3 August post on COIN continues to evoke stimulating commentary...
Comments
I’m fairly new to the realm of military academics and I think this affords me somewhat of a fresh mindset when it comes this discussion. Although I can understand the frustration on both sides, I see two primary opinions that are invalid, as they are not argued on the same plane. First off, I’ve not read his latest book and I’m not likely to, at least in the near term, but I have listened to COL Gentile speak several times and I have followed his posts here and in other forums. I have also worked first hand on the opposite end, mentoring and instructing brigade 2 and 3 shops at COIN seminars.
I don’t think COL Gentile is necessarily trying to argue whether or not COIN is currently a core mission, capability, or competency. I think he is simply arguing that it shouldn’t be and… for the most part I tend to agree. I see COIN as a decade-long distraction from what big Army should be doing, conventional. We have many specialized units for FID, humanitarian assistance, etc. in each branch of service. The costs are too high to invest so much of our force into COIN. Let’s be honest, it’s simply not financially possible to maintain large-scale COIN like we have in Afghanistan. Is anyone arguing that our COIN strategy in Afghanistan is/will be a (long-term) success? Iraq? If not then why is COIN still such a huge topic of debate? I’m quite certain that we’ll have all new doctrine by the time we can afford to nation-build again.
Perhaps Terry Tucker can comment on this since he is and I hardly am a COIN or Stability Operations expert.
I note that publicly released Army publications show that COIN and Stability Operations manuals have virtually identical logical lines of operations (LLO) (COIN) and lines of effort (stability operations).
<strong>COIN LLO</strong>..............................<strong>Stability Operations Lines of Effort</strong>
Combat Opns/Civil Security Opns....................Establish Civil Security
Train and Employ Host Nation Security Forces.....Establish Civil Control
Establish or Restore Essential Services..........Restore Essential Services
Support Development of Better Governance.............Support to Governance
Economic Development..............Economic and Infrastructure Development
Using the "Find" function in the COIN manual (FM 3-24) I find only two references to "nation building." The somewhat similar "Stability Operations" Army Doctrinal Resource Publication (ADRP 3-07) says this early on citing that stability operations training is not optional:
<blockquote>Department of Defense Instruction 3000.5 establishes policy that stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the DoD prepares to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.</blockquote>
What the average reader does not understand when reading COL Gentile's opinions about COIN is the whole "graduate level" argument is a straw man distracting all from the DoD and Army doctrinal requirement to perform stability operations on an equal footing with offensive and defensive operations. It is a <strong>core</strong> mission.
Army doctrine calls for Decisive Action (what used to be Full Spectrum Operations) that consists of Offense, Defense, Stability, and Defense Support of Civil Authorities. The last one of the four occurs only in the U.S. whereas the other three occur simultaneously at varying degrees of importance and activity when units deploy overseas.
In other words, there is no doctrinal choice between training for combat operations (offense and defense) and stability operations. Both are required. Both must be trained. COL Gentile's arguments most likely are advertised because Armor branch tanks in particular are ill-equipped to conduct stability operations once that phase has primacy. Some tanks remain essential as the late Battle for Sadr City and Marine and allied tanks in Afghanistan illustrated. They just are not necessary in the same large numbers nor is artillery which is why so many of both type units often get different vehicles and missions during stability operations and COIN.
His argument about 2/3 of the Army being light or motorized forces also is a reflection of the fact that infantry, airborne, and air assault forces have no tank equivalent. Stryker BCTs have fewer tank-like vehicles than an Armored BCT combined arms battalion which has equal numbers of armor and infantry companies and virtually identical numbers of M1 Abrams and M2 Bradleys. When COL Gentile argues elsewhere that tanks and heavier offensive/defensive systems would be required for stability operations in Korea, he partially is correct. However, he must not have looked at the maps that show lots of mountains, many rice paddies, and lousy roads north of the DMZ that also would favor lighter forces and vehicles not 12' wide.
You may find this riposte of interest by Terry Tucker: http://www.e-ir.info/2013/08/20/an-open-rebuttal-to-gian-gentiles-essay…
<em>There is hokum in the area though. That hokum is cravenness of the American general officer corps, the reification of Big Army ethos, when it comes to being truthful about who the enemy is in Afghanistan. There hasn't been one that I've heard of who risked his career to say "Sir, I can't send my men out if we don't do something about the Pak Army/ISI. I won't send them if I can't do everything I can to protect them and sir, if it costs me my career then so be it." That is hokum.</em>
Are you sure you've looked into this thoroughly? Does throwing money at people and expecting a different result from the past count as non-hokum?
