Press Release on EFV Termination
Today the Secretary of Defense announced the termination of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program. I support his decision. After a thorough review of the program within the context of a broader Marine Corps Force Structure Review, I personally recommended to both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy that the EFV be cancelled and that the Marine Corps pursue a more affordable amphibious tracked fighting vehicle.
Despite the critical amphibious and warfighting capability the EFV represents, the program is simply not affordable given likely Marine Corps procurement budgets. The procurement and operations/maintenance costs of this vehicle are onerous. After examining multiple options to preserve the EFV, I concluded that none of the options meets what we consider reasonable affordability criteria. As a result, I decided to pursue a more affordable vehicle.
Our Nation's amphibious capability remains the Corps' priority. In the complex security environment we face, the execution of amphibious operations requires the use of the sea as maneuver space. A modern amphibious tracked vehicle is the means towards this end. It enables the seamless projection of ready-to-fight Marine rifle squads from sea to land. It is thus the key to allowing ship-to-shore operations in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments; assuring access where infrastructure is destroyed or nonexistent; and creating joint access in defended areas. It is also central to the entire Marine tactical vehicle strategy for operations ashore. Once on land, an amphibious armored fighting vehicle provides the Marine rifle squad with the protected mobility and firepower to maneuver to a position of advantage to rapidly close with, engage, and defeat the enemy.
The Marine Corps remains committed to develop and field an effective, survivable and affordable amphibious tracked vehicle. To bring this capability to the force sooner rather than later, we intend to capitalize on the Office of the Secretary of Defense's recent efforts to streamline procurement and to rapidly accelerate the acquisition and contracting processes in developing our new amphibious tracked vehicle requirement.
Shortly, we will issue a special notice to industry requesting information relative to supporting our required amphibious capabilities. We look forward to working with industry in meeting this challenge to field a modern and affordable amphibious tracked vehicle that will support our Nation's needs.
Comments
I can't agree w/that Gunny.
There was an article written in the summer that stated he was much more in favor of dumping the EFV than his predecessor or contemporaries competing for the job of 35th CMC from the Infantry community.
It went on to say that he had a much more Transformational approach to Amphib Ops through the use of STOM (which is Aviation heavy & bypasses the beach as a build-up/break out point) than the more traditional picks (Mattis/Dunford) were comfortable with.
One cannot exclude forced and early entry from the mission capabilities the USA MUST have in the future. Indeed, the current trend in the direction of strategic disengagement off the Eurasian landmass argues quite the opposite. Like the C-17 and FCS cuts, the tendency is to take away rather than expand strategic and operational options in an uncertain environment. The Marines need to circle the wagons and defend their core roles and mission in the face of this retrenchment. Restarting EFV may not be a bad choice, but like all such programs, there is a need to preserve lessons learned in order to make the next generation system successful.
We may be trading the EFV to save Osprey (even though it's being fielded).
I hold forth more on my blog about this decision - which is not a done deal of course. I support it. The Corps was at risk of being defined by this massive program and will be lucky to survive it with its reputation on the hill in tact.
All too often when someone mentions amphibious capability, beltway wonks think forcible entry against a hostile shore. As Gen Amos points out, the amphibious capability needed by the nation is one that permits the use of Naval Forces for a host of operations from HA and DR to moving ashore in an unfriendly environment due to access challenges. To think that we will never need an amphibious capability in the future is short-sighted. We will continue to need a capability that provides access to the littorals around the globe.
Although I am a huge fan of U.S. Army SF ODAs after watching them in action in Latin America and Afghanistan, the Marines have earned a reputation as competent trainers of foreign military units as demonstrated in their training programs for Georgia and Liberia. And now a Middle Eastern nation has asked for Marine assistance in training an elite unit. The Marines are showing that GPF can play a useful role in the SFA mission.
According to the Marine Corps' new operating concept documents, SFA, FID, "small wars," and "engagement" will be a part of the Marine Corps' post-Afghanistan mission. But Marine Corps leaders have concluded that they also need to retain "crisis response" and "power projection" capabilities.
Why? If, as Brian Burton seems to recommend in his <i>Proceedings</i> piece, the Marine Corps focuses only on SFA, it will set up a head-to-head bureaucratic clash with Army Special Forces and SOCOM. The 2010 QDR calls for SOCOM to generate and maintain about 660 "teams" (presumably ODA-equivalents) for the ongoing, post Afghan SFA/FID/Phase 0 mission. ADM Olson and GEN Casey agreed that roughly 660 would meet the ongoing SFA/FID requirement. MARSOC, a tiny part of the Marine Corps, makes a contribution to this force. But the rest of the Marine Corps is not a main part of this SFA plan laid out in the QDR.
To sum up, SOCOM and Army SF already plan to cover the main post-Afghanistan SFA/FID mission. The Marine Corps knows it needs to find something other than this to do. Within the overall issue of global maritime security and operations, there remains a huge amount to keep the Marine Corps productively busy and focused within its area of expertise.
Of all of this, I find this one statement the most interesting/confusing:
"Our Nations amphibious capability remains the Corps priority."
My understanding of the Marine Corps is that it is their expeditionary capability that is most important to the nation, rather than their amphibious capability that they employed in WWII (though not as often or to as large a scale as the Army, but I quibble).
Why do we cling to this? It is like horses in the Cavalry. Currently we see IW as a major issue for the future. IW is at the core of the Corps, so to speak. To cling to amphibious capabilities is not only expensive, but more importantly shifts training focus to infil/exfil, rather than on what one actually does once on the ground.
The Marines are such a tremendous organization because they have historically evolved when necessary. From snipers in the rigging, to shore raids, to "small wars" our colonial phase, to major ground conflict in WWI, to the tremendous amphibious capability of WWII; etc.
Maybe I'm reading more into this; but the Army needs to back off from IW some, and get more focused on deterring and fighting major wars; while the Marines need to back off from amphibious operations and focus more on expeditionary IW type operations. Sending the Army down range sends a message, and often it is the wrong one. Sending SOF, or SOF and Marines is often more appropriate.