All, this article was recently published in The Washington Post, written by Greg Jaffe.
I think this has the potential of engendering tremendous discussion across the Army. I ask that you take the time to read it and am very interested in hearing your thoughts on its implications. Reflecting back on your time as former company grade leaders, both as commanders and staff officers, and looking forward as you assume positions as field grade officers including battalion command, this article articulates several topics that are important to discuss as part of our profession.
V/r BG Ed Cardon
Share your views with BG Cardon at the CAC Blog.
Comments
<b>Morgan:</b><blockquote>"I had read in "Once a Warrior King" that SWIC used to train the MATs for VN. Not sure why we aren't doing that now....."</blockquote>I do not know the correct answer to that question but I've heard USSOCOM was asked and declined. I have a supposition:
Turf and Command concentration on DA as opposed to SFA / FID.
That may or may not be right. I'd like to hear that it was for far more valid reasons though I have difficulty envisioning any that could be of a higher priority than imparting knowledge and expertise to people who are being sent to do a difficult job for DoD and the US...
In fairness, I've also heard they are now providing people to Polk to assist the 162nd INF BDE - FSF-TT.
The old MATA course at SWC worked and worked well in its day, those established at other posts were not nearly as good.
"I had read in "Once a Warrior King" that SWIC used to train the MATs for VN. Not sure why we aren't doing that now....."
David Donovan did a hell of a job in that village with no experience. Imagine how successful he would have been with 2-3 tours under his belt prior to "going local."
"Anyway, yours sounds like a good plan....and I know who I'd pick for the team, though their wives might get PO'd.....mine too."
That's the monkey on the back that we're all dealing with it. There's many days when I think that taking the S3 job down at Benning to teach will be just fine. I can ride out my twenty and go teach high school peacefully in a small town on the Outer Banks.
I'd sell it this way. This is how I sold it to myself- One more time into the breach. We got Iraq down to a reasonable level of violence. Now, we gotta do it one more time in A'stan. It's the whole duty thing that tears at our core. We have the experience that cannot be learned in the classroom. The wives will not like it, but they know who we are. "One more tour boys. Walk with me." You know as well as I do that the men you'd select cannot say no.
Morgan,
Sounds good to me. Here's some additionally thoughts to expand on your ideas.
1. COA development. I'd sell it this way. Thinking in terms of a linear fight (which us Big Army guys understand :)), "Gant's plan" is the equivalent of the old Div Cav and BRT's screen line missions. Instead of OP's, we have villages. BCTs and BNs are postured back in the FOBs prepared to reinforce and support when needed.
2. Don't call it the "Gant plan." Nest it into the current plan as a supporting effort. Historically, SF missions are shaping and not strategically decisive, and the boss always likes it better when he thinks it's his plan anyways.
3. Recruitment, Selection, and Training. This one will ruffle some feathers. We don't have enough SF teams to do this unilaterally. If I was King for a day, I'd have USASOC set up a six-month mini-course at Bragg. Team Leaders (O3/O4s) are volunteers who have served admirably in multiple tours in Iraq/A'stan/Bosnia. They get to pick their team (this will cut down on team-building time if you're deployed with guys you already trust). SWIC trains them up like they did back in the 1960's for 'Nam. To enhance the program, competition, and make this work, at the completion of a 24-month tour, the team gets KD ratings AND a long tab. Ha, Ha. I can see the haters now!!!
Mike
MikeF,
I wonder if the "Gant Plan" will ever get off the ground. The idea of implementing it, thereby putting multiple troops at great risk, surely causes nightmares for higher-ups afraid that they'll get called on the carpet the first time one of those guys gets killed.
If it were implemented (and I'd jump on it for a 18-month, maybe 24-month, stint), I'd say the regular army would have to provide the bulk of the troops, broken out into several hundred, possibly thousands of, well-armed, well-resourced small teams distributed throughout RC-East, RC-South, and RC-Central (I think those are still the main "hot spots"). I'd think an experienced SF guy or two would have to be with each team and the team would work with whatever tribe/ village that they're assigned to.