<blockquote>During the past decade, other partner nations have also been in need of help in the face of insurgency, including Yemen, Somalia, the Philippines, Pakistan and Colombia, among others. Indeed, I was keenly focused on some of these missions as commander of US Central Command, and on all of them as the director of the CIA.</blockquote> - Reflections of the Counterinsurgency Era, RUSI Journal, GEN. (retd.) Petraeus
<blockquote>We must convince the Pakistani government, therefore, that it is their national interest to embark on a counterinsurgency campaign against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Given that these entities pose a threat to the Pakistani government (just check out the latest series of suicide attacks against Pakistani targets), this is not necessary as hard as it might seem. Once the Pakistani government decides to fight the Taliban and Al Qaeda, then we can offer our assistance in a number of ways. The fact is that no military in the world today is as proficient at counterinsurgency as that of the United States.</blockquote> - COL. (retd.) Peter Mansoor, SWJ interview
<blockquote>Pakistan one of only four countries to receive direct cash transfers. Between 2002 and 2008, this “thank you” to Pakistan for help in fighting terrorism cost the U.S. taxpayer $2,374,000,000. By its nature, these cash transfers became Pakistani sovereign funds, precluding U.S. oversight.</blockquote> - Harvard's Belfer Center report "U.S. Aid to Pakistan—U.S. Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption"
<blockquote>The spending bill Congress sent to President Obama Thursday night zeroes out funding for a Pakistan military aid program that was a key part of David Petraeus's counterterrorism plan when he was chief of Central Command.
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The Pakistani Counterinsurgency Capability Fund called for $3 billion to be spent on helicopters, equipment and training for Pakistan's special operations forces between 2009 and 2014. Some in Washington were concerned the fund would circumvent the State Department's role in overseeing foreign military assistance. </blockquote> - the Hill
To be fair to the Pakistanis, many often complain about outside aid corrupting officials, including aid from Western nations and of course, the Saudis whose influence is schizophrenic in its proxy war with Iran. So the Pakistanis are blamed when our own money creates problems. Yes, in the end each nation is responsible for its own actions and Pakistanis have agency but it makes it harder to combat corruption when so money is thrown at them.
PS: I wonder who advised the so-called coindinistas on South Asian regional politics? I think I've got a pretty good idea based on the whole DC world but I'd like to find an article confirming. Nothing nefarious in my mind, just status quo thinking which the military then absorbs, you are only human.
Not to agree with Carl, but what I see in COL Gentile's ideas is an attempt to come up with platitudes and powerpoint deep solutions to difficult problems.
Let’s assume that we are right that Soldiers trained for HIC can be quickly retrained for COIN:
1. What does that COIN doctrine look like? What should the force structure look like? What equipment is required? Where are his answers to these questions?
2. Why is HIC more important that COIN? Is there really a near peer competitor we are going to have fight or is it more likely that the next time American Soldiers are called on to act it will be in a failed state where there is either an active insurgency or the potential for one?
This amounts to smoke and mirrors, sleight of hand. You bring up answers but not to the problem presented. You attack the idea of the Savior General without ever solving the problems that that General had to wrestle with. Instead of addressing the problems as they exist he retreats to the comfortable past.
BTW, I like him better in the Bing West interview. At least there he actually discusses COIN.
G Martin:
After thinking about it some, I believe you and Gian are possibly right about it being an either/or situation, but only for a army with a mediocre or worse officer corps. I don't think it is for an army with a good officer corps. Good officers can make the transition, good ones. Puller did. McMaster did. Maybe some of the guys like McCaffrey and Powell did too. And I am talking about officers, not units. I can see where a unit that tried to be all things at all times would have problems. But if there are truly good officers, when the time comes the unit can make the switch. So maybe what we should be looking at isn't what the focus should be on, conventional or otherwise. Maybe we should be looking at the quality of the leaders. If the leaders are poor, and in my view they are mostly darn poor at the high levels, it doesn't matter what the focus is on, you will get beat.
This gets us to how we develop officers and the personnel system of Big Army, the big military in general. Let me start by saying that from what I've read the quality of the people at lowers levels can be very good, and as you said, they made the adjustment. It deteriorates as you go up the chain and at the top it seems to be shockingly poor, and again as you said, they didn't make the adjustment. So, we know what the problem is. If we can change it we won't have to have the discussion about what to concentrate on because the quality of the leaders would be such that we could handle both.
