War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age
By Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker

My copy just arrived and from a quick scan through the United States (Small Wars Journal discussed here as an example of a public community of practice and our new media discussion several months ago is cited) and United Kingdom chapters - looks very informative and interesting - I will have a detailed review later.

Book Description

The rise of insurgencies and the rise of the Web are two grassroots trends that are operating in tandem to put modern armies under huge pressure to adapt new forms of counterinsurgency to new forms of social war.

War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age argues that two intimately connected trends are putting modern armies under huge pressure to adapt: the rise of insurgencies and the rise of the Web. Both in cyberspace and in warfare, the grassroots public has assumed increasing importance in recent years. After the dot-com bubble burst in 2000, Web 2.0 rose from the ashes. This newly interactive and participatory form of the Web promotes and enables offline action. Similarly, after Rumsfeld's attempt to transform the US military into a lean, lethal, computerized force crashed in Iraq in 2003, counterinsurgency rose from the ashes. Counterinsurgency is a social form of war—indeed, the U.S. Army calls it armed social work—in which the local matrix population becomes the center of strategic gravity and public opinion at home the critical vulnerability.

War 2.0 traces the contrasting ways in which insurgents and counterinsurgents have adapted the new media platforms to the new forms of irregular conflict. It examines the public affairs policies of the U.S. land forces, the British Army, and the Israeli Defense Force. Then it compares the media-based counterinsurgency methods of these conventional armies to the more successful methods devised by their asymmetric adversaries, showing how such organizations as Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Hezbollah use the Web not merely to advertise their political agenda and influence public opinion, but to mobilize insurrections and put insurgent operations into action. But the same technology that tends to level the operational playing field in irregular warfare also incurs a heavy cost in terms of the popularity of insurgencies.

Authors

Thomas Rid is a Research Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations in the School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He was a Research Fellow at the RAND Corporation, the Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. He organized a conference of the leading exponents of counterinsurgency doctrine from the U.S. Army, the British Army, the Armee de Terre, and the Bundeswehr and directed the foreign policy program of the American Academy in Berlin. He is the author of War and Media Operations and co-editor of Understanding Counterinsurgency Warfare. His articles appear regularly in such periodicals as Policy Review, Military Review, Die Zeit, Neue Zuricher Zeitung, Der Tagesspiegel, and Merkur.

Marc Hecker is a Research Fellow at the Security Studies Center of the Institut Francais des Relations Internationales in Paris. He is the author or co-editor of a presse francaise et la premiere guerre du Golfe, La defense des interets de l'Etat d'Israel en France, and Une vie d'Afghanistan. He is an editor of Politique Etrangere. His articles appear in such periodicals as Politique Etrangere, Le Figaro, Liberation, Etudes, and Ramses.

Continue reading "War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age" »

While I’m on the subject of the day job – kudos to John Robb – he presented a very informative and well delivered briefing (Global Guerrillas – go figure) today at the conference I’m attending. It’s a non-attribution affair – but he delivered the goods in terms of what we really need to be thinking about as we meander down the road we’re currently on. Had several great aside conversations with John on breaks – indeed – his insights are well worth pondering. I hope to have more later – or more desirable – John will post something on his web page…

Continue reading "Quick Shout Out" »

Just a quick note of congratulations to the folks at the Center for a New American Security on one outstanding conference today. A great line-up of speakers and panelists – with a wide range of observations and opinions - made fighting the traffic on the I-95 parking lot well worth the trip. Job well done.

Continue reading "Kudos to CNAS" »

Earlier today I participated in a U.S. Joint Forces Command media teleconference and roundtable with Vice Admiral Robert S. Harward, Deputy Commander for USJFCOM and Rear Admiral Dan W. Davenport, Director of the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation (JCD&E) Directorate. This roundtable concerned USJFCOM’s new Capstone Concept for Joint Operations and an ongoing associated war game (29 May – 5 June) intended to assess the ideas of the CCJO and inform future force development as well as the new Joint Concept Development Vision released to the public yesterday.

Up front – full disclosure – I consult for USJFCOM. That said, I think it useful that our community of interest understand the intent of the CCJO and more importantly – what is different about this new version and its relationship with other concepts that address issues discussed in the CCJO such as combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction. So, my question was to be - What’s new about this version of the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations and what is the relationship between the CCJO (beyond simply being the “Capstone” or “higher order”) and the family of operating and integrating concepts that address many of the issues contained in the CCJO? Maryann Lawlor of SIGNAL Magazine, who was two ahead of me in the reverse alphabetical pecking order, beat me to the punch...

Here's the answer in a nut shell - The CCJO is a combination of existing constructs that address the challenges we face in a way that offers fresh insights into the conduct of military operations.

The bolded emphasis is mine. As you read the CCJO and tick off the national security challenges, basic categories of military activity and common operating precepts you might find yourself thinking - I've seen this all before - and you probably have - in this or that concept, a doctrinal publication, in a white paper or one of countless studies and monographs - each looking at a particular issue or two as a separate problem set. The CCJO acknowledges all that and as such takes a holistic approach to some very complex issues - read or reread the CCJO with that in mind. This is not a document that should get the once over and shelved - it is to be revisited and pondered upon as we search for solutions.

For a quick summary of other issues addressed at the Q&A today see Gerry Gilmore's piece at American Force Press Service.

And as posted here previously - especially if the current state of concept development and the usefulness of these documents baffles you - please read the Joint Concept Development Vision released yesterday by USJFCOM. It cannot be emphasized enough how important the following three guidance principles are:

1) Concept development will be based on a thorough understanding of current doctrine. 2) Concepts will provide a clear and testable alternative to that doctrine. 3) Concepts will be validated through experimentation, practical experience, analysis, and professional debate will be transitioned systematically and expeditiously into doctrine.

For discussion on the JCDE Vision see what the Council has to say.

Continue reading "CCJO and JCD Vision Media Roundtable" »

HEADQUARTERS GRAND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC

General Orders No.11, WASHINGTON, D.C., May 5, 1868

I. The 30th day of May, 1868, is designated for the purpose of strewing with flowers or otherwise decorating the graves of comrades who died in defense of their country during the late rebellion, and whose bodies now lie in almost every city, village, and hamlet church-yard in the land. In this observance no form of ceremony is prescribed, but posts and comrades will in their own way arrange such fitting services and testimonials of respect as circumstances may permit.

We are organized, comrades, as our regulations tell us, for the purpose among other things, "of preserving and strengthening those kind and fraternal feelings which have bound together the soldiers, sailors, and marines who united to suppress the late rebellion." What can aid more to assure this result than cherishing tenderly the memory of our heroic dead, who made their breasts a barricade between our country and its foes? Their soldier lives were the reveille of freedom to a race in chains, and their deaths the tattoo of rebellious tyranny in arms. We should guard their graves with sacred vigilance. All that the consecrated wealth and taste of the nation can add to their adornment and security is but a fitting tribute to the memory of her slain defenders. Let no wanton foot tread rudely on such hallowed grounds. Let pleasant paths invite the coming and going of reverent visitors and fond mourners. Let no vandalism of avarice or neglect, no ravages of time testify to the present or to the coming generations that we have forgotten as a people the cost of a free and undivided republic.

If our eyes grow dull, other hands slack, and other hearts cold in the solemn trust, ours shall keep it well as long as the light and warmth of life remain to us.

Let us, then, at the time appointed gather around their sacred remains and garland the passionless mounds above them with the choicest flowers of spring-time; let us raise above them the dear old flag they saved from dishonor; let us in this solemn presence renew our pledges to aid and assist those whom they have left among us a sacred charge upon a nation's gratitude, the soldier's and sailor's widow and orphan.

II. It is the purpose of the Commander-in-Chief to inaugurate this observance with the hope that it will be kept up from year to year, while a survivor of the war remains to honor the memory of his departed comrades. He earnestly desires the public press to lend its friendly aid in bringing to the notice of comrades in all parts of the country in time for simultaneous compliance therewith.

III. Department commanders will use efforts to make this order effective.

By order of

JOHN A. LOGAN,
Commander-in-Chief

N.P. CHIPMAN,
Adjutant General

Official:
WM. T. COLLINS, A.A.G.

Old Army Buddies - Michael Auslin, Washington Post
Those Who Make Us Say 'Oh!' - Peggy Noonan, Wall Street Journal
They Died for You - Rick Atkinson, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
Remembering Bataan - Washington Times
Roots of Memorial Day - Hayley Peterson, Washington Examiner
What are the Origins of Memorial Day? - Seattle Post Intelligencer
Observing Memorial Day - Larry Abeldt, Abilene Recorder Chronicle
What Does Memorial Day Mean? - Tabatha Hunter, Benton County Daily Record
What Patriotism Means to an American Citizen - Johnnie Godwin, The Tennessean
Let Us Honor the Best and Noblest of Us All - Spartanburg Herald Journal
Honor Their Sacrifice - Doug Chapin, Washington Times
The Dead We Honor - New York Post
Legacies of War Dead Endure - Rick Hampson, USA Today
Memorial Day Roll Call Salutes 148,000 Veterans - Gillian Flaccus, Associated Press
Obama Pays Memorial Day Weekend Tribute - Kent Klein, Voice of America
Grief and Honor at Arlington Cemetery - James Key, USA Today
Rolling Thunder - Michael Ruane, Washington Post
Memorial Day 2009 - Washington Post
This Memorial Day - New York Times
Being True to Our Values - Philadelphia Inquirer
Sterling Memorial - Bob McManus, New York Post
Memorial Day 2009 - McQ, Blackfive
A Word of Caution - Greyhawk, Mudville Gazette
How Not to Celebrate Memorial Day - Uncle Jimbo, Blackfive
Tibor Rubin - Greyhawk, Mudville Gazette

Continue reading "Memorial Day 2009" »

Been on two road trips and missed getting an early jump on Dave Kilcullen’s testimony before the House Armed Services Committee concerning the situation in Pakistan. They dragged Dave out of our wargame last week to testify and I saw him off as he headed from our pristine suburban Maryland locale to the Hill – but such is life - and our loss was a gain for Congressional SA on a worsening problem.

Anyway, kudos to Ex (also at the wargame) at Abu Muqawama for the link and for a bulletized summary of the “lowlights of the Pakistani Army's recent history”. I have to agree - Studying the past few years, one could arrive at the conclusion that Pakistan's army is epically incompetent. One could similarly arrive at the conclusion that Pakistan's army is competent -- but fighting for the other side. Either way – not much to cheer about.

Here is Dave’s “bottom line” from his testimony:

The United States Government has spent $10 billion dollars supporting Pakistan since 9/11, and in that time we have seen a dramatically worsening situation across the whole country. More of the same will not help, and indeed may make the situation worse. I fully support the benchmarks in the bill and would like to see an even greater emphasis on rule of law, policing and civilian administration, with even greater conditionality and stringency placed on continued assistance to the Pakistani military, unless and until it demonstrates a genuine commitment to cease supporting the enemy and begin following the direction of its own elected civilian government.

Rather than continuing to pretend that Pakistan is a weak but willing ally against extremism, we need to recognize that while some elements in Pakistan – some elected civilian political leaders, the majority of the Pakistani people, many tribal and community leaders and some appointed administrative officials – are genuinely committed to the fight against extremism, substantial parts of the Pakistani security establishment are complicit with the enemy, whether through incompetence, intimidation or ill intent. Our approach in assisting Pakistan should be to strengthen our friends and limit the power of our enemies, while helping Pakistan stabilize itself and govern its people responsibly and humanely. Increasing assistance to the police – making the police, in effect, the premier counterinsurgency force – while channeling all military support through civilian authorities and ensuring greater accountability and conditionality on military assistance, is the correct approach. We are way past prevention in 2009, and need to focus on stopping the rot and stabilizing the situation in 2009‐2010, then rolling back extremism and militancy thereafter.

Continue reading "$10 Billion and Getting Worse" »

The Department of Homeland Security recently disseminated two FOUO reports - Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment (7 April 09) and Leftwing Extremists Likely to Increase Use of Cyber Attacks over the Coming Decade (26 January 09) - that are now in the public domain. These two reports - which say absolutely nothing helpful to those on the frontlines of defending our nation - will most certainly stoke partisan bickering.

David Rehbein, National Commander of the American Legion, expressed his concern over such analytical mush as this nugget from the "right-wing" report...

The possible passage of new restrictions on firearms and the return of military veterans facing significant challenges reintegrating into their communities could lead to the potential emergence of terrorist groups or lone wolf extremists capable of carrying out violent attacks.

... in a 13 April letter to Secretary Janet Napolitano at the DHS:

... The best that I can say about your recent report is that it is incomplete. The report states, without any statistical evidence, "The possible passage of new restrictions on firearms and the return of military veterans facing significant challenges reintegrating into their communities could lead to the potential emergence of terrorist groups or lone wolf extremists capable of carrying out violent attacks."

The American Legion is well aware and horrified at the pain inflicted during the Oklahoma City bombing, but Timothy McVeigh was only one of more than 42 million veterans who have worn this nation's uniform during wartime. To continue to use McVeigh as an example of the stereotypical "disgruntled military veteran" is as unfair as using Osama bin Laden as the sole example of Islam...

The cited DHS report is almost as sad as this Penn State 'instructional video' entitled The 'Worrisome' Veteran.

Update:

US Officials: Recession Could Fuel Right-Wing Extremism - Voice of America

Homeland Security Warns of Rise in Right-Wing Extremism - FOX News

US Officials Warn of Radical Activity - United Press International

Federal Agency Warns of Radicals on Right - Washington Times

Right-wing Extremists Seen as a Threat - Los Angeles Times

Napolitano Defends Report on Extremism - Washington Post

Napolitano Says 'Risks' Monitored, Not Ideology - Reid Wilson, The HIll

Napolitano Defends DHS Report - Politico

Six Things You Should Know About the Homeland Security Report on ‘Rightwing Extremism’ - Judge Andrew Napolitano, FOX News

Homeland Security Report Characterizing Veterans as Potential Terrorists is “Offensive and Unacceptable” - Congressman John Boehner

Legion Objects to Vets as Terror Risk - Washington Times

Homeland Insecurity - San Francisco Chronicle

Top Dem 'Dumbfounded' by 'Extremism' Report - Washington Times

Republicans Criticize Report on Right-wing Groups - Associated Press

The New McCarthyism: DHS Reports on Right-Wing Extremism - US News & World Report

DHS Report on Right-Wing Extremists Is No Attack on Tea Party Conservatives - US News & World Report

You Might Be A Right-Wing Extremist If… QandO

Continue reading "Right Wing Extremist Vets, Left Wing Extremist Puter Hacks, Oh My..." »

Here it is, one of the best I've attended...

Continue reading "CNAS Book Discussion with Dave Kilcullen" »

SWJ will be taking a two-week and change break from the Daily Roundup - time crunch time right now - day job and catching up on all the great submissions for posting to SWJ - and a bit more rack time in the zero dark early hours.

Expect the Roundup to return on or about Monday, 27 April - will stay abreast of wave-top / critical issues analytical news and opinion important to our community of interest and will post a quick excerpt and link to help fill the void.

Dave

Continue reading "SWJ Daily Roundup Update" »

I'll defer to Bill, Robert and our Council moderators to post their CPs...

Continue reading "Sat Misc - SWJ Jump CP - Dilegge" »

From our good friends at Kings of War - Regular Warfare is Increasingly Irregular by Dr. David Betz (Note to self - you have not been visiting Kings of War of late as much as you should).

Fascinating article in the Straits Times from a couple of days ago ‘North Korea Rethinks War-fighting Strategy‘. The upshot of it is that North Korea is increasingly reliant on irregular measures. Personally, I see this as yet another reinforcement of Frank Hoffman’s hybrid wars concept (the link goes to the KCL events page–scroll two thirds of the way down and you will find a podcast of Frank’s lecture here from 21 January)...

The North Koreans are learning lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan. Chief among those would seem to be: when fighting Western armies you can tie them in knots with irregular techniques whereas confronting them in a conventional order of battle is a good way to get slaughtered. What lessons are we learning? According to some it’s that we should stop messing around with this irregular warfare stuff because, hey, North Korea might want to do some high-intensity manoeuvre warfighting with all those heavy divisions it’s got!

More at Kings of War.

