In early March, after weeks of debate across a conference table in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, the participants in President Obama's strategic review of the war in Afghanistan figured that the most contentious part of their discussions was behind them. Everyone, save Vice President Biden's national security adviser, agreed that the United States needed to mount a comprehensive counterinsurgency mission to defeat the Taliban. That conclusion, which was later endorsed by the president and members of his national security team, would become the first in a set of recommendations contained in an administration white paper outlining what Obama called "a comprehensive, new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan." Preventing al-Qaeda's return to Afghanistan, the document stated, would require "executing and resourcing an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency strategy."
To senior military commanders, the sentence was unambiguous: US and NATO forces would have to change the way they operated in Afghanistan. Instead of focusing on hunting and killing insurgents, the troops would have to concentrate on protecting the good Afghans from the bad ones. And to carry out such a counterinsurgency effort the way its doctrine prescribes, the military would almost certainly need more boots on the ground...
More at The Washington Post.
Comments
Bill, I'll take your:
"We need an occupying power doctrine (not just to add another flavor of the day and to further neglect the art of war) that is endorsed by the UN (I like dreaming also). It doesn't need to be long, probably doesn't need to be more than 20 pages long, but it needs to emphasize what conditions should be established before we transition from occupier to supporter of the new government."
Especially the UN dreaming part. The day that "machin" gets an fonctional brain, I'll let you know.
More seriously, the base of stabilization doctrine has to be revised. Some assumptions are just not functioning, in reallity but as well in theory. May be should start a threat on that: How to invade a country and not turn it in a failed thorn state. ;)
I'll go back to your catch 22 phrase. When do you transition from an invader/occupier to a supporter of the new government? Especially hard if you never leave the country. It is one thing leaving and getting invited back, and totally another when you invade and stay in large numbers.
Occupying power isn't politically correct, and it doesn't sit well with us Americans (we know how to handle occupiers), but on the other hand ignoring reality won't allow us to come up with a realistic strategy.
Perhaps, just perhaps, we were "too" eager to step out of our occupier shoes in both Iraq and Afghanistan? Then we wondered why these hastily established and weak governments were not capable of conducting their own COIN? What legitimacy does a new gov have, especially when it is propped up by a foreign power?
We need an occupying power doctrine (not just to add another flavor of the day and to further neglect the art of war) that is endorsed by the UN (I like dreaming also). It doesn't need to be long, probably doesn't need to be more than 20 pages long, but it needs to emphasize what conditions should be established before we transition from occupier to supporter of the new government. Not tomorrow we're going to have an election, and then this mess is yours. Best of luck, your friends America.
We can do better than this.
Nomination for quote of the Month:<blockquote>"Perhaps we should strike COIN and CT from the lexicon and talk about real strategy of ends, ways, and means instead of trying to devise strategy based on formulas (e.g., 20-25 troops for every 1000 people) - of course we love the science because it is too hard to explain the art."</blockquote>Perhaps of the year.
Though I could quibble that it is not too hard to explain the art; there are just few who understand that it is just that and can therefor explain it. That does not address those that are too enamored of 'metrics' to accept there is such a thing as an art. Lot of amateurs mucking about...
Excellent post. Spot on as our British friends say. BZ for the squiddishly inclined -- and Keep the Faith for the few.
I have to take exception to this sentence:
'Everyone, save Vice President Biden's national security adviser, agreed that the United States needed to mount a comprehensive counterinsurgency mission to defeat the Taliban.
I know I may be splitting hairs to some but the correct strategy might be to support a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign conducted by the Afghanistan government to defeat the Taliban. One of our fundamental problems is that we think in terms of conducting the COIN campaign ourselves and it is "our" war to win. If the Taliban insurgency is directed at the US then we must be the defacto occupiers (probably not a good theme we want to highlight but I am sure the enemy will/does). Perhaps we should understand that our "war" is with AQN and the Afghan governments war is with the Taliban. Of course they are not mutually exclusive - if Afghanistan is a US ally (or at least friend or partner) we may have an obligation to help them in their COIN campaign against the Taliban while we fight a parallel war against AQN. But if the whole war is ours then we are de facto the occupying power and of course one of the goals of an insurgency is to rid a country of an occupier.
But of course the catch 22 to my own criticism is the question of whether or not the Afghan government is even capable of defeating the Taliban insurgency. This is the dilemma we are in and the kind of "imperfect storm" we have now: We have those who believe COIN is the answer to everything and that the US should conduct and lead the COIN effort but in order for a COIN campaign to be successful it takes a sovereign government with the ability to project a credible capability to coerce (capture/kill/arrest the enemy) and the ability to engender the perception of legitimacy among its own population (through effective security operations, development, and the ability to provide essential government services). But of course do the Afghan people want that kind of sovereign government? But it seems few take into account what the Afghan people want (and need from their perspective).
But in the end the debate comes back to whether we execute a COIN "strategy" or a CT "strategy" and we play the child-like games of "my strategy is better than your strategy." Perhaps we should strike COIN and CT from the lexicon and talk about real strategy of ends, ways, and means instead of trying to devise strategy based on formulas (e.g., 20-25 troops for every 1000 people) - of course we love the science because it is too hard to explain the art. But I am a dreamer.
The statement that always comes back is that civilian action will allow to reduce troops on the ground.
But the aim of civilian action in COIN is to support and reenforce the security brought by military action and turn it to stability. Believing that providing more relief to the people will reduce the risks is inconsistant. Orther theather are here to remind that when security is not there, it is the civilians who are paying the hard price. In the context of overseas operations, a foreigner, civilian or military, is a target and nothing else.
Successfull COIN request both military and civilian, and not one against the other.
Even an exhaustion strategy is possible only if the military can secure areas for the civilians to provide relief and recovery. For the civilian actors, the engagement will always be based on a risk/benefits assessment. Benefits must be higher than risks and risks have to be close to zero to have a successfull civilian support.
We are debating sending more troops to Afghanistan to protect Afghans. Yet, we apparently do not have the wherewithal to protect Americans from border crossers since we are moving "hundreds" of Border Guards from our insecure Mexican border to the Canadian border. See more at: http://www.thebutter-cutter.com/Protecting_Americans.php