Book Review: A Lesson Ignored

Book Review: A Lesson Ignored

By Colonel William T. Anderson

The Moro War, How America Battled a Muslim Insurgency in the Philippine Jungle, 1902-1913, by James R. Arnold, Bloomsbury Press, 2011, 306 pages.

As Operation Iraqi Freedom spiraled into a counterinsurgency in the summer of 2003, our military institutions struggled to get a sense of the cultural and religious conflict spiraling out of control.  Book shelves long dusty through nonuse were perused for any examples of how to wage war in what appeared to be a new paradigm.  In reality, of course, this situation was not new but a modern example of wars at the turn of the 20^th Century.  There were lessons to be learned in libraries.  You just needed to know where to look.  It would have been helpful if Mr. Arnold’s new book had been available.  The author of several books on the history of counterinsurgency, he has done a great service in reminding us of the Moro War in the Philippines from 1902-1913 when an insurgency sprang from a clash of cultures. 

As a result of the 1898 Treaty of Paris ending the war with Spain, the US obtained sovereignty over the vast Philippine Archipelago.  Included in this collection of islands was Moroland, a province comprised of the islands of Mindanao, Palawan, Basilan and a host of smaller islands in the Sulu Sea.  Inhabited by primitive Muslim communities of pagan hill warriors, the dense jungles of Mindanao became known to American soldiers as the “boondocks,” based upon a Tagalog word bundok.  Arriving in 1899, the Americans were, as Mr. Arnold describes, “{b}lithely unaware of the history that had shaped Moro society and supremely confident in the virtues of their own beliefs.”  Sound familiar?  One critical fact was that the Spanish had never really established any sovereignty in Moroland.  The only thing that was accomplished by the Spanish was to unite the various tribes against the occupying Christian colonial administration in a holy war.  It is not hard to imagine the reaction of the Moros when Christian Americans replaced the Spanish and announced that the US was in charge and were going to “improve” the local culture.

Between 1899-1902, there was a honeymoon of sorts in Moroland as each side avoided confrontation. Due to more pressing problems, the Americans concentrated their efforts during this period on Luzon to the north and other islands of the archipelago.  Indeed, the difficult operations in Samar from 1901-1902 are an iconic episode of Marine Corps history.  Subsequently, focus shifted to Moroland in 1903 where both sides eventually experienced “mutual disillusionment.”  A conflict was inevitable as Moroland was essentially a feudal society based upon banditry and slavery.  The first military governor, Brig. Gen. Leonard Wood, attempted to bring order by exposing the locals to the benefits of “civilized” society.  This exposure included punitive expeditions similar to those conducted against Native Americans.  Subsequently, Wood’s successor, Brig. Gen. Tasker Bliss, sought to incorporate economic and social reforms rather than use force.  This was in response to considerable bad press about what some believed was Wood’s “reign of terror.”  Success was ultimately achieved after Brig. Gen. John Pershing became governor in 1909.  His approach was a combination of reforms and the use of decisive force when warranted.  Regardless of who was in charge, what ensued was a decade of classic colonial misrule marred by bloodshed on both sides, with each having a share of villains and heroes.

The crux of the problem for the Americans in Moroland has a modern sound to it.  With the arrival of well-meaning troops, the US began a campaign with the laudable goal of improving Moro society.  However, these agents of progress failed to understand the culture of the Muslim inhabitants and, in effect, did everything within their power to challenge the Moro way of life.  Indeed, the visitors viewed most aspects of Moro society with disgust:  slavery, piracy and the degradation of women, to name three.  Reluctantly, the American soldiers ventured into the wild interior; areas so remote and ungovernable that even the Spanish stayed out.  Once the inhabitants began to resist attempts at civilization, a conflict ensued that pitted predominately Christian forces against a ragtag group of Islamic fighters in a classic insurgency.  Thus, in what was mainly a company-grade officers’ war, lessons were learned by the US through the blood, sweat and tears of the American soldier.  Mistakes were made and new approaches attempted when others failed. 

The reputations of a number of leaders burned brighter after their service in Moroland.  Some would rise to positions of greater leadership, both before and during the Great War.  Regrettably, some reputations would suffer.  The Moro War lasted until Gen. Pershing was relieved by the first civilian governor.  Pershing would return to the US and command a brigade in San Francisco, a transfer seen by some as a demotion.  However, during his service in Moroland beginning in 1902 as a captain, he had earned an enormous amount of respect from anyone who knew of the war.  Ultimately, he would lead the American Expeditionary Force during our participation in the Great War.

Mr. Arnold has done a masterful job in telling this story.  He recounts not only the routine problems operating in an austere area (i.e., fatigue, supply shortages and sickness) but he also discusses how the US authorities wrestled with the complex nature of a counterinsurgency.  It is axiomatic now that a thorough understanding of the indigenous culture is critical to success.  Failures in cultural appreciation led to many missteps.  In addition, a short-deployment rotation of personnel can be counter-productive in a conflict that requires experience of the local conditions and the maintenance of goodwill with local leaders.  Finally, Mr. Arnold relates the difficulties with strategic communications and the questions of national commitment for a war lasting over a decade.  Even in an era without the blogosphere, their version of instantaneous communication through the telegraph caused many leaders to lose sleep.  Not surprisingly, some journalists were not welcomed in some US camps in Moroland.  This is a great story of a little-known war far from home with “ill-defined national objectives” coupled with operational errors.  We should be distributing copies to the war colleges and forces preparing to go overseas.

Col. William T. Anderson USMCR (Ret.) is currently a senior analyst with the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia.