invasion of Iraq, the Middle East sits at a crossroads. While it is a unique case, the Iraqi experience holds hard-won lessons for what lies ahead. Rather than prescriptions on **how to "do it better next time,"** the lessons should be that transition is an unpredictable and protracted process that

cannot be predictably managed. This process can only find legitimacy in solutions that stem from the host society.

The April “Revolution” and the Soviet-Afghan War: Why Neither is a Good Analog to Today’s War in Afghanistan (1 May) by Colonel Joseph Collins. Colonel Collins writes that relative stability of 1933 to 1978 gave way to insurrection


first against Afghan communists, and later, the invading Soviet Union. The communist coup (April 1978) and the Soviet invasion (December 1979) touched off a period of 33 years of war that continues up to the present. If we review the basics, however, the Soviet experience is not a good analog for U.S. and NATO operations.



Look for Doctrine Man Adventures created exclusively for SWJ in each issue of the newsletter.

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THE FURTHER ADVENTURES OF
DOCTRINE MAN



Is Spending the Strategy? (4 May) By Scott Dempsey. The author argues that American foreign assistance has long been misunderstood if not ridiculed by detractors as a frivolous expense that does not serve American interests. In an attempt to reassert the relevance of aid on the battlefield, Congress and the Obama administration have allocated unprecedented resources - via USAID and the Commanders Emergency Reconstruction Program (CERP) - with the thought that money, when paired with military force, can stabilize even the most violent hotspots around the globe.

A Civilian's Comprehensive Critique of the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual...In 5-6 Pages (5 May) by Braden Civins. The author writes that the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, published in 2006, quickly became doctrine for the U.S. armed forces. While the manual has its share of detractors, even its fiercest critics acknowledge that it is **regarded as “transcendent” and has “become the defining characteristic of the...new way of war.”** This critique (1) explores the validity of a key assumption underlying the manual; (2) analyzes specific guidance offered as a result of that assumption; and (3) argues that the manual makes a significant omission of no small consequence.

Achieving a Peace Settlement between Abkhazia and Georgia: Lessons from Swiss Federalism (6 May) by Phillip K. Abbott. The author writes that since the end of the Georgian-Abkhazian War of 1992-93, negotiations failed to come up with a viable solution considered satisfactory to either side. To a great extent, any meaningful settlement must first rule out the subordination or exclusion

of ethnic minorities by the majority. Thus bringing us to the unique political culture of Swiss federal democracy, where leaders generally avoid speaking **in terms of “majority and minority”**. Instead, **“Swiss political structures strive to be volksnah [in touch with the people] and to every extent possible, respond to the wishes of all citizens.”**

While such an approach is not often observed in most democratic societies, this is one of many subtle features of the Swiss model that may offer a fresh look at addressing separatist movements.

The Closers, Part IV: Civilians in the Build Phase (9 May) by Colonel Gary Anderson. Colonel Anderson continues his *Closer* series. **“You Americans should not leave. Iraqis are incapable of governing ourselves. Within a year after you are gone, there will be chaos or another dictatorship. You are capable of ruling us; Iraqis are not”** -- Farmer Jamail, February, 2010, I was coming to the end of my tour. My conversation with Jamail that day was the last I would have with him. Nearly a year earlier our Governance Team had found the market area of Zaidon in a state of near chaos with a lethargic population, filthy and unpaved streets strewn with rubbish, and a pile of ruins where the milk collection plant had been. Without the collection plant, the dairy industry was depressed. That last day, the streets were clean and lighted, the potholes were gone, and solar lighting made night shopping possible. Business in the shops was booming and the once hostile populace was eager to talk and gossip with us. The foundation for the new milk collection facility had been laid, and it was scheduled to reopen within a year; indeed, it did open in early 2011.

To Design or Not to Design: In Conclusion (9 May) by Major Ben Zweibelson. Major Zweibelson closes his *Design* series. Is Design a necessary methodology for the U.S. Army? By codifying into service doctrine an entire chapter on design in FM 5-0, the Army appears to acknowledge the need for ontological approaches to complex systems. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency also featured a new Design chapter when updated in 2006. Although the presence of design in doctrinal form validates a substantial requirement for alternative methodologies to JOPP and MDMP, Army design in current form suffers from an identity crisis as well as extensive tacticization via institutional bias. To take higher guidance without critical thinking and launch into MDMP prioritizes analysis and description over synthesis and **explanation. Today's increasingly complex** conflict environments cannot function without Design consideration prior to any detailed planning processes initiating. Yet Design by its logic is a cumbersome and problematic methodology when applied to traditional military planning processes.

Computer Aided Democracy (CAD) (9 May) by Bob Cassilly. The author writes that the important roles computers and the internet played in stirring passions among activists in the Middle East come as no surprise to veterans of U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq. Since the U.S. involvement in Iraq in 2003, computers have steadily emerged as indispensable tools of unlimited potential in development of effective, transparent, and democratic government. When I first arrived in Tikrit as a PRT member in early 2006, Coalition efforts to computerize Iraq held a firm toehold but the process was still in its infancy. Coalition governments and

nongovernmental organizations had furnished most Iraqi government offices with caches of desk top computers loaded with a basic Microsoft Office package. Unfortunately, many of the computers were unused and the remainder was employed almost exclusively for word processing. Internet connections were rare and the sporadic electrical service of only hours per day was sufficient to temper the enthusiasm of even the most ardent computer user. My initial PRT assignment was as leader **of a small, international team of "governance advisors" who comprised one of the PRT's four technical advisory sections.** Our PRT was one of the State Department's **16, civilian** lead PRTs, whose mission was to be pushed forward into combat zones technical experts in governance, rule of law, economic development, political development, health, and reconciliation. They provided a level of front line expertise that would otherwise have been confined to the walled Embassy compound in Baghdad.

Deciphering Shades of Gray: Understanding Counterinsurgency (10 May) by Jon Mikolashek and Sean N. Kalic. The authors write that there is a current trend in the United States Army, advocated by some officers, that population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) theory should be the sole focus of their intellectual pursuits. Nicknamed COINistas by friend and foe alike, COINistas concern themselves with how and why insurgencies emerge. While this trend is understandable considering their numerous deployments in counterinsurgency environments, from an academic perspective they are narrowly focused and tend toward formulaic solutions. This means that they use their battlefield experience combined with recent and shallow knowledge gleaned from

several popular counterinsurgency studies to produce a simplified “strategy” for the current fight. The problem with **this “solution”** is that it overlooks the true complexity of the counterinsurgency fight by fixating on finding a simple solution. Our proposal is that there is a better way to understand counterinsurgency that will benefit the United States Army and the nation. The Army as an institution and these experienced and valiant, noble officers must incorporate more history into their critical thinking and study of insurgencies.

Are The Taliban And Al Qaeda Allies?

(11 May) By Paul Overby. The author writes that “In my view” should preface every statement here. It is likely the situation in Afghanistan is understood perfectly by no one, certainly not I. So I present these remarks as a prolegomenon or an extended suggestion to which others may compare their own thoughts. Any figures, for instance, are approximate. I combine references to some of my favorite books with personal experience garnered from a total of about two and a half years on the street as an independent observer in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the first nine months of which are described in my book **Holy Blood**. In the challenge of extricating ourselves from the war in Afghanistan, the most critical element is the actual and emotional heart of the opposition we are facing--the Taliban. This war which is taking an American life every day and costing \$2 billion a month is not, in all likelihood, militarily winnable. Though they are the reason we went to Afghanistan in the first place, al Qaeda is now marginal. After 9-11 our prime and overriding aim was to secure the American homeland against terror attacks by Islamist extremists like Osama bin Laden (inspiration, coordination,

oversight) and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (planning, execution) by preventing al Qaeda and similar groups from enjoying a sheltered gathering space in Afghanistan. The safe haven happened to be provided by the Taliban, but the real villains were AQ. But now, ironically, it is the Taliban we are expending most of our energy fighting.

U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project: The Nature of War Theory

(11 May) by Lieutenant Colonel Paul B. Olsen with Dr. Thomas J. Williams, Project Adviser. LTC Olsen writes **that today’s advances in evolutionary biology are unifying competing theories of natural selection and serve as a timely call for a similar unification of competing theories of war.** This paper explores the relationship between war and **natural selection by first examining war’s biological origins**, and then placing them within a multidisciplinary framework called the Nature of War Theory. This theory, as its name implies, reconciles natural selection and war to reveal a shared overarching and paradoxical duality, displaying that war is characterized by the simultaneous violent interplay of evolutionary individual-level and group-level adaptations, manifested by individualist and altruistic wars, respectively, and highlighted by trends and insights recognizable to both students of war and evolutionary biology.

The End State

(12 May) by Mike Young. The author writes that modernizing the Department of Defense (DOD) organization using known blueprints from the market place will allow the DOD to remove \$100B from its annual baseline budget without cutting a single weapon system program. Pretty bold statement; but take it to the bank. The Department of Defense (DOD) approach to organiza-

tion was once the organization construct most copied by large corporations in the **1950's**. **Back when General Motors** was the largest employer in the country, the competitive landscape did not change very often, and firms were able to sell everything they made to the domestic market. This management construct was put in place to reduce the chance to make mistakes and preserve the status quo. Most companies produced their overall profit and loss statements for the company as a whole, masking how each business unit fared. To say the competitive landscape has changed significantly **since the 1950's would not do it justice.**

After Bin Laden: Confronting the Haqqani Network in Kurram (12 May) by Reza Jan. The author writes that information gleaned after the killing of Osama bin Laden seems to indicate that bin Laden was much more centrally involved in running al Qaeda. Even so, his death is not a decisive blow to the network and it would be wrong to hail it as **such**. **In fact, al Qaeda's enduring links** to other militant Islamist groups in the region and the expansion of the al Qaeda-linked **Haqqani Network's** operational territory inside Pakistan serve to **broaden the group's room to maneuver** and increase its survivability.

