Small Wars Journal

Defining Success in Afghanistan

Wed, 01/12/2011 - 9:49pm
Here's the video of Monday's Defining Success in Afghanistan panel discussion at American Enterprise Institute. I watched it live and thought it very informative and thought provoking - whether you completely agree with a particular view on the war or not.

The AEI-ISW report, which is the subject of this event, is available here.

About this event via AEI: The US strategy in Afghanistan can succeed, according to a new report by Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan released Friday. Mr. Kagan, resident scholar and director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, and Ms. Kagan, founder and president of the Institute for the Study of War, laid out their main arguments in "Defining Success in Afghanistan" Monday at AEI. AEI's Danielle Pletka underscored that this war is little understood by the American public and that insufficient effort has been made to illuminate the enemy insurgency, the nature of international efforts, and Afghan self-governance. Ms. Kagan gave an overview of the situation on the ground, pointing out that International Security Assistance Force troops inflicted unprecedented damage to al Qaeda in southern Helmand and Kandahar provinces throughout 2010. On the issue of a stable Afghan state, Mr. Kagan argued that longstanding Afghan history and tradition suggest that self-governance can be enduring, noting in particular the indigenous process by which Pashtuns achieve consensus among their tribal leaders. Afghans see the current hypercentralized government as illegitimate because it lacks the proper checks on executive power and is rampant with corruption, fueling the insurgency. While terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan are of great concern, Mr. Kagan argued that dismantling the local networks used to carry out attacks within Afghanistan will render those sanctuaries less significant. Andrew Exum, who served as a civilian adviser to General Stanley A. McChrystal in Afghanistan, said that a strict counterterrorism mission would be difficult now and would not likely help achieve US objectives, but he raised concerns over the regenerative nature of the enemy. He added that he will withhold judgment on the significance of 2010's military successes until next summer. He also emphasized that the war is fought in phases and that the public needs to be prepared for additional fighting in the future. General Jack Keane compared the war in Iraq with that in Afghanistan and expressed optimism that with the right strategy in place, a new 2014 time frame, and the exceptional leadership of General David Petraeus, there is real hope for success in Afghanistan.

Comments

Janes,

Re this:
<i>
American investors spend countless dollars in India because there is an abundance of workers that are much cheaper to employ than their American counterparts.
</i>

There's a lot more to attracting meaningful investment than labor cost. India succeeds because it has a labor force that is not only cost-effective, but reasonably well educated, technologically competent, and in many cases English-speaking. Infrastructure, a functioning legal system, investment-friendly policies, and political stability also make a difference.

This is way more than Afghanistan can hope to achieve in the short or even medium-term future. They're more likely to start - as many other nations did - stitching fake adidas shorts and soccer balls together... lousy work but one step above no work at all.

Hard to start climbing on the 10th rung of the ladder.

G Martin

Mon, 01/24/2011 - 6:40pm

James: "9/11 would seem to me to be the cost of doing nothing. Just my opinion. If you are right then we spend a bunch of money and establish an effective government in Afghanistan which 10 years from now may become the new India in the sense of economic opportunities. But if you are incorrect then we have another terrorist attack and maybe one that dwarfs the effects of 9/11. I don't want to see another 9/11 to prove that I am right that the cost of doing nothing is truly higher."

I, like Dayuhan, also think there are many more possibilities between these two that you have stated. And I'm pretty sure that my arguments weren't supporting the possibility of an effective Afghan government in 10 years with anything close to Indian economic opportunities- that, to me, is a joke. I'm sorry, I don't see the same potential in Afghanistan anytime soon, if ever- and its mostly for cultural/psuedo-religious reasons. And I don't think anyone was arguing for "doing nothing". Surely there are other things we can do that are cheaper than nation building that wouldn't be described as "doing nothing".

Comments like the two extremes mentioned border on the emotional and irrational. Only seeing one possibility if we do pop-centric COIN with the so-called "right force level" (no more attacks from Afghanistan and a viable trading partner in 10 years) and one possibility if we don't (more 9-11 style attacks) does not jive with most of the analyses I've seen coming out of Afghanistan in the last 3 years.

But, I will end here with saying we will have to agree to disagree- your assumptions and mine are very different, therefore there isn't much we should agree on. This is also getting into policy- which is outside of the military's bailiwick. Trying to decide how much blood and treasure is worth achieving a theoretical level of security is in the politician's court.

We in the military, IMO, owe them options and our best guess for implications (and not an overly-simplified "if we don't do COIN then more 9-11s and if we do- then SUCCESS!"). Seeing the populace's and politicians' latest polls and decisions- it would seem they favor doing much less nation-building and more "doing nothing" (although it will be far from "doing nothing"). It is time to accept that and get on with what our people and political masters demand: a FID mission with no combat role. STRATCOM aside, I think everyone at ISAF is preparing for that reality.

