Operation Telic in Iraq was supposed to be about liberating a repressed people and rebuilding a nation, but it turned into a war of attrition that put the Northern Ireland experience in the shade. The impact on the British Army has been profound. Every assumption made by senior military commanders based on the prevailing intelligence and political judgment at the time was turned on its head.
As a consequence, the doctrine of warfare taught at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and at the staff colleges had to be rewritten, and the Ministry of Defence was forced to beg for funds from the Treasury to provide equipment off the shelf to cope with the unexpected and unprepared-for surge of violence in southern Iraq.
Sandhurst went from being a renowned academy that prepared young officer cadets for regimental life, big-picture wars and peacekeeping operations to a production line for almost instant deployment to Iraq once the Sovereign's Parade was over.
More at The Times.
Comments
This article got me thinking about a couple things. First, I had the honor of spending a couple months at Sandhurst in the early '90s as part of a USMA exchange. After discussing the "ins and outs" of our leader development program, my sponsor told me "West Point makes great officers. Sandhurst makes great leaders". I dismissed this as a good ribbing, but based upon my experience during the capstone FTX with the Brits, I came to understand why he might have believed this to be true. I distinctly remember the Color Sergeants and Officers in the cadre routinely relating their experiences in dealing with challenges in Northern Ireland. Many of the field problems thrown at the cadets were full of tough and ambiguous situations which were informed by these experiences. Invariably, these scenarios were conducted in and around replicated civilian population centers, challenging the cadets even more as they planned their operations. The cadets muddled their way through them and had to confront the 2nd and 3rd order effects of their decisions as the scenario played out and during the AARs. I returned to USMA for the rest of our summer training, where we focused on force-on-force and platoon level tactics as prescribed in FM 7-8. It was good training and served me well in future years. However, none of the scenarios replicated platoon operations in stability operations, such as those the US Army were already conducting in Bosnia, forcing me to confront civil-considerations. At the time, I felt I was missing out on a good training opportunity. My friends at USMA tell me that the training there has changed dramatically, challenging the cadets and preparing them for some of the challenges they will face in the years ahead.
The other thing that this article got me thinking about was Strategic Communication. Supporting like-minded states and maintaining our coalitions are important parts of US National Security Strategy. Our mil-mil engagements with nations all over the globe, particularly with those operating on our flanks in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places serve as excellent platforms for us to honor our coalition partners for their service. I cite the Cold Stream Guard performance of "America the Beautiful" on 9/11 and pictures of Churchill attending memorial services for US Servicemen in the wake of WWII as examples of how to leverage simple images. Such events have tremendous resonance and can do much to maintain strategic partnerships.
MAJ John Wilson
Fort Gordon, GA