Continue reading "Regular Warfare is Increasingly Irregular" »

Thoughts on the “New Media” - compiled by Small Wars Journal

Last weekend I sent out the following “RFI” to a number of bloggers I know:

Andrew Exum’s post / review of Tom Ricks’ The Gamble several weeks ago at Abu Muqawama got me thinking (once again) about the impact of the “new media” on issues concerning national security, military doctrine and concept development, as well as lessons learned. As one part of this new media I’m not sure I fully grasp our influence – though I am often told we are, quote – “making a difference”. Here is the excerpt from the AM post that got me thinking about this.

“The New Media: Ricks cited a discussion on Small Wars Journal once and also cited some things on PlatoonLeader.org but never considered the way in which the new media has revolutionized the lessons learned process in the U.S. military. (Forget Abu Muqawama, though, because this lowly blog started around the same time as the surge.) Instead of just feeding information to the Center for Army Lessons Learned and waiting for lessons to be disseminated, junior officers are now debating what works and what doesn't on closed internet fora -- such as PlatoonLeader and CompanyCommand -- and open fora, such as the discussion threads on Small Wars Journal. The effect of the new media on the junior officers fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was left curiously unexplored by Ricks, now a famous blogger himself.”

I’d like to get your thoughts on this - nothing elaborate – maybe a paragraph or two on the core issues concerning the new media and it impact on the military. I’d then like to post the responses I get as one post on SWJ.

Appreciate the consideration.

What follows are the replies I received through yesterday. Some stuck to the one-two requested paragraphs, some sent more. Rather than attempt to “over edit” and get some uniformity I opted to go with this initial batch of thoughts on this issue.

All good stuff that hopefully energizes a discourse on the impact of new media and its influence on military doctrine, concept development, training, education, and lessons learned. Without further ado (and in alphabetical order) here is Spencer Ackerman, Tom Barnett, Janine Davidson, Andrew Exum, Grim, Judah Grunstein, Dave Kilcullen, Raymond Pritchett, Mark Safranski, Herschel Smith, Starbuck, Michael Tanji, and Michael Yon...

Thoughts on the “New Media” - compiled by Small Wars Journal

Update:

Counterinsurgency and the New Media - Andrew Exum, Abu Muqawama

New Media Poised to Change the Future National Security Debate - Raymond Pritchett, Information Dissemination

SWJ, New Media and COIN - Judah Grunstein, World Politics Review

Thoughts on the New Media and Military Blogging - Herschel Smith, The Captain's Journal

New Media + Old Military = New Military - Jules Crittenden, Forward Movement

The "New Media," the Surge, and the Writing of History - Mark Grimsley, Cliopatria

Media Blitz - Spencer Ackerman, Attackerman

New Media and Modern War - Joshua Foust, Registan

Legacy Futures in Cyberspace - Adam Elkus, ThreatsWatch

Small Wars Invitational on The Surge and New Media - Grim, Blackfive

The Difference - Greyhawk, Mudville Gazette

Recommended Reading - Mark Safranski, Zenpundit

Counterinsurgency and the New Media - Starbuck, Wings Over Iraq

Continue reading "Thoughts on the “New Media” (Updated)" »

The Unforgiving Minute: A Soldier's Education
By Craig M. Mullaney

If you can fill the unforgiving minute
With sixty Seconds' worth of distance, run,
Yours is the Earth and everything in it,
And--which is more--you'll be a Man, my son!

--Rudyard Kipling, "If"

My only regret in reading The Unforgiving Minute is that I had not read it earlier – when I received an advance copy in the mail several weeks ago. Now finished, I will offer up my very short summation, echo the praise lavished on this fine piece of work since its release and give it a hearty thumbs up as essential reading for those in (or veterans of) our business – and maybe more importantly - for those who need to know what that business is all about.

The Unforgiving Minute traces Craig Mullaney’s life as a student at West Point, Ranger School and Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar; as a Soldier in Afghanistan; as a teacher at the US Naval Academy, and as a veteran.

His writing style displays a fine balance that allows The Unforgiving Minute to be informative, educational, moving, and entertaining for both the seasoned warrior and uninitiated civilian alike. General David Petraeus was spot on in describing Mullaney’s book as a wonderful, beautifully written story of the education and development of a young soldier-scholar, the coming of age of an infantry officer, and the exercise of a small unit leader's responsibilities in a tough, complex, and frustrating situation in Afghanistan. It captures particularly eloquently and movingly the relationships among those who walk point for our nation as part of that most elite of fraternities, the brotherhood of the close fight.

Within those words – two – soldier-scholar – probably describe my major take-away from The Unforgiving Minute and reinforces all I’ve experienced the last 30 years associated with the US military – we can ill afford leaders equipped solely with the implements of warfare – they must be intellectually equipped as well. Craig Mullaney is indeed a soldier-scholar and –citizen as well and his story is the story of a whole generation of young leaders.

I'll leave you with Steve Coll's description of The Unforgiving Minute - ... one of the most compelling memoirs yet to emerge from America’s 9/11 era. Craig Mullaney has given us an unusually honest, funny, accessible, and vivid account of a soldier’s coming of age. This is more than a soldier’s story; it is a work of literature.

The Unforgiving Minute - Craig Mullaney's web site
Interview with Andrew Exum - Abu Muqawama
Interview on Afghanistan - Charlie Rose Show

Continue reading "The Unforgiving Minute" »

This is in reference to Ex Picks the Winners and Losers of The Gamble.

It is not the critic who counts, nor the man who points how the strong man stumbled or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena; whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly...who knows the great enthusiasms, the great devotions, and spends himself in a worthy cause; who, at best, knows the triumph of high achievement; and who, at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who know neither victory nor defeat.

--Theodore Roosevelt, 1910

I spent a good part of last night corresponding with COL Gian Gentile – an Army officer I greatly respect and consider a dear friend. While we often find ourselves on the opposite poles of the COIN – conventional warfare debate – I relayed to him that this debate is a worthy debate – critical to the future of our armed forces. He deserves the highest credit for pushing this debate into the public domain.

Gian did this, all the while opening himself up to both warranted and unwarranted criticism. He stood in the arena while others either cheered or jeered from the sidelines. I cannot express how impressed I am with those who actually take a stand – those who stand tall in that arena.

Gian, as I said in at least two e-mails – you done good and have everything to be proud of. I salute you sir – as a brother in arms and as a loyal friend.

Semper Fi,

Dave

Continue reading "The Man in the Arena" »

Dan Twining over at FP’s Shadow Government warns the new administration about moving the goalposts in Afghanistan while Charlie at Abu Muqawama takes on the Commandant of the Marine Corps on his desire to get his Marines out of Iraq and into Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Herschel Smith talks of lies, damn lies and statistics while freting over whether John Nagl’s reputation may suffer by getting an agreement nod from The Captain’s Journal.

Spencer Ackerman (aka ATTACKERMAN) chimes in on about how Secretary Gate's SASC testimony offers a glimpse into a new Afghanistan policy - BUT - Jules Crittenden rounds up that same testimony quite nicely - thanks Jules.

SWJ’s (and FP's) own Westhawk, at his proper blog, poses two humdinger questions - does Obama see Karzai the same way Kennedy saw Diem? – and - what if Afghans will not defend themselves?

Tom Ricks (The Gamble) at FP’s Best Defense, points out the obvious concerning a new and wise policy brief and the not so obvious in dubbing Gentile and Exum the Lewis and Martin (almost typed in Clark) of Counterinsurgency.

Max Boot at Contentions pays high praise to Yochi Dreazen for his reporting in general and for this specific dispatch from Afghanistan.

Ever diligent Bill Roggio, with no time for such speculation, keeps on keeping on with just the facts ma’am at The Long War Journal.

Something in Wednesday's water - or truly interesting times?

Continue reading "Wednesday’s Afghan Potpourri" »

... let's not reset back to institutional folly like this:

Stifled Innovation? Developing Tomorrow's Leaders Today by Dr. Leonard Wong, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, April 2002. Synopsis and emphasis by Cavguy at the Council.

Of the 365 days in the year, approximately 109 days are unavailable for training due to weekends, federal holidays, payday activities, and the Christmas half-day schedule. This results in a total of about 256 available days for company commanders to plan and execute training.

Requirements for mandatory training at the company level riginate from Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training, policy letters, command training guidance, and other directives. Scrubbing all levels of command down to the Brigade level, to include Department of the Army, Major Army Command (MACOM), Corps, Division, and installation level, for anything that generates a training requirement results in the identification of over 100 distinct training requirements...

... Note that, as expected, most directed mission-related training requirements come from Division-level or below. More importantly, most directed nonmission-related training requirements originate from DA and MACOM levels. This is critical since policy actions may be most effective in reducing the DA and MACOM requirements.

Incorporating the amount of time necessary to execute each directed training requirement (for example, training on “The Benefits of an Honorable Discharge” takes about 60 minutes a year) results in approximately 297 days of directed training.

Of the 297 days, about 85 percent (or 254 training days) is mission-related training and 15 percent (or 43 training days) is nonmission-related training.

The number of days required by all mandatory training directives literally exceeds the number of training days available to company commanders. Company commanders somehow have to fit 297 days of mandatory requirements into 256 available training days.

When we eventually get back to "normal" let's get back to the future.

Continue reading "When we "reset the force"..." »

Military Brass Joins Wired Troops: Admirals and generals hope to connect with soldiers via their own Facebook pages and blogs. But will they tweet?

Christian Science Monitor article by Gordon Lubold, and no we aren't making this up, that cites Small Wars Journal and innovation in the same breath... Damn, just damn.

Some of the US military’s top flag officers are becoming dedicated bloggers and attempting to change the military and extend their reach, one Facebook “friend” at a time.

They are using the Internet and social media to reach down within their own traditionally top-down organizations – and outside them, too – to do something the military isn’t known for: creating more transparency to empower young military leaders and the public.

Some senior officers say transforming the military means more than buying next-generation vehicles or developing new training. It’s giving more people more access to what they’re doing and thinking. That’s already happening as top officers create their own blog sites and Facebook pages in order to keep pace with the plugged-in, hyperconnected charges they lead...

As social media expands and its value becomes more apparent, those kinds of policies may be reassessed, defense officials say. Meanwhile, sites like Small Wars Journal (SWJ), a respected online forum, offer warrior academics a chance to vet ideas and build consensus.

“It connects the top thinkers on the direction the military should go as it adapts to the wars in the 21st century,” says John Nagl, a former Army officer and author who is a regular part of the debate on SWJ. “It allows instantaneous feedback and ideas to be debated in real time, and it accelerates the debate.”...

More at CSM - and a hearty thanks - as well as a Tip of the Hat (Akubra is my brand) Gordon and John - much appreciated, to say the least.

Update #1: Nice piece by Galrahn over at Information Dissemination - Admiral, Do You Tweet Sir?

... In no small part due to a comment in the article by John Nagl, the Small Wars Journal gets an honorable mention in this article as an example where new media is having influence in the national security debate. While it is possible other areas of new media are having a similar effect, I would argue the Small Wars Journal is the exception, not the rule, and is the only place this is happening. What makes the Small Wars Journal unique?

Because it is where active and retired members of the military want to debate their ideas, want their opinions in the open source on any given topic, and Dave has tapped into a community that has become comfortable with their ideas debated in an open forum. The Small Wars Journal has the capacity to "help shape the public debate about national security policy" primarily because those involved in the debate have found value participating in the public debate...

More at ID and another thanks and a tip of the hat.

Update # 2: Mark Safranski (Thanks and H/T) at Zenpundit - When Old Government Intersects with New Media

... Tradtional think tanks are not set up to do what SWJ does because they come with either ideological baggage (Heritage, Brookings Carnegie) or institutional affiliations (SSI, CNA, Hoover) that preemptively circumscribe membership, discussion and research interests for fear of drying up the revenue stream. Few large donors, be they Uncle Sam, Richard Mellon Scaife or George Soros, are motivated to open their checkbook by the idea of unfettered inquiry and unlimited time horizons or providing a platform to their professional or political opponents. Attempts by official orgs to imitate SWJ will result in costly but sterile echo chambers. Genuine Web 2.0 interactivity is not desired because it is spontaneous and unpredictable but without that interactivity there’s no spark, no insight and no intellectual productivity...

Much more at Zenpundit.

Update # 3: More from Galrahn at Information Dissemination - CSIS Studies the Digital Network Advantage

The Center for Strategic and International Studies has a new 47 page PDF report out titled International Collaborative Online Networks: Lessons Identified from the Public, Private, and Nonprofit Sectors. I thought the report was very interesting, and very well done.

More at ID.

Continue reading "Military Brass Joins Wired Troops (Update 3)" »

John Nagl, Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, provides (via e-mail) the lead-in and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, at The Washington Post, provides the food for thought.

First John:

NATO's Secretary General earns his salary for the year in the Washington Post piece below describing much-needed improvements to the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan - a population security approach that builds Afghan government legitimacy; better understanding within NATO of counterinsurgency principles, especially the comprehensive approach that focuses on non-military solutions; a regional approach that includes Pakistan as an inherent part of the problem in Afghanistan; and better strategic communications to the region and to our own peoples.

He'll earn next year's salary a hundred times over if he can get NATO to implement the wisdom contained here.

And from Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Washington Post:

It has been seven years since Afghan forces supported by the United States toppled the Taliban and denied al-Qaeda the terrorist haven, training ground and launch pad that Afghanistan had become. Since then, there has been clear, substantial progress, including democratic elections, the liberation of many Afghan women to take their place in public life, and improvements in health care and education.

But an honest assessment of Afghanistan must conclude that we are not where we might have hoped to be by now. While the country's north and west are largely at peace and improving, the south and east are riven by insurgency, drugs and ineffective government. Afghans are increasingly frustrated by the lack of progress in building up their country. And the populations in countries that have contributed troops to the NATO-led mission are wondering how long this operation must last -- and how many young men and women we will lose carrying it out.

In April, to mark the 60th anniversary of NATO's founding, the member nations' heads of state and government will meet in Strasbourg, France, and Kehl, Germany. This meeting is to be part of Barack Obama's first visit to Europe as president, and it will present an opportunity for alliance leaders to discuss the way forward. Five key lessons from recent years should help shape the path of this mission...

Continue on for the five key lessons. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer is the Secretary General of NATO.

Continue reading "Afghanistan: We Can Do Better" »

Gian Gentile versus Abu Muqawama, Round 582 - yep.

I assume most of you have seen Gian Gentile's latest piece, in Foreign Policy. He takes a series of statements regarding defense policy and then offers a short argument in favor of or in opposition to each one. Always one to rise to the bait, here's my take on each...

One take-away by Gian posted at the comments section:

Dude, AM, brother in arms, please stop calling me anti-coin. Dave D at SWJ loves to apply that moniker to me; but it is not true. I am not anti-coin and if you have read any of my stuff you will see how over and over again I call for the Army to maintain, institutionalize what we have learned from coin over the past seven years. I have also said over and over again that the army does need a coin capability in the future. However, we should not transform the army to a force built primarily for coin and irregular war. For scholarly and professional arguments that support this view see Colin Gray's new excellent essay in SSI on US Strategy and MG Dunlap's brand new piece in AFJ.

Continue reading "Gian vs. Ex" »

We'll cut to the quick - here is the new US Government’s Counterinsurgency Guide. More later, been on the road, as has Bill...

Update: Comment, via e-mail, on the new USG COIN Guide by Colonel John Agoglia, Director of the COIN Training Center in Kabul...

Congratulations are in order for all who helped write and publish it. And while a sign of changing times - having DoS, USAID and DoD co-writing and co-signing this document - what would be even more useful is to get many who wrote it out here helping us implement it as we prepare for this upcoming campaign season that will be fraught will challenges as we flow in additional troops, I believe additional DoS and USAID officers would seriously help prepare for the upcoming election here - as our new President's team gets their feet on the ground. I know as the Director of the COIN Training Center Afghanistan in Kabul I can use and would welcome all the help I could get and I am sure the folks in the Embassy, the various commands and the PRTs would agree!!!!

Congratulations again, but now it's time to implement the guidance and get this campaign back on track!!

Continue reading "USG COIN Guide" »

Ex does a victory dance in his post on the latest from John Nagl and Brian Burton - Striking the Balance: The Way Forward in Iraq at World Policy Journal. All I can say is how about them Ravens?

Continue reading "Rogue Cousin Says “Eat It”" »

A very nice post by Reach 364 at the Building Peace blog entitled Warrior Intellectuals.

I finally read John Nagl's counterinsurgency book Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. I'd heard the book was good, but I had no idea HOW good. It's fantastic. The beauty of the book is that it's not merely about counterinsurgency; it's about building adaptive learning organizations that know how to defeat insurgencies. That's something I'm passionate about, so I devoured the book over my Christmas break, when I should have been busy opening presents and eating pumpkin pie...

Read it all - BP is added to our blogroll.

Continue reading "Nice Piece at Building Peace" »

Had some time today to reread and think about several articles we've linked to over the last several months. In case you missed this one - or not - I'd recommend a first or second read of All Counterinsurgency Is Local by Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason in October's The Atlantic. Here are several take-aways:

1) As in Vietnam, the U.S. has never lost a tactical engagement in Afghanistan, and this tactical success is still often conflated with strategic progress. Yet the Taliban insurgency grows more intense and gains more popular traction each year.

2) The U.S. engagement in Afghanistan is foundering because of the endemic failure to engage and protect rural villages, and to immunize them against insurgency. Many analysts have called for more troops inside the country, and for more effort to eliminate Taliban sanctuaries outside it, in neighboring Pakistan.

3) Politically and strategically, the most important level of governance in Afghanistan is neither national nor regional nor provincial. Afghan identity is rooted in the woleswali: the districts within each province that are typically home to a single clan or tribe. Historically, unrest has always bubbled up from this stratum—whether against Alexander, the Victorian British, or the Soviet Union. Yet the woleswali are last, not first, in U.S. military and political strategy.

4) The Taliban are well aware that the center of gravity in Afghanistan is the rural Pashtun district and village, and that Afghan army and coalition forces are seldom seen there.

5) To reverse its fortunes in Afghanistan, the U.S. needs to fundamentally reconfigure its operations, creating small development and security teams posted at new compounds in every district in the south and east of the country.

Much more at The Atlantic about a COIN approach concentrating on the rural areas in Afghanistan.

Continue reading "All Counterinsurgency Is Local" »

Bing West’s newest book The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq has been named a Wall Street Journal Best of 2008. Congrats, Semper Fi, as well as fair winds and following seas to you and yours Bing.

In preparation for writing The Strongest Tribe, former Marine infantry officer Bing West "traveled with 60 U.S. and Iraqi battalions and interviewed 2,000 soldiers... His chronicle is full of eyewitness accounts of nerve-wracking patrols, improvised-explosive detonations and small-unit gunfights," wrote reviewer Jonathan Kay, the managing editor for comment at Canada's National Post newspaper. The resulting book -- about the implementation of the American troop surge in 2007 - provided a bracing counterpoint to the usual scornful portraits of the war in Iraq, Mr. Kay said. The book "deserves to be read as an authoritative testament to this historic achievement."

Description: From a universally respected combat journalist, a gripping history based on five years of front-line reporting about how the war was turned around–and the choice now facing America.

During the fierce battle for Fallujah, Bing West asked an Iraqi colonel why the archterrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had fled in women’s clothes. The colonel pointed to a Marine patrol walking by and said, “Americans are the strongest tribe.”

In Iraq, America made mistake after mistake. Many gave up on the war. Then the war took a sharp U-turn. Two generals–David Petraeus and Raymond Odierno–displayed the leadership America expected. Bringing the reader from the White House to the fighting in the streets, this remarkable narrative explains the turnaround by U.S. forces.

In the course of fourteen extended trips over five years, West embedded with more than sixty front-line units, discussing strategy with generals and tactics with corporals. He provides an expert’s account of counterinsurgency, disposing of myths. By describing the characters and combat in city after city, West gives the reader an in-depth understanding that will inform the debate about the war. This is the definitive study of how American soldiers actually fought –a gripping and visceral book that changes the way we think about the war, and essential reading for understanding the next critical steps to be taken.

Continue reading "Wall Street Journal Best Books - Bing West Scores Again" »

Hat tip to Starbuck at Wings Over Iraq for pointing to this valuable travel advice by Rob Crilly at From the Frontline - how to plan a trip to Somalia:

1) Have you been to Somalia before? If yes proceed to 2. If no proceed to 3
2) Were you kidnapped on that occasion? If yes proceed to 4. If no proceed to 5
3) Have you been to Iraq or Afghanistan? If yes proceed to 7. If no proceed to 6
4) Then you should know better. Don’t go
5) Then your luck is probably about to run out. Don’t go
6) Then what are you thinking of? Don’t go
7) Then you are probably under the impression that you can hide in the green zone and wait for an embed to go somewhere interesting. In Somalia there’s no green zone, and the only embeds are with Ethiopian or African Union soldiers who are being blown to smithereens on a daily basis. There’s no-one you can trust. And no-one who can guarantee your safety. Don’t go

Check out Wings Over Iraq and From the Frontline - great stuff and both added to our blogroll.

Continue reading "Holiday Travel Guide" »

Four article series by Donna Miles of American Forces Press Service based on Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates’ article, A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age, published in the January/February 2009 issue of Foreign Affairs magazine.

Gates Urges Greater Balance in Military Capabilities - Part 1

Procurement System Must Be More Responsive to Current Requirements - Part 2

US Must Maintain Conventional Dominance - Part 3

Appreciation of Limits, Humility Important in Facing Challenges - Part 4

Continue reading "AFPS Roundup of A Balanced Strategy" »

Putting together the SWJ news and commentary roundup each morning, combined with the commentary on several e-mail discussion lists I belong to, have exposed me to much speculation on our actual spending in regards to Afghanistan vs. Iraq. A savvy and knowledgeable e-mailer on one particular list service - points to the most likely source to put us “in the ballpark” on this issue.

With that I give you The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11 by Amy Belasco of the Congressional Research Service. This report was last updated on 15 October 2008. The bottom line numbers cited in this report are as follows:

Total War Funding as of the FY2009 Bridge Fund

In the FY2008 Supplemental (H.R. 2642/P.L.110-252), Congress funded DOD’s war costs not only for the rest of FY2008 but also for the first part of FY2009 in order to give a new Administration breathing room to set its war policies. As of enactment of H.R. 2642, the FY2008 Supplemental, the cumulative total for funds appropriated since the 9/11 attacks to DOD, State/USAID and VA for medical costs for the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and enhanced security total $864 billion. This total includes:

$657 billion for Iraq;
$173 billion for Afghanistan;
$28 billion for enhanced security; and
$5 billion unallocated

Of this total, 76% is for Iraq, 20% for Afghanistan, 3% for enhanced security and 1% unallocated. Almost all of the funding for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is for Afghanistan.

Some 94% of this funding goes to the Department of Defense to cover incremental war-related costs, that is, costs that are in addition to normal peacetime activities. These costs include funds to deploy troops and their equipment to Iraq and Afghanistan, to conduct military operations, to provide in-country support at bases, to provide special pay for deployed personnel, and to repair, replace, and upgrade war-worn equipment. DOD’s baseline or regular budget covers the costs of normal pay for all military personnel, training activities, running and building facilities on U.S. installations, buying new military equipment, and conducting research to enhance future military capabilities.

Continue reading "What We Spend on the “Wars”" »

Ain't this just dandy and a pisser to boot - those who have strived - and died - to ensure Iraq's freedom and future place as a responsible partner on the world scene are brushed aside for the latest bash Bush melodrama and a 'real hero' is on the scene - Iraqi who threw shoes at George Bush hailed as hero via The Times. Plenty on this elsewhere, on the dailies and wires - most likely more tomorrow - meanwhile back in the real word... People care, they die or suffer serious wounds, and their contributions are tossed aside for this. A damn shame it is, indeed.

Nothing follows.

Continue reading "It Takes a Hero" »

Via Galrahn at Information Dissemination - The US Naval Institute is now blogging. So far, so good. Glad to see USNI in the blogosphere.

Also - check out Information Dissemination's main page for a lively discussion of piracy issues and Secretary Gates' recent Foreign Affairs article entitled A Balanced Strategy.

And while I'm at it - check out Seven Questions: Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper on How to Kick Pirate Booty at Foreign Policy.

Continue reading "Now Hear This, USNI Now Has a Blog" »

Just spent an absolutely great 24 hours plus – a 2 1/2 hour dinner last night with COIN Leadership Seminar panelists Colonel Steve Davis, Colonel Dave Maxwell and Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling; moderator Colonel Dan Kelly, MCTAG Director Colonel Scott Cottrell and SWJ partner in crime Bill Nagle.

Great conversation on complex issues led into today’s seminar – adding into the mix an informed and experienced audience made for quite a day. We will have more on this later as we sort through the notes for an AAR and format the video of today’s panel discussion as well as the Q&A for CD and web posting.

With that, I’ll leave you with a couple of pics and the opening remarks of LTC Paul Yingling...

Continue reading "COIN Leadership Seminar - Quick-note" »

Our favorite anti-COIN Colonel, Gian Gentile, and yet SWJ friend - go figure that one out, continues his personal crusade in this recent International Herald Tribune opinion piece - Mired in 'Surge' Dogma.

Here are some tidbits (regular SWJ and Abu Muqawama readers are well familiar with this drum beat):

The US Army and other parts of America's defense establishment have become transfixed by the promise of counterinsurgency...

The promise of counterinsurgency is to turn war into a program of social-scientific functions that will achieve victory...

The current US counterinsurgency program rests on the dubious assumption that the surge in Iraq was a successful feat of arms...

The recent uptick in bloodshed shows that the war is not over...

Yet influential American counterinsurgency experts have simply co-opted the counter-Maoist model. There is no originality - or at least a serious consideration for very different alternatives...

Many army officers and Department of Defense thinkers seem to be able to think only about how to apply the perceived counterinsurgency lessons from Iraq to Afghanistan...

Perhaps under the Obama administration, the army and the greater defense establishment will embrace creativity instead of dogma and at least consider other options. If not, our way ahead has already been decided for us...

Come on Gian, be part of the solution here - not the problem, and give General Petraeus and company credit where credit is due - no one - read - no one - is suggesting plopping down the Iraq model onto Afghanistan and even the most ardent counterinsurgency proponent freely admits we must maintain our military capabilities across a "full spectrum" of possible scenarios. I’d like you to at least acknowledge that we must maintain a reasonable capability to conduct COIN when all is said and done. I served through the post-Vietnam denial of all things “irregular” – and look at where that got us.

Continue reading "Gian, Yet Again, Energizes the Anti-Surge Story-Line" »

Adam Elkus at Rethinking Security - Ludic Spaces and National Security:

A while ago, Michael Tanji came up with the concept of Think Tank 2.0--a geographically dispersed and eclectic network that collaborate online in a series of salon-like discussions. Since then, I've been entertaining a similar idea--the ludic space...

If we consider operational doctrines and theories of national security as kinds of narratives battling for control, we may do well to construct ludic structures where we can construct meaning from the play, competition, and the continuous exchange and modification of narratives about the future. Small Wars Journal is a kind of ludic space existing in the boundaries between the military, academia, and the media. It drives discussion on military issues because it provides a freewheeling, multi-dimensional exchange from individuals of many different backgrounds...

More at Rethinking Security.

Continue reading "Thank You Adam Elkus" »

I’m sitting here pondering the latest e-mail circulating through various military and subject matter expert networks concerning Dr. Jason Brownlee’s Middle East Report hit-piece on the Army’s newest field manual – FM 3-07, Stability Operations. In Imagining the Next Occupation, Brownlee evokes all the politically biased bugaboos in his implied bottom line - the better we become at nation building the more likely we are to try to do more of it, thereby establishing military occupation as a Pentagon priority.

I’ll give my “knuckle-dragger” two-cents worth and then turn this discussion over to good friend and colleague Dr. Janine Davidson via her recent Small Wars Journal post - The New Army Stability Operations Manual: Fact, Fiction, and Perspective on FM 3-07 (reposted here in full and recommended reading for Dr. Brownlee should he be inquisitive enough to wander by SWJ).

My bottom line for those disposed to hurling stones at doctrinal publications such as FM 3-07 and FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (USA and USMC doctrine) is they really do not understand why the Army and Marine Corps (MCWP 33.3.5) felt compelled to write both publications – because in the absence of such doctrine – they were reduced to “winging it” – conducting stability and counterinsurgency missions as directed by our civilian authorities without the whole of government package associated with such operations. Read – all those non-military lines of operation such as governance, essential services and rule of law. When a vacuum exists someone needs to fill it and this often falls to the default only guys in town – excepting the bad guys of course.

Doctrine is not national security strategy, defense strategy or a campaign plan and it is especially not the U.S. military’s version of Mao’s Little Red Book. Often unread by many until needed, military doctrine provides a common framework and lexicon to foster initiative and creative problem solving. In the case of the two FMs mentioned here, it provides a how to think - not what to think - about an unfamiliar operating environment. The military really does like to be "prepared for the unexpected" and the lack of such doctrine has caught us flat-footed one too many times. More importantly, the collaboration between the Army and non-DoD civilian departments and agencies on FM 3-07 paved the way for a common framework to someday truly contribute to a whole of government approach (read unity of effort here) to problems that beg for non-military solutions. Dr. Brownlee – it ain’t sinister – it's just good common sense.

Now on to the smart stuff – here is Dr. Davidson’s 20 October SWJ post on the facts, fiction, and perspectives concerning FM 3-07.

The recent release of the Army’s latest Field Manual, FM 3-07 Stability Operations, has generated as much controversy as it has praise. On one side of the debate are those who see it as a great step forward in helping the military make sense of the complex, violent, and population-focused environments in which it increasingly finds itself. To the extent that our future conflicts are likely to look more like our current ones as Secretary Gates has asserted, it is high time we stopped muddling through and got serious about learning how to do this stuff. On the other end of the spectrum, however, are those who see the new doctrine as another dangerous step on the slippery slope toward U.S. imperialism. The better we become at nation building the critics claim, the more likely we are to try to do more of it. Moreover, teaching soldiers how to do stability operations not only erodes their war-fighting skills (i.e. their “real” mission), but it lets the civilian agencies who are supposed to do it off the hook in building their own capabilities and capacities. There are merits to both arguments, but on balance FM 3-07 should be seen as a great accomplishment.

Why FM 3-07?

It is perfectly understandable to hope that the military will conduct fewer stability operations in the future, but hoping does not make it so. The military still needs to prepare itself for the missions it will most likely be called on to perform. Given the thousands of troops over the last 200 years who have repeatedly been called to conduct these messy stability operations with little to no doctrine, education, or training, it seems high time someone put some rigorous effort into understanding how to conduct them better.

The concern over the U.S. as an imperialist power may be valid, but let’s not get carried away. Doctrine is not grand strategy. For those who worry that this new doctrine will make it more likely that we will try to invade and occupy more countries, consider that it might just have the opposite effect. If there is one thing this manual makes very clear, it is that stability operations are not rocket science – they are actually more complex and uncertain. Having a better understanding of the complexity and cost of these missions can only enhance the policy and strategy-making processes.

Fact vs. Fiction

The real value of FM 3-07 is that it gets a dialogue going and sets a few things straight:

First, FM 3-07 rightly notes that, contrary to popular belief, the Army has been conducting these types of missions for 200 years. The opening chapter is an excellent overview of this rich history. Military troops have been tasked with stabilizing, building, and re-building societies since the first units were sent West to keep peace between the settlers and the Indians and to build – literally – the nation. Recall that West Point was established as an engineering school for a reason. President Thomas Jefferson insisted that if we were to have a standing military (which he originally opposed) it should be as useful in times of peace as it is in times of war. One might make a similar case today and ask if the American taxpayer should expect more for $500 billion than an institution organized, trained, and equipped to fight conventional battles and nothing else.

Second, the manual recognizes that the nature of conflict is more complex than the pure science of defeating enemy militaries. If we truly wish leave a lasting peace in the places in which we intervene or fight, we do not have a choice between preparing for pure scientific battles and preparing for stability operations. At a minimum, if we do not stabilize a place after we bring down an enemy, then we set a trajectory for more chaos not peace. In so many other cases where the military is called to intervene in on-going conflicts or insurgencies, where the need to provide human security is the decisive line of operation, we need a military with a “full spectrum” mindset to understand the myriad interconnected tasks required to get the job done. FM 3-07 is a first step in this education.

Third, the manual suggests that despite aspirations to the contrary, the desired capability and capacity in civilian agencies not only does not currently exist, but it is not likely to be built in the near future. More importantly, even if and when USAID, State and all the other agencies were to enhance their expeditionary capacity 10 fold, these civilians would still not be capable – nor should they be – of doing their thing while bullets are still flying. That is the definition of a combatant, not a civilian. This means that the military will, at a minimum, be required to set a trajectory for accomplishing the long term strategic objectives with or without civilian experts on the ground. Once the environment is safe enough for civilians to engage, the military needs to know how to support their work. This means having a fundamental understanding of the nature of the conflict environment, the intersecting lines of operation (e.g. governance, security, economic development, etc), and the appropriate coordination of efforts among myriad military and civilian actors. This is what FM 3-07 is designed to accomplish.

Finally, it is important to understand that although this is a military manual, paid for and sponsored by the U.S. Army, it is in every other way, shape, and form, a true interagency, whole-of-government product. The process of writing this manual was almost as important as the product itself – and this process was unique. Through a series of conferences, roundtables, and workshops with thought leaders and representatives from various agencies throughout the government, in the NGO community, and among allies, FM 3-07’s author, LTC Steve Leonard, was able to glean the latest thought, theory, lessons, and controversies from the widest possible group of experts. Detailed debates over language, connotations, social science theory, and recent lessons learned from the field took place over a 10-month period, with some of these non-military participants contributing actual text to the finished product. In the end, FM 3-07 was written for and by the civilian-military community of practice, which spans well beyond just the U.S. Army. LTG Caldwell, the manual’s chief sponsor at Fort Leavenworth, recognized the importance of generating this vibrant interagency dialogue and has thus set the bar for future whole of government efforts in doctrine and strategy. Indeed, the next QDR might follow a similar model.

In sum, FM 3-07 is a great accomplishment. It is about time we thought seriously about these missions – not only how to do them, but why we do them. That the publication has generated great debate means that it is functioning just as it should.

Update:

Andrew Exum has more at Abu Muqawama - On Critiques of COIN/StabOps:

Spencer Ackerman at Washington Indpendent chimes in too - The Counterinsurgency Debate in Two Quick Hyperlinks.

Update # 2:

Mark O'Neill at Lowy Institute's The Interpreter - It's Not a Strategy, it's Just a Very Useful Book:

The pertinent fact to take away from all of the noise is that FM 3.07 is not grand strategy. It is not even a strategy. It is essentially a ‘cook book’ that provides US Army personnel in simple, easy to understand format, concise information about what they should do when in a stability operation. And this is useful, since they actually have a few of these on their plates at the moment, and it is probably better (for all of us) if they can pull them off successfully.

The idea that the US is likely to embark upon countless crusades because the US Army now has some instructions in how to undertake stability operations is ridiculous. Consider this - the US Army has had doctrine for the tactical use of nuclear weapons for over half a century. I don’t recall seeing any blogging about the fact that because they have nuclear weapons doctrine that they will invariably use such weapons. It is simply an illogical argument.

Continue reading "Why Can’t We All Just Get Along? (Update # 2)" »

Just back from a quick tour of blogs I frequent - and some I will soon frequent - to see what they are saying - or have said recently - concerning the President-elect's national security and foreign policy nominations. Not all have commented – here’s what’s what from those that have:

David Ignatius at PostPartisan - This is Obama’s team; he’s clearly in charge. You could see that he wasn’t diminished by the proximity of strong personalities; quite the opposite.

Max Boot at Contentions - As someone who was skeptical of Obama’s moderate posturing during the campaign, I have to admit that I am gobsmacked by these appointments , most of which could just as easily have come from a President McCain.

Steve Coll at Think Tank - The real challenge (and practical fix) for the next Secretary of State is simply to convince Congress to pay for more diplomats. Filling the shortfall of 2,400 or so positions would reduce waiting times for job applicants, but more importantly, it would give our diplomatic corps the time to get out from behind our desks to communicate with locals, the resources to plan for and respond to emergencies and major events, and the career flexibility to get the training we need to be ready for future challenges.

Blake Hounshell at Passport - What will they do in office? It's too early to tell, but all of these folks, David Sanger observes, "have embraced a sweeping shift of priorities and resources in the national security arena."

Joshua Keating at Passport - Jones's thin paper trail may worry partisans, but with Clinton, Joe Biden, Robert Gates, and Susan Rice on his team, Obama probably has enough big egos with well-defined worldviews to advise him on foreign policy. He may be looking for a towering presence who can call BS on wrongheaded recommendations when necessary, a task the 6'4" Jones seems more than qualified to carry out.

Galrahn at Information Dissemination - The US Navy is a mess right now, and Obama's decision to retain Secretary Gates can't be seen as a good thing for US Navy leadership. Think about the gamble facing the Navy with the Obama administration, the argument to change plans just for the DDG-1000 with the current argument expects the Obama administration to come in, override the recommendation of Secretary Gates, hurt the shipbuilding industry (piss off or on the Unions, however you want to call it), spend more money on the alternative Navy plan, build a fleet for a strategic environment best represented by a nuclear war with China, and finally, take action counter to the majority Democratic Congressman and Senators who are supporting the DDG-1000 plan.

David Wood at Military Watch - The threat of nuclear weapons runs through almost every national security decision Obama and his team will make, from terrorism through negotiations with Moscow.

Noah Shachtman at Danger Room - As predicted, Robert Gates will be staying on as Defense Secretary in the new Obama administration. Count me as psyched. I've been of fan of Gates', for quite some time. I wrote this, for example, in June.

Mary Katharine Ham at The Blog - He fell back on his usual dissembling on Iraq, when asked about withdrawal: "Now, remember what I said consistently during the campaign, and you were there for most of it. I said we'd have all combat troops out of Iraq in 16 months, and that there would likely remain a residual force there." He's clearly squeaking the door open on staying in Iraq, both with rhetoric and appointments (Jim Jones as National Security Adviser instead of Susan Rice.)

Tom Barnett at Thomas P.M. Barnett - Gates is staying, very exciting to hear!

Dan Froomkin at White House Watch - Rather than simply hire a new brand of loyalists -- or replace one gut player with another -- Obama is making it clear that he wants his thinking challenged and wants to hear opposing views before he reaches his decisions.

James Joyner at Outside the Beltway - We’re about to see a great shift in resources from the military to other actors, David Sanger argues. In a New Atlanticist piece called “Obama’s Foreign Policy Shift,” I join Matt Yglesias in proclaiming this “a really good idea.”

Jennifer Rubin at Contentions - Certainly much depends on execution of policy, as specific decisions arise for the new administration. But conservatives have little reason to complain about the national security front.

Joe Klein at Swampland - Watching the Obama rollout of his national security team from overseas--I'm in Europe, on my way to Afghanistan--I was struck by the inanity of most of the questions from my colleagues. Granted, these are political reporters, not national security or foreign policy specialists, but what sort of journalist expects the President-elect to tell the "inside story" of how he selected Hillary Clinton?

Jennifer Rubin at Contentions - In responding to a query on his (Obama's) team’s strong viewpoints and personalities, he again emphasized his commitment to military strength. His emphasis was on strengthening our capabilities “in all dimensions.” (This would seem to mesh with my take that he’s not going to be abandoning “hard” power, but rather attempting to supplement it.)

Judah Grunstein at World Politics Review - I think the political optics of what signal this sends regarding Democrats ability to manage national security rightly take a back seat here to the fact that Gates has been very impressive in effecting the institutional changes necessary to support the operational needs of two ongoing wars. But the Pentagon's final internal armistice lines (COIN vs. conventional and hard vs. soft power in Iran, for instance) have not been ultimately settled, which means maintaining continuity at the top makes sense for the time being.

Spencer Ackerman at Attackerman - Instead, Obama presented a clear picture of what he intends to do. Withdraw from Iraq along his 16-month timetable, "but I will listen to the recommendations of [military] commanders." Renew efforts against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Confront the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Reduce the dependency on foreign oil. And, as my last post indicated, recalibrate the balance between civilian and military efforts in U.S. national security to use what Vice President-elect Biden called the "totality" of options.

Jules Crittenden at Forward Movement - Wake up and smell the foreign policy! Big day for the incoming Clinton-Bush administration as POTUS-elect Obama Rodham Bush 3 announces the national security team he campaigned against.

Herschel Smith at The Captain's Jounal - So there seems to be a fundamental difference between Gates and the balance of the team. Gates apparently doesn’t believe in fairy tales and myths, while the demands on the left are for Obama not only to defund the military and engage enemies with dialogue, but to succeed, and that, remarkably so. This administration and the American public are being set up for huge disappointment, but all is not lost.

Mark at The Torch - The shift would create a greatly expanded corps of diplomats and aid workers that, in the vision of the incoming Obama administration, would be engaged in projects around the world aimed at preventing conflicts and rebuilding failed states. However, it is unclear whether the financing would be shifted from the Pentagon.

Steve Field at The D-Ring - With the announcement that Sec. Gates will be staying on at the Pentagon for at least a year during what is described as a “rolling transition,” my attention has turned to the new communications apparatus at the Pentagon.

Editors at New Atlanticist - The incoming administration will face an enormous array of national security challenges. With General Jim Jones' vision, integrity, and wisdom having such a central role in guiding them, they have a solid foundation.

Westhawk at Westhawk - What about the Obama team’s regional strategy for the Afghan problem? One is likely to get better results from a negotiation when one is bargaining from a position of strength. That doesn’t describe the U.S. position right now, something the Pakistani and Iranian governments know very well.

Antonious Block at Strategy and National Security - I think the idea of keeping Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense until Obama's own secretary can assemble his team and hit the ground running is brilliant. I also think Clinton will be an excellent Secretary of State (even though I was vehemently opposed to her as a presidential candidate).

Erin Simpson at Abu Muqawama - Victory in our time. Victory for this blog, that is.

Continue reading "Blogging On and About Obama's Nominations" »

A quick note for the SWJ daily roundup fans – I’m temporarily suspending the roundup in order to catch up on the all the new material flowing in from our SWJ community. I’ll do my damnest to post individual items from the MSM that are important to our readership on a one by one basis to the blog. I could use a helping hand – drop me an e-mail concerning items you think we should link to.

Damn day job and that sleep thing always seem to get in the way!

Expect the full media coverage you’ve come to love and enjoy to be resumed sometime next week.

Dave

Continue reading "SWJ Roundup Operational Pause" »

Just call me old fashioned – I have serious misgivings respecting and tolerating journalists who embed with an enemy (the Taliban in this instance) responsible for what some call the strictest interpretation and implementation of Sharia law “ever seen in the Muslim World.” The crimes against humanity that were a direct result of their rule in Afghanistan and continue in their desire to regain that rule cannot be forgiven or glossed over in hopes of some temporary respite from increased violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Yea, yea, okay – some people’s terrorists are other people’s freedom fighters – yada, yada – save it for the think tank- or university-circle sponsored seminars, studies and white papers. There is still black and white in today’s complex environment and our efforts in South Asia should most certainly fall within that category.

If there was ever a grouping of individuals and supporters that deserved complete annihilation (yea - I said the A word) – the Taliban and their support structure would and should be up front and center. It will take quite some time (that is why it is called The Long War) and there will most certainly be peaks and valleys along the way – but we must - and will - win this one and we will write the last chapter of the history book reserved for the victors.

But this is not about me and my particular passion for defeating a brutal enemy, it’s about Nir Rosen and his latest Rolling Stone piece entitled How We Lost the War We Won: A Journey Into Taliban-Controlled Afghanistan. Opinions via e-mail and several blogs and their comment sections are generally favorable to Rosen’s latest dance with the devil.

It’s Official: Nir Rosen, Who Embeds With the Taliban, Is More Impressive Than I Am

--Spencer Ackerman, Washington Independent

My colleague Nir Rosen, who is also a contributor to The Washington Note, is quickly becoming the preeminent Robert Kaplan-esque chronicler of Islamist insurgencies and conflict.

--Steve Clemons, The Washington Note

I read a draft of this story a few weeks ago and was, no kidding, glued to the page.

--Andrew Exum, Abu Muqawama

More blog traffic here – the vast majority strongly disagree with my humble opinion on Rosen and his reporting – so be it.

So, with a nod to Sun Tzu concerning knowing your enemy, I'd say read Rosen's article for any insight it may provide in defeating this gang of thugs.

-----

Update 1

Creative Dissent - Andrew Exum, Abu Muqawama
Our World - Richard Fernandez, The Belmont Club
Nir Rosen and the Taliban - Herschel Smith, The Captain's Journal
Why Nir Rosen Isn't To Be Trusted - Terry Glavin, Chronicles & Dissent
Nir Rosen: the Neo-Taliban’s Nancy DeWolf-Smith? - Joshua Foust, Registan

Update 2

I've received several e-mails indicating there might be some glaring errors or misrepresentations of fact in Rosen's Rolling Stone account of his most excellent adventure. For those so inclined, please send along such items to SWJ - documented / referenced of course. I'll post them here as an update.

Update 3

Embedded With The Taliban - Jules Crittenden, Forward Movement

In fact, How We lost The War We Won: A Journey Into Taliban-Controlled Afghanistan is misleading from the start. Contrary to his claim, Rosen never actually manages to embed with the Taliban. He just hangs out with some guys who say they are commanders … though other Taliban don’t seem to have much respect for their standing … and say they’ll get him in, but never quite manage to do more than link him up with some heavily armed layabouts. Lucky for him. Had he actually been with any fighting elements of the Taliban, he’d probably be dead now, which is what usually happens to the Taliban in large numbers when they directly engage the hated Crusaders. He probably would have been OK if he was just with a … you know … demolitions unit. Unless it was a suicide demolitions unit and they decided to give the American the full embedded experience.

Continue reading "A Personal Problem With Nir Rosen's Dance With The Devil (Updated)" »

Carried over from a June 2008 Small Wars Council post by Jedburgh - Another classic reprint from Rand: Counterinsurgency: A Symposium, April 16-20, 1962.

This April, 1962 symposium was held at a time when Kennedy Administration officials were focusing increasingly on the growing communist insurgency in Vietnam and on the verge of radically expanding the numbers, roles, and types of US military forces in that country. The purpose of the symposium was to distill lessons and insights from past insurgent conflicts that might help to inform and shape the US involvement in Vietnam and to foster the effective prosecution of other future counterinsurgency campaigns.

To gather these lessons and insights, Rand brought to the same conference table twelve US and allied officers and civilian officials who had expertise and a proven record of success in some aspects of guerrilla or counterinsurgency warfare. As their biographies will testify, the accomplishments and backgrounds of the symposium’s formal participants gave their views significant credibility. Each participant could claim firsthand experience with guerrilla or counterinsurgent operations in one or more of the following post-World War II conflicts: Algeria, China, Greece, Kenya, Laos, Malaya, Oman, South Vietnam, and the Philippines. Three of the participants had led or operated with anti-Japanese guerrilla or guerrilla-type units in Burma and the Philippines during World War II.

During five days of meetings, the participants exchanged views on a wide spectrum of topics relating to the political, military, economic, intelligence, and psychological measures required to defeat insurgencies. Convinced that the fundamental verities of effective counterinsurgency policy and practice that were elucidated by the participants remain as valid today as they were 44 years ago, Rand decided to republish the symposium proceedings.

Among the insights that emerged from the discussions, the reader will find a number of counterinsurgency best practices that seem especially germane to the insurgency challenges confronted today by the United States and its allies.

Formal Participants

Charles T.R. Bohannan, Lieutenant Colonel, AUS-Ret.
Wendell W. Fertig, Colonel, USA-Ret.
David Galula, Lieutenant Colonel (French Marine Corps)
Anthony S. Jeapes, Captain (British Army)
Frank E. Kitson, MBE, MC, Lieutenant Colonel (British Army)
Edward Geary Lansdale, Brigadier General, USAF
Rufus C. Phillips, III
David Leonard Powell-Jones, DSO, OBEY Brigadier General (British Army)
John R. Shirley, OBE, Colonel (British Army-Ret.)
Napoleon D. Valeriano, Colonel (formerly with the Armed Forces of the Philippines)
John F. White, Colonel (Royal Australian Army)
Samuel V. Wilson, Lieutenant Colonel, USA

Counterinsurgency: A Symposium, April 16-20, 1962 - Rand report.

