CCO Interview with Bing West

Ten Questions with Bing West

Bing West served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Reagan administration. A graduate of Georgetown and Princeton Universities, he served in Marine infantry in Vietnam. His books have won the Marine Corps Heritage Prize, the Colby Award for Military History and appeared on the Commandant's Reading List. West appears regularly on The News Hour and Fox News. He is a member of St. Crispin's Order of the Infantry and the Council on Foreign Relations. He lives in Newport, RI.

He recently released The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics and the Endgame in Iraq, the result of fourteen trips to Iraq embedded with front-line units over the entire course of the war, and agreed to be interviewed by the CCO on the lessons he learned from writing the book.

1. Your assessment of the national Iraqi security forces, including the Army and the Police, is pretty bleak. An important aspect of counterinsurgency is working with indigenous partners, but given that their inability to take control of the counterinsurgency effort was a major part of our change in strategy in early 2007, do we need to rethink our basic assumptions as to how best to work with the host nation? Would it have been better to adopt a grass-roots approach from the beginning, putting all our effort into working with groups from each town, city and region to secure their own areas before looking to create national forces?

President Obama has declared a total pull out by Aug of 2011. So US advisers have about two years to improve the Iraqi security forces. But the leverage of advisers has been tremendously weakened -- discounted -- because the date certain for their departure has been agreed by the US and GOI. It's too late for significantly more strengthening by US mentoring. We will provide technical training, staff procedures and logistical support. The greatest defect in our approach is the lack of police techniques appropriate to an insurgency.

The grass-roots approach makes all the sense in the world; but it cannot be applied until a majority of the locals in the affected area support the approach and are —to inform on the insurgents in their midst. In Iraq, that willingness on the Sunni side did not appear until late 2006; then it spread rapidly. On the Shiite side, the power of the Sadr extremists was not broken until the battles in Basra and Baghdad in April of 2007.

2. Similarly, do we need to revisit our assumptions for creating governance in such a situation? How can we avoid giving the impression that we're playing favorites, thereby branding someone as an American lackey, while also avoiding the negative consequences of top-down power brokering, such as groups like Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army gaining control over critical departments like the Health Ministry?

If we have to go in to remove some son of a bitch, why shouldn't we play favorites? The people understand when they are ruled by a tyrant. We should have arrested Sadr for treason in July of 2003.

3. Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha, the leader of the Awakening Council who was assassinated in September 2007 told you that the Iraqis had to decide for themselves that their future lay with the Americans and not al Qaeda. What role does securing the population play in winning the loyalty of the population? Is it enough on its own or does it require some other catalyst, such as al Qaeda's brutal treatment of the Sunni population, that causes the people to end their support for the insurgents? What implications does this reality have for Afghanistan?

Darned if I know when and why a population turns against the insurgents previously harbored, either out of fear or ideological or religious solidarity. There are limits to what foreigners, no matter how well-meaning, can do when reaching across cultural lines. I do believe that the American soldier and marine bring a combination of decency, perseverance and overwhelmingly superior fighting power. That has an effect first upon the security forces of the host nation; they feel empowered by aligning with the strongest tribe. Eventually in Iraq the Sunni sheiks, rallying around Abu Risha's remarkable leadership, turned first to the American side, and after a year or so, began a grudging political dialogue with the Baghdad Shiite-dominated government.

How or when or even why that model can be transferred to Afghanistan is beyond my ken at the moment. It would be sheer speculation on my part. It may or may not happen; I haven't spent enough time in Afghanistan to offer an informed opinion.

4. After using numerous "cease-fire" declarations since 2004 to rearm and regroup, Moqtada al-Sadr announced last summer that he was disbanding most of his militia. Is this "ceasefire" different from all the rest? If so, what do you think influenced this decision, particularly if the majority of the American effort in Baghdad in 2008 was against al Qaeda and not the Jaish al-Mahdi?