(One of the things I think would help a little is closing the academies. What does the system teach when the best must defer to the worst if the worst is a year ahead? That kind of system has strange values.)
I fear most what you suggest, that if the Congress doesn't do it, we will only be reformed by a catastrophe, like Prussia when Napoleon came. But if that happens, our fate may be much worse because there won't be a Russia or Great Britain around to rescue us. Won't that be the ultimate horrible irony, the country savaged because the institution charged with its defense valued its corrupt practices more than the nation.
Talking with him off and on- and especially a VTC he did on-line with the COIN Center leads me to believe that is his main point- that conventional armies can shift to COIN far better than COIN armies can shift to conventional. Seeing combined arms maneuver training and COIN ops and I'd have to agree.
I disagree that it is not an "either-or" situation. You have to prioritize. I've seen elements of the military who try to do it all- or have multiple priorities. They end up having no priority and not being able to do much very well at all. They are an inch deep and a mile wide- and will lose in all that they try to cover down on.
I think we did adjust at the tactical level. Where we didn't was at the higher levels. I do blame the military leadership for not charting a better course at the beginning (Afghanistan 2001/2002 and Iraq 2002/2003). But, after that the political leadership let the military dictate too much IMO. Enough blame to go around. I'd also throw in "emergence" as a causative factor.
That last point to me explains why the generals haven't stood up- which I totally agree with you on. They exist in a system that forces micro behaviors that are very logical from guys at the E-9 and O-4 levels and higher that- while logical at the individual level- wreak havoc on our operations and strategy IMO.
And, lastly- I agree with you that we have a "far greater problem". We seem from my point of view to have been overcome by bureaucracy to the extent that we have natural conflicts of interest as an institution with national security efforts (just to be clear- I think most departments and agencies of the federal government suffer from this, if not all). Because of this I don't think much will improve unless we suffer catastrophically or somehow Congress gets in the reform mood some day.
G Martin:
That may one of Gian's points in other writings, but that is not what this article is about. This article is mostly a complaint that other kinds of war aren't given their due respect, that and "COIN" is hokum.
If what you say is Gian's point in other writings and the opinion of other officers, then that is a fallacy of the false alternative, competent execution of small war on one hand vs. competent execution of big war on the other. An either or situation. I don't buy that. That is what Big Army seems to want, the either or. You say prepare for the one and them make adjustments for the other. That is just the point, we won't adjust.
We used to adjust. Pershing led the Lake Lanao campaign when he was a captain. The guy in charge had to finesse and transfer people to get that done but he did it because Pershing was the best man for the job. That was adjusting. That could not happen now, even if God spoke audibly from on high. Big Army wouldn't have it. Chesty Puller officered Nicaraguan and Haitian troops. That won't happen now outside the unnamed three letter agency perhaps. I don't think it would be such a big deal to arrange for guys who wanted, and I'll bet there are more than one or two, to stay in country for 2, 3, 4 years more or less continuously, but as far as I know that isn't done.
I don't know about nation building. I do know the military should be prepared to do what is asked of it for they may the only ones who can. Our did it in the past, in the Philippines, Haiti and other places to an extent. The problem with the term 'nation building' is it can be used to describe anything and if you eschew 'nation building' then you get to turn down anything you don't fancy doing.
Your point #2: That there are leaders who will stand up for their men is no surprise and I admire them like I did the Marines at Bing Nghia when I first read about them in college. But how many of those leaders you know who did that are general officers, especially 3 and 4 stars who can actually influence policy by their actions? Maybe there were some but what I saw as a civilian is somebody like Adm Mullen who knew, absolutely knew, the the Pak Army/ISI were the enemy and didn't do much at all about it until it couldn't affect his career anymore. Guys like that, the multi-stars, violate the compact they have with the soldiers to do their best by them.
My point wasn't that guys don't care that one type of war is called 'graduate' level and another isn't. There are guys who do care about that or articles like Gian's wouldn't be written. My point is the soldiers and small unit leaders may not care much about that. I think that true and what they think is pretty important.
If operational and higher level HQs greatly influenced by popular culture and won't question a 'graduate' level thinker, I'd say Big Army has a far greater problem than a what is essentially a meaningless label. What you are describing is high officers who can't think on their own in response to the situation on the spot. Or maybe even worse, an organization that won't allow them too.