A Recommendation for Quiet Professionals (13 May) by Colonel Dave Maxwell. COL Maxwell writes that there are two schools of thought in Special Operations regarding writing for publication. On one hand, there are those who suggest SOF operations and experiences should remain in the shadows known only to those within the community. On the other, there are those who argue the SOF story should be told in detail to ensure the proper recognition for, correct employment of, and sufficient resourc-

ing for SOF. I am a believer in a modified version of the second school—with one very important caveat. Quiet Professionals must put less emphasis on the **“quiet” and more on the “professional.”** As members of SOF, we have a professional responsibility to write and publish and share our experience with each other, the rest of the military and the interagency team as well as to inform, and yes, even influence, policy and decision makers. At the same time we have a responsibility to read and learn from the writings of our joint and interagency partners as the experiences of all must be cross-leveled, understood, and integrated. **As the old proverb goes, “intelligent men learn from their mistakes and wise men learn from the mistakes of others.”**

Battling Radical Islamist Propaganda in Somalia: The Information Intervention Option (14 May) by Jacob Udo-Udo Jacob. The author writes that while the international community continues to dither over Somalia, Islamic fundamentalists have taken over control of the **country's information space and other** key strategic assets. This article discusses the precarious media environment in Somalia and revisits discourses on Information Intervention, conceptualised by Jamie Metz in 1997. It **examines the nature of UN's ‘Information Intervention’ in Somalia and argues that** the international community can do more by drawing on available legal instruments to carry out ‘coercive’ information intervention.

Mission Command: Realizing Unified Action (15 May) by Colonel Richard N. Pedersen. This paper proposes to describe mission command in a more accurate and practicable way. Effectively integrating the operations process with-

in mission command activities in current and future environments is a complex problem. Enacting changes to time-honored and culturally inculcated institutional concepts is also a complex problem. Complex problems cannot be fully understood until possible solutions are proposed and developed through collaborative discussion and learned about through action. This paper provides a starting point for that process by offering three substantive proposals that may now be discussed and evaluated in order to stimulate further cultural change by transforming institutional concepts.

The Impact of Incorporating MRAPs into BCT's (16 May) by Major Joe Parker. The author writes that the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle had a highly publicized entry into the military ranks of vehicles, first with the Marines in 2004, and then eventually filling requirements with the Army to provide a dramatic increase in IED and blast protection than the ill-suited HMMVW for combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rushed in to production by as many as nine separate contractors, the endstate resulted in an accelerated production of multiple variations of the MRAP, with the types roughly categorized as Category I, II, and III and based on number of occupants and mission specific mine/IED clearance operations. Now, as the combat mission in Iraq has completed and leaders begin to discuss life beyond Afghanistan, the MRAPs usefulness is in question. The Department of Defense is actively pursuing a replacement for the HMMVW with the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program, and the MRAP is facing an identity crisis. Is it a troop transporter or a combat system? What capability beyond the blast protection does it bring and how does that translate into

future utilization? It would appear that the MRAP does have a future beyond our current conflicts as Defense Secretary Robert Gates instructed the military to incorporate it into the Army Brigade Combat Team Modernization (BCTMOD) plan. What is yet to be seen is how well the MRAP incorporates itself into the BCTMOD plan, what role and capability it fills in the Brigade Combat Team, and what additional requirements it places on existing force structure.


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Defense by Defoliation: The Necessity for Agent Orange in Vietnam (21 May) by Heather M. Brown. The author writes that in the mid-to-late 1960s, Americans became increasingly concerned with the strategic decision-making of U.S. leaders regarding the military's presence in Vietnam. One of the most controversial decisions of the era was ratified on 7 January 1962, when the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army were given authorization under Operation RANCH HAND, to deploy the herbicides 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetate (2,4,5-T) and 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetate (2,4-D), commonly known by its code name, Agent Orange, on South Vietnam. Operation RANCH HAND directed the herbicide spraying project from U.S. Air Force C-123 twin-engine aircraft, U.S. Army helicopters and infantry hand sprayers. The RANCH HAND herbicide missions were held to a specific standard: typically multiple, brief, two-minute sprays requiring three to five C-123 aircraft flying in staggered lateral

formation. Targets were chosen by U.S. military officers who were granted special approval from the U.S. Military Assistance Command and the American Ambassador. Thus, the U.S. Air Force was responsible for defoliating southern Vietnamese jungles, forests and foliage in order to improve visibility of enemy territory by exposing Việt cộng and North Vietnamese Army infiltration routes, base camps, weapon placements, and storage sites. U.S. Air Force records indicate, between 1962 and 1971, U.S. Army and Air Force units conducted 6,542 spray missions and deployed approximately 12 million gallons of Agent Orange on South Vietnam. They specifically targeted foliage used for cover, food crops and U.S. base perimeters.



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From Mars to Minerva: Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and the Two Western Ways of War (21 May) by Dr. Tony Corn. Dr Corn writes that a decade after 9/11, the absurdity of the U.S. grand strategy in the Long War is never better illustrated than by the fact that Washington currently spends \$ 100 billion dollars a year in Afghanistan chasing a grand total of 100 Al Qaeda fighters (one billion per terrorist). If there is only one reason to rediscover Liddell Hart today, it is because, as Sir Ernest Rutherford famously said in a different context: “We

are running out of money, gentlemen. **It’s time to start thinking.”** At any rate, the need to go beyond inter-service jointness and toward inter-agency jointness calls for an intellectual shift away from Clausewitz and toward Liddell Hart. For ultimately, the difference between the two is not just a matter of “direct vs. indirect” approach at the operational level. It is a difference between a theory that focuses on the intersection of strategy and tactics, and one that focuses on the intersection strategy and grand strategy. In retrospect, the beginning of the end of the era of Clausewitzology in military circles may have started as early as 1989, with the adoption by the U.S. Marine Corps of a “maneuver” doctrine (FM-1) which self-consciously distinguished itself from the “attrition” doctrine associated with “Big Army.” While paying lip service to Clausewitz, this new doctrine was clearly closer to Liddell Hart in spirit.


Muffled Voices (22 May) by Gene Kamenka with Dr. Roy Houchin. The authors write that the Global War On Terror (GWOT), or as we now call it, Overseas Contingency Operations, has cost our nation dearly in terms of loss of life, the number of wounded and the amount of national treasure expended. Operations over the past decade exacted an additional casualty--the ability of military leaders to communicate effectively at the strategic level. Our track record for clear, concise and honest communications is indeed lacking. When most military leaders attempt a foray into the realm of Strategic Communications (SC), their product tends to be a labored affair. A review of messages gone awry since the attacks of 911 includes, but is not limited to: the rescue of Jessica Lynch, the Abu Ghraib scandal, Haditha’s killings, civilian casualties and in-

tentional civilian killings in Afghanistan, the disappointment in standards at Walter Reed Hospital, loss of accountability at Arlington Cemetery, and released Navy tapes of on-ship antics involving questionable judgment. To be fair, there have also been SC wins, for instance: the surge in Iraq, the turnaround in Al Anbar province, and the military's response to the Haiti earthquake. Unfortunately, when it comes to SC, a win never negates a loss--a win fades quickly, but a bad message lingers and is difficult to overcome.

Extreme Barbarism, a Death Cult, and Holy Warriors in Mexico: Societal Warfare South of the Border? (22 May) By

Dr. Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan. This short essay is about impression—gut feelings combined with a certain amount of analytical skill—about recent trends taking place in Mexico concerning the ongoing criminal insurgencies being waged by the various warring cartels, gangs, and mercenary organizations that have metastasized though out that nation (and in many other regions as well). The authors spent over eight hours sequestered together about a month ago on a five-hundred mile 'there and back again road trip' to attend a training conference as instructors for the Kern County Chiefs of Police. Our talks centered on Mexican Drug Cartels, 3rd Generation Gangs, 3rd Phase Cartels, Criminal Insurgency Theory, and a host of related topics most folks just don't normally discuss in polite company. In the car, and at the conference, we were bombarded by Sullivan's never ending twitter and social networking news feeds—in Spanish and English—linked to the criminal violence in Mexico. If Dante had been our contemporary, we fear, he could just have easily taken a stroll through some of the

cities and towns of Mexico using those news feeds and substituting the imagery for the circles of hell he described in his early 14th century work the Divine Comedy. The hours of conversation about the conflicts in Mexico, bolstered by the news feeds and even the Q&A from the training time provided to the Kern Chiefs, provided us both with much to reflect upon. Additionally, both authors are currently co-writing three essays for a follow-on project to the earlier *Narcos Over the Border* (Routledge) book, the work that zenpundit.com found as "...one of the more disturbing academic works recently published in the national security field, not excluding even those monographs dealing with Islamist terrorism and Pakistan," concerning Mexico's immense problems.



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Bringing the Hurricane: The American Way of War (22 May) by Lieutenant Colonel David S. Pierson.

The author writes that over five years have passed since Hurricane Katrina came ashore in the Gulf Coast region and the United States is still recovering from the effects of that storm. In a matter of hours Katrina knocked out power and phone systems, destroyed levees, flooded vast areas of land, destroyed almost 300,000 homes, killed over 1500 people and even changed the political landscape of the

United States. For every 20 minutes that Katrina pounded the Gulf States, it produced energy equivalent to a 10-megaton nuclear bomb exploding. Imagine if a nation had the ability to drop a storm of such destructive power on its enemies – not a nuclear storm, but a storm of enormous magnitude. Could **that nation influence their enemies’** actions and behavior by using such power or even just threatening to use it? While **we can’t control the weather, the United States** easily possesses the ability to produce similar effects of such a storm. The effects of a storm are widespread, sometimes arbitrary, and not at all surgical in their focus. Such effects run counter to the restrained and measured operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We currently wage war with the precision of a golf course sprinkler system as opposed to potential deluge of armaments that could bring the perfect storm.