I had wanted this comment to follow directly after the first, in which I quoted from a summary of 2007 declassified documents re Pakistan's support for the Taliban. But as a new commenter here I wasn't familiar with the moderation protocol and wanted to wait, given that there'd been a delay in the first comment posting.

To reply first to the topic of the SWJ post,
I think it's a moot question as to whether the U.S. should stay on in Afghanistan and do nation building. The U.S. military bases being built in Afghanistan -- three at the last count, and which are to be reserved for U.S. use -- are just one sign that the Pentagon is planning on being in the country a long time, whether or not there will be extensive drawdowns of combat troops.

I also think it's playing ostrich at this to argue the questions of whether the U.S. can achieve victory in Afghanistan and what victory might look like. That's because it's obvious by now that until the Pakistan military's modus operandi in Afghanistan is halted NATO is trying to empty the ocean with a sieve and making it impossible for Afghan self-governance.

Just to review: the MO is to use proxies to assassinate or intimidate every Afghan they neutralize who shows intelligence and skill as an administrator, and who's not corrupt.

That's the same MO the Pak military used in East Pakistan and in Kashmir. It's the same MO they used in Baluchistan. It's the same MO they used in Afghanistan after the Russian pullout.

In fact it's the same MO they use against their 'own' people in the Punjab and Sindh who would seriously challenge the power of the country's largest landholders.

So I don't want to hear at this point about paths to victory in Afghanistan and nation building. First replace a sieve with a bucket.

One reason I chose to scare up a summary of those declassified documents is that their release marked a turning point, in that the U.S. government could no longer practice denial and deception regarding the extent of the involvement of the Pakistan military/ISI with the Taliban.

This has meant that since the release of those documents U.S. officials have had to substitute for denial verbal handsprings; e.g., 'We still believe it's only rogue elements in the ISI,' 'They're improving,' and creative excuses; e.g., 'Remember we need to transport NATO supplies through Pakistan,' but the tactics haven't fooled any informed observer.

And such tactics won't fool U.S. military servicepeople once they leave Afghanistan and settle into civilian life -- the ones who will steel themselves to dig into the details of the U.S. government's actions toward Pakistan. They may know the big picture while in theater but the devil is in the details.

Yet if the U.S. military command sees the lengthening shadow stalking it, it hasn't given a sign of this under Gates's leadership and Mullen's.

Virtual suicide missions, FUBAR orders, and friendly fire are all part of the fabric of war. But I believe that U.S. tolerance for the Pakistan military's use of proxies to murder U.S. troops represents the first time in history that taxpayers are in effect funding the killing and maiming of their own country's finest citizens in order to placate a vaunted ally.

How does the U.S. military high command think that thousands of ex-servicepeople are going to react when they learn in detail of such an atrocity?

So I would be a little less concerned at this point about defining success in Afghanistan and a lot more concerned with halting a betrayal of horrific proportions.

Now to reply to some specific comments here:

James, regarding your statement, "I understand that role of the Saudi/Pakistan support to the Taliban; however, they didn't support the Taliban when is was Mullah Omar and 5 other guys. [...]"

From yesterday's <a href=http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/23/pakistan-godfather-taliban-…;
Guardian report on former ISI spymaster and vaunted "godfather" of the Taliban, Sultan Amir Tarar:<blockquote>[...] He ran a network of CIA-funded training camps in the tribal belt and Balochistan, which funnelled tens of thousands of mujahideen guerrillas into battle against the Soviets.
[...]
Among his students was a young Afghan cleric named Muhammad Omar, who emerged as head of the Afghan Taliban and seized power in Kabul in 1996. Tarar played a key role in that movement too.

Operating under diplomatic cover, Tarar was the ISI's point-man with the Taliban, nurturing a relationship in which Pakistan offered arms, advice and finance.

He developed a close personal relationship with Omar and, according to some reports, advised him as US forces attacked Afghanistan in late 2001.
[...]</blockquote>It was never "Mullah Omar and 5 guys." It was always Pakistan's high military command working in close cooperation with the U.S. command through the ISI front and with financial help and advice from the U.S. and Saudi military and intelligence services.

That's the truth. That Omar and his crew filled a law-and-order vacuum in Afghanistan and thus were tolerated and even welcomed by many Afghans until they recoiled from the Taliban's methods and Saudi-inspired Wahhabist doctrine makes it no less true.

As to the extent to which the U.S. government directly contributed to the indoctrination techniques Tarar used to radicalize Afghan refugees, see the March 2002 Washington Post report, <a href=" http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A5339-2002Mar22?language=print… ABC's of Jihad</a>:<blockquote>In the twilight of the Cold War, the United States spent millions of dollars to supply Afghan schoolchildren with textbooks filled with violent images and militant Islamic teachings, part of covert attempts to spur resistance to the Soviet occupation.