Have to respectfully disagree with a few of your points:
#1- I think Gian's point- or, at least lots of officers who agree with him- is that you don't need to be so good at COIN that you totally re-tool your entire institution to do it- that the risk you run (money and lives) just isn't that great if you keep a conventionally-trained and ready military that does COIN every now and then (assuming you don't get dragged into nation-building- at which time it becomes very expensive). To do COIN well- yes- you would need to transform your military- but, then what? You're really good at COIN, and not so great at a type of warfare that has the potential to lose hundreds of thousands in a single battle. With limited resources you have to prioritize- and I'd have to agree with what I think is the main gist of his writings- we should prioritize and thus craft our institution to be ready for conventional warfare- and, if we have to do COIN- then fine, we'll adjust, but let's don't do nation-building - at least not the military, and not without the support of the country, clear national interests tied to said nation-building, and popular and political support to fund and support the effort.
#2- I know many leaders who stood up to their higher and refused to go out of the wire and who, when they did, fought ISI proxies. I also know many Afghans who did the same.
Finally, the idea that guys don't care if one type of warfare is labeled as "graduate" level and one isn't or that a certain general is lionized- is wrong from my vantage point. The guys know who is held up as the popular leader and there is tremendous pressure to accept those popular leaders as unquestioned geniuses- and they see that in the way the operational and higher HQs tend to avoid questioning "the graduate level" thinkers and their fundamental assumptions. Sure, the NCOs and young Os at the tactical level just shake their head and think everyone above them are idiots and then get about the tough business of the day- but, being at those higher levels and seeing the effect of labeling something as "graduate" and so-and-so as a "genius", I'd have to conclude that not only is it bad- but our lower-level guys know it and experience the fallout from it daily. As an institution I think it is very disingenuous and has a disastrous effect on operations.
Deleted a bunch of stuff.
Carl, I like you (how can I not like you? You answer my blog questions :) ) but I think you keep misunderstanding substance because the style is not to taste.
We paid lots of bad actors in the region "to do coin" because all anyone could think about was "we have to learn to do small wars better." Improvisation and creativity are supposed to be American traits but maybe something has changed in us.
You might want to look up the contracts for "doing coin" on some good government websites. Or maybe not. Then you'll end up like me so maybe it's better not to know.
Well I read the article and to this forever a civilian it was 11 paragraphs of Big Army sour grapes. I expect to get lambasted for this but once in, go fast I guess.
That a member or members of the professional officer corps gives or give a good golly goldurn about some perceived insult because of a throwaway line about small war fighting being "postgraduate" vs. graduate or some such nonsense strikes me as juvenile silliness. This sounds like the high school football players talking about who is more important, the offensive line or the defensive line. This is war, life and death, young men looking to the professional officers for life and death and some of those officers have their panties in a bunch about being dissed by Victor Davis Hansen. Those guys are looking to the officers to get it right, the fighting part, big or small, and I suspect they don't care a whit about whether the proper respect has been shown by somebody somewhere. And they don't give a rat's arsenal about whether popular culture lionizes some general or other at the expense of a more sophisticated appreciation of history.
Gian dismisses the notion that small war requires a special skill set, yet he is an instructor at West Point, an institution that exists to teach a special skill and ranks the students on how well they master it. Military history is rife with examples of guys with special skill sets taking over an outfit or an effort and transforming things. To say that small war doesn't show the same pattern is to cherry pick history for the sake of Big Army sensibilities. There is a world of difference between having a McFarland or a McMaster running the show vs. a Tunnell or a Steele.
Human terrain teams are given some criticism, probably rightly. But why were the HTTs created? They were created to help the guys on the ground know what the heck was going on in their areas. Knowing what is going on in the local area is critical in fighting a small war. Why did they need help in knowing what was going on? Because they weren't in one place long enough to learn before they were moved. That was, I've read, mainly the result of Big Army personnel policies that could not be changed to accommodate the realities of the war actually being fought. What started as a rap at a ham handed attempted to fight a small war better, is actually an indictment of Big Army that absolutely refused to change certain things for the sake of winning a war.
Whether or not "COIN" is hokum...is...it don't mean nothin', because "COIN" don't mean nothin' beyond being used as a pejorative stand in for whatever some writers on whatever disapprove of. So Ms. Fontan said "COIN" was bad; that's nice. What the heck did she mean?
There is hokum in the area though. That hokum is cravenness of the American general officer corps, the reification of Big Army ethos, when it comes to being truthful about who the enemy is in Afghanistan. There hasn't been one that I've heard of who risked his career to say "Sir, I can't send my men out if we don't do something about the Pak Army/ISI. I won't send them if I can't do everything I can to protect them and sir, if it costs me my career then so be it." That is hokum.