Continue reading "In One Room - Galula, Kitson, et alii" »

What’s good for the goose is good for the gander.

--General Anthony Zinni- Naval Institute Forum, Sept. 2003

First item - Blast Kills 7 Russian Troops in S. Ossetia - Philip Pan, Washington Post

A car bomb exploded outside Russia's military headquarters in South Ossetia on Friday, killing seven soldiers and two others in what leaders of the Kremlin-backed separatist region immediately described as a terrorist attack launched by Georgia.

The blast in Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian capital, came amid continuing tensions as a cease-fire deadline approached for Russian troops to withdraw from territory around the breakaway region, which has declared its independence from Georgia.

Russian troops had seized the car in a Georgian village outside South Ossetia and taken it to Tskhinvali to be searched after detaining four individuals who were carrying guns and grenades, Maj. Gen. Marat Kulakhmetov, the commander of the Russian forces, told the Interfax news agency.

More at the Washington Post, New York Times, Agence France-Presse and Associated Press.

And this broader item - in tomorrow's Post - Behind the Bluster, Russia Is Collapsing by Murray Feshbach

The bear is back. That's what all too many Russia-watchers have been saying since Russian troops steamrolled Georgia in August, warning that the country's strongman, Vladimir Putin, was clawing his way back toward superpower status. The new Russia's resurgence has been fueled -- quite literally -- by windfall profits from gas and oil, a big jump in defense spending and the cocky attitude on such display during the mauling of Georgia, its US-backed neighbor to the south. Many now believe that the powerful Russian bear of the Cold War years is coming out of hibernation.

Not so fast. Predictions that Russia will again become powerful, rich and influential ignore some simply devastating problems at home that block any march to power. Sure, Russia's army could take tiny Georgia. But Putin's military is still in tatters, armed with rusting weaponry and staffed with indifferent recruits. Meanwhile, a declining population is robbing the military of a new generation of soldiers. Russia's economy is almost totally dependent on the price of oil. And, worst of all, it's facing a public health crisis that verges on the catastrophic.

To be sure, the skylines of Russia's cities are chock-a-block with cranes. Industrial lofts are now the rage in Moscow, Russian tourists crowd far-flung locales from Thailand to the Caribbean, and Russian moguls are snapping up real estate and art in London almost as quickly as their oil-rich counterparts from the Persian Gulf. But behind the shiny surface, Russian society may actually be weaker than it was even during Soviet times. The Kremlin's recent military adventures and tough talk are the bluster of the frail, not the swagger of the strong.

While Russia has capitalized impressively on its oil industry, the volatility of the world oil market means that Putin cannot count on a long-term pipeline of cash flowing from high oil prices. A predicted drop of about one-third in the price of a barrel of oil will surely constrain Putin's ability to carry out his ambitious agendas, both foreign and domestic.

That makes Moscow's announced plan to boost defense spending by close to 26 percent in 2009 - in order to fully re-arm its military with state-of-the-art weaponry - a dicey proposition. What the world saw in Georgia was a badly outdated arsenal, one that would take many years to replace - even assuming the country could afford the $200 billion cost.

Something even larger is blocking Russia's march. Recent decades, most notably since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, have seen an appalling deterioration in the health of the Russian population, anchoring Russia not in the forefront of developed countries but among the most backward of nations.

Much more at The Washington Post.

Continue reading "The Bear: Mission Accomplished Moment?" »

Continue reading "Saturday's Great Escape" »

For those with Army Knowledge Online (AKO) access check out the completed research on the Research and Analysis page of the Urban Warfare Analysis Center (UWAC). A relatively new organization, UWAC prides itself on its “fusion” approach to research and analysis:

The UWAC Analysis Team utilizes a fusion cell approach to foster innovation and collaboration. In contrast to the old “stovepipe” approach in which information and expertise is rarely shared across teams, the fusion cell model brings together people with diverse experiences and skill sets. Thus, the two main ingredients for the creation of innovative ideas – collaboration and multidisciplinary expertise – are both captured.

The UWAC team is comprised of three disciplines – military specialists, technology experts, and social science analysts – to produce research and analysis across multiple functional areas.

UWAC participated in a USJFCOM / USMC project I worked on earlier this year in my “day job” and provided top-notch support. Here is a listing of their current urban operations related products:

• Implications of Iranian Media in Iraq
• Using Ocean Waves to Power Port Cities during Stability Operations
• Islamification of the Chechen Wars
• Virtual Worlds and Terrorist Attack Planning
• How a Boy Becomes a Martyr - The Dangers of Web 2.0 Technology
• Weapons Review: SCAR
• Aquaponic Technology in Urban Operations
• Virtual Worlds and Money Laundering
• Web 2.0 and Enemy Recruitment
• Impact of Off-the-Shelf Global Telecommunications Technology
• Urban Jihad: Militant Exploitation of the Koran
• Lessons Learned From the Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006
• How the Iranian Media Help Build Support for Hezbollah
• Virtual Worlds and their Implications for Urban Warfare
• Hezbollah's Use of Arab Media to Galvanize Support
• Iran’s Evolving Urban Warfare Doctrine
• Cell Phone Use by Insurgents in Iraq
• Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq: Assessment and Outlook
• Sistani’s Future Role in Iraq
• Suicide Bombings in Urban Warfare: Trends in Motives and Targets
• Attacking Urban Insurgents: Choking Off the Money Supply
• Influence Operations in Iraq: Discussion Paper for JUW08 War Game
• Information Operations: Lessons from Private Marketing Companies on Cultural Awareness
• Text Messaging by Insurgents and Terrorists: A Potent Force Multiplier
• Tamil Tigers: Trendsetters of Urban Suicide Bombings Pursuing Airborne Capabilities
• Virtual Worlds and Enemy Attack Planning
• Emerging Nanotechnologies for Urban Warfare: Piezoelectric Devices
• Influence Operations: Print-on-Demand Printing
• Case Study of Urban Warfare: Compilation of Lessons Learned from the Chechen Wars
• Nanotechnology in Urban Operations: Overview of Capabilities and the Way Forward
• Emerging Nanotechnologies for Urban Warfare: Shear Thickening Fluids
• Contract Airborne Surveillance Support to Balkan Urban Operations
• Case Study: U.S. Marines in Beirut (1982-1984)
• Urban Warfare: Learning Best Practices on Biometrics from Casino Operations
• Emerging Technologies for Urban Warfare: Radio Frequency Identification – Tracking the Possibilities
• Emerging Technologies for Urban Warfare: New Carbon Fibers to Produce Stronger, Lighter Body Armor
• Urban IED Threat in Somalia
• Sun Tzu and Modern Urban Warfare
• West Africa: Drug Trade and Communication Schemes
• Colombia's Counterdrug Operations
• Emerging Technologies for Urban Warfare: Nanotechnology and Battlefield Medical Care

Not bad for a young organization.

Continue reading "Urban Warfare Analysis Center" »

Sean Naylor of Army Times reports that General David Petraeus is planning to form a team of under 100 experts to conduct a top-to-bottom strategic assessment of US Central Command’s area of responsibility.

Petraeus tapped Col. (P) H.R. McMaster to lead the Joint Strategic Assessment Team, or JSAT, according to multiple sources.

McMaster is widely regarded as one of the Army’s most capable officers. He is the author of Dereliction of Duty, an examination of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s performance during the Vietnam War, and he commanded the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tal Afar in western Iraq, a deployment that came to be seen as a model of how to conduct counterinsurgency at the local level.

The team will include people from government, the military and academia.

Petraeus takes charge at CentCom on Oct. 31 and the JSAT will begin its work immediately thereafter.

Sources said the work would likely be completed in February.

General Petraeus, along with Ambassador Ryan Crocker, utilized a JSAT in 2007 that contributed much to the creation of the classified Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq. Among other recommendations the JSAT provided the framework for a new population-centric counterinsurgency strategy intended to provide a bridge for the Iraqi government and security forces to eventual handover of day to day political and security functions.

Michael Gordon of the New York Times and Ann Scott Tyson of the Washington Post reported on JSAT efforts in US Is Seen in Iraq Until at Least ’09 and New Strategy for War Stresses Iraqi Politics, respectively.

The overarching aim of the plan, which sets goals for the end of this year and the end of 2008, is more political than military: to negotiate settlements between warring factions in Iraq from the national level down to the local level. In essence, it is as much about the political deals needed to defuse a civil war as about the military operations aimed at quelling a complex insurgency, said officials with knowledge of the plan.

The groundwork for the campaign plan was laid out in an assessment formulated by Petraeus's senior counterinsurgency adviser, David J. Kilcullen, with about 20 military officers, State Department officials and other experts in Baghdad known as the Joint Strategic Assessment Team. Their report, finished last month, was approved by Petraeus and Crocker as the basis of a formal campaign plan that will assign specific tasks for military commands and civilian agencies in Iraq.

The plan anticipates keeping US troop levels elevated into next year but also intends to significantly increase the size of the 144,000-strong Iraqi army, considered one of the more reliable institutions in the country and without which a US withdrawal would spell chaos. "You will have to do something about the sucking noise when we leave," said a US officer familiar with the plan.

The plan has three pillars to be carried out simultaneously -- in contrast to the prior sequential strategy of "clear, hold and build." One shifts the immediate emphasis of military operations away from transitioning to Iraqi security forces -- the primary focus under the former top US commander, Gen. George W. Casey Jr. -- toward protecting Iraq's population in trouble areas, a central objective of the troop increase that President Bush announced in January.

"The revised counterinsurgency approach we're taking now really focuses on protecting those people 24/7 . . . and that competent non-sectarian institutions take the baton from us," said Kilcullen, offering an overview of the campaign plan.

With mounting pressure to "get Afghanistan under control" - and many pundits and politicians advocating an Iraq-like "surge" of US and NATO troops into that country - the formation of a Central Command JSAT is very good news. A critical counterinsurgency lesson learned (and at times unlearned) is one size does not fit all and while a new strategy may include a substantial increase in ground combat forces circumstances warrant a comprehensive approach based on factors peculiar to Afghanistan.

Moreover, JSAT recommendations for Afghanistan must be an integral part of a regional strategy that includes Pakistan and India - as Dr. T.X. Hammes rightly argues in his recent Small Wars Journal blog post - The Good War?

Even worse, to date, the candidates are discussing only Afghanistan without mentioning Pakistan or India. Yet both these Southwest Asian nations are much more critical to the United States future than Afghanistan. Neither candidate has questioned the wisdom of bombing, and likely destabilizing Pakistan, a nuclear-armed nation of almost 170 million people, in order to help our security efforts in Afghanistan. Nor has there been a discussion whether dedicating more resources to Afghanistan is more effective than dedicating different but equivalent resources to support Pakistan. This is despite the fact that 80% of the supplies for the forces we have in Afghanistan come by road directly through one of the least stable parts of Pakistan. In short, if Pakistan destabilizes we probably lose in Afghanistan – the converse is not true.

Yet, our position in Afghanistan appears to be largely shaping our policy toward Pakistan. And our actions in Pakistan inevitably have a major impact on our relationship with India -- a rising nation destined to be the most important of the three.

We entered Afghanistan to destroy Al Qaeda’s operating forces and eliminate its training bases. We successfully eliminated the bases and hurt Al Qaeda badly. One reason often given for our presence in Afghanistan is that we must stabilize it as a nation so that Al Qaeda can never use it as a terrorist base again. Unfortunately, Al Qaeda has moved its forces and its bases into Pakistan. The subsequent conflict inside Pakistan is contributing to increasing instability in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and has greatly increased the strain on the Pakistani government.

Before we rush more troops into Afghanistan, we must answer basic questions about our strategy for the region and how our efforts in Afghanistan support that strategy. Good tactics and more troops are not a substitute for a strategy – and in fact can significantly raise the cost of a bad strategy.

While not mentioned by T.X., Iran shares a border and long history with Afghanistan and if recent reporting holds true is increasingly taking an active role in supporting the Taliban.

For additional background on the Iraq JSAT and the issues facing decision-makers in 2007 see The New Yorker's The General's Dilemma by Steve Coll, Newsweek Magazine's Brainiac Brigade by Babak Dehghanpisheh and John Barry, and Dave Kilcullen's posts here at Small Wars Journal (scroll down to 2007 entries).

Continue reading "Joint Strategic Assessment Team II" »

SWJ was very fortunate to have worked with Colonel Steve Boylan, officially and off-line, during his tour as the chief spokesman for General Dave Petraeus at Multi-National Force – Iraq. Short and sweet – Steve is the consummate professional and it has been our pleasure, both professionally and personally. Paul Bedard has a short piece up at US News and World Report’s Washington Whispers blog on what’s next for COL Boylan:

Colonel Steven Boylan, who has been the chief spokesman for Army General David Petraeus since 2006, has declined to travel with the four-star general when he moves from Baghdad to Tampa, Fla., in October to take over the helm of the US Central Command. "The family had a vote, and they voted to stay in Kansas," Boylan tells Whispers. He'll return to Fort Leavenworth, where he first hooked up with Petraeus when the general ran the US Army Combined Arms Center and wrote the new doctrine for defeating an insurgency. Boylan traveled with Petraeus to Baghdad, leaving the family in Kansas.

From SWJ – thanks Steve and wishing you and yours the best in your next assignment as well as fair winds and following seas wherever your travels may take you.

Nothing follows.

Continue reading "Fair Winds and Following Seas - Job Well Done" »

Sometimes I just have to shake my head and wonder out loud (in this case blog) what the hell are they thinking? In this case the “they” is the readership of Phil Carter’s Intel Dump over at The Washington Post.

Intel Dump has always offered up first-rate discussion and analysis on foreign policy and national security issues – even when you disagree with a particular point of view expressed by Phil or a guest blogger you come away smarter for having read the postings.

Phil is on sabbatical (working on the Obama campaign) but he did manage to reel in an all star lineup of guest bloggers to fill the void – and that’s just what they have been doing – in spades – great posts on Iraq and Afghanistan (where we are, how we got there and what we need to do), Bacevich's The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism, seapower and power projection, supporting our deployed civilians as well as the military and more. Posts that make you think.

What has me wondering out loud this Sunday morning is these 16 posts garnered a total of 157 comments from Intel Dump readership - and not all of those are exactly on-topic. A 17th posting by Bob Bateman concerning Chuck Norris’ appearance on Larry King Live has racked up 189 comments (at 1045).

Have we descended that far into partisan politics and celebrity infatuation? Is public discussion on serious and important issues in these times of dynamic political, foreign policy and national security flux impossible? Judging by these comments maybe it is.

Nothing follows.

Continue reading "By the Numbers" »

A big supporter and great friend of SWJ has some news - his wife has written a novel - Tethered by Amy MacKinnon - that is receiving great reviews. Check it out at Jules Crittenden's Forward Movement.

Congrats to Amy and Jules!

Continue reading "Off Topic, But..." »

Who said Army doctrine writers don't have a sense of humor? Well - okay - but this brought a smile to our small mugs. Kudos CADD and a hat tip to LTC Shawn Stroud for sending this along.

Continue reading "Oprah in Camouflage?" »

One of our favorite war correspondents provides a detailed background on the origins of "The Surge" - Troop ‘Surge’ Took Place Amid Doubt and Debate by Michael Gordon, New York Times.

When President Bush speaks to the Republican convention on Monday, he is expected to tout the “surge” of forces in Iraq as one of his proudest achievements. But that decision, one of his most consequential as commander in chief, was made only after months of tumultuous debate within the administration, according to still-secret memorandums and interviews with a broad range of current and former officials.

In January 2007, at a time when the situation in Iraq appeared the bleakest, Mr. Bush chose a bold option that was at odds with what many of his civilian and military advisers, including his field commander, initially recommended. Mr. Bush’s plan to send more than 20,000 troops to carry out a new counterinsurgency strategy has helped to reverse the spiral of sectarian killings in Iraq.

But Mr. Bush’s penchant to defer to commanders in the field and to a powerful defense secretary delayed the development of a new approach until conditions in Iraq, in the words of a November 2006 analysis by the Central Intelligence Agency, resembled anarchy and “civil war.” ...