The primers, which were filled with talk of jihad and featured drawings of guns, bullets, soldiers and mines, have served since then as the Afghan school system's core curriculum. Even the Taliban used the American-produced books, though the radical movement scratched out human faces in keeping with its strict fundamentalist code.
[...]</blockquote>Many of those textbooks were used in the madrassas that were set up in refugee camps in Pakistan for Afghan refugees. And just to be clear, those camps were not exclusively reserved for Pashtuns. Afghans from all clans and ethnic backgrounds were given refuge in Pakistan once the Russian military entered Afghanistan.

James, regarding your statement, "It was the lack of quality education in the Pashtun regions of Pakistan that provided the demand for the Wahabbism madrassas," that is not entirely correct from my reading of Ahmed Rashid's authoritative history of the Taliban See pp. 89-90 of his 2001 book, <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Taliban-Militant-Islam-Fundamentalism-Central/dp/… Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia</a>.

In brief, Rashid recounted that the aim of both the JUI and Zia's military regime in setting up madrassas was to indoctrinate and train Afghan Pashtuns to govern in Afghanistan. Later, as the Pakistani public education system collapsed (or to be more precise, was allowed to collapse), Zia vastly increased the number of madrassas. And yes, those schools became the only source of formal education for many of the poorest Pakistanis, and not just the Pashtuns.

What the passages in the book do not address is why Zia allowed the education system to collapse, despite massive infusions of aid from the West to prop it up. And when I say massive, I mean uncounted USD billions -- so many billions that no one in the 'international community' wants to tot up exactly how many.

This comment section is not the place to explore where successive Pakistani regimes diverted the education aid money to, and why Zia didn't want the country's masses to receive quality public education. But I will say here that it's uniformed to assume that a better education system is the key to turning Pakistanis away from radicalism.

And before I leave the subject of education: it shouldn't be assumed that the madrassas are the sole educational sources of radicalization in Pakistan. Indeed, a Frontline documentary aired a year or so ago featured Pakistani educators pointing out that the greatest radicalizing influence was Pakistan's public schools -- and that in comparison many madrassas were bastions of liberalism.

Thus, only the fact that many Pakistani families can't spare their children for school attendance has prevented an even greater level of radicalization than is seen in today's Pakistan.

James (not verified)

Mon, 01/24/2011 - 1:23pm

"It is possibly not wise to define options in such absolute and extreme terms."
I didn't say that as absolute or extreme. American investors spend countless dollars in India because there is an abundance of workers that are much cheaper to employ than their American counterparts. That is what I was referring to. I don't expect Afghans to become Indians but a stable Afghanistan would provide similar investment opportunities.

Pundita (not verified)

Mon, 01/24/2011 - 1:03am

James, Madhu:

"Washington D.C., August 14, 2007 - A collection of newly-declassified documents published today detail U.S. concern over Pakistan's relationship with the Taliban during the seven-year period leading up to 9/11.
[...]
[T]he declassified U.S. documents released today clearly illustrate that the Taliban was directly funded, armed and advised by Islamabad itself.

Obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the National Security Archive at George Washington University, the documents reflect U.S. apprehension about Islamabad's longstanding provision of direct aid and military support to the Taliban, including the use of Pakistani troops to train and fight alongside the Taliban inside Afghanistan. [Doc 17]

The records released today represent the most complete and comprehensive collection of declassified documentation to date on Pakistan's aid programs to the Taliban, illustrating Islamabad's firm commitment to a Taliban victory in Afghanistan. [Doc 34].

These new documents also support and inform the findings of a recently-released CIA intelligence estimate characterizing Pakistan's tribal areas as a safe haven for al-Qaeda terrorists, and provide new details about the close relationship between Islamabad and the Taliban in the years prior to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Declassified State Department cables and U.S. intelligence reports describe the use of Taliban terrorist training areas in Afghanistan by Pakistani-supported militants in Kashmir, as well as Pakistan's covert effort to supply Pashtun troops from its tribal regions to the Taliban cause in Afghanistan-effectively forging and reinforcing Pashtun bonds across the border and consolidating the Taliban's severe form of Islam throughout Pakistan's frontier region.

