"In Vietnam, the U.S. had trouble judging whether it was winning or losing. Does the problem persist in Afghanistan today?"
Comments
In fairness, I withdraw the statement about body counts and the desire for promotion. The Secretary of Defense wanted ways to measure progress and so body counts became the standard. I was a draftee who was sent to Vietnam. The world of High Command was another planet. In fact, I cannot recall ever having a serious conversation about the war while I was in Vietnam and it was years before I ever discussed it with anyone. My apologies to any officers who have served in Vietnam. I am hardly in the position to make moral judgements about anyone
The endorsement by "leading historians" really does not amount to much, given their respective views on the Vietnam War. Herring, Young and Brigham have all been quite critical of the American War in Vietnam, with Herring being the most balanced of the three (but see his most recent book, "From Colony to Superpower" for a far from balanced view of the Cold War in general)
I do happen to agree with Colonel Daddis about "counting" and what we count. In the case of Vietnam. body counts were useless and when driven by an officer's desire for promotion, immoral. Nevertheless, I am dubious about the efficacy of applying Vietnam to the present situation in the Middle East and South Asia. Daddis makes the basic error of writing backwards i.e, from the present to the past. How can one compare the culture of Vietnam to any country in the Middle East ? Daddis and the writings of Young, LLoyd Gardner and others who try to force an analogy between Vietnam and Iraq are playing a political game with history, which does not even have the intellectual legitimacy of a counter factual.
The other problem with Mark Moyar's review is that he missed entirely the main point of Greg's book, which was one of strategy rather than tactical measurements. Then again, focusing on the promise of better counterinsurgency tactics has always been a central pillar to "better war" thinking, whether it be Vietnam, Iraq, or today in Afghanistan. Gregs book is a first rate piece of scholarship that essentially concentrates on what is most important in war--strategy--yet Moyar in the review missed this critical point.
The Iraq Surge is a good example of this better war thinking in how the Surges limited tactical successes have come to be seen by many (Max Boot when he declares US "victory" in Iraq; Peter Feaver when he sees himself and other DC elites as the driving part of a perceived radical change in strategy on the ground, et al) as strategic game changing event.
It is the elevation of tactics over strategy and the flawed belief that better tactics can rescue failed strategy. They cannot. Just look at the history of World War II. The Germans had pound for pound the finest industrial fighting force the world had ever seen yet its strategy was flawed and its policy morally perverse. In the end for the Germans tactical excellence in its Army could not resolve this contradiction in its favor and they lost, and lost bad. The Russian Army on the other hand never got good at tactics but it developed over the years good operational generals and more importantly its strategy was sound.
Some folks it seems have come to believe in the weaponization of history in the current fight in Afghanistan; by that I mean they are violating Clausewitz's advice that history should inform thinking and judgment but never accompany the commander to the battlefield. I fear Moyar is not in St Carls camp on this one.
gian
I've not yet read the book, but find my own experiences in MR-3 mirrored in many of Dr. Moyar's observations. I would add only that, as he has suggested might be the case, having locals come forward with information (some good, some useless) was not a problem, as they were ever ready to make a few bucks.--But the problem was getting the counterparts to act on the intel. And when they did, all too often efforts such as Phoenix/POPAT (Protection of the People Against Terrorism) were reduced to catch and release.
To answer the question, Yes.
As Colonel Greg Daddis argues in this excellent new book (for proof just see the battery of leading historians who endorse it) by Oxford University Press on metrics in Vietnam, since in that war the US never really got its strategy right, it could never really figure out the metrics to determine if it was achieving its strategic objectives.
To me in Afghaninstan, since our strategy is really nothing more than a set of Counterinsurgency principles, maxims, and tactical methods, our metrics tend therefore to reflect the tactics of Coin. And as Sun Tzu wisely said many years ago:
"strategy without tactics is the slow road to victory," but "tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat."
Greg's book is a must read, and I highly recommend it to all.
gian