In the end, the troop reinforcement proposal split the military. Even after the president had made the basic decision to send additional troops, Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the top American commander in Iraq, never sought more than two brigades, about 8,000 troops in all, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates reported to Mr. Bush in late December. But General Casey’s approach substantially differed from those of two officers who wanted a much bigger effort: the No. 2 commander in Iraq, Lt. Gen Raymond T. Odierno, and Gen. David H. Petraeus, who helped oversee the military’s new counterinsurgency manual and whose views were known by the White House before he was publicly named to replace General Casey, administration officials said.

Current and former officials from the Bush administration and the military agreed to disclose new details about the debate over the troop increase in response to repeated requests. Most insisted on anonymity because the documents were still classified, but said they believed the historical record should reflect the considerations that were being weighed at the time...

Much more at The New York Times.

Continue reading "Troop ‘Surge’ Took Place Amid Doubt and Debate " »

IRAQ

The Iraq Decisions That the Next President, Whether It’s Obama or McCain, Will Face: In a new book, war correspondent Linda Robinson also assesses the performance of Gen. David Petraeus - Linda Robinson, US News and World Report

As this nation prepares to elect a new president, there is a sense that America's involvement in Iraq has turned a corner. Much of the credit for the diminished bloodshed and the prospects for political progress has gone to the US commander, Gen. David Petraeus, who leaves Iraq next month to take up expanded regional responsibilities as head of US Central Command. In her new book, Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq, former US News Senior Writer Linda Robinson draws on 11 reporting trips to Iraq and extensive interviews with Petraeus and his team to document the evolution of American actions in Iraq. She offers recommendations on how to move forward in Iraq.

By June 2008, Iraq was calmer than it had been since April 2004. The war was not over, but it clearly had reached a new stage. When Gen. David Petraeus took command a year and a half earlier, Iraq was on fire. The majority in the United States believed there was no way to avoid an ignominious defeat such as America had not suffered in a quarter century. Petraeus, with the help of many others, pulled Iraq back from the brink of civil war and created an opportunity for the next administration to bring the war to a soft landing.

Accomplishing that will not be easy, but what had seemed inconceivable to most onlookers in 2006 is now distinctly possible—if the 44th American president has the fortitude and wisdom to capitalize on what has been achieved. The new president has the great advantage of starting with a clean slate and no special relationships or past commitments. He can adopt a new policy that builds on the successes achieved in 2007 and 2008 and provides the critical missing ingredients that can be supplied only by presidential authority. The basic conceptual change needed is to shift the paradigm from war-making to peacemaking and to elevate achievement of the elusive political solution to be the policy's central goal.

More at US News and World Report.

AFGHANISTAN

The Taliban ‘Advance’: No Time To Wobble - Paul Smyth, Head, Operational Studies, Military Sciences Department, RUSI

The ambush and the loss of French soldiers in Afghanistan may well be described as a tactical setback if not defeat, but at a strategic level, the insurgents are nowhere near victorious.

This week’s violent encounter in Afghanistan’s Surobi district is a timely example of how a tactical event can have strategic impact. In this case, it brought a Head of State rushing to Kabul and it generated some unscheduled messages of France’s clear determination to support the ISAF mission, an outcome which some may say, cannot be seen as a Taliban victory.

For the families, friends and colleagues of the ten dead and twenty-one wounded French soldiers, the incident was an obvious tragedy of enduring effect. Every casualty in Afghanistan causes personal suffering and, in an expeditionary intervention that is based on choice not national survival, major losses inevitably raise questions which cast doubt on the purpose, validity and future of the endeavour. But without wishing to dismiss the reality of bereavement, when making strategic decisions of international importance, government leaders and military commanders must be beware of placing undue emphasis on the genuine heartbreak that can accompany their policy choices. For although it is true that some tactical events have strategic impact, it is a gross error to assume that all tactical incidents hold strategic relevance.

More at RUSI.

Continue reading "Iraq and Afghanistan" »

Farewell to an American Hero - Joe Galloway, McClatchy Newspapers

For the better part of 60 years, two old Army pilots who loved each other argued over many a meal and drink as to which of them was the second best pilot in the world.

The two shared the cockpits of old Beaver prop planes and Huey helicopters; they shared rooms in military hooches all over the world; they shared a love of practical and impractical jokes and they shared an undying love of flying and soldiers and the Army.

They also shared membership in a very small and revered fraternity of fewer than 105 men who are entitled to wear around their necks the light blue ribbon and gold pointed star that is the Medal of Honor, America’s highest decoration for heroism above and beyond the call of duty.

Their story was told in a book my buddy Lt. Gen. Hal Moore and I wrote 15 years ago titled "We Were Soldiers Once... and Young" and in the Mel Gibson movie, "We Were Soldiers," released in the spring of 2002. Too Tall and Old Snake were ably portrayed in the movie.

Their argument over which of them is the Best Pilot in the Whole World sadly came to an end this week when our friend and comrade-in-arms Maj. Ed (Too Tall to Fly) Freeman slipped the surly bonds of earth and headed off to Fiddler’s Green, where the souls of departed cavalrymen gather by dispensation of God Himself.

More at McClatchy Newspapers.

After Action Report, IA DRANG Valley - LTC Hal Moore
LZ X-Ray - More about LZ X-ray and LZ-Albany
LZ X-Ray - Battle Overview
We Were Soldiers - Joe Galloway's Photos

Continue reading "Our Loss, Fiddler's Green Gain" »

For SWJ – a perfect storm – outstanding recent releases by authors who are “Small Wars Journal friends”. Each have offered up original material to SWJ and / or provided moral support. For a niche Internet site we are humbled that these acknowledged experts have extended their support to SWJ.

Baghdad at Sunrise - Peter Mansoor

This compelling book presents an unparalleled record of what happened after US forces seized Baghdad in the spring of 2003.

The Strongest Tribe - Bing West

From a universally respected combat journalist, a gripping history based on five years of front-line reporting about how the war was turned around–and the choice now facing America.

Tell Me How This Ends - Linda Robinson

After a series of disastrous missteps in its conduct of the war, the White House in 2006 appointed General David Petraeus as the Commanding General of the coalition forces. Tell Me How This Ends is an inside account of his attempt to turn around a failing war.

We Are Soldiers Still - Hal Moore and Joe Galloway

In their stunning follow-up to the classic bestseller We Were Soldiers Once... and Young, Lt. Gen. Hal Moore and Joe Galloway return to Vietnam and reflect on how the war changed them, their men, their enemies, and both countries - often with surprising results.

Pete, Bing, Linda, Joe – Again, we are humbled and grateful for your support – congratulations on your contribution to understanding the critical issues that will define and shape our nation’s future.

Job well done!

Continue reading "Books You Should be Reading" »

In February SWJ posted an entry “Are We Ready for Hybrid Wars?”

From that post: This new model argues that future conflicts will blur the distinction between war and peace, combatants and noncombatants.

Rather than distinct modes of war, we will face “Hybrid Wars” that are a combination of traditional warfare mixed with terrorism and insurgency.

Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, by Frank Hoffman, summarizes the background and analysis of the changing character of warfare in our time.

Examining the debate over the past decade about the evolution of modern warfare in the post Cold-war world, several thinkers have claimed that we were in the midst of a “Revolution in Warfare.” Hoffman takes this discussion to a new and much more mature level by recognizing that we are entering a time when multiple types of warfare will be used simultaneously by flexible and sophisticated adversaries. These adversaries understand that successful conflict takes on a variety of forms that are designed to fit one’s goals at that particular time - identified as “Hybrid Wars” in Conflict in the 21st Century.

Hoffman notes that it is too simplistic to merely classify conflict as “Big and Conventional” versus “Small or Irregular.” Today’s enemies, and tomorrow’s, will employ combinations of warfare types…

This short roundup – more of a compilation of hybrid threat and environment items - revisits this issue for several reasons. The assumption that our future adversary will employ multiple types of warfare simultaneously - state or non-state- is gaining traction amongst those charged to develop concepts, doctrine and capabilities to confront future threats – and – regardless of traction and the trend for the buzz-word crowd (see EBO) to be temporarily enamored with the latest – well, buzzword – hybrid is exactly what we will encounter on the battlefields of the 21st Century.

There is much work to be done in regards to maturing the concept of hybrid wars and the threat associated with that environment. And, much like the current and potential hybrid threat adapts to counter our efforts; we must be honest, adaptive and creative as we push through defining the national security and foreign policy capabilities required to defeat this threat. It won’t be easy – but it is a critical necessity. So now I’ll get off my SWJ soapbox and offer up several items regarding hybrid war and enjoin our readership to add to the discourse...

Continue reading "Are We Ready for Hybrid Wars? - Revisited" »

The SWJ news roundup will be taking several new turns and twists over the next several weeks to months as we attempt to fit in a very time intensive effort (read - takes mom and pop away from other SWJ tasks) with readership suggestions and comments (often 180 out from one another) as well as finding time for planned site upgrades and attending to the ever increasing article and blog submissions by site visitors - all while making time for day jobs and family…

For the time being we will be highlighting what we consider “overarching” news articles, opinion pieces, blog items and studies in shorter roundups – with a bit of narrative - or in separate individual blog entries – with a concentration on foreign affairs and national security issues we feel important enough to share with the Small Wars Journal Community of Interest. Please feel free to send us pointers to those items we miss – thanks much.

Continue reading "On the SWJ Daily News Roundup" »

How The Surge Worked by Peter Mansoor, Washington Post, 10 August 2008.

Pete Mansoor served as General David Petraeus's executive officer at Multi-National Force - Iraq from February 2007 to May 2008. He holds the General Raymond Mason Chair of Military History at Ohio State University and is the author of the forthcoming book "Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander's War in Iraq."

Mansoor is also the founding director of the US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Under his leadership, the Counterinsurgency Center helped to revise the final version of the new Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, which was published jointly by the Army and Marine Corps in December 2006. This document was the first revision of US counterinsurgency operations in more than 20 years, incorporating lessons learned during conflicts throughout the 20th and 21st centuries.

In 2003-04, Mansoor served as Commander of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, in Iraq, which was responsible for security and stability in the Rusafa and Adhamiya districts of Baghdad, an area of 195 square kilometers and 2.1 million people. After the April 2004 uprising of militia loyal to the Shiite cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr, Mansoor’s brigade combat team restored the holy city of Karbala to coalition control within three weeks, an operation that earned the organization a Presidential Unit Citation for collective valor in combat.

Pete Mansoor on The Surge (italicized emphasis SWJ):

Given the divisive debate over the Iraq war, perhaps it was inevitable that the accomplishments of the recently concluded "surge" would become shrouded in the fog of 30-second sound bites. Too often we hear that the dramatic security improvement in Iraq is due not to the surge but to other, unrelated factors and that the positive developments of the past 18 months have been merely a coincidence.

To realize how misleading these assertions are, one must understand that the "surge" was more than an infusion of reinforcements into Iraq. Of greater importance was the change in the way US forces were employed starting in February 2007, when Gen. David Petraeus ordered them to position themselves with Iraqi forces out in neighborhoods. This repositioning was based on newly published counterinsurgency doctrine that emphasized the protection of the population and recognized that the only way to secure people is to live among them...

The arrival of additional US forces signaled renewed resolve. Sunni tribal leaders, having glimpsed the dismal future in store for their people under a regime controlled by al-Qaeda in Iraq and fearful of abandonment, were ready to throw in their lot with the coalition. The surge did not create the first of the tribal "awakenings," but it was the catalyst for their expansion and eventual success. The tribal revolt took off after the arrival of reinforcements and as US and Iraqi units fought to make the Iraqi people secure...

The Iraq war is not over, but our war effort is on a firmer foundation. In the end, the Iraqis, appropriately, will determine their future. The surge has created the space and time for the competition for power and resources in Iraq to play out in the political realm, with words instead of bombs. Success is not guaranteed, but such an outcome would be a fitting tribute to the sacrifices of the men and women of Multi-National Force-Iraq and their ongoing efforts, along with their Iraqi partners, to turn around a war that was nearly lost less than two years ago.

More at The Washington Post.

Update: The Importance of The Surge - Max Boot, Contentions

By now the improvement in conditions in Iraq is undeniable. But opponents of the surge are still loath to give credit where it’s due. Too often we hear that the “surge” was just one factor among many–and not necessarily the most important–in the improving security situation. Other factors are often cited, including the Sunni Awakening, the growing size and effectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces, and Moqtada al Sadr’s retreat. Those other developments are real and important, but they would not have been game-changers were it not for the additional influx of American soldiers and a change of strategy in how they were employed.

Flashback: Don't Confuse the "Surge" with the Strategy - Dave Kilcullen, Small Wars Journal, 19 January 2007

Much discussion of the new Iraq strategy centers on the “surge” to increase forces in-theater by 21,500 troops. I offer no comment on administration policy here. But as counterinsurgency professionals, it should be clear to us that focusing on the “surge” misses what is actually new in the strategy - its population-centric approach...

What matters here is not the size of forces (though the strategy will not work without a certain minimum force size), but rather their tasks. The key element of the plan, as outlined in the President’s speech, is to concentrate security forces within Baghdad, to secure the local people where they live. Troops will operate in small, local groups closely partnered with Iraqi military and police units, with each unit permanently assigned to an area and working its “beat”.

This is different from early strategies which were enemy-centric (focusing on killing insurgents), or more recent approaches that relied on training and supporting Iraqi forces and expected them to secure the population.

The new strategy reflects counterinsurgency best practice as demonstrated over dozens of campaigns in the last several decades: enemy-centric approaches that focus on the enemy, assuming that killing insurgents is the key task, rarely succeed. Population-centric approaches, that center on protecting local people and gaining their support, succeed more often.

The extra forces are needed because a residential, population-centric strategy demands enough troops per city block to provide real and immediate security. It demands the ability to “flood” areas, and so deter enemy interference with the population. This is less like conventional warfare, and more like a cop patrolling a beat to prevent violent crime.

This does not mean there will be less fighting indeed, there will probably be more in the short-term, as security forces get in at the grass-roots level and compete for influence with insurgents, sectarian militias and terrorist gangs. But the aim is different: in the new strategy what matters is providing security and order for the population, rather than directly targeting the enemy – though this strategy will effectively marginalize them...

Nothing follows.

Continue reading "Mansoor on The Surge (Updated)" »

I’m a cautious book buyer, normally waiting several weeks to months after a book has been released to get the low down on whether I really want a particular item for my personal library. I just made an exception and preordered Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander's War in Iraq by Colonel Peter Mansoor. I can’t imagine anything by COL Mansoor being less than outstanding and figure the pre-release reviewers (an impressive list at that) can’t be all wrong.

From the Amazon.com Baghdad at Sunrise page:

This compelling book presents an unparalleled record of what happened after U.S. forces seized Baghdad in the spring of 2003. Army Colonel Peter R. Mansoor, the on-the-ground commander of the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division—the “Ready First Combat Team”—describes his brigade’s first year in Iraq, from the sweltering, chaotic summer after the Ba’athists’ defeat to the transfer of sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government a year later. Uniquely positioned to observe, record, and assess the events of that fateful year, Mansoor now explains what went right and wrong as the U.S. military confronted an insurgency of unexpected strength and tenacity.

Drawing not only on his own daily combat journal but also on observations by embedded reporters, news reports, combat logs, archived e-mails, and many other sources, Mansoor offers a contemporary record of the valor, motivations, and resolve of the 1st Brigade and its attachments during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Yet this book has a deeper significance than a personal memoir or unit history. Baghdad at Sunrise provides a detailed, nuanced analysis of U.S. counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, and along with it critically important lessons for America’s military and political leaders of the twenty-first century.

Frederick W. Kagan, American Enterprise Institute

"This book will be read by students at military academies and war colleges for years to come. It also speaks to general readers interested in Iraq, in the voices of our soldiers, and in understanding the problems we faced and those we created, without the hyperbole and politicization of most first-person accounts of the early years of this conflict."

Conrad Crane, lead author of the Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency

"This is the best personal memoir of the Iraq War that I have seen."

General David H. Petraeus, US Army, Commanding General, Multi-National Force - Iraq

"Baghdad at Sunrise is a masterful account of command in counterinsurgency operations. Colonel Peter Mansoor''s superb description of his brigade''s experiences during our first year in Iraq is a must read for soldiers, scholars, and policymakers, alike-and all would do well to examine the lessons he draws from his experiences."

Colonel H. R. McMaster, US Army, author of Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam

"A moving, insightful, and unique account of a combat brigade''s experience in Iraq crafted by a gifted soldier-historian-a must-read for anyone who wants to understand how the U.S. military is coping with counterinsurgency warfare in the 21st century."

Thomas E. Ricks, military correspondent, The Washington Post, and author of Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq

"The Iraq war has produced many good books by sergeants and lieutenants, but few notable memoirs by senior officers. Finally, in Baghdad at Sunrise, Colonel Mansoor gives us an account of a year''s combat in the Iraqi capital as seen by a brigade commander. What''s more, he brings the eye of a trained historian to the task. He is candid about both the successes and the failures of the U.S. military. Read it."

Williamson Murray, author of A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War

"Colonel Mansoor has provided us with an exceptional memoir from mid-level of the tragic course of post-conflict operations in Iraq. It represents an account by a first-rate soldier and perceptive historian that is a must read for anyone interested in what really happened."

Preorder Baghdad Sunrise at Amazon.com.

Hardcover: 432 pages
Publisher: Yale University Press (September 15, 2008)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 030014069X
ISBN-13: 978-0300140699

Continue reading "Baghdad at Sunrise (Bumped)" »

Gates's Next Mission - David Ignatius, Washington Post opinion

Defense Secretary Bob Gates has been talking recently about how to rebuild America's national security architecture so that it fits the 21st century. The next president should think about assigning Gates to fix what he rightly says is broken.

Gates is an anomaly in this lame-duck administration. He is still firing on all cylinders, working to repair the damage done at the Pentagon by his arrogant and aloof predecessor, Donald Rumsfeld. Gates has restored accountability in the military services by firing the secretaries of the Army and Air Force when they failed to respond forthrightly to problems. And he has been an early and persuasive internal administration critic of US military action against Iran.

Amazingly for a defense secretary, Gates has been arguing against the "creeping militarization" of foreign policy. In a speech last month, he urged more funding for the State Department and other civilian agencies, saying they have been "chronically undermanned and underfunded for far too long." In Washington, that's almost unheard of -- sticking your neck out for the other guy -- and it's one reason Gates's reputation has been steadily rising...

More to include a proposal for a 'Gates Commission' to revise the basic framework of the National Security Act of 1947.

Nothing follows.

Continue reading "Ignatius on Gates" »

The 2008 Warlord Loop Reading List

Introduction and reading list posted here with permission of the author and Proceedings.

John M. Collins began to amass military experience when he enlisted in the Army as a private in 1942. Thirty years and three wars later, in 1972, he retired as a colonel. He spent the next quarter century as the leading analyst on military and defense issues at the Congressional Research Service. Seven years ago, he established the Warlord Loop, a by-invitation-only e-mail forum that fosters voluminous, freewheeling exchanges seven days a week. Resultant brainstorming is roughly equivalent to a graduate education in national security at no cost save time expended.

The Warlord Loop’s current reading list features two books apiece that a cross section of 300 cosmopolitan members believe would best enable practitioners at every level to prepare for an uncertain future and concurrently help concerned citizens understand salient issues.

This compilation differs from countless competitive lists because contributors include civilian national security specialists along with Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard representatives who range in rank from NCO stripes to four-stars. Males, females, liberals, conservatives, Republicans, Democrats, and nonpartisans touch every point on the public opinion spectrum.

One note – My two selections were The Village by Bing West and Fiasco by Tom Ricks. Apparently during the editing process, The Village was replaced with Dreams and Shadows by Robin Wright – a fine book I’m sure – but not one that I’ve had the opportunity to read just yet.

Continue on to the 2008 Warlord Loop Reading List.

Nothing follows.

Continue reading "The 2008 Warlord Loop Reading List" »

I've not had the time to visit and / or fully read my favorite blogs of late. That said here are some items from just a few sites as well as a SWJ Daily News Roundup item that I thought warranted special attention here.

The Last Battle by Michael Gordon at The New York Times

... Over the previous few years, my own trips through Iraq had focused mostly on the US and Iraqi governments’ struggle with Sunni insurgents in battlegrounds like Mosul, Baquba, Hit and Arab Jabour. But the nature of the war has fundamentally changed. The American “surge,” together with a strategy that emphasized protecting civilians and engaging with Sunni tribesmen, weakened Sunni insurgents and jihadists. The bitter fighting between Shiites and Sunnis that turned Baghdad into a killing ground of car bombs, suicide attacks and mutilated corpses has quieted down. And now this sectarian struggle has been eclipsed by a growing tussle for power among the Shiites themselves. The competition involves Prime Minister Maliki and the Shiite religious parties (the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and Maliki’s Dawa Party) that constitute the ruling hierarchy in Baghdad; Moktada al-Sadr’s weakened but still-popular political movement and its military wing, the Jaish al-Mahdi, or Mahdi Army; and, increasingly, Shiite tribes.

The tug of war among the religious parties and the Shiite tribes has emerged as one of the most-significant but also least-understood aspects of Iraq’s political scene. It pits leaders from the Shiite core of Maliki’s coalition against outsiders looking for a way in. It is a struggle between party officials who spent the Saddam years in exile, mostly in Iran, and tribal leaders who endured his rule at home - and, on another level, a contest between urbanized Shiites, who lean more toward the religious parties and Sadr’s movement, and agrarian Iraqis, whose loyalties lie more in tribal society. Significantly, it is also a rivalry between Shiites who favor a government based on religious parties and those who have a more secular vision...

Much, much more - and discuss at Small Wars Council (Hat Tip MikeF).

Peacemaking is the Graduate Level of Strategic Discussion by Galrahn at Information Dissemination.

... When thinking about whether COIN is the graduate level of war, we ultimately decided that whether COIN is the graduate level of war or not is semantics, but what is relevant is that COIN represents the graduate level of strategic military discussions today.

The value of the COIN discussion is that its emphasis has required military thinkers to take a broader view of military strategy in a context outside of the Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, Fuller, etc.. wartime centric military strategy approaches. The COIN debate is part of a larger, and growing, military strategy debate towards peacemaking, or war prevention, and that is what makes it graduate level.

Why is this important? Because it has the effects of broadening the debates in other aspects of military strategy. An example would be the evolution of military strategy involving nuclear weapons from a broad position of MAD into a peace time strategy of escalation control and a wartime strategy of escalation dominance. I’m being general for the example, much intellectual rigor is still required in this and other schools of military strategy that connects the peacetime posture and wartime posture towards winning conclusions in military strategy....

RAND Terrorism Report Thrashes a Straw Man by Westhawk at his blog Westhawk.

... Seth Jones and Martin Libicki of RAND released a historical study of how terrorist movements end. Their examination of 648 terror groups that operated between 1968 and 2006 concluded that military force led to the end of terror groups in only seven percent of the cases. Political accommodation (43%) and police work (40%) were the most common techniques for ending terror campaigns.

The instant response of the mainstream media (for example, here) was to label the RAND report as an indictment of the Bush administration’s strategy against al Qaeda, a military campaign also known as The War on Terror.

Yet a closer examination of the RAND report shows it to be little more than easy smack-down of a straw man...

Messrs. Jones and Libicki must know that for at least two decades the FBI has made a major priority of expanding its liaison operations with foreign police services. And the RAND authors must also know about the Pentagon’s wide-ranging training and advisory efforts, not only in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in the Sahel, west Africa, southeast Asia, and Latin America. Rather than making themselves look foolish by calling for activities the US has already been doing for years, the authors might have critiqued these efforts instead...

Is the Islamic Army Going Back to the Mattresses? by Marc Lynch at Abu Aardvark.

It hasn't gotten any attention that I've noticed amidst the furor over the provincial election law and Kirkuk, but a few days ago the Emir of the Islamic Army of Iraq announced a new offensive against American bases and troops. This campaign was authorized, according to the very brief statement, because Iraq's fate must not be determined by occupiers or their agents. This follows on the heels of the announcement a few weeks ago by Jaysh al-Mujahideen that it was leaving those two coalitions, of which it was a founding member along with the Islamic Army, due to their failure to produce any political results.

Why does this matter? Because the Islamic Army is the core of the coalition of 'nationalist-jihadist' insurgency factions which have expressed interest in joining the political process (the Reform and Jihad Front, the Political Council of the Iraqi Resistance) and is one of the key factions believed to have joined up with the Awakenings Councils / Sons of Iraq in force. Its public break with the Islamic State of Iraq (AQI) in April 2007 was probably the most important turning point in the transformation of the Sunni insurgency.

This could very well just be a propaganda move, an attempt to rebuild some credibility and draw attention to their military capability. It may amount to nothing more than an upswing in videos of exploding hummers. But that could backfire upon them, since if attacks do not in fact begin to pick up, it could prove seriously damaging to the Islamic Army's remaining credibility and devalue them as interlocutors. I've already seen some mocking posts on other forums asking, essentially, "where's the beef?" ...

The Wrong Place by Richard Fernandez at The Belmont Club.

Two assertions about Iraq ought to be challenged or at least examined more closely. The first is the idea that security improvements in Iraq and al-Qaeda’s defeat had little if anything to do with the US effort. The second is the assertion that the “real” strategic center of gravity always should have been Afghanistan, because the proper object of the War is to “get bin Laden”.

Take the question of whether the growing success in Iraq had anything to do with US effort. Once violence in Iraq began to wane and al-Qaeda was clearly being defeated, the search to find a non-American explanation began in earnest. For a while it was fashionable to credit Moqtada al-Sadr’s “ceasefire” with improving conditions in Iraq...

A variant of the same narrative was that Iran had for reasons never fully explained, decided to let a defeated American army off the hook...

Still another line of argument was that the Anbar Awakening occurred prior to and independently of the Surge...

This discounts the effect of operations prior to the 20% increase in troop strength in Iraq that is commonly regarded as the start of the Surge. It discounts improvements in intelligence gathering, the creation of the Iraqi Army, the election of the Iraqi government, dismantling of the insurgency’s lines of communication of the insurgency, the change in tactics - a whole host of things - almost as if the Surge started from tabula rasa; a blank slate...

Rethinking Smith-Mundt: A Look Back at its Purpose by Matt Armstrong at MountainRunner.

Small Wars Journal just published my paper "Rethinking Smith-Mundt" in which I researched the historical record, scholarly books and articles and media reports surrounding the information activities portion of the US law commonly referred to as the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948. After two years (1946-1947) of debates, testimony, amendments and a European fact finding trip, the Act was passed in January 1948. The result was legislation that institutionalized America's international engagement. It mandated controls and oversight to improve the quality of America's international broadcasting and as well as cultural and educational exchanges. To the modern reader, the concerns of the 80th Congress are remarkably similar to those of the 110th, right down to the public statements. However, the 80th Congress had deeper concerns than today's Congress and managed to deal with a far more comprehensive package than being considered today.

The purpose of "Rethinking Smith-Mundt" is to see through the haze of misunderstanding surrounding the Act and understand its original intentions. These intentions were not to prohibit the role of government in information engagement but rather to enhance its role, though in very proscribed ways. In fact, the media and the private sector recognized and supported the notion that engaging the world required assets beyond their capacity. The prohibition against domestic dissemination of news by the State Department's (and later the the United States Information Agency, created five years after Smith-Mundt) was not an outright prohibition but rather an allocation of responsibilities that let private sector media do what it did best and governmental media do what it did best. The wall between public and private was far more porous than we imagine today, something that only becomes clear when we re-examine the debates surrounding the formulation and passage of the Act. Such a re-examination also reveals why such prohibitions are no longer needed today...

Nothing follows.

Continue reading "Sunday Evening Reads" »

I had the opportunity (and good fortune) to attend the Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare panel discussion Tuesday, 22 July, at the National Press Club in Washington, DC. The Center for Naval Analysis and Osprey Publishing sponsored this discussion on counterinsurgency featuring Dr. John Nagl (Center for a New American Security), Dr. Daniel Marston (Australian National University), and Dr. Carter Malkasian (CNA). They recently collaborated on Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (Osprey, 2008), an edited book that examines 13 of the most important counterinsurgency campaigns of the past 100 years, including the current Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. Dr. David Kilcullen (US State Department) moderated the discussion and provided critical commentary.

Speaking to a packed crowd in the main ballroom, the panel held court presenting a wide array of COIN theory, history and practice. I am about half through transcribing my notes from a recording I made of the event - but decided to go ahead and post this entry now as CNA was kind enough to provide an edited transcript.

As a partial introduction - here are my notes of Dr. John Nagl's opening statement on the importance of US Army Field Manual 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 33.3.5 - Counterinsurgency and how it filled a critical gap.

We were not prepared when the insurgency began in Iraq in 2003. We were trained and equipped to defeat a conventional enemy.

The Army’s unpreparedness dates back to its failure to internalize and learn the lessons of Vietnam. This led to a 40 year gap in counterinsurgency doctrine, education and doctrine. In 2003, US Army officers knew more about the American Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency.

The Army focused on winning short campaigns to topple unfriendly governments without considering the more difficult tasks required to rebuild friendly ones. Thus stunningly successful invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and of Iraq in early 2003 were triumphs without victory as stubborn insurgents stymied America's conventional military power.

As a result, we did not have all the equipment needed to protect our soldiers from time-honored insurgent tactics like roadside bombs, we had not trained our soldiers in understanding the key to success in counterinsurgency is protecting the population; nor had we empowered them with all the political, diplomatic, and linguistic skills they needed to accomplish that objective.

While there were many reasons why the Army was unprepared for the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, among the most important was the lack of current counterinsurgency doctrine when the campaigns began.

Doctrine is important to the American Army as it codifies both how the institution thinks about its role in the world and how it accomplishes that role on the battlefield. Doctrine drives decisions on how the Army should organize, what missions it should train to accomplish and what equipment it needs.

But then Lieutenant General David Petraeus became the Commander of the Army’s Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas in late 2005. He and his Marine Corps counterpart, then Lieutenant General James Mattis (Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command), decided to remedy that particular part of the problem. They worked together based on their shared understanding of the cognitive counterinsurgency and the urgent need to reform their services to make them more capable of conducting this most difficult type of war. One of the tools they chose to drive change in the Army and the Marine Corps was the new Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency doctrine (FM 3- 24 / MCWP 3-33.5). In a sheer stroke of genius, General Petraeus asked his old West Point classmate Conrad Crane to be the lead ‘pen’ on the project that became 3-24. Con’s role in this project has been underreported and underappreciated.

In Vietnam the Army did not learn one of the principles of counterinsurgency in time – we didn’t get it figured until the American people lost faith in the war effort. This time, the learning process happened much quicker. The driver and the beneficiary of that change was FM 3-24.

The book was designed both to help the Army and Marine Corps prepare for the next counterinsurgency campaign and was also designed to make substantive contributions to our ongoing efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Additional Links:

Senior Scholars Advise Next Steps in COIN- Wall Street Journal Market Watch

More Troops May Not Solve Afghanistan - Andrew Gray, Reuters

Afghanistan Needs Iraq Strategy - United Press International

Adviser: Iraq Approach Likely in Afghanistan - Sean Naylor, Army Times

Majority of Afghan Insurgents Not Taliban - Khalid Hasan, Daily Times

Continue reading "Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare" »

The New York Times ran an article today; 4,000 U.S. Combat Deaths, and Just a Handful of Images; concerning independent photojournalist Zoriah Miller. For those who have not been following this story, Miller was banned from his Marine Corps embed after posting images of Marines killed in a 26 June suicide attack on his blog. The Times reports that Major General John Kelly, Commanding General of Multi-National Force – West, made the call forbidding Miller from working in Marine Corps-controlled areas of Iraq.

While The Times article is generally sympathetic to Miller’s claim that General Kelly’s decision was “absolute censorship”

I took pictures of something they didn’t like, and they removed me. Deciding what I can and cannot document, I don’t see a clearer definition of censorship.

and evokes the now standard-issue Vietnam War comparison,

If the conflict in Vietnam was notable for open access given to journalists - too much, many critics said, as the war played out nightly in bloody newscasts - the Iraq war may mark an opposite extreme: after five years and more than 4,000 American combat deaths, searches and interviews turned up fewer than a half-dozen graphic photographs of dead American soldiers.

credit must be given to the authors, Michael Kamber and Tim Arango, for presenting the bottom-line concerning this dust-up (bolded emphasis by SWJ):

It is a complex issue, with competing claims often difficult to weigh in an age of instant communication around the globe via the Internet, in which such images can add to the immediate grief of families and the anger of comrades still in the field.