Reflections on Clausewitz and Jomini: A Discussion on Theory, MDMP, and Design in the Post OIF Army (25 May) by Major Christopher Otero. The author writes that one of the most intellectually challenging moments in the United States Command and General Staff College is when after 10 years of serving in an Army at War you are finally introduced to the two major theorists of modern warfare, Antoine-Henri Jomini and Carl Von Clausewitz. Both are considered to be the most prominent theorists of the western way of warfare and the question that often gets framed by our instructors is which of these two best inform your understanding of modern war? Do you consider yourself Jominian or Clausewitzian in your outlook? Imagine the surprise when I answered **‘Both’**. In this document, I will attempt to explain why the answer NEEDS to be both and why picking one

has led the United States Army to a rather peculiar fault of breeding the best tacticians in the world, but generally creating very poor strategists. I will propose a unitary framework that blends the two theorists and endeavors to bridge the gap as well as begin a dialogue about the relationship between the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and the Design methodology. It is my intention to eventually propose an update to the MDMP process in an effort to **‘modernize’ it** IAW lessons learned.

Arunachal Pradesh: A Crux of Sino-Indian Rivalry (27 May) Dr. by Jeffrey Reeves. The author writes that few bilateral relationships have the potential to transform geopolitics like that between **China and India. The two states’ policies** directly affect a collective 2.5 billion individuals, or one-fifth of the world’s **population, and influence Asia’s overall stability and development. China and India are projected to be the world’s first and third largest economies by 2025, respectively. Cooperation and/or competition between the states will, therefore, shape the regional and global systems for the medium to long terms.**

Mind Games From Above: The Use of Psychological Warfare and Direct Propaganda at the Turning Point of the Malayan Emergency, 1952-54 (27 May) by Stephen J Fallon. The author writes that the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) provides several interesting lessons for those interested in the separate, but related fields of political history and the psychology of war. This essay focuses on the latter as the success of the conflict for the British army, UK government and Malayan state (who will be referred to as the **‘the authorities’**) is a direct reflection of the centrality of psy-

chology in this war. This essay does not seek to provide a chronological narrative **of the Emergency's progression, but will** instead focus on the relatively unexplored branch of the conflict: the use of propaganda and the psychological methods employed the government and its agents. This essay will analyse the psychology behind the propaganda used during the conflict and the British army **and UK government's adaptation of it to** suit conditions in Malaya. While somewhat more has been written about the propaganda used, its use in conjunction with psychological warfare (psywar) techniques has received little attention in the past fifty years. In particular the psychological methodologies developed by the British army during the period 1951-53 for use against the communist insurgents in Malaya present a case study with lessons for a professional army to successfully combat irregular troops in a rural setting.

Going Outside the Wire: Liaising With Special Operation Forces to Rebuild Agriculture in Afghanistan (27 May) by Daniel Miller. The author writes that civilian diplomats are crucial to ensuring those in military commands have accurate and timely situational awareness. They can raise key issues to the decision makers often bypassing bureaucracies of partner agencies. The development specialists, and in many places, agricultural experts are critical to overseeing often millions of dollars in reconstruction projects. The development officers are also responsible for ensuring any projects funded by the military component of the PRT are developmentally sound and will do no harm to the community in the long term. The PRTs were designed and organized to adapt to the needs and conditions of the area where they operated and no two PRTs are iden-

tical in their number of personnel or stability strategies. Provincial Reconstruction Teams have played an important role in the stabilization and development of Afghanistan and provide a valuable model for integrating civilian and military capabilities to assist in both improving security and extending the reach of the central government. While encouraging, there is still considerable territory in Afghanistan beyond the reach of the PRTs where development assistance is urgently needed.

Us and Them: A Personal Essay (31 May) by Phat Doan. The author writes that on July 6th, 2010, there was no turning back. We resigned our full-time jobs, put our educations on hold, said goodbye to our family and friends and prepared for the unknown adventure to come. Two months later, dusts swallowed the plane combat landing from the empty sky. Our hearts sunk as we raced off the plane under the cover of darkness. Thoughts of snipers and mortar observers, from the million stories **we've heard, immediately** crossed our minds. Picking up our ruck-sacks, reality finally hit us as we walked through the quiet, lifeless land. The moon shined with little light reflecting; grasping our weapons tightly, we tried to make out the familiar faces of our friends looking **for any little comfort. So it began...**

Introspection and Emotional Vulnerability as Leader Development and Team Building Tools (31 May) by Colonel Steven Rotkoff. COL Rotkoff writes that all of us have gone through the process of changing stations and being confronted **with the question "tell me a little about you". Invariably our answer revolves** around some form of our military resume, **"I've served here, had these** jobs, worked for these bosses, have this

education and by the way I'm married, have 2.1 kids and a dog named fluffy."


While this approach conveys a lot of information in reality it tells someone almost nothing about what you believe, how you lead, or who you truly are. There is another more effective way of having this conversation. It is called 'Who am I?' (WAI).

What Constitutes Terrorist Network Resiliency? (31 May) By Major David N. Santos. MAJ Santos writes that since the devastating attacks of September 11, 2001 there have been numerous discussions on the issue of terrorism and terrorist networks, such as al Qaeda, within the media and the intelligence community. At times these discussions have created an image of the terrorist phenomenon as one of a monolithic and unstoppable menace continuing to spread around the world unabated. Lost in these discussions is a basic understanding of what any organization needs to continue to exist. What are its basic needs? What are its sources of strength and resiliency? Most organizations, whether terrorist or not, rely on some basic essential elements that are used to help define, guide and maintain the organization. These elements allow an organization to develop strength in its structure as well as its cause in order to maintain a resilient mindset. These elements of strength and resiliency enable the organization to experience periods of adversity, look critically at the outcomes of those experiences and take the lessons learned to improve the organization's performance.

United States-Haitian Relations from 1791 to 1810: How Slavery and Commerce Shaped American Foreign Policy (31 May) by Colonel Philip K. Abbott. COL Abbott writes that in 1789, on the

eve of the French Revolution, Saint-Dominique (Haiti) was arguably the most **valuable colony on earth. It was "an integral part of the economic life of the [agricultural] age, the greatest colony in the world, the pride of France, and the envy of every other imperialist nation."** Producing more sugar than all the British Caribbean islands combined, Haiti supplied over forty percent of the **world's sugar. For the United States, colonial Haiti was the second largest foreign trading partner, superseded only by Great Britain. As John Adams wrote in 1783, "[Haiti] is a part of the American system of commerce, they can neither do without us, nor we without them."** As a national commercial interest, trade with Haiti was especially important for New England merchants, where the French colony purchased sixty three percent of the dried fish and eighty percent of the pickled fish exported from the United States. It not only provided a dynamic outlet for American goods to keep the sugar plantations running, but many producers as well as shippers in America grew dependent on the island market.

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As part of our 2011 fundraising campaign the *Small Wars Journal* challenge coin is being offered as a gift for a \$50 tax deductible donation.. The front image is called *Tracking Bin Laden* and was painted by U.S. Army Cen-

ter of Military History, Museum Division's staff artist Sergeant First Class Elzie Ray Golden, US Army. The image on the back of the coin is called *After the Battle* and was painted by Michael R. Crook in Tan Hep, Vietnam, 1967. Both paintings are part of the U.S. Army art collection. [Order yours here.](#)



Blog. Don't forget to catch SWJ Managing Editor [Robert Haddick's](#) weekly op-ed, *This Week at War* on Friday evenings at *Foreign Policy* and SWJ Blog.

Here are May's THAWs:

- ***Pakistan Loses the Upper Hand*** (6 May). Topics include Bin Laden's death will change Washington -- and Pakistan won't like it and are the Navy's big aircraft carriers too risky?
- ***Send in the Lawyers?*** (13 May). Topics include the SEALs did their job. Now will the lawyers do theirs? And security partnerships are frustrating, but necessary.
- ***The Milosevic Option*** (20 May). Topics include NATO wants to get 'more aggressive' against Qaddafi. But how exactly? And how to get policymakers to understand tradeoffs -- and then remember them later.
- ***The Jet that Ate the Pentagon*** (27 May). Topics include policymakers get 11th-hour second thoughts on the Joint Strike Fighter and defense cuts will mean more risk. Is the Marine Corps the Pentagon's best hedge?

SWJ Blog staples include the daily news and opinion roundup as well as standalone links to professional journal, professional military education, and think tank articles, studies and papers of im-

portance to our community of interest and practice, SWJ staff op-eds, and information concerning Small Wars-related conferences, seminars and webcasts.

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Council. Join other members of the Small Wars Council in conversations on topics of interest to our community of interest and practice. Register here to access all the forums and conversation threads, and to establish your own profile. Below are just a few of the current conversations you can join.

Is it time to get out of Afghanistan? "I repeat: investment by US companies or participation of US companies in a consortium does not translate to "US control" of the pipeline or whatever flows through it. Citing the pre-70s Saudi Aramco as an example to the contrary is, I fear, ridiculous. We all know business was once done that way. We all know business isn't done that way any more: there's not a sovereign nation on the planet that would accept such an arrangement in today's world. Anyone who's even vaguely familiar with the way Central Asian energy deals are being structured knows that foreign control is simply not an issue: the US is not going to "control" these resources... nor, frankly, does it need to.

