Dramatic changes are needed in order to succeed in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Almost daily, the people of the region experience deteriorating security and a worsening economic situation. At the same time, Afghans and Pakistanis will both be making tough political choices in the coming months, and the United States and major allies are in the midst of multiple policy reviews. The appointment of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke should provide the opportunity to transform the current approach into one that has clear goals and a compelling narrative.
Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Brink is the result of a 200 person conference, held on November 21, 2008 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and co-organized by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University (NDU). The event included participants from all parts of the U.S. government. (See agenda in Appendix A and participants in Appendix B).
The report is divided into three sections: 1) Policy Challenges; 2) Assumptions; and 3) Recommendations and Policy Options.
Comments
One thing I particularly like about this report is that it actually does a good job of making its assumptions explicit. That's a necessary step when you're dealing with anything with as many moving parts as Afghanistan. Having read them over, they all seem plausible to me.
I think one key challenge in implementing the recommendations is getting the allies to go along with concentrating 70-80% of the forces in a few key provinces. As one of the assumptions notes:
<blockquote>The NATO allies do not all share U.S. priorities, thus the mission in Afghanistan continue to be opposed by the publics of some of the top contributing allies.
Significant increased force deployments or rules of engagement that are more flexible
are unlikely.</blockquote>
Assuming that 30k new soldiers are sent in and that all U.S. soldiers are in key provinces, that's still around 2/3s of available forces. We'll be able to get some of that from NATO allies that are already in some of the rougher parts of Afghanistan. Unless we can find a means for those with tougher rules of engagement to get to these provinces, this recommendation implies a nigh total commitment by both the U.S. and ANA. I can certainly believe that's what's necessary, but it really underlines just how dramatic the changes need to be.
(Disclosure: I'm a friend of one of the co-authors, but I had nothing to do with the writing of the report.)