The State Dept and DoD big-wigs would work the Kabul government, regular forces would continue to partner/ train/ mentor ANSF through ETT and partnership units, and TETs would work the small communities.
Not sure about political advisors and merging tribes into coherent governments. Maybe the TETs could work that as well.
How does that sound?
Morgan,
I'm with you on that way ahead, and I'll volunteer to roll with Jim for three years, but we need to expand his idea. Yes, it'll work on the micro-level. How do we build off this plan to institutionalize it theatre wide? What is the role of Regular Army in support of the tribes? How will the political advisors merge the tribes into a coherent gov't?
This whole issue (Wanat and Keating) seems to reinforce the arguement MAJ Gant is putting forth.....that small Tribal Engagement Teams, living in the local villages and getting their protection FROM the villagers, is the way to go. I doubt 300 talibs would've tried to storm a local village just to get at some "Amrikans".
Just my opinion, as always.
Great CAC Blog comments by lots of smart, war- experienced Majors. However, the LTC doctor who worked on Wanat casualties had the best response and the most first-hand knowledge of events, IMHO.
As he noted, not sure how you punish anyone who had to endure 15 straight months in this hellhole on the edge of the countrys least populated province, with ethnicity unrelated to other Afghans, and thus largely irrelevant.
But mistakes were made and lessons were learned long before Wanat. No 173rd ABCT commander or Soldier deserves blame for failing to practice COIN during their tenure given the threats and casualties encountered. But there is no better example that we cannot kill our way out of Afghanistan, what with 861 bombs dropped and thousands of artillery rounds landing. There is also ample evidence of little interaction with Afghans causing adverse feelings, culminating when Apaches took out 17 locals in trucks nine days prior to the Wanat attack while targeting mortarmen.
Personally, believe multiple services/branches should use Wanat and Keating as examples of lessons learned and ideal real world vignettes for training. We built a 4-hour practical exercise to plan a UAS area security at Wanat, using the true background and not telling students what actually happened WITHOUT UAS until the end of the P.E. Other key DOTMLPF lessons, better sought than punishment, might include:
* Strategic: ISAF does not need lots of isolated COPs in high terrain resupplied solely by air. That conclusion had already been reached when Keating was being closed and Wanat established. Let the bad guys trek long distances through border mountains threatened by UAS and fast movers...and then kill them if they attack flatter, more easily defended areas. Wanat was at 4000' with nearby peaks and ridges at 6,000' to 10,000'. I have a 1:50,000 map of the area on my wall and the QRF route from Camp Blessing was equally treacherous with the HMMWV QRF covering 8 kms in the same time it took the AH-64D QRF to cover 50 miles.
* COIN: As mentioned, killing never-ending streams of the local and Pakistan-based enemy, and attacking civilian homes, even when fired from, will not prevent attacks or win Afghan compliance
* Infantry: Better positioning and protection of COPs and OPs is essential, as are protected vehicle and mortar firing positions. More patrolling helps as does interaction with the populace. Small platoon UAS and better unattended ground sensors and unmanned ground vehicles could have helped identify the build-up better than the exposed manned OP
* Artillery: Perhaps in addition to Excalibur 155mm rounds, the FA needs multiple smaller sub-munitions terminally guided by GPS that can safely land closer to designated friendly and civilian positions to limit collateral damage and fratricide. Such munitions could also be used by 120 and 81 mm mortars, and GMLRS rockets. NLOS-LS too. Danger close for unguided 155mm with high angle fire was excessive with the enemy close, so multiple 155mm rounds far from a close enemy did not help enormously
* Joint Air: Need small diameter bombs, light attack aircraft, F-35, A-10s, more precision airdrop (bravo USAF on current efforts), and more JTACs and ROVER/OSRVT for small units
* Aviation: IMHO, organic/direct support long-endurance Army armed UAS are essential as USAF Predators/Reapers are not always available. A villager specifically asked the night before if the unit had UAS. More attack weapon team QRFs and FARP fuel/ammo closer to COPs would assure a 20-30 minute AH and/or UAS response once called
* Sustainment: Contractor logistics will not always be viable in hazardous areas. Small civilian pick-ups actually brought water, etc to Wanat after primary contractors backed off. Kamen K-MAX just demonstrated automated sling load drop-off of individual loads totaling 1500 lb loads at 12,000' at four locations.