There's been a great deal of utter nonsense written about the proposed TAPI pipeline, and I fear you've bought the lot. The key item of context that's typically missed in these discussions is scale. It's just not that big or important a project. It's not a game-changer; never was.

The intention of the pipeline was to bring a portion of Turkmenistan's natural gas output south to India and Pakistan. For the Turkmens this was part of an effort to diversify export routes: they were simultaneously developing a larger pipeline to China (now in operation) and building up their links to the Russian gas grid. It wasn't about a seismic shift in policy, just a natural diversification. There's never been any question of the US supplanting Russian and Chinese regional influence, for reasons that will be instantly clear to anyone with access to a map.

For India and Pakistan the pipeline would have been one source of energy supply among many. It would not have the capacity to meet all their needs and nobody would be foolish enough to rely on a pipeline crossing such a volatile area. Again, a matter of interest but at no point a critical need or a game-changing project.

In the project's original incarnation, in the Taliban years, the US interest was in using the project as a cash-generating carrot to try to bait more moderate elements in the Taliban into a more engaged stance, and of course the possibility of tossing a project to an American company that was undergoing some hard times (none of the major companies were interested; the project was too small and too risky). Since regime change there have been vague attempts to revive the project, mainly as a way of trying to provide a revenue source for the Afghan government. Of course nobody's really interested in investing, given the security risks.

There is not and never was any great strategic imperative here on the part of the US. The pipeline would not have giv-

en "control" of anything, just the potential for Afghanistan to earn a little money. In the old days that was a possible lever to manipulate the Taliban; more recently it's a possible way to let the Afghan government earn a bit on its own and suck a little less off the great American teat, which is running a bit dry at the moment. It's nowhere nearly as large or important as it's been cranked up to be by people who are trying to construct a case for some "all about oil" scenario or some vast regional strategic imperative."

(Response) **"US control does mean the US govt will have influence on the manner the oil supply affects US strategic and national aims. I would be surprised if it didn't.**

I have provided adequate links to show the interconnection between US business and the US Govt, to include how the CIA is also used. The Aramco deal was just an example. Obviously, it did not appeal to you. There are many others to include Untied Fruits, but then that too is dated.

Let us take an example nearer to time. Hugo Chavez! To believe that there has been no effort to topple Hugo Chavez notwithstanding so many links in the open source would not be ingenuous. And to believe that it was not only for strategic reasons but also because of US Business interests would be totally naïve."

Your Brain in Combat **"Outside of the weapon sites has a lot of different meanings. Could mean you're in the TOC, could just mean you're in the thick of it with a rifle in one hand, and the handset up to your ear with the other hand - in both cases you're outside of the weapon sites. Kind of vague in the description.**

Selecting officers based on their responses in realistic training...sounds great. How do we get started? We still have commanders that take their LTs out for a run in order to determine who the new Scout PL is going to be; and base moves of company commanders on year group, time of CCC, staff time, and other measures that generic nothing in the way of a leadership metric.

Maybe my experiences are out of the norm, but I've never had to run in PTs and running shoes over to establish an LP/OP, or conduct reconnaissance on an NAI, and the last I checked my PT card didn't cover my ability to adjust fire, call in a MEDEVAC, or conduct a KLE.

I think Ken White is hinting at some very salient and noteworthy points. However, as we rush to close theaters and begin an age of austerity, we are likely to see the dime & washer drill replace reflexive fire; see Table XII (using SLAP-T rounds of course, \$15 as opposed to about \$1200 avg cost for training rounds for a main gun, IIRC) replace force-on-force maneuvers; and then to see CCTT replace Table XII, Table VIII; and thought experiments will likely replace battle drill training for our infantry. It's just too expensive to buy ammo, pay for fuel, and replace uniforms and equipment that get destroyed in a typical field exercise. That said, I think we need to suck it and find a way to sustain (assuming it's already done) good training.”

(Response) “Unfortunately, the incompetent will always be with us -- at all ranks and grades. The system catches many but can never catch all and the number of shoddy leaders that slip through varies, it's cyclical. A good Cof-SA has his effect 15-20 years down the

road. Conversely, a bad one does the same thing. The Personnel system rewards conformity and mediocrity so that has been true since WW I and the Army thus waxes and wanes.

It also reflects civilian society... That's the been there, done that. All you mention and more has occurred before and the Army survived. There were times in the late 50s-early 60s and again in the late 70s and the 90s when all those things were problematic -- even to the extent of inadequate funding for fuel causing vehicles to stay in the motor pool for entire fiscal quarters.

Good news is there is an unintended benefit. In austere times, people learn literally to do more with less and one *has* to innovate and use initiative. Those latter two things get stifled all too often in periods of excessive money being available.

There's also the benefit that less funding is available for the micro-managers to stick their nose into things.

Consider that the 'broke' Army of the 1930s did okay when committed after a few minor bubbles and the almost equally relatively poorly funded Army of the early 60s did okay in Viet Nam -- until the money kicked in, the second team got hired and the politics got overly intrusive. The American solution of throwing money at things that do not work rarely really succeeds in fixing the problems. Making do has its merits...

At the risk of being a heretic, I think the CTCs are also inimical to good training and they are ungodly expensive in all aspects including travel and equipment. They have some merit but having seen Army units before their inception and

after, I'm not convinced the results justify the significant expense. Just the opposite, in fact. Aside from the CTCs, the Task, Condition and Standard solution of BTMS severely and adversely affected Army Training.

Dump both those and the picture ahead may not be nearly as bleak as one might think.

Got so busy being philosophical I lost the thread -- in austere times, you can't just buy stuff and do things by rote or even afford running shoes, you have to **THINK** and not waste money on inessentials. That in itself is what they call "good trainin'." Great exercise for the brain...

Your Brain in Combat **“The priest who was my French instructor once told us that “[w]e have a saying in the Church—‘You will be promoted to your level of incompetence.’”**

As someone with no military experience I just had the impression that up or out might be counterproductive if your institution restricts combat leadership responsibility to a group made up of individuals who by definition can only have so much experience.

Am I correct in my understanding that NCOs in the USMC are entrusted with some of the combat leadership responsibilities that fall upon junior officers in the U.S. Army? If so, is this done (at least partly) with an eye towards enabling proven combat leaders to remain in a place where that matters for a longer period of time? Or is it more about the tendency to pay Marines less for doing **more?**”

(Response) **“No, while I can't speak for the US Army, I think you are going in**

the wrong direction with this.

Officers become valuable to the military when the reach field officer (major) and beyond. Their time as junior officers is merely to prepare them for real **command** say from battalion level upwards.

Platoon commanding (while considered by many to be the happiest and most personally rewarding command experience due to the intimacy of the personal combat leadership experience) is merely an apprenticeship. In this a bright eyed and bushy tailed lieutenant will find an old and bold and hairy ass'd platoon sergeant a few steps behind him to support/guide/assist/advise and when necessary press him in his first command experience. Note platoon sergeant is not a command position as they go from section/squad to platoon to company and so on. The platoon sergeant should be tactically qualified to company level and be able to take over command should casualties demand. So why not give command of a platoon to the most experienced and capable? Because this officer apprenticeship is most often the career make or break for a young officer and an important testing/proving ground. Yes, there are a few late bloomers but that's another story.

Where I come from it is the time as platoon commander (30 months for rifle platoons) which sets him in a career stream. The first thing that happens is that the course order these youngsters passed out with gets "adjusted" career wise over the next 30 months and then thereafter every year with the annual assessment until the pecking order is resolved. So in the simplest terms out of every 12 platoon commanders you get 4 company commanders and then of the 4 one Lt Col battalion commander. Now

out of this process you will still get a number of company commanders who don't shape up and then even a number of battalion commanders the same. There is a continual selection and weeding out process... which is not fool proof.

I say fool proof specifically because politics play a more and more important role the higher the rank level. This would be internal politics and then from the idiots in the government departments or congress/parliament/whatever. Then of course should a general mobilization take place then due to war-time escalation everyone gets over promoted by a few levels and quality flies out the window.

After all that it is probably only for a few years in a thirty odd year career where an individual's performance in the closeness of the "look into his eyes then kill him" type combat counts. However this performance (positive or negative) will live with him for the rest of his career.

You need to credit the military with the knowledge that comes through experience that it appreciates that there are certain young officers who may prove to be outstanding combat officers but may not be suitable for higher command and then there will be those (as stated) who will be "carried" by their platoon sergeant but grow into capable, possibly even outstanding, senior officers as they would be late bloomers.

You will find many complain about "check the box" personnel management in the larger militaries. This takes the personal out of career management so it is unlikely that truly meritorious officers will rise (as they should) above the rest as they too are trapped in a system

where everyone gets a chance regardless of how unsuitable.

So don't hold your breath that some fireball of a young officer will have an accelerated career due to his prowess in combat.

...then one must have a war when one is a platoon commander to prove this matter as much to oneself as to the military. A quick 6 month tour is not really **enough but is better than nothing.**"

Suppressive Fire "It depends on much. A vehicle convoy must not be pinned because it's got little combat power but much speed in the killing zone. Its threatened vehicles need to speed out of the killing zone. An Infantry squad on the other hand has relatively much firepower, but little speed. It needs to dive first, then react to the situation.

There's also the decision-making and communication thing and the human factor. You can expect a driver to drive on when under fire (even though with much increased risk of a crash) while almost every infantry squad has at least one soldier who's sure to take a dive into cover, no matter what's the orders.

Speed is relative, of course. Movement speed, ability to accelerate further, distance to end of killing zone, lethality of ambush fire / time ... this can be calculated by OR, but usually the troops in the conflict learn when to run and when to duck by trial & error.

