Comments
John,
If I understand you correctly, American COIN is viewed as a utopian response to a perceived problem? Its interesting to think about why so much capital (land, labor, means of production, etc.) has been invested in Iraq and Afghanistan. How do you define the 'problem that we are attempting to 'solve in those places, what alternatives to this tactic/technique/procedure (ttp), named COIN do you see (outside of Europe), and would you recommend additional reading on the subject?
Paul,
I appreciate your considered response to my free-form questions, there dear leader ;)
One more article for your perusal... hopefully your afternoon caffeine intake will be enough to get you through.
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/05/the-quiet-coup/7364/
Both of the Atlantic articles are, perhaps, a bit heavy on the pathos side of ethos/pathos/logos spectrum but they speak to popular themes observed/articulated by some during these times of uncertainty. The author of this last article that I linked to is noteworthy if nothing else for the position he once held. Following the adage of 'use the google Luke I attempted to chase the popularity metrics for both articles but found no quantitative data.
I would suggest that Mexico is indeed relevant to this discussion in that it can be broadly viewed as a model of longstanding non-transparent/non-accountable ties between elites (transnational or otherwise) and oligarchies, and perhaps more narrowly as a series of specific examples regarding different types of outcomes resulting from varying responses to territory and identity concerns. Spanish 'COIN as practiced in Mexico in 1519, was different than American COIN in the 1840s, (Mexican-American War) was different than French COIN practiced in Mexico (Franco-Mexican War - of which Free Trade was an issue) during the 1860s, and all of these can be contrasted with Mexicos myriad internal responses to civil war and revolution. Todays responses and outcomes to these themes, as we have discussed elsewhere, are just as interesting. Overall, I am optimistic regarding Mexico's potential to resolve issues internally.
So, in attempt to tie this all together, is/was COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan to be seen as a response to encroachment upon the 'international communitys territory and identity? As I understand it the international community is primarily, or perhaps exclusively, comprised of Westphalian nation-states. Is using a quick napkin sketch - Immanuel Kants League of Nations/United Nations construct attempts to do the right thing but finds that the US designed/powered COIN pathway to perpetual peace is not sustainable - a fair method of assessment to define portions of the future debate regarding COIN?
Perhaps its time for more caffeine... .
Steve
John,
You might want to consult a dictionary and grammer handbook. Please take a look at your writing before you clog up the Journal and drive people away.
"COIN will only suscede in Utopia. While great in theory, in the real world it dosn't stand the test. It might work in Europe is the continent was a failed state but no where else. Until we look for and use proven stratgies (and we can improve upon them) we will continue to gain nothing. We should look at the root causes certainly, but we will have to crush them in order to win.
Posted by John | June 23, 2011 1:24 PM"
Hi, Steve,
I think there is a "transnational elite" that have more in common with each other than with their fellow citizens in many cases. Capital has much more freedom of movement than labor (witness all the debates in the US and elsewhere over immigration). The Westphalian state will reassert itself (or attempt to reassert itself) when there are challenges to its core constituent elements--territory and identity. Notice how the most tyrannical regimes in the Arab Spring have blamed "outside agitators"...they are not like "us".
When territory and identity are linked together and challenged, the nation-state becomes ever more relevant. I think this is why our concerns about drug cartel violence in Mexico have struck such a chord--territorial security and immigration are fused together in talk about "border security"...a physical manifestation of both territory and identity. (Apologies for the tangent).
What the nation-state offers that no other organization has done (up to this point) is offer the fusion of territory and identity with accountability. The EU may suffer because of its weak institutions of accountability and is there truly a "European" identity? I don't know. The transnational elite may have such an identity. Again, I don't know.
Okay, I think I hurt something in my brain. I really should stretch out before thinking conceptually.
Dear Leader signing off,
DPRK
COIN will only suscede in Utopia. While great in theory, in the real world it dosn't stand the test. It might work in Europe is the continent was a failed state but no where else. Until we look for and use proven stratgies (and we can improve upon them) we will continue to gain nothing. We should look at the root causes certainly, but we will have to crush them in order to win.
<i>"If capitalism encourages the free flow of capital to areas with the most return- and if we're going to continue to champion capitalism- then not only are we possibly not THE anchor of stability- but there is no stability to begin with as it is not inherent in the system we've helped develop.
Other countries (BRIC?) are beginning to have just as much, if not more, DE-stabilizing influences as our economic might has (I'm sure many outside the U.S. perceive and have experienced the U.S. de-stabilizing their neighborhoods- for better or for worse). How can we avoid the French model of post-imperial delusion and instead slide into a comfortable "must get along with others" role like the Brits have?"</i>
Hey Grant,
France and the UK are interesting conceptual bookends. Are they enough to contain, or even fully describe, 'American Exceptionalism' at this point in time however?
I would argue that America, as an idea, is still very much a powerful engine which drives the world. This doesn't mean that we lack for dangerous, and potentially fatal, national issues to resolve (compare & contrast the fiscal competence of our elected officials with that of much of our corporate world for example).
*****"Im just "writing out loud" and havent really fleshed this out in my own mind yet. With my academic year done, clearly idle hands are the devils play toys."*****
Hey Paul/(DPRK ;) ),
As long as we are thinking/writing out loud
If we acknowledge the existence of a worldwide intellectual ecosystem, for want of a better phrase, how cohesive is the concept of the westphalian nation-state in the teeth of the ongoing changes attributed to the forces of decentralization/globalization? Of all the nation-states in existence, are there any (democracies perhaps?) that are best placed to weather such a sea change and point the way forward for others?