Also published today are documents linking Harakat ul-Ansar, a militant Kashmiri group funded directly by the government of Pakistan, [Doc 10] to terrorist training camps shared by Osama bin Laden in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. [Doc 16]

Of particular concern was the potential for Islamabad-Taliban links to strengthen Taliban influence in Pakistan's tribal regions along the border. A January 1997 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan observed that "for Pakistan, a Taliban-based government in Kabul would be as good as it can get in Afghanistan," adding that worries that the "Taliban brand of Islam... might infect Pakistan," was "apparently a problem for another day." [Doc 20]
[...]
Islamabad denies that it ever provided military support to the Taliban, but the newly-released documents report that in the weeks following the Taliban takeover of Kabul in 1996, Pakistan's intelligence agency was "supplying the Taliban forces with munitions, fuel, and food." Pakistan's Interservice Intelligence Directorate was "using a private sector transportation company to funnel supplies into Afghanistan and to the Taliban forces." [Doc 15]

Other documents also conclude that there has been an extensive and consistent history of "both military and financial assistance to the Taliban." [Doc 8]
[...]
<strong>Highlights</strong>

> August 1996: Pakistan Intelligence (ISID) "provides at least $30,000 - and possibly as much as $60,000 - per month" to the militant Kashmiri group Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA). Despite this aid, the group is reaching out to sponsors of international terrorism including Osama bin Laden for additional support, and may in the near future become a threat to Islamabad itself as well as U.S. interests. HUA contacts have hinted they "might undertake terrorist actions against civilian airliners." [Doc 10]

> October 1996: A Canadian intelligence document released by the National Security Agency and originally classified Top Secret SI, Umbra comments on recent Taliban military successes noting that even Pakistan "must harbour some concern" regarding the Taliban's impressive capture of Kabul, as such victory may diminish Pakistan's influence over the movement and produce a Taliban regime in Kabul with strong links to Pakistan's own Pashtuns. [Doc 14]

> October 1996: Although food supplies from Pakistan to the Taliban are conducted openly through Pakistan's intelligence agency, the ISID, "the munitions convoys depart Pakistan late in the evening hours and are concealed to reveal their true contents." [Doc 15]

> November 1996: Pakistan's Pashtun-based "Frontier Corps elements are utilized in command and control; training; and when necessary - combat" alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan. [Doc 17]

> March 1998: Al-Qaeda and Pakistan government-funded Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA) have been sharing terrorist training camps in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan for years [Link Doc 16], and HUA has increasingly been moving ideologically closer to al-Qaeda. The U.S. Embassy in Islamabad is growing increasingly concerned as Fazlur Rahman Khalil, a leader in Pakistan's Harakat ul-Ansar has signed Osama bin Laden's most recent fatwa promoting terrorist activities against U.S. interests. [Doc 26]

> September 1998 [Doc 31] and March 1999 [Doc 33]: The U.S. Department of State voices concern that Pakistan is not doing all it can to pressure the Taliban to surrender Osama bin Laden. "Pakistan has not been responsive to our requests that it use its full influence on the Taliban surrender of Bin Ladin." [Doc 33]

> September 2000: A cable cited in The 9/11 Commission Report notes that Pakistan's aid to the Taliban has reached "unprecedented" levels, including recent reports that Islamabad has possibly allowed the Taliban to use territory in Pakistan for military operations. Furthermore the U.S. has "seen reports that Pakistan is providing the Taliban with materiel, fuel, funding, technical assistance and military advisors." [Doc 34]"

For the entire article and links to the documents cited above see
<a href="http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/index.htm">this page</a>.

I suspect and hope that there is some possible middle ground between doing nothing (not smart) and trying to "spend a bunch of money and establish an effective government in Afghanistan which 10 years from now may become the new India" (not possible, no matter how much we spend). It is possibly not wise to define options in such absolute and extreme terms.

James (not verified)

Sun, 01/23/2011 - 5:46pm

"My main issue with the ISAF and 3-24 lines are that they are stated- as they are stated here (i.e.: "the true cost of doing nothing is far higher")- as facts instead of assumptions. "
The true cost of doing nothing will almost certainly be far higher. :)

9/11 would seem to me to be the cost of doing nothing. Just my opinion. If you are right then we spend a bunch of money and establish an effective government in Afghanistan which 10 years from now may become the new India in the sense of economic opportunities. But if you are incorrect then we have another terrorist attack and maybe one that dwarfs the effects of 9/11. I don't want to see another 9/11 to prove that I am right that the cost of doing nothing is truly higher.

What will success in Afghanistan look like?

When we see McDonald's in downtown Kabul (not on Camp Eggers or any other ISAF camp), or Wal-Mart or Dunkin Donuts, we can declare success.

Not trying to be facetious but there seems to be something about US companies, particularly fast-food restaurants, setting up shop in various countries that calms down the average insurgent.

G Martin

Sun, 01/23/2011 - 5:30pm

My main issue with the ISAF and 3-24 lines are that they are stated- as they are stated here (i.e.: "the true cost of doing nothing is far higher")- as facts instead of assumptions. How do you know that the true cost will be far higher? You are making an assumption- and you may be right- but since it is a prediction of future possibilities, you may also be wrong. But, we don't talk like that- we simply state that if we don't have a viable ANSF that fights the Taliban, then the "cost" (a truly subjective term) will be higher for us.