Finally there's a big problem; how do you react differently to an RPG strike and a AT mine strike? The RPG requires a speedy reaction, while the same could just drive the blue force into many more AT mines... I attempted to find something simple that allows for a good reaction almost every time even with human factors in play, but I didn't

find any back in '03 or '04 when I was looking at ambush problems.

An unpredictable opfor that varies its tactics or even combines them is a helluva lot more difficult and dangerous than the remote controlled HE mine tactics that dominated in the last decade.

The proper response to the aforementioned dilemma is probably to be so overwhelmingly dangerous to direct fire opfor that they restrict themselves in their tactics down to a point where we are not in such serious dilemmas anymore; that's pretty much what **was done.**"

(Response) "**I think that piece on Movement Security** mentioned earlier has much value even though it is circa 1970s.

While it is necessary to have the doctrine it is TTPs which need to be locally adapted to enemy and terrain in the ever changing operational environment. You are correct that one needs to avoid settling into a predictable routine.

As far as the killing zone is concerned it rather depends how long it is and due to spacing how many vehicles are caught therein. Obviously those vehicles caught in the killing zone must attempt to drive out and those not yet in should avoid entering it. The enemy would presumably want to force the vehicle of their choice to stop in the killing ground and prevent following vehicles from being able to pass by to get out. Good selection of the position of the ambush is also important with steep inclines and narrow bridges being of the best.



Counterinsurgency

Dr. David Kilcullen

**Dedicated to
*Small Wars Journal***

Anti-tank mines one would assume would be command detonated otherwise there would be just too much guesswork about how and when the ambush would be initiated. But then maybe the enemy think differently (or don't think). For slow moving vehicles an RPG into the radiator will most often stop such a vehicle or cause it to lose control and crash... but then generally it must be the first vehicle which may have some frontal protection.

The rule applies that the vehicle(s) caught in the killing ground must attempt to drive out and allow the troops to debus and form up. Those who have not yet entered the killing should stop and carry out the drill to secure the vehicles and then prepare to clear the ambush party. The command and control is another issue which should be rehearsed.

The kind of reaction required will be determined by the quality of the enemy you face.

It seems that the logistic convoys out of Pakistan are well secured as they only (from what I hear) have problems in Pakistan and few if any on the Afghanistan leg of the **route.**"


Starbuck and Zenpundit: Recommended Reading

Welcome to “Recommended Reading” where Crispin Burke ([Starbuck](#)) and Mark Safranski ([Zenpundit](#)) offer SWJ readers intriguing links from the previous month in a tidy digest format.

American Diplomacy “[Public Diplomacy in Uniform: The Role of the U.S. Department of Defense in Supporting Modern Day Public Diplomacy](#)” by Rachel Greenspan: How State and DoD overlap and can collaborate to own the “narrative” in public diplomacy.

The Atlantic “[From Roman Legions to Navy SEALs: Military Raiding and its Discontents](#)” by Adam Elkus: Special forces, however spectacular in operational excellence, historically are only as good as the strategy and policy that guide their use.

CSIS “[The 2011 Unified Command Plan—A Missed Opportunity?](#)” by Nathan Freier: JFCOM should not have **been the lone COCOM to hear “Na na na na na na na, Hey, Hey, Hey, Goodbye”** from SECDEF Robert Gates.



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NECSI “[Framing a complexity theory solution to the Middle East crises](#)” by Yaneer Bar-Yam and A.S. Gard-Murray:

The Arab Spring models as a bread riot and not an 1848 liberal revolution.

The Jamestown Foundation “[From Rommel to Qaddafi: Petrol Supplies Still the Key to Military Success in Libya](#)” by Andrew McGregor: The evolution of motorized desert warfare.

Edge Perspectives with John Hagel “[The Pull of Narrative – In Search of Persistent Context](#)”: **Context is king. For the IO, PD, PSYOP/MISO types.**

Michigan War Studies Review “[A War It Was Always Going to Lose: Why Japan Attacked America in 1941](#)” By Jeffrey Record : **A review by Cathal J. Nolan** and “[The Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War](#) “. If you are serious about military history, you are reading the *Michigan War Studies Review*.

Alex Horton, [Department of Veterans Affairs](#): “[T]ake some time [this Memorial Day] and remember the spirit of the country and the dedication of those men and women who chose to pick up arms. They never came home to be thanked, and only their memory remains.”

Andrew Exum, Lt. Gen. David Barno, Matthew Irvine in a CNAS Report “[Beyond Afghanistan: A Regional Security Strategy for South and Central Asia](#)”. “Defending U.S. vital interests in South and Central Asia is **not** a distraction from the rise of the Pacific Rim – it is a prerequisite for success. The dangers present in South and Central Asia cannot be wished away and only by taking steps to advance their resolution, no matter how slowly, will the United States be able to protect its broader interests across the rest of Asia.”

Adam Elkus, “[Bin Laden and the Clauswitzian Trinity](#)” in the *Huffington*

Post. “Clausewitz observed firsthand how the French Revolution used nationalism and popular fervor to mobilize large armies and drive them to feats of nearly superhuman endurance. He understood that popular enmity and the drive for victory is a basic and inescapable element of conflict. We cannot avoid throwing our emotions into war even in an age of increasing automation and **decreasing tolerance of risk.**”

Tom Ricks, Nathan Hodge, and Jacqueline Koo, “Experts warn the free ride for UAVs is ending as spending constraints loom”, **The Best Defense.**

David Axe, “Chinese Carrier Lacks Fighters”, **The Diplomat.** “**To enable true, long-range carrier operations, the People’s Liberation Army Navy still needs to develop, build and field carrier-capable airborne command-and-control aircraft plus aerial tankers and electronic-warfare planes. Without these so-called ‘enablers,’ Shi Lang and her J-15s represent little more than training assets, with few real-world applications.**”

Carl Prine and Ali K. Chishti, “What’s new Ali cat?”, **Line of Departure.** “Osama bin Laden was as much of a threat to Pakistan as to the United States and the world. And although the Pakistani security establishment might also agree with this, to the Pakistan military it seems **finances are more important than lives.**”

Peter Grier, “The bin Laden effect: How the al-Qaeda leader changed America”, **Christian Science Monitor.** “**For the United States of America** the question now may be whether an era that began on 9/11 ended as the eddies stilled and the ocean closed over the corporeal remains of Al Qaeda’s leader. In life, Mr. bin Laden made a tremendous impact

on the US. There’s no denying that. The devastation and deaths he orchestrated 10 years ago led the nation to spend more than a trillion dollars, by one estimate, to erect a homeland security **apparatus alone.**”

“What Pakistanis Think: Conspiracy of the Masses”, **The Economist.** It turns out that Pakistanis, as ever, believe in conspiracies. Although two-thirds, roughly, reckon that America trampled on Pakistani sovereignty in the **Navy Seals’ raid to kill bin Laden on May 2nd** (perhaps surprisingly, as many as 23% concluded that sovereignty was not infringed), nearly half (49%) thought that the whole incident was actually staged for some reason or other. Only 26% thought the al-Qaeda chief was really killed on the night in question. As for how Pakistanis sum up bin Laden himself: **44% concluded he was a “martyr”, while 26% preferred to call him a “criminal”.**

Joshua Foust, “The Looming Afghan Crash”, **PBS Need to Know.** “One way or another, the war in Afghanistan will eventually wind down. On Tuesday, the Washington Post announced that the Obama administration is seeking to “speed up” **its direct talks with the Taliban** to end the fighting. By all accounts, there will be a substantial reduction of U.S. forces by the end of 2014, withdrawing upwards of 70,000 troops and support personnel...**Both Afghanistan and the U.S. stand to face substantial economic disruptions when the war does end.**”

Jason Fritz, “Scheduling Defeat”, **Ink Spots Blog.** “**In a surprising result**, the House narrowly failed to pass a bill that would have required some immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanis-

tan and to set a timetable for the remainder. With 26 Republicans joining the Democrats, it seems that the death of bin Laden and disillusionment with what we're doing in Afghanistan generally are driving a shift in political support

Aaron Ellis, "The Special Relationship lacks a purpose for the 21st Century", **Egremont**. "As global power shifts eastwards and emerging Asian states challenge US hegemony, Washington will be increasingly concerned with security and stability in the western Pacific. This is their broader challenge and President Obama is pursuing the correct policies in that region. The UK does not have a similar strategic clarity. If [the UK wants] to enjoy the kind of relationship we enjoyed last century then our defence and foreign policies must expand east of Suez."

Dallas Boyd, "Protecting Sensitive Information: The Virtue of Self-Restraint". [I]nformation, unclassified but nonetheless sensitive, includes risk assessments that identify infrastructure vulnerabilities, analyses that hypothesize creative attacks, and otherwise dangerous knowledge that is released under the rubric of scientific openness or the public's "right to know"...[g]reater discipline in the dissemination of sensitive information can be introduced without compromising the nation's values.

Rand Corp., "Israeli Air Force had 'Flawed Strategy' During Lebanon War". "The [Israeli] government's greatest misstep was taking an overly unreflective view of what military power of any kind, unaided by a coherent and effective strategy, could accomplish when the declared goals were so ambitious and the Israeli Defense Forces' ground

troops were so unready. That misstep had nothing to do with the strengths or limitations of air power."

Richard Fontaine, Will Rogers, "Internet Freedom: A Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age". "[N]ew communications technologies are a double-edged sword. They represent both a medium for individuals to communicate, form groups and freely broadcast their ideas around the world, and a tool that empowers authoritarian governments. U.S. policymakers should better appreciate the complex role new communications technologies play in political change abroad, and how those technologies intersect with the array of American foreign policy objectives."