* Engineers: Chinook-lifted Bobcats cannot lift dirt high enough to fill 7' HESCO. More HESCO is required early in COP construction. More air transportable engineer equipment is required. Perhaps some sort of lift device could be added on tail of MRAP to lift troops and supplies to the elevated interior and lift dirt high enough to shovel off into 7' HESCO
* MI: Did you know that the new Joint Pub 3-30, C2 for Joint Air Ops, gives priority for aerial ISR to airpower controlled by the JFACC and JAOC ISR Section? Is that any way to run a counterinsurgency or other ground war?
It is, IMHO, contradictory to have FM 3-24 paradoxes saying that the more you protect the force the less secure you will be, and that more risk must be accepted...while punishing leaders for insufficient protection and excessive risk. Then again, how much interaction with locals can occur at stand-to, and isnt that when protection can be full force without violating COIN tenets?
There's little doubt Wanats COP would have fared better further from the hotel and other town buildings and using a narrow trench-like HESCO protected interior to reduce likelihood of interior RPG shots, and early elimination of vehicles and mortars. The OP was poorly positioned as the company commander noted. Time ran out before required moves and improvements could be completed. But, hindsight is easy, and perhaps better used to learn, rather than blame?
BTW, highly encourage all to read the 245 page Wanat report, and view the CBS and ABC video surrounding Wanat from a friendly and enemy perspective. The Washington Post also had a great series and some great graphical portrayal of Wanat that you can actually see in the ABC video.
Has a generation of officers become risk averse or too willing to manage risk with hope as a method because we have a climate of no command responsibility?
Take for instance, the numerous acknowledgments from government officials and SWJ posts pointing out that our Army didnt practice COIN prior to FM 3-24: that's wrong.
The Armys light forces trained for counter-insurgency (called Low Intensity Conflict then) using FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict, 1981; FM 100-20 / AFP 3-20 Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, 1990; and, FM 7-98 Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, 1992.
Throughout this period, our IPB focused on stability and security threats; we trained against 'insurgents; and, we used PSYOP and Civil Affairs. But because few commanders were ever held responsible for bad 'commandership, we learned that bad decisions do not have consequences.
I guess few remember the U.S Armys COIN efforts in El Salvador and Nicaragua, the subsequent creation of Army Light Divisions, and the establishment of the Joint Readiness Training Center in the 1980s: all to master COIN. Most of the light community never saw an armored vehicle until they went to Ft. Chafee, AR for a JRTC rotation or until GEN Sullivan directed Heavy-Light rotations at the NTC following Desert Storm. The Army trained at COIN throughout the 1980s and 1990s: our leaders just did it really poorly, our lessons were captured but not learned, and our commanders tactical failures were glossed over usually blaming the OPFOR as too familiar with the scenario, terrain, or cheating. We accepted the risk in our current wars when we developed a command climate of NO accountability for the things that matter and too much accountability for the things that dont.
At the final AAR for an ARTEP, I once listened to then-BG Carl Stiner tell a battalion commander, "you have the worst battalion Ive seen in 22 years military service; you completed none of your ARTEP missions; you have low standards and dont meet them." Thats clear feedback and accountability, and Ill wager that LTC never got another chance to risk casualties in an infantry unit again.
Finally, the commanders that failed in the Louisiana and Carolina maneuvers in 1940 and 1941 never got a chance to fail in World War II. They had to be replaced--George Marshall couldnt risk it.