I submit that the issue isn't ANSF conducting COIN. I have witnessed them conducting COIN- and when they want to do it, I have seen them do it very well. I think they have the capability now (just not the capacity to do it the way we want them to do it: i.e. with our systems).

I submit that the real issue is GIRoA wanting to conduct COIN. I haven't seen much evidence that the powers that be want to prosecute the same type of operations and strategy that IJC is prosecuting. So, if we can't do FID until ANSF can do COIN, and GIRoA (or the Ministry of Defense's Operational HQ entity) won't conduct a COIN effort- then where will we be- constantly conducting their COIN for them? What happens in 2014 if Karzai says "stop!" to his troops and locks them up on FOBs?

James (not verified)

Sun, 01/23/2011 - 4:49pm

No worries. I have put my boot in my mouth a few times too, lol.

I agree that we finally have the right number of troops on the ground here and can now provide the security needed to fix the governance side of things in Afghanistan. The problem is that we don't have the people in place on the civilian side to actually make those fixes.

"If the Pakistani state had been set up differently, then you are correct, we would not see the poor governance of Pashtun areas."
When the US should have sending money to Pakistan/Afghanistan to build schools and rebuild the destroyed infrastructure in Afghanistan from the Soviet occupation, we were too busy rebuilding eastern Europe. And we figured that we had already spent enough money and effort in SWA.

Madhu (not verified)

Sun, 01/23/2011 - 3:12pm

Yikes. I deserved that, didn't I?

No, no, no. I wasn't talking about you. I was expressing a common frustration you find among the Indian (and some Afghan) diaspora about American decision-makers and this was the wrong place and the wrong thread to express that frustration. This was entirely my error and I apologize completely.

But, if our understanding is so good, why are we where we are today? If it is as Cole stated, we finally have the correct support that is needed, then fine.

I don't believe that has been communicated in a meaningful way to the American public.

When I talk about propaganda, I am talking about that which is directed at various publics. I am talking about frequent SWJ commenter Omar Ali's concept of information operations directed at the public of Pakistan and the US and etc. This is real and not paranoia.

If the Pakistani state had been set up differently, then you are correct, we would not see the poor governance of Pashtun areas.

My point is that the poor governance, historically, is partly a function of the idea that someone else will step in and "fix" everything. I believe a reading of the history of the region will show that.

Again, my deepest apologies.

But you know, you frequently read in the Indian papers that Americans are being duped. It must be frustrating for you on the ground to read that but why shouldn't I discuss it? Why should I pretend a thing which doesn't exist?

James (not verified)

Sun, 01/23/2011 - 3:07pm

"A hybrid COIN/counterterrorism approach may be an option when ANSFs are ready. They are not. As today's SWJ article points out in "Counterinsurgency: Falling Short...," civilians of the U.N. and NGOs are ill-prepared to conduct nation-building WITHOUT the point of a gun. Without coalition or effective ANSF able to provide such protection and mentor the ANSF, the civilian mercenary option becomes the sole less than palatable option."

Exactly the point that I have tried to make on both threads I have commented on about this subject. We cannot conduct the FID in Afghanistan to secure our national interests in the region until there is security. That security will not come without the population-centric COIN with ISAF in strong kenetic support of ANSF (often times in the lead). As the ANSF become fully staffed, more effective and capable to plan/execute their own COIN, we can begin to scale back the roles ISAF plays in the kinetic side and focus more on FID. But, the end goal of tranferring resposibilty of Security, Development, and Economic growth is dependent on mentoring and developing Afghan leaders to manage those institutions and building that link between the Government and the people.

James (not verified)

Sun, 01/23/2011 - 2:57pm

"The rise of the Taliban had more to do with Saudi money and Pakistani regional strategic aims than it did to any "abandonment." We shouldn't be so quick to believe propaganda."

I understand that role of the Saudi/Pakistan support to the Taliban; however, they didn't support the Taliban when is was Mullah Omar and 5 other guys. They didn't support the Taliban when they had rescued the two children that had been kidnapped and were being raped by the warlord. They didn't even really support the Taliban when they took Kandahar City. It was the lack of a government that cared for more than the non-pashtun areas that allowed the rise of the Taliban. It was the lack of quality education in the Pashtun regions of Pakistan that provided the demand for the Wahhabism madrassas. The same madrassas from which the Taliban received the majority of their fighters.

I am not just reading propaganda publications to find my information. I have sat through conferences given by experts with over 30 years experience on the ground. I have been there on the ground and interfacing with the locals nearly daily. We shouldn't be so quick to assume someone is uneducated on the region and the subject at hand. You may have a different opinion about the roles or strategies from that of the good major and myself but please try to express them in a way that doesn't challenge our integrity or intellect on the matter.

Madhu (not verified)

Sun, 01/23/2011 - 1:09pm

<blockquote>This hope of tapping the U. S. Treasury was voiced so persistently that one wondered whether the purpose was to bolster the world against Bolshevism or to bolster Pakistan's own uncertain position as a new political entity.<blockquote>

Keep this in mind, too, as you think about "nation-building" in Afghanistan too. The laws of unintended consequences in this region are brutal.

Madhu (not verified)

Sun, 01/23/2011 - 12:53pm

And, of course, as with any theory proposed by an online nobody, it's probably bunk.

But that excerpt is a doozy, isn't it? It ought to be read by every SA policy analyst and ought to have been read out loud in our hearings on the subject of AfPak some years ago.

Knowledge is power.

Madhu (not verified)

Sun, 01/23/2011 - 12:47pm

@ James:

The rise of the Taliban had more to do with Saudi money and Pakistani regional strategic aims than it did to any "abandonment." We shouldn't be so quick to believe propaganda.

I am so sorry to be such a broken record on the subject and I am sure I come across as a typical Indo-Pak online diaspora squabbler, but I am alarmed at the fantastic ability of our decision makers to think they know more than they do.

It is my belief that the South Asia intellectual "bench" here in the States is shallow and riddled with the influence of our prior Cold War relationships. By this I do not mean to insult any South Asia policy experts. I am talking about the sum-of-the-whole, not the individual parts.

What do I mean?

<strong>Grant, James</strong> - and others. Please take a look a the following excerpt taken from a 1949 book on the subject of Jinnah. The linked post states: "....Margaret Bourke-White's 1949 book, Halfway to Freedom, and which I republish in this post. The book was based on dispatches Bourke-White filed for LIFE magazine on post-Independence India and Pakistan. The excerpts deal with the earliest days of Pakistan and the last days of its founding father (pictured above with Mohandas K. Gandhi), Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), the Quaid-i-Azam ("great leader")."

<blockquote>This would need clarification in the constitution. Presumably Jinnah, the lawyer, would be just the person to correlate the "true Islamic principles" one heard so much about in Pakistan with the new nation's laws. But all he would tell me was that the constitution would be democratic because "the soil is perfectly fertile for democracy."

What plans did he have for the industrial development of the country? Did he hope to enlist technical or financial assistance from America?

"America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America," was Jinnah's reply. "Pakistan is the pivot of the world, as we are placed" -- he revolved his long forefinger in bony circles -- "the frontier on which the future position of the world revolves."

He leaned toward me, dropping his voice to a confidential note. "Russia," confided Mr. Jinnah, "is not so very far away."

This had a familiar ring. In Jinnah's mind this brave new nation had no other claim on American friendship than this -- that across a wild tumble of roadless mountain ranges lay the land of the Bolsheviks.

I wondered whether the Quaid-i-Azam considered his new state only as an armored buffer between opposing major powers. He was stressing America's military interest in other parts of the world.

"America is now awakened," he said with a satisfied smile. Since the United States was now bolstering up Greece and Turkey, she should be much more interested in pouring money and arms into Pakistan.

"If Russia walks in here," he concluded, "the whole world is menaced."

In the weeks to come I was to hear the Quaid-i-Azam's thesis echoed by government officials throughout Pakistan.

"Surely America will build up our army," they would say to me. "Surely America will give us loans to keep Russia from walking in."

But when I asked whether there were any signs of Russian infiltration, they would reply almost sadly, as though sorry not to be able to make more of the argument, "No, Russia has shown no signs of being interested in Pakistan."

This hope of tapping the U. S. Treasury was voiced so persistently that one wondered whether the purpose was to bolster the world against Bolshevism or to bolster Pakistan's own uncertain position as a new political entity.</blockquote>

What does this have to do with our mission in Afghanistan? Everything. That was written in 1949. Think about that. <strong>Robert C. Jones</strong> and <strong>Omar Ali</strong> are both correct. Constitutions matter. Our "allies" long-term strategies matter.

It is my theory that we never understood the region correctly and so we wasted time trying to convice the Pakistani Army to round up networks and "do counterinsurgency" when those tactical maneuvers will never link up with our larger strategies. In misunderstanding this, we created friction on the Afghanistan side. How can our Afghanistan allies trust us when we don't know anything about the region?