Steven A. Cook, Bernard Gwertzman, "Dim Prospects for Israeli-Palestinian Peace", Council on Foreign Relations. "[T]he United States [can't] really fully support the Arab Spring because of problems in dealing with countries like Syria, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, where the president's politics have been different from what they were in Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt, for example. They are slowly moving in the right direction in Syria."

SWJ Interviews

Recent *Small Wars Journal* interviews with links:

An Interview with Bing West, A Sequel (6 May) by Octavian Manea. **What is wrong with the war strategy employed by ISAF forces?** The strategy's goal is "to serve and secure the people" (namely, the 11 million Pashtuns living in 7,000 villages.) This goal is too idealistic and too ambitious. We have 1,000 outposts; so what is happening in the

other 6,000 villages? We do not patrol at night. We do not arrest. We do not speak Pashto or understand their Islamic tribal culture. How can we serve them? We can secure some of them as long as we are physically near at hand. But the people are the prize for winning the war, not the means of winning it. They are waiting to see whether the Taliban or the Afghan army wins. We are treading water with this strategy.”


Small Wars Journal Counterinsurgency Inquiry: Dr. John Nagl, COL Douglas Macgregor, Dr. Nadia Schadlow, COL Gian Gentile, COL Robert Cassidy, and Celeste Ward Gventer (10 May) by Octavian Manea. Octavian Manea asks the following questions: 1. Why should the local providing of governance be a concern for the U.S. military? Why should the U.S. military be in the business of providing local governance? An iconic image of the latest book by Bing West (The Wrong War, Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan) is that of Lt Colonel McCollough who had to assume and perform the role of the governor, police chief, school principal, and banker, in Nawa. 2. Beginning in 2007, “You can’t kill your way out to victory” became the hallmark of a military organization that until then was perceived as being too conventionally minded, too kinetic and enemy-centric focused. Has the U.S. Military succeeded in overcoming its Jominian culture of being too enemy-centric and becoming more comfortable with the drinking-tea and doing windows side of the spectrum? Able to successfully manage both the governance building and war-fighting skills? Or is it in the danger of going too much to the other side of the spectrum, of becoming too focused on drinking-tea and doing windows (projects, shuras, economic development), and so neglecting

its war fighting core duties? Is this after all an impossible balancing act? And too confusing for a soldier trained as warrior?

The Use of Air Power in Limited Wars: Interview with Professor Earl H. Tilford, Jr. (24 May) by Octavian Manea.

“How would you describe the doctrinal mindset of the US Air Force on the eve of America's involvement in the Vietnam War? To what extent were the WW2 experiences (the air wars against Germany and Japan) the core, formative experiences of the US Air Force doctrinal mindset? What meant “the right use of the air power” for the US Air Force doctrinal Weltanschauung? The doctrinal mindset of the United States Air Force in 1960 and 1961, on the eve of America’s involvement in the war in Vietnam, was focused on strategic deterrence through atomic and nuclear dominance over the Soviet Union. The efficacy of strategic bombing had its roots in the post-World War I period when people like Italy’s Guilio Douhet, Britain’s Sir Hugh Trenchard, and the American air power advocate Billy Mitchell sought a way to avoid the carnage experienced in ground warfare, especially on the Western Front in France, by going to the enemy’s heartland and destroying both the enemy’s war making capacity and will to fight by strategic bombing to devastate industry and the socio-economic infrastructure of the opposing force. The origins of that strategy can be traced to General William T. Sherman’s “March to the Sea” in the closing months of the American Civil War in 1864 and early 1865 The atomic bomb made the difference. In theory, the atomic bomb wedded to the delivery system provided by the four-engine, Boeing B-29 bomber, made it possible

for air power to be decisive in warfare. That established the foundation for the establishment of a separate United States Air Force, a service enjoying equal status with the US Army and US Navy. In the immediate post war period, after the U.S. Air Force gained separate service status in September 1947, bomber pilots dominated its leadership and the Strategic Air Command, established in 1946, became the premier command within the US Air Force because its mission epitomized “the right use of air power” (capable of destroying any enemy’s industrial and war-making capacity), in the Air Force’s doctrinal weltanschauung. By 1961, the budget for the Air Force was nearly twice that of the US Army. In fact, the budget for the Strategic Air Command was larger than that allocated for the entire US Army.”



The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy and the Way Out of Afghanistan
By Bing West

Professional Reading

Great Small Wars-related articles and talented authors are not limited to SWJ. Here are some recent (or recently caught our eye) items of interest from national defense related journals and magazines.

Maritime Strategy in an Age of Blood and Belief by Admiral Sandy Winnefeld, *Proceedings*, July 2008. While the United States keeps a watchful eye on potential global trouble spots, it cannot lose sight of the changing security complexion in Europe, Eurasia, and Africa. As the 20-year fog of the post-Cold War transition lifts, a 21st-century pattern of international affairs is coming into sharp focus. The classic ideological feud between capitalism and socialism has given way to new dynamics that are remaking the international system: rising ethno-nationalism, violent religious extremism, globalization, scarcity of energy and food resources, and concerns over immigration and climate change. Nowhere is this more true than Europe, Eurasia, and Africa, where these factors are widespread and intensifying, with increasingly disruptive effects. Although China, Korea, and Iran crisis scenarios exert the strongest influence over mid-term security strategies—including force structure, presence, and capability decisions—Europe and Africa are rising again on the ladder of America’s vital security interests, with important long-term implications for how our nation’s maritime forces are shaped and operated.

The Impact of a Decade at War by Colonel Charles Allen, *Armed Forces Journal*, May. By asking questions, the Army will be able to examine the environmental context with insight from our constituents, determine critical areas of concern that will help in reframing the problem and chart the way ahead. Through this critical and potentially uncomfortable self-reflection, the Army **can gain what it seeks: “the strength to overcome and the strength to endure.”**

A Better Way to Develop Officers by Karen E. Boroff, Major Aram M. Donigian and Major Zachary J. Mundell, *Armed Forces Journal*, May. Aimless with little impact. This describes an organization's human resource policies when those policies do not support or are not congruent with the larger strategic direction of that organization. With this in mind, the speech by Defense Secretary Robert Gates at the U.S. Military Academy on Feb. 25 was perfectly on target. Gates articulated a vision for the future strategic direction of the armed forces, and especially the Army. Then, in concrete terms, he put forth specific human resource policies that need to change to fulfill the Army's mission.

Getting it Right: Ten Problems with the Afghan Campaign by Dan Green, *Armed Forces Journal*, May. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Commander Gen. David H. Petraeus often talks about getting the "inputs" right in Afghanistan, which means having the right mix of military forces, civilian assets and Afghan government participation to conduct a population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. In many respects, the process of getting the inputs right only really began in 2009, but with the beginning of the U.S. draw-down later this year, it is useful to investigate whether we have the inputs right **as well as whether the "outputs" are correct**. The following 10 problems with the Afghan campaign reflect the challenges of resourcing the conflict correctly but also have to do with implementation strategy in general, as well as how civilian interagency and Afghan partners are doing in support of the COIN strategy.

A Darwinian World: Libya Points to a New Era of Aggression and Turmoil by Colonel Bob Killebrew, *Armed Forces Journal*,

May. As these words are written, U.S., British and French warplanes are striking Libyan ground forces along the Mediterranean littoral; American and other NATO troops are pounding out "fragile and reversible" gains in Afghanistan; and unrest continues to roil governments in Bahrain, Yemen and Syria. To our south, criminal cartels and violent gangs murder government officials, civilians and one another in Mexico and points south. Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, whose state policy protects cocaine production and smuggling, invites into his country the Iranian Republican Guard and Hezbollah, while, over the horizon, China continues its naval buildup. Whatever happened to the "peace dividend" and the long rest the world was supposed to get after the end of the Cold War? Those days are long gone, obviously, in the tectonic forces moving the world forward into a century more unstable than many had predicted.

Constant Conflict by Ralph Peters, *Parameters*, Winter 2010-2011. This article was first published by *Parameters* in 1997. We have entered an age of constant conflict. Information is at once our core commodity and the most destabilizing factor of our time. Until now, history has been a quest to acquire information; today, the challenge lies in managing information. Those of us who can sort, digest, synthesize, and apply relevant knowledge soar—professionally, financially, politically, militarily, and socially. We, the winners, are a minority. For the world masses, devastated by information they cannot manage or effectively **interpret, life is "nasty, brutish... and short-circuited."** The general pace of change is overwhelming, and information is both the motor and signifier of change. Those humans, in every country and region, who cannot understand the new world, or who cannot profit from its uncertainties, or who cannot reconcile

themselves to its dynamics, will become the violent enemies of their inadequate governments, of their more fortunate neighbors, and ultimately of the United States. We are entering a new American century, in which we will become still wealthier, culturally more lethal, and increasingly powerful. We will excite hatreds without precedent. We live in an age of multiple truths.

Cyber Infrastructure Protection edited by Dr. Tarek N. Saadawi and Colonel Louis H. Jordan, Jr. This 9 May Strategic Studies Institute book provides an integrated view and a comprehensive framework of the various issues relating to cyber infrastructure protection. It provides the foundation for long-term policy development, a roadmap for cyber security, and an analysis of technology challenges that impede cyber infrastructure protection. The book is divided into three main parts. Part I deals with strategy and policy issues related to cyber security. It provides a theory of cyberpower, a discussion of Internet survivability as well as large scale data breaches and the role of cyberpower in humanitarian assistance. Part II covers social and legal aspects of cyber infrastructure protection and it provides discussions concerning the attack dynamics of politically and religiously motivated hackers. Part III discusses the technical aspects of cyber infrastructure protection including the resilience of data centers, intrusion detection, and a strong focus on IP-networks.