While I understand we must give priority to the perspective of the "boots on the ground" even commanders are not above reproach. I have worked for commanders I would follow through the gates of hell and I have also had those commanders who would throw me in front of the bus if it would further their career. The question for me is how many of these commanders are truly qualified to lead troops in combat? I served on a PRT where the commander's qualifications in no way, shape, or form, qualified the command of a unit in a combat environment. Why are the lives of our troops, and the nation's will placed in this type of jeopardy? What type of consequence is there when a commander fails? - no bronze star?
I think a big part of what empowers leaders to assume risk is knowing how it relates to the mission. Outside of what we believe we know about Wanat, this means leaders either need to be provided a well understood task and purpose, or they need to be assured that their leadership (at least up to the theater CDR) will not hang them out to dry when the unexpected occurs.
It still appears to me that the mission is undefined in terms of tasks and a purpose that can be clearly articulated up and down the CoC, and where when subordinate leaders back brief their higher on their "plan", or the immediate reaction to an incident outside "the plan" everyone can visualize what is being described, and consider the range of consequences and outcomes.
While the conceptual framework may be in our doctrine, the application of specific tasks and the capabilities that support the ability to do that task seem undefined. There also seems to have been some false choices set up based on how we see concepts being applied.
I think it is almost inevitable then that we'll have some leaders who take risks, and that some of those risks will not go as planned. I would offer that along with any consideration for negligence on the part of leaders, a more stringent investigation should go back and look at the events that led up to it, and look not only at what decisions were made, but why. We may find that in their estimate they were doing what they thought was right based on what they had been taught, and what they had been told. If that is the case, the problem may be that we are doing the wrong things to develop leaders, and we are communicating the wrong ideas.
Consider a unit that extends its footprint beyond what is deemed tactically supportable - it may have been because they were told they had to affect their entire AO in a persistent manner, or because they assumed risk given their understanding of the objective and conditions. Now consider that that the enemy does not contest their actions for whatever reason, and the unit is hailed as wildly successful, and their tactics are the model to be emulated. What happens when the enemy observes this in another unit's AO and decides that its a great opportunity to destroy the unit, and send a message?
How should we handle the unit's leadership that believed because they may have been taught or told in theater something that seemed "counter-intuitive" to what they had grown up with, or because the concepts they'd read about in books by authors in other conditions had been accepted as being the foundation for their own efforts by their service.
War seems adept at serving up the unexpected. I find it hard to believe that leaders at almost any level wake up one morning and say "we should go out and fail today". I do believe its possible that we sometimes wake up and doubt what we know because the leaders above may not entirely understand the difference between applying something conceptually and the need to have a definable mission with real tasks and purposes that can be scrutinized and fully considered so that their subordinate leaders can know when its appropriate to accept risk(s).
Further, when the leadership above reacts without fully understanding (and explaining) what may be broken it further extends uncertainty and makes assuming risk harder. Things get evalated in the context of how the leadership will react when the unexpected occurs vs. how it may further the objective of the mission.
Best, Rob
As I posted in a different place on the Interwebs, what would be the reaction today to the Battle of LZ X-Ray in the Ia Drang? Would LTC Hal Moore still receive a Distinguished Service Cross for his exceptional battlefield leadership or would he get a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand (GOMOR) permanently filed in his records, punitive relief (recall that Hal Moore came out of command anyway shortly afterward in a normal rotation), and removal from the Colonel's promotion list (he pinned on shortly thereafter also) thereby ending his career in 1966 as a LTC instead of in 1977 as a Lieutenant General?
I can't really add to the discussion at CAC, because a number of majors have already hit upon my initial reaction--that this may have the side effect of making leaders far more risk averse.
Take a look at the scrutiny aviators are placed under after an aircraft accident. Flight records are meticulously examined, with investigators commenting on the accuracy and completeness of paperwork in trivial and unrelated matters. Investigators examine medical files, ask about one's family and personal life, and examine the entire chain of command to determine culpability.
What if this happened for every battlefield defeat? I think this sort of attitude might make commanders far less likely to incur risk. Am I to understand that losing an outpost might get you relieved of command, but losing a village because troops stayed on the FOB won't get you relieved?
Unfortunately, we sometimes lose battles and things don't turn out the way we planned them. That's war.