While the Bush administration faced criticism for overt political manipulation in not permitting photos of flag-draped coffins, the issue is more emotional on the battlefield: local military commanders worry about security in publishing images of the American dead as well as an affront to the dignity of fallen comrades. Most newspapers refuse to publish such pictures as a matter of policy.

But opponents of the war, civil liberties advocates and journalists argue that the public portrayal of the war is being sanitized and that Americans who choose to do so have the right to see - in whatever medium - the human cost of a war that polls consistently show is unpopular with Americans.

Those who know General Kelly will tell you – he is the consummate professional - and would not take such action lightly. As a commander in combat, responsible for the lives of thousands of US and Iraqi military personnel and civilians – as well as protecting the emotional well-being and privacy rights of the families of his Marines, he made a tough call – the right call.

Times have changed, this ain’t Vietnam, in this era of global instantaneous communication it would be foolish to cede the ‘war of ideas’ to our murderous adversaries by presenting them propaganda fodder, presenting those same murderers with near real-time “battlefield damage assessment” and assume away the notion that family members will never receive notification of a loved-ones death via an Internet image or blog post. This is just plain common sense as well as common decency.

Miller is a very talented photographer and should be admired for his courage to go in harm’s way in pursuit of his chosen profession. He should recognize that equally talented and courageous professionals are tasked with a responsibility well beyond that of an independent photojournalist – they make the day-to-day tough decisions and move on to other pressing matters. Miller and his cheerleaders should do likewise.

Continue reading "A Tough Call, the Right Call" »

... I am hooked on Information Dissemination - enough said.

Continue reading "Simply amazing..." »

Got the following in an e-mail today - will follow up here as I hope to get a spot on a Thursday teleconference with the author of the report...

(Links and emphasis by SWJ)

Dear Dave,

In a post about AFRICOM last year, you wrote: “Regardless of where you might stand on the value of establishing this new command, it is happening and we need to get it right.” Refugees International is releasing a report this Thursday, July 17 that lays out recommendations for the US to get AFRICOM right, and much of it has to do with the interagency collaboration you proposed.

The report also analyzes the ways in which US foreign aid in Africa—and the world over—is becoming increasingly militarized, in some cases to the detriment of long-term security and humanitarian and development investment. On Thursday, July 17 at 12pm ET, there will be a phone briefing on the report with the report’s author, Mark Malan, and Ken Bacon, President of Refugees International.

In the report, Mark Malan (Peace Building Program Manager for Refugees International and former head of research for Kofi Annan’s International Peacekeeping Centre in Ghana) asserts that AFRICOM is enabling the Department of Defense to take over funds that were previously managed by the State Department and USAID. For example, the percentage of Official Development Assistance that the Pentagon controls has skyrocketed from 3.5% to nearly 22% in the past decade, while the percentage controlled by USAID has shrunk from 65% to 40%.

The report argues Pentagon programs in Africa fund immediate, short-term security programs rather than the broader US commitment to aid the growth of prosperous, stable countries. For example, more than half of the FY09 requested budget for Foreign Military Financing in Africa is for just two countries – Djibouti and Ethiopia – that are considered key partners in the continental War on Terror. As a result, 17 African Union member states have refused to host AFRICOM operations on their soil, viewing the US agency as an occupying force rather than a solution to long-term stability and security needs.

In spite of AFRICOM’s drawbacks, however, Refugees International contends that AFRICOM could have an extremely positive impact on the region. A meaningful collaboration among the State Department, USAID and the Defense Department could kill three birds with one stone: help the US and African nations to fight terrorism, assist African countries with sustainable economic development, and build goodwill on the ground among humanitarian agencies, African legislators and civilians.

The report will be available for download at 12 am, July 17 at www.refugeesinternational.org.

Continue reading "Report: AFRICOM Criticized by Refugees International " »

From: GOMO
Sent: Tuesday, June 17, 2008 2:32 PM

Subject: CSA Sends - Transition Team Commanders (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE

CSA SENDS

Soldiers that serve on our Transition Teams (TTs) and our Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are developing exactly the type of knowledge, skills and abilities that are vital for our Army to be effective in an era of persistent conflict. These are tough, demanding positions and the members of these teams are required to influence indigenous or surrogate forces as they execute missions that are of vital interest to this Nation. The tasks associated with Transition Teams, from direct combat to stability operations, will be a major part of full spectrum engagement in theaters of interest now and for the foreseeable future. I want to ensure that the officers that lead these teams are recognized and given the credit they deserve.

I am directing that the Major's positions on these teams be immediately designated and codified in DA PAM 600-3, for all branches, as Key and Developmental (KD). Any officer holding one of these positions will be considered "KD" for his or her branch as a Major. Additionally, these officers will be afforded the opportunity, should they desire, to hold an additional 12/24 months of a branch specific KD position (e.g. XO, S-3, etc). Our promotion board guidance already stresses the importance of these positions and this additional information will be added to all upcoming board instructions. Additionally, because the success of these teams requires our best leaders, I have directed HRC to award Centralized Selection List (CSL) Credit for LTCs serving specifically in the TT Commander positions that have direct leadership responsibility for a training/transition team.

Therefore, we are creating a new CSL sub-category called "Combat Arms Operations". It will be open to all eligible officers in the Maneuver, Fires and Effects (MFE) branches and to Foreign Area Officers (FAO). It will fall under the Operations category and will be effective on the FY 10 CSL board which meets this September.

As a bridging strategy, for FY09 we will activate officers for these command positions from the alternate lists of all four major MFE command categories - Operations, Strategic Support, Training, and Installation. Officers accepting and who serve will be awarded CSL credit in the Operations category for serving as a Transition Team Commander. Additionally, if selected by the FY 10 CSL board, the officer may opt to command in the category they are selected after completion of their TT Command. Those that do command will receive credit for a second CSL command. If chosen, and they opt not to command, they will still receive credit for their TT command.

Our ability to train and operate effectively with indigenous forces will be a key element of 21st century land power. We need our best involved.

GEN Casey

-----

Discuss at Small Wars Council

Continue reading "Big Thumbs Up to General Casey" »

Christopher Griffin and Thomas Donnelly have a new study posted at the American Enterprise Institute on a very topical and very contentious issue - building the capabilities of our allies and security partners. In The Frontline Country Team: A Model for Engagement the authors provide a critique of the development and current practice of American security cooperation programs and a proposal for how they may be improved.

From the AEI synopsis:

For over sixty years, the United States has sought to build the capabilities of its allies and security partners. This is a mission that has accelerated since the terrorist attacks of September 2001, and it is one that any administration, be it Democratic or Republican, will inherit in January 2009. As a longstanding strategic goal, building partnership capacity has also dredged up a series of contradictions and conundrums for American policymaking, as officials attempt to foster governance without fueling dictatorships, engage "frontline states" without becoming enmeshed in their internal feuds, and manage the details of convoluted international partnerships from the confines of Washington. Resolving these contradictions--or at least mitigating them--is the principal ongoing challenge of American security cooperation programs.

In this report, we provide a critique of the development and current practice of American security cooperation programs, as well as a modest proposal for how they may be improved in the future. We find that many of the authorities and instruments for engagement already exist, but that they may be more effectively harnessed if leadership is devolved from Washington to the "frontline country team," in which the ambassador is responsible for coordinating and directing American policy. We argue that the country team is the point at which the rubber of American policy hits the road and where it will ultimately succeed or fail.

The Frontline Country Team: A Model for Engagement

Continue reading "The Frontline Country Team" »

What Rumsfeld Got Right - Robert Kaplan, The Atlantic

Rumsfeld, one former Pentagon official told me, saw Iraq’s degraded military as an easy target for our own; its destruction would provide a quick demonstration of American power, as well as get rid of the regional threat that the Iraqi regime constituted. No firm believer in democratic transformation, he probably assumed, as did many other people at the time, that any new regime in Baghdad, even a military one, would be a dramatic improvement, in strategic terms for the US and in human-rights terms for the Iraqis. Rather than a fear of chaos, what is more apparent at this stage is a certain complacency on Rumsfeld’s part. For example, he evidently did not challenge the personnel system’s choice of ground commander in post-invasion Iraq. The Army’s 5th Corps was slated to rotate out of Germany and into Iraq. Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the 5th Corps commander, and his staff, despite their service in Bosnia, had done little thinking about counterinsurgency. From that set of circumstances, a long trail of well-documented mistakes followed. In this and other cases, Rumsfeld, who is often accused of micromanaging, did not micromanage enough.

Kaplan on Rumsfeld - Max Boot, Contentions

Robert D. Kaplan, one of our most thoughtful and enterprising foreign correspondents, has an intriguing article in the Atlantic headlined, “What Rumsfeld Got Right.” He admits that the Rumsfeld legacy is not a good one, as seen in the worsening situation in Iraq and Afghanistan on his watch. But he tries to argue that Rumsfeld wasn’t wrong about everything. “Even before 9/11,” he writes, “Rumsfeld saw a new strategic landscape of manifest uncertainty, of fundamental and catastrophic surprise.” In responding to that changed environment, Rumsfeld moved tens of thousands of troops out of established bases in Europe and Asia

A Transformer in Disguise - Thomas Donnelly, Weekly Standard

Donald Rumsfeld's primary mission when he returned to the Pentagon as secretary of defense in 2001 was to transform the US military to meet the missions of the new century. Today it seems more likely that it is his successor, Robert Gates, who will leave the lasting legacy. It's not just the high-profile firings - Air Force secretary Michael Wynne and Chief of Staff Michael Moseley recently joined former Army secretary Francis Harvey, CENTCOM chief Admiral William Fallon, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace on the list of senior defense officials Gates has pushed out. Nor is it simply the critical promotions of General David Petraeus to replace Fallon and General Raymond Odierno to take Petraeus's place in Iraq. What these decisions reflect is Gates's larger purpose: to make the US military focus on the war they've got rather than the war they'd like to have. Though he's only been in the job for 18 months and will presumably be gone with the rest of the Bush administration next January, Gates has managed to push aside what he calls the "next-war-itis" that metastasized during Rumsfeld's reign and became almost as intractable a problem as al Qaeda or the Taliban. It wasn't supposed to be this way. When he replaced Rumsfeld after the Republican "thumping" in the 2006 elections, Gates was widely viewed as the man who was going to end the futile fighting in Iraq, slay the neocon dragons, and return a sensible "realism" to the land.

-----

Donald Rumsfeld - Wikipedia

Continue reading "On Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and More" »

Westhawk, a first-rate blog and a daily read for me, has a post up titled Remembering America’s New Friends. Here is an excerpt.

This decade, a million American soldiers have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Many have had a chance to develop relationships with Iraqi and Afghan soldiers, civil servants, and businessmen. Summed together, these relations are now forming bonds that will endure beyond whatever decisions statesmen in these countries decide to take. The personal relationships between Americans and their counterparts in Iraq and Afghanistan will influence the strategic balance in the region. These relationships are also likely too numerous and too deep for any statesmen to control.

Rob Thornton is a US Army officer and combat veteran of the Iraq war. He spent a year as an advisor to an Iraqi battalion and now works at the US Army school house at Fort Leavenworth improving the US military’s foreign military advisory efforts. Thornton recently wrote a comment at Small Wars Journal Blog that illustrated the bonds that are strengthening at the personal level between Americans, Iraqis, and, presumably, Afghans...

More, read it all.

Continue reading "Remembering America’s New Friends" »

This morning I stumbled across (actually it appeared in the left sidebar under Google Ads) what looks like a pretty good resource for students and practitioners of COIN – The Counterinsurgency Library. The site is pretty well organized and contains a lot of historical and recent content. Reminds me of what I had (and still have) planned for our own SWJ library. Until we get there take a look around the COIN library.

Here’s the library’s about statement:

Counterinsurgency has become a subject of great interest in the last few years, and this website is intended to bring together the literature on this vitally important subject in a single location. This is a collaborative website, in which anyone can enter bibliographical references. A user can – and is indeed encouraged to – annotate the entries. Visitors can also search by topic to find a list of articles about specific insurgencies or issues in counterinsurgency.

Counterinsurgency is a complex subject, as it rests at the intersection of history, economics, military strategy, and even political theory. This site attempts to collect articles on all of these aspects of counterinsurgency. In this respect it is different than other reading lists on, or bibliographies of, counterinsurgency. Some reading lists focus on military issues; others look at specific historical examples.

What makes this site unique is that it is both collaborative and dedicated to both the practical and deeply philosophical issues surrounding counterinsurgency. Many of the articles included here deal with specific counterinsurgencies, ranging from Iraq to Malaysia to Vietnam; other articles address practical questions such as the role of indigenous police forces in counterinsurgency. Still others deal with the theoretical foundations of the state, a subject that, even while largely unacknowledged, underlies all counterinsurgency efforts. At all times, this site is interested in a holistic view of success in counterinsurgency.

Please help us create a resource that can be of use to both scholars and soldiers, to those who are paid to think about counterinsurgency and to merely concerned citizens, and to all who hope for success in the difficult art of counterinsurgency.

The site is divided into two sections - Hot Topics and What's New. The hot topics include posts by country, other categories, Iraq, COIN tactics and theorists.

Continue reading "COIN Library" »

The alarm bell has been ringing for some time on China’s involvement on the Dark Continent. The "People's" Republic of China's interest in Africa is not new... (Peter Brookes and Ji Hye Shin in a 2006 Heritage Foundation Backgrounder):

In the 1960s and 1970s, Beijing’s interest centered on building ideological sol¬idarity with other underdeveloped nations to advance Chinese-style communism and on repelling Western “imperialism.” Following the Cold War, Chinese interests evolved into more pragmatic pursuits such as trade, investment, and energy.

In recent years, Beijing has identified the African continent as an area of significant economic and strategic interest. America and its allies and friends are finding that their vision of a prosperous Africa governed by democracies that respect human rights and the rule of law and that embrace free markets is being challenged by the escalating Chinese influence in Africa.

… but should concern us now more than ever. The “why” was provided yesterday by Thomas Christensen and James Swan in their statement before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Christensen is Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Swan is Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs - two who should be in the know about such matters. The transcript of their statement can be found here...

Continue reading "China in Africa: Implications for U.S. Policy" »

Continue on for some selected reading on regional, threat, defense and irregular warfare issues...

Continue reading "Tuesday Night Reading Assignment" »

- Schmedlap

- SWC Thread Saving their Souls in Fallujah?

Continue reading "Small Wars Council Quote of the Day" »

Thomas Donnelly and Frederick Kagan hit a home run with their analysis and recommendations in yesterday’s New York Post - The Proud, The Few – Stretched to its Limits, Our Military Needs One Million Men.

First up – setting it straight – defining vs. ignoring the problem.

The fix-the-military argument was recently made at greater length by the New York Times. On May 18, the paper's editorialists noted that the efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have taken a serious toll on the Army and Marine Corps, wearing down not only people but equipment "at an unprecedented rate." Well, the loss rates would not have been surprising to the defenders of Bastogne, the armies at Antietam, or the servicemen and women in any other major war, but it is true that US land forces have been asked to do too much with too little for too long.

The question is how we should respond to this fact. The Times and its anti-war allies argue that the remedy is not to expand the force to meet the wartime mission, but to reduce the mission to what a small force can handle, consistent with a decent family life, defense budgets constrained to historic lows and peacetime recruitment and promotion "standards." In other words, let's not fix the problem. Let's give up.

And second up, the solution.

The Army and the Marines are indeed under great stress, but, as service leaders, officers, and sergeants-major take great pains to explain, they are far from broken. If anything, the tactical performance and discipline of US forces in the field has improved significantly in recent years. The Iraq surge is a case study of counterinsurgency warfare planned and executed brilliantly. Broken forces do not conduct such operations. From the level of team and squad to supreme command, US forces have adapted themselves remarkably to a war they were not at first ready to fight. In retrospect what is remarkable is how resilient and flexible the all-volunteer, professional force has proven to be.

The compelling reason to reinvest in America's Army and Marine Corps is not to withdraw and prepare for the "next war," but to build land forces capable of sustaining and prevailing in the