The Military's Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal Democracies by Dr. Geraint Hughes, Strategic Studies Institute, 6 May. The author examines historical and contemporary examples of military involvement in counterterrorism, outlin-

ing the specific roles which the armed forces of liberal democracies have performed in combating terrorism, both in a domestic and international context. He describes the political, strategic, conceptual, diplomatic, and ethical problems **that can arise when a state's armed forces become engaged in counterterrorism**, and argues that military power can only be employed as part of a coordinated counterterrorist strategy aimed at the containment and frustration—rather than the physical elimination—of the terrorist group(s) concerned.

Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003-09: A Case of Operational Surprise and Institutional Response by Brigadier Andrew Smith, Strategic Studies Institute, 29 April. Surprise is a familiar term in military writings and is **enshrined in most nations' doctrine**. Surprises that emerge in tactics, however, can also operate at the strategic and operational levels and are particularly dangerous because they can test the relevance and adaptability of military forces and the "institutional" defense establishments that create, develop, and sustain them. A military establishment that is too slow to recognize and respond **to such surprises places its nation's interests at grave risk**. Western nations are contemplating major reductions in defense spending, with consequent limitations on force structure. As the range of enemy capabilities that a force will be able to match, qualitatively and quantitatively, becomes smaller, the potential for operational and strategic surprise will increase. A key conclusion from this analysis is the critical role of strategic leadership in recognizing the scale of surprise and in forcing the necessary institutional response. At a time when budgets will not allow surprise to be addressed by maintaining large and tech-

nically diverse forces at high readiness, the ability to recognize and respond adroitly to operational and strategic surprise may be a critical requirement for a modern defense establishment.

Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century

by Dr. Colin S. Gray, Strategic Studies Institute, 8 April. Power is one of the more contestable concepts in political theory. In recent decades, scholars and commentators have chosen to distinguish between two kinds of power, “hard” and “soft.” The former is achieved through military threat or use, and by means of economic menace or reward. The latter is the ability to have influence by co-opting others **to share some of one’s values and, as a consequence, to share some key elements on one’s agenda for international order and security.** Whereas hard power obliges its addressees to consider their interests in terms mainly of calculable costs and benefits, soft power works through the persuasive potency of ideas that foreigners find attractive. It is highly desirable if much of the world external to America wants, or can be brought to want, a great deal of what America happens to favor also. Coalitions of the genuinely willing have to be vastly superior to the alternatives.

Resolving Ethical Challenges in an Era of Persistent Conflict

by Colonel Tony Pfaff, Strategic Studies Institute, 29 March. The character of irregular warfare has **challenged the American “way of war” in a number of ways. Not only** does it challenge how U.S. forces fight, it also brings into question the ethical norms that they employ to govern the fighting. The resulting confusion is especially evident in the public debate over the use of force in Iraq and Afghanistan.

For example, traditional just war thinking has permitted collateral damage that has undermined the civil order that those military operations are intended to impose, while at the same time has prohibited Soldiers from killing or detaining the enemy who threatens that order in the first place. These counterintuitive outcomes suggest that the traditional view needs to be revised in light of the demands of combating irregular threats. Revising this view will have to take into account the emphasis that combating irregular threats places on populations rather than on military capability. In doing so, it expands the ends and means of war requiring Soldiers to not only defend the state, but to impose civil-order outside the state as well. These complications fundamentally change the character of warfare and require Soldiers to rethink where they may accept and place risk when balancing the ethical demands of their profession. This point has important implications for the way the United States should fight irregular wars and the norms they should employ to govern them.

SWJ Book Reviews

Adapting to the Utterly Unpredictable, the Entirely Unknown

Review by F. G. Hoffman

James A. Russell, *Innovation, Transformation, and War, Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007*, Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2011, 288 pgs, \$24.95.

The most respected military historian of our day, Michael Howard, commented years ago that the one aspect of military affairs he believed needed to be studied **above all others was “the capacity to**

adapt oneself to the utterly unpredictable, the entirely unknown.” For a generation we ignored his advice, and instead pursued techno-centric illusions and conceptual dark holes with little payoff.

Reinforcing that advice, now retired Army General Dave Fastabend once encouraged the U.S. Army to seek one operational advantage in the future--to **strive to “be superior in the art of learning and adaptation.”** The last decade of the Long War has borne out both these arguments and also demonstratively shown how far we still need to go despite the development of counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations doctrine in the Army and Marine Corps.

The prevailing narrative from our two ongoing conflicts in Central Asia and the Middle East gives a lot of credit for success to the promulgation of FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* in late 2006 and the increased resources commonly called **the “surge” in both conflicts**. This storyline is an irritation to many commanders who already understood the best practices of successful COIN and applied them successfully in Iraq without benefit of the codified commandments handed down like stone tablets.

In *Innovation, Transformation and War*, Dr. James Russell demonstratively undercuts that simplistic top down-driven narrative of American innovation in Iraq. Dr. Russell is a veteran of the policy wars in the Pentagon, a professor of national security affairs at the Naval Post-Graduate School in Monterey, CA, and a long time expert in Middle East affairs. Russell demonstrates that well before Mr. Bush directed the first surge in Iraq, Army and Marine units had devised and were implementing new COIN competencies and techniques quite suc-

cessfully at the tactical level. They did so without top down guidance, campaign directives from higher headquarters, or published principles or paradoxes from the past. The author notes “it is somewhat misleading to assert that the new doctrine suddenly and systemically enhanced battlefield performance that **had been notably lagging.**” As Russell shows with convincing evidence, the tide had already been turned in Anbar Province, presumably as a result of this diverse set of bottom up initiatives.

Russell seeks to understand the process by which rapid implementation of entirely new solutions and technologies can be forged in the crucible of combat. In contrast, our understanding about military innovation is heavily based upon successful peacetime or interwar innovation. This type of innovation is anticipatory and predicated often by dramatic changes in security threats or new technological breakthroughs such as the combustion engine, aviation, radar, or computers. The literature has focused on such formal systems of deliberate and institutional innovation as reflected in *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (Cambridge 1996) a DOD-sponsored research project, which culminated in a volume edited by the noted U.S. historians Williamson Murray and Allan Millet. Likewise, Stephen Peter Rosen’s *Winning the Next War* focuses largely on the phenomena of directed innovation by military institutions and the variables or environmental factors that lead to successful change.

The literature is sparse with respect to formal theories on how military organizations change or evolve during war. Organizational theorists focus on post-conflict learning, with the exception of Timothy Lupfer’s *Dynamics of Doctrine*

research monograph on German tactical experimentation or Dr. John Nagl's *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* which explored Britain's successful adaptation in Malaya during the 1950's, representing exceptions. Whereas Nagl captures both plans of the theater headquarters and its development of the campaign, Professor Russell examined the tactical and operational lessons that field units developed and pursued themselves, in the absence of help from what he calls the "rear echelon."

The improved performance on the complex battlefield of Iraq commenced in 2005 and was obtaining observable results by 2006 in the absence of explicit top-down direction from the military hierarchy or formal Joint doctrine. What accounts for this success? Russell concludes that an iterative process of organically generated tactical adaptation and innovation unfolded over time in a distinctive progression of trial and error culminating in standard operating procedures and innovative practices peculiar to the circumstances of the units he studied. These included a number of Army brigades (armor, Stryker, cavalry and National Guard) and three Marine battalions (including 1st Bn, 7th Marines commanded by then LtCol Dale Alford and 3rd Bn, 6th Marines led by LtCol Nick Marano in Al Qaim).

This work is not a rambling academic exercise. The field research that supports **Russell's revisionist perspective** is based upon extensive primary sources including personal observations and interviews with the participants in country. It is a compelling assessment of current history and recent interpretations of ongoing conflict, written with lucid prose and a mature understanding of irregular warfare.

One of Russell's key conclusions involves the willingness of operational headquarters to apply decentralized command techniques and a marked willingness to empower tactical leaders. **"This organizational flexibility produced wartime innovation,"** Russell finds, **"that fundamentally changed the conduct of the war against the insurgents in the years preceding the promulgation of formal, joint doctrine."** **This confirms insights found in Meir Finkel's recent book *On Flexibility*** (also published by Stanford's successful security series).

While this book reflects an extraordinarily deep grasp of the literature on innovation and organizational learning, the book raises questions about institutional culture and officer education. Dr. Russell notes that the Army and Marine units were culturally different, but that this distinction was not a variable that affected their development of creative solutions. Other research (Wick Murray, Deborah Avant, Elizabeth Kier, and Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff) suggests that elements of Army and Marine culture influence how culture impacts Service command styles, operational art, and the role of education in preparing commanders and staffs for changing tactics and techniques by building up their storehouse of historical models and past best practices. Each Service has a *Mask of War* that it wears and this mask can retard or facilitate evolutionary changes. Last, the role of intensive educational preparation as part of the profession of arms has been emphasized by Generals Paul Van Riper and Jim Mattis over the past decade and merits attention in this rich vein of scholarship.

The author's bottom up model of tactical adaptation is original and worthy of further development. RAND's Adam Gris-

som, writing in the *Journal of Strategic Studies*, may have been the first to shed light on this subject. To expand this inquiry, a wider set of historical cases, including both offensive and defensive examples would be useful, as well as conventional operations including both ground and aviation applications to broaden our research base and to improve our ability to generalize from the insights with greater confidence beyond just U.S. ground units involved in COIN. Additionally, the process of capturing and rapidly disseminating lessons learned between units, and between successful field units and the rear echelon to improve the performance of units being trained for subsequent deployment **is worth study.** Finkel's book shows how critical this can be to learning organizations especially by transmitting the learning among adjacent or follow on units—**what might be termed “horizontal dissemination.”** If counterinsurgencies are learning competitions as FM 3-24 suggests, then this aspect of the competition should be studied in more depth as it expands the speed and breadth of the learning cycle.