Sadr's synapses don't beat in regular rhythms. He's somewhere in Iraq playing video games. He is a diminished player. His organization is marginalized. The Iranians would like to use Sadr's henchmen as their cat's paw, to include terrorist acts. Sadr is no longer main stream because his forces lost their power status in Sadr City and Basra. Many are in hiding or in Iran.

5. What, in your view, is the proper relationship between civil and military players in counterinsurgency? Should major reconstruction aid be used primarily as a means of ending support for insurgents, or as a reward for populations that reject the insurgents and provide assistance to the counterinsurgents? Or should we be involved in major reconstruction efforts at all in places like Iraq?

I'm not a advocate of fulsome nation-building. In the March issue of Military Review, I lay out my reasons. In a nutshell, if you hand sovereignty over to a set of leaders, then the burden and authority to build a nation rest with them, not you.

6. You tell the story of Maj. Rory Quinn, who, with the experience of two tours as a company commander in Iraq, advises other company commanders on proper police techniques for counterinsurgency, which he calls a "police war." You point to this as a "gap in military training." From your perspective, what are the biggest gaps in military training and education for counterinsurgency? What can the military be doing differently in preparing soldiers for counterinsurgency?

Every treatise on counter insurgency begins by explaining that you must hold a census and identify the population because that strips the insurgent of his protective cover. For some reason, we have refused to do that in either Iraq or Afghanistan. In Iraq, the average Sunni male was stopped twice a year for ID; yet over seven years, we claimed it was too hard to be systematic about taking fingerprints and a census.

7. You argue, "reducing US force in Iraq can be done prudently, as long as we don't promise a total withdrawal that signals America has given up. That makes no sense given the progress that has been made." What are your thoughts on the Status of Forces Agreement? Does it meet your metrics for prudent withdrawal of American forces?

Prime Minister Maliki, who is convinced he does not need those pesky Americans, outfoxed President Bush, who agreed to a total withdrawal by August of 2011. President Obama was delighted to affirm Bush -- and to say that the Bush policy of going into Iraq and managing the war were wrong. I have no idea what will happen after 2011 in Iraq.

8. You are critical of the contributions from the civilian agencies in Iraq. With the new administration, there has been an emphasis, at least verbally, in providing greater resources to the State Department to allow it to take some of the burden off of the military, particularly in counterinsurgency and stability operations. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen have also repeatedly stressed the need for increased civilian resources in these types of missions. In your view, how far will this go to rectify the problem you point to in sharing responsibilities? Are the shortcomings on the civilian side fundamentally one of resources or is the problem bigger than that?

Our diplomats are trained to respect the sovereign rights of other countries, including the right to steal, etc. Iraq and Afghanistan rank among the most corrupt nations in the world. Yet we say corruption impedes good governance. Of course it's more complicated than that, but as a nation we've not determined how we correct glaring blemishes in governments such as the one in Kabul. The Pentagon is anxious to transfer the mission of creating responsive governance to State. I'm not sure how either an American civilian or a military officer eradicates the corruption associated with drug money in Kabul and the provinces. Obama has promised a new NATO strategy in April.

9. You make the case that holding elections in Iraq too early, at least at the national level, contributed to the problem by giving power to a government that was beholden only to certain segments of the population and ignored other groups. In situations like Iraq and Afghanistan, where we found ourselves with control of countries with no government, what would you suggest as an alternative? Should local elections be held sooner than national elections? Should the intervening power play a role in the governance of the country until it can bring some semblance of security and stability to the country? Should it organize and appoint an indigenous governing body until security and stability can be restored? Or is there some other option?

It's not so much the exact political model as it is a matter of power. In both Iraq and Afghanistan the fundamental error was turning over complete authority to host nation leaders who were badly flawed. We should have insisted on a joint board to review key promotions and billets for the security forces.

10. You take issue in previous writings with the phrase attributed to David Galula that "COIN is 80% political and 20% military." In your estimation, is it more likely that political advances will lead to security, or that ending the violence and creating security will allow room for political advances?

Insurgency is a branch of warfare. War is about killing until the other side is eradicated or accepts your terms. If you cannot protect the population from death, you lose. Security leads.