If there are any Af-Pak Hands lurking, I suggest adding the link or the Burke-White book to any reading list on the region.

http://pundita.blogspot.com/2011/01/quaid-i-azam-has-bad-cold-margaret…

<u>Sri Lanka</u>: Island with no cross-border sanctuaries and no neighbor country providing Tamils support
<u>Afghanistan</u>: Pourous surrounding borders (except for trucks held by irritated Pakistan and Iran), with Pashtuns in Pakistan far outnumbering those in Afghanistan, the ISI supporting "good" Taliban, and LET and al Qaeda cooperating with Taliban goals

<u>Sri Lanka</u>: 74% majority ethnic group were fighting an 18% Tamil ethnic group that only wanted self-rule
<u>Afghanistan</u>: 42% ethnic group is "fighting" several different ethnicities adding up to 58% and the even smaller Taliban 30,000 minority demands imposition of their extremist beliefs on 17 million Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, etc. and the less extreme 12 million Pashtuns

<u>Sri Lanka</u>: As James points out, Hindus aren't likely to board boats heading to defend the Tamils
<u>Afghanistan</u>: Pashtunwali tenet of revenge and Islamic interpretations of jihad would attract foreign fighters and Pakistani Pashtuns seeking revenge

As James says, brutal force against Pashtuns as a whole would mimic the Soviets and diminish any contrast in U.S. attempts at assistance. It would inflame worldwide Islamic extremists and eliminate any gains made in getting Muslim countries to more closely mirror other world republics.

A hybrid COIN/counterterrorism approach may be an option when ANSFs are ready. They are not. As today's SWJ article points out in "Counterinsurgency: Falling Short...," civilians of the U.N. and NGOs are ill-prepared to conduct nation-building WITHOUT the point of a gun. Without coalition or effective ANSF able to provide such protection and mentor the ANSF, the civilian mercenary option becomes the sole less than palatable option.

IMHO, give the surge a chance now that resources provided in abundance for years to Iraq are finally arriving in Afghanistan.

James (not verified)

Sun, 01/23/2011 - 11:52am

Our failure to deal with the post-Soviet Pashtunistan led to both the rise of the Taliban and arguably the event of 9/11 in the first place. Yeah it is more expensive to nation build in Afghanistan than it is to sit in our little world back in North America but the true cost of doing nothing is far higher.

G Martin

Sun, 01/23/2011 - 11:21am

You asked when an insurgency was defeated by anything other than 3-24 COIN- I gave a few examples. The bottom line is that there doesn't seem to be room for limited objectives in our doctrine for COIN: either you nationbuild or you don't do COIN. I agree with COL Gentile's assertion that we in the military have not offered our politicians other COAs when doing COIN- and there ARE other options besides nation building.

James (not verified)

Sat, 01/22/2011 - 3:26pm

The means that Sri Lanka used to defeat the Tamil Tigers go against democracy at its core. We are supposed to be the beaming light of hope and freedom throughout the world and how would that change if we conducted a Sri Lanka COIN strategy of brute force without regards to collateral damage and loss of innocent human life, and silence of the press though retaliatory violence and murders throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan? Could you really support that?

And that is exactly what Russia tried in Afghanistan but the difference is that the entire Muslim world rallied around the mujaheddin. This is not likely to have happened throughout the Hindu community.

G Martin

Thu, 01/20/2011 - 11:28pm

James-

Instead of trying to prove a negative- we should, in my opinion, state a hypothesis and invite data that negates it. There have been many papers written on alternative explanations on why things turned out the way they did in Iraq (I think its still a little early to be declaring victory, although we've spun it so...). That doesn't prove that the surge wasn't necessary (and sufficient), but it does poke holes in the victory narrative used by our current leaders (to steal an idea from COL Gentile). So language to say that the surge "may" have been necessary, but was probably not sufficient sounds better to me than "the surge was necessary because we won".

Alternatives to 3-24's concept of how to do COIN abound in the historical record- in fact, I'd submit that 3-24's concept of COIN is relatively new (thus the flaw in the recent RAND study in my opinion). Genghis Khan most certainly did not try to win hearts and minds nor nation-build when he traveled through Afghanistan (unless you count having the wife of a slain general oversee the stacking of human skulls from the dead of one city as population-centric COIN). I'm not saying that is politically viable today, but there are other ways to defeat insurgents (Sri Lanka as one recent example).

And if the host nation government (no matter how illegitimate they might be seen by the populace) does not frame the problem as an insurgency- then I would call it a political problem that "we" face and not an insurgency. A perception problem. A differing concept of the internal threat problem. Having IJC prosecute a COIN campaign inside Afghanistan that the host government and much of the populace disagrees with in terms of the ways, means, and ends means our problem is perhaps with ourselves as opposed to the insurgents.

wisegal (not verified)

Thu, 01/20/2011 - 10:34pm

we'll know it when we see it?

James (not verified)

Thu, 01/20/2011 - 3:13pm

Ahh, Maj we find ourselves engaged in virtually the same debate just on a different thread, lol.

""We" are facing an insurgency is a way to frame the problem, but it would run counter to our COIN doctrine: COIN is when you assist another government in fighting their insurgency."
True but how do you define it when we toppled the existing government and are still in the process of standing up the new one? Should we are wouldnt we be nation-building is a completely different debate. As we find ourselves today we are in a place that requires one of two things. Conduct COIN on behalf of and be side the emerging government of GIRoA or say we have done our part GIRoA this insurgency is now yours to deal with.