In the future, the ability to change rapidly may well be our major source of asymmetric advantage. If nonlinear modes continue to characterize modern warfare, the corresponding need to be adaptive without recourse to extensive doctrinal, organizational or materiel retooling could mean the difference between success and failure. Innovation, Transformation and War offers numerous insights on abetting this degree of agility and is recommended with great enthusiasm for its conclusions on adaptation and operational flexibility, as well as for its provocative assessment of the prevailing Iraq history. No professional library devoted to modern conflict or the

study of how our military needs to prepare for war in the 21st century would be complete without this study. It represents the front edge of a major research thrust, and will surely prove to be a lasting contribution to our growing grasp of the challenges of modern conflict and measurably adds to our understanding of military innovation. It is strongly recommended for senior military leaders in the Joint and Service combat development community and all students of innovation and history.

Mr. Hoffman is a retired Marine Reservist and frequent contributor to Small Wars Journal.

Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918 by Martin Samuels. Frank Cass Publishers, 2003, 285 pgs, \$48.27. *Small Wars Journal* review by Lieutenant Colonel Reyes Z. Cole.

Identity in Algerian Politics: The Legacy of Colonial Rule by J.N.C. Hill. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009, 209 pages. *Small Wars Journal* Review by Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein.



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Small Wars-Related Events

We're tracking events here and on our [Small Wars Journal Facebook page](#) – Thanks Bret!

1 June: [Beyond Bullets and Bombs: Fixing the U.S. Approach to Development in Pakistan](#); Center for Global Development, 1800 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, First Floor, Washington, D.C. Fallout from the killing of Osama bin Laden in a Pakistani garrison town has prompted an anxious reassessment of all facets of the complex, troubled alliance between the United States and Pakistan. A new report from CGD's Study Group on U.S. Development Strategy in Pakistan shines light on a crucial and too-often neglected aspect of the relationship: the aid, trade and investment policies that constitute America's effort to support Pakistan's development. The group's message is alarming, but with a note of optimism. Two years into a new approach to engagement with Pakistan, the authors write, the U.S. development program still lacks coherent priorities, tools to manage and adjust them as conditions require, and a system to measure and report progress. Yet there are signs that the program has laid the foundation to do better—and there is a window of opportunity now to refocus and strengthen the program. The report authors will present the key findings and recommendations and invite comments and questions from a distinguished expert panel and members of the audience.

1 June: [CAREC and the Future of Economic Development in Afghanistan and Central Asia](#); Johns Hopkins SAIS, Rome Building Auditorium, Rome Building, Washington, D.C. Johannes

Linn, senior resident scholar at the Emerging Markets Forum and non-resident senior fellow in the Global Economy and Development Program at the Brookings Institution; Leif Rosenberger, economic adviser for the United States Central Command and adjunct professor at the U.S. Army War College; Robert Schoellhammer, deputy resident director at the Asian Development Bank in the North American Representative Office; and Frederick Starr, chairman of CACI, will discuss this topic.

2 June: [High Stakes: New Reports on the Democratic Republic of Congo](#); U.S. Institute of Peace Headquarters, B241, 2301 Construction Avenue NW, Washington D.C. This is a year of high stakes in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) is due for renewal by the end of June and elections will be held before the end of this year. Meanwhile, a new report has documented that sexual violence in the DRC is occurring at much higher rates than previously reported and is less concentrated in North and South Kivu and other conflict affected areas. Moreover, elections preparations are worryingly behind. With human security at such low levels and uncertainty about the upcoming polls, recent reports state that the DRC could face renewed political crisis. What are the underlying reasons for these problems and how should the United States and the international community respond to such high stakes in the DRC?

1-2 June: [RUSI Land Warfare Conference](#); Whitehall, London, U.K. Sponsored by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). The British Army faces a challenging period following the Strateg-

ic Defence and Security Review. It is required to achieve success in Afghanistan while beginning to transform for future conflict, and must undertake both these tasks while managing a very difficult financial situation. Although its operations in Afghanistan are protected, post SDR the Army arguably has less certainty about its force structures and capabilities than the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. The Land Warfare Conference is therefore a timely opportunity to influence thinking and decisions. It is the first public opportunity for RUSI and the Army to examine where land forces should be going following the Strategic Defence and Security Review by encouraging professional debate and discussion within the land environment and with a wider Whitehall and international community.

2 June: Center for a New American Security's (CNAS) Fifth Annual Conference; Willard InterContinental Hotel, 1401 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. Sponsored by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Registration information, the agenda and featured speakers will be available at the **link soon**. **This year's conference will focus** on how the United States can manage global risk and seize opportunities in a time of growing economic constraint. Featured topics include cyber security and Internet freedom, the rapidly evolving Middle East, a new phase of the war in Afghanistan, and cooperation and competition in the Asia-Pacific.

3 June: Ten Years after 9/11: Evaluating a Decade of Conflicts on the Rules of War; U.S. Institute of Peace Headquarters, 2301 Construction Avenue NW, Washington D.C. Almost ten years after the devastating attacks of 9/11, the United States engaged in two wars that sent tens of thousands of American troops to

fight in Afghanistan and Iraq. A new survey conducted recently by the American Red Cross about the attitudes of the first post-9/11 generation of American youth reveal for the first time their opinions about the rules of war and what is or is not acceptable behavior in wartime. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the American Red Cross invite you to join us for a timely discussion on the relevance and importance of international humanitarian law at a time when civil conflicts are also erupting in North Africa and the Middle East.

8 June: Global Security Forum 2011; The Center for Strategic and International Studies invites you to watch the 2011 Global Security Forum live via the CSIS website.

8-9 June: Defence Information Superiority 2011 - Information Superiority in an Age of Uncertainty; Whitehall, London, U.K. Sponsored by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). In an uncertain security environment and at a time when opinion, news and information is available globally in near real time, information superiority at the strategic, operational and tactical level remains essential to the success of military operations and the political decision-making process underpinning them. At the same time, financial constraints demand that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) makes the most of existing information systems through application of best practice from allies, other government departments and industry while strategic partnerships will be essential to maintaining the MoD's information advantage. This conference, once again supported by the MoD, will bring together another senior panel of speakers from MoD, Industry and allies to address emerging trends and means to im-

prove the MoD's information management and exploitation.

16 June: Engaging Extremists; U.S. Institute of Peace Headquarters, B241, 2301 Construction Avenue NW, Washington D.C. Many conflicts on the international scene today involve extremist groups that employ violence to achieve their goals. But should states and international bodies engage entities such as the Taliban, Hamas, and Hezbollah, and if so, which ones, when, and how? These questions are among the most politically fraught and vexing challenges facing international negotiators and mediators. Please join us for a discussion of two recent USIP Press publications, Engaging Extremists: Trade-offs, Timing, and Diplomacy, edited by I. William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure (USIP Press, 2011), and Talking to Groups That Use Terror, by Nigel Quinney and A. Heather Coyne—the latest publication in the Institute's Peace-maker's Toolkit series. The Institute will also be acknowledging Professor Zartman's extraordinary contributions to building the conflict resolution field.

13 July: The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers; Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, One Woodrow Wilson Plaza 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. As Ambassador and Special Envoy on Afghanistan from 1989 to 1992, Peter Tomsen has had close relationships with Afghan leaders and has dealt with senior Taliban, warlords, and religious leaders involved in the region's conflicts over the last two decades. In Tomsen's latest book entitled *The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and*

the Failures of Great Powers, he draws on a rich trove of never-before-published material to shed new light on the American involvement in the long and continuing Afghan war. *The Wars of Afghanistan* offers perspective on how Afghanistan's history as a "shatter zone" for foreign invaders and its tribal society have shaped the modern Afghan narrative. It brings to life the misinformed secret operations by foreign intelligence agencies, including the Soviet NKVD and KGB, the Pakistani ISI, and the CIA.

1-4 August: Connections 2011; National Defense University, Washington DC. 2011 is the 200th anniversary of modern wargaming. Sponsored by National Defense University. In keeping with this anniversary the theme of Connections 2011 is "The Next 200 Years of Wargaming - Expanding Our Scope" For example, Connections 2011 will explore how wargaming can evolve to effectively explore; science and technology alternatives, optimizing tooth and tail mix, orchestrating all of government responses. Connections 2011 will explore this theme through; keynotes, four panels, three working groups, demos and a play test. Many believe the most valuable element of Connections is the chance to meet leaders from across the branches of wargaming.

13-14 September: 10 Years Later: Insights on al-Qaeda's Past & Future Through Captured Records; National Defense University, Ft. Lesley McNair, Washington D.C. "10 Years Later" will examine what we knew about al-Qaeda before 9/11, and what we have learned over the past 10 years. It will also examine how captured records and other primary sources can contribute to our understanding of future challenges from al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The CRRC at

the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University invites scholars to submit papers for a three panel conference on al-Qaeda and associated movements to mark the ten year anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. The panels will examine what we knew about al-Qaeda before 9/11, what we have learned over the past 10 years, and how captured records and other primary sources can contribute to our understanding of future challenges from al-Qaeda and its affiliates.

26 September: 2011 Defense Forum Washington; Ronald Regan Building and International Trade Center, Washington DC. Sponsored by the U.S. Naval Institute the 2011 forum will focus on a national commitment to helping our wounded warriors and their families transition.

24-27 October: 16th Annual Expeditionary Warfare Conference; Bay Point Marriott, Panama City Beach, Florida. Sponsored by the National Defense Industrial Association. The conference objectives are to provide an opportunity for the services to present clear statements of their requirements and intent to industry, service laboratories and other interested parties; an opportunity for frank dialogue between the military services, industry, and other attendees; and an atmosphere of trust and cooperation that exists between the military services and industry.

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