If core values for an idea can be both described and seen as socially binding (in the positive sense) by a vanguard (America's Citizens?), can the physical ties of a nation-state be transcended or will nation-states need for revenues (and the vanguard's need for security, rule of law, infrastructure, etc) retard the evolution(?) or change to something other than the westphalian state.
I continue to watch the Arab Spring/Revolutions with interest, continue to watch the slow motion train wreck in Greece (with the awareness that Portugal, Spain, Italy, and possibly the EU as a whole are located just a bit further down the tracks) and I keep coming back to this article for insight into the viewpoint of another demographic as I consider current events.
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/01/the-rise-of-the-new…
Steve
Grant,
You raise several good points with the British and French experiences; throwing in the rise of the BRICs is also a complication for the US. I keep wondering if we will experience a "Suez Canal moment" when we are cautioned by the BRICs (or one of them) to pull back from the deploying of US military might, and the US does so because national decision makers fear jeopardizing our critical economic-political relations with the BRICs.
Again just thinking "out loud' on paper...
DPRK
<em>And, yet this goal must be matched with what are now clear limits on our resources and even our will as a nation.</em>
Totally agree. I wonder if we're like the French after WWII: unable to admit that our power has diminished.
If capitalism encourages the free flow of capital to areas with the most return- and if we're going to continue to champion capitalism- then not only are we possibly not THE anchor of stability- but there is no stability to begin with as it is not inherent in the system we've helped develop.
Other countries (BRIC?) are beginning to have just as much, if not more, DE-stabilizing influences as our economic might has (I'm sure many outside the U.S. perceive and have experienced the U.S. de-stabilizing their neighborhoods- for better or for worse). How can we avoid the French model of post-imperial delusion and instead slide into a comfortable "must get along with others" role like the Brits have?
Dave,
I read the HuffPost piece and your reflections with a great deal of interest. I think this is going to be the intellectual debate within the Army and perhaps within the DOD and the various circles of the political elite. What proportion of COIN proficiency do we need maintain to assist in meeting the national strategic objectives of the US in the near and medium term?
In light of last nights speech by the President, we need to consider his all-important phrase that the US is "the anchor of global stability". And, yet this goal must be matched with what are now clear limits on our resources and even our will as a nation. We should ask ourselves-- how does proficiency in COIN assist in that overarching strategic goal given the constraints at home? Then, we should build COIN elements from there. You put your finger on what is likely to be key ingredient, namely foreign internal defense.
Im thinking of the Nixon Doctrine that was conceived to 1) avoid a major systemic war through a balance among major powers, 2) expand our nuclear deterrence to regional friends in order to maintain regional stability and 3) areduce direct US military intervention in the global periphery through the use of proxy fighters. Foreign internal defense was a lynchpin to war by proxy in Central America, southern Africa and even Afghanistan during the 1970s and 1980s phase of the Cold War. Perhaps an updated version of the Nixon Doctrine is where we are heading--avoiding a major systemic war by maintain our role as "an anchor of stability", working with strong regional powers to undergird regional stability and using proxies and stand-off technology like drones to reduce the need for direct US military intervention in the periphery. Perhaps "wars among the people" are giving way to "wars of distance" fought by local forces we train and supported by UAVs. This would make Libya a test case.
Im just "writing out loud" and havent really fleshed this out in my own mind yet. With my academic year done, clearly idle hands are the devils play toys.
My students noticed that my full name plus my title, Dr. Paul Rexton Kan, can be abbreviated and turned into an ironic acronym. So, Im going to sign off as...
DPRK
Interesting how the COIN strategy and COIN theory will now be discredited. I just hope we do not throw the baby out with the bath water and we do not have a purge and "book burning" (metaphorically speaking) of all COIN theory as we did after Vietnam. I know the flame will continue to burn at Bragg (and of course here on _Small Wars Journal!_) but we do not need to totally purge our entire military of all COIN theory. We do need to know about _ALL_ COIN theory (not just "population centric") so that we can conduct effective Foreign Internal Defense when it is deemed in US interests to do so.
But I think TX Hammes hits the nail on the head in the article. It is not about the theory, it is about the assumptions that underpin the strategy. I think the cause of failure for most strategies is getting the assumptions wrong. I think our assumption about Karzai and the capability and the legitimacy of the Afghan government may turn out to have been in error.
Some other examples of bad assumptions in history:
Aircraft are interesting but of no military value.
Marshal Foch, 1912
It is an idle dream to think the automobile will replace the railways.
American Road Congress, 1913
There is no likelihood that man will tap the energy of the atom.
Robert Millikan, Nobel Prize Winner, 1920
We have reached the limits of what is possible with computers.
John von Neumann, mathmatician, 1949
I think there is a market for maybe five computers
Thomas Watson, CEO, IBM, 1943
The internet will catastrophically collapse in 1996.
John Metcalf, inventor, 1995
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B: Gorbachevs USSR was not prepared to intervene militarily in E. Europe.
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A: Saddam had WMD and was hiding them.
B: Deceiving the IAEA served Iraqs domestic needs and regional deterrence