Where has anything except COIN ever defeated an insurgency? COIN in how you counter and insurgency just as many other strategic uses of force are agreed upon as the best way to counter the opponents strategy. COIN is not a cookie cuter strategy that you take 3-24 and put it on the table and you magically win. It is something that must be applied to the current field of battle and we must figure out what pieces fit where.

"How can we "prove" that the surge was necessary?"
How can you prove it wasn't? Up until that point we were getting slaughtered. If there was no surge in Iraq and the COIN failed it would not have been viewed as the surge was necessary but instead that COIN was ineffective. But it did succeed and the surge played a large part in that so therefore it is reasonable to say that the surge was necessary.

G Martin

Thu, 01/20/2011 - 9:50am

Again, I see us stating assumptions as facts! It wouldn't matter to me if this was only a post on SWJ, but this is what we do in our HQs and in our planning sections as well: we state assumptions as if they are facts that are not to be contested. The HQs blame the executioners if things go wrong: they never question the logic behind the plans.

"We" are facing an insurgency is a way to frame the problem, but it would run counter to our COIN doctrine: COIN is when you assist another government in fighting their insurgency. I'd agree with you that that is how we have framed the problem: it is either a global insurgency against the Western way of life and/or it is an Afghan insurgency that only we know how/have the capability to fight. Either way I think this is a framing of the problem that is laden with potential invalid assumptions. But, we state it as fact.

"The way to defeat them is using COIN" is also an assumption that is stated as fact in our halls of academe as well as our HQs. It is possible that COL Gentile and others are right to say that the way we define COIN limits us and that it isn't THE way (nor the successful way) to progress in Afghanistan.

And that a surge was required in Afghanistan is also an assumption. Not only that, but that the surge was required in Iraq is also a theory- but it is stated as fact by too many. How can we "prove" that the surge was necessary? It might not have or it might have been necessary, but not sufficient. I usually see it framed as if it was sufficient- or when combined with 3-24 it was sufficient (the surge being the means, 3-24 being the ways).

I find the "momentum" moniker frought with issues. In Afghanistan we seek "irreversible momentum", and we don't really define it. We are left to assume that once we hit the magical formula- things will spiral into positiveness without us having to do anything.

I'd submit there is no such thing as sustainable momentum, all we are seeing is "creative destruction"- and that can lead to positive or negative trends, but hard to tell which way it will end up from close-up (in time as well as in space). If they turn out positive (like in Iraq), we'll search for that one thing that we think caused it and say that that one thing led to a "shift in momentum" or "irreversible momentum". Unfortunately, the logic behind all of this is highly questionable.

James (not verified)

Wed, 01/19/2011 - 10:09pm

The bottom line here is that we cannot change the past and avoid the insurgency in Afghanistan as much as we could not change the past in Iraq in 2006. But in both cases we were/are faced with the insurgency and the way to defeat them is using COIN which required/requires a surge to provide that initial shift in momentum. We will see how well we handle(d) the other portions of the COIN but the surge worked as planned in Iraq.

negotiator6

Tue, 01/18/2011 - 4:10pm

Some may recall, Mr. Kagan of the AEI along with General Keane were the "surge" supporters and who lobbied the Bush people for the surge in Iraq.

Many of us who served in Iraq and who seek to "understand" the rationale for the invasion focus on one strategic (and horrific) mistake by the Bush people..that is...the dismantlement of the Iraqi Army and secondarily, the total disbandment of the civilian Iraqi infrastructure.

Reading..The Fourth Star authored by David Cloud and Greg Jaffe..at page 112 through 114, the authors quote General Abizaid in several paragraphs where Abizaid confronts Feith on the issues noted above. Abizaid warns Feith after a video conference call with Rumsfelt....that as Feith said (according to quotes from Abizaid)that de-Bathification was similar to de-Nazification.

As most may know, General Abizaid not only speaks Arabic, but knowledgeable reference the area, tribalism and post conflict infrastructure development.

Contrary to Abizaid's recommendats, Feith essentially ordered the General to disband the military and fired/terminate the Iraqi civilian who ran the country. We all know what happened next.

Flash forward to January of 2011 and the endstate in Iraq is unknown..but one thing we do know...that some 4300 American KIA...nearly 28,000 with severe disability lifetime wounds..and thousands more suffering from PTSD. And the economic cost....hundreds of billions.

How is it that seasoned, trained, knowledgeable and exceedingly intelligent officers like Abizaid, Petraeus and others are overruled by people who have only a thin experience level....?

In short, the people who called the disbandment of both the Iraqi military and civilian civil servants was Rumsfelt and Feith.

I hope the faceless souls of those lost in Iraq haunt these two for the rest of their collective lives.

RH/Balad/2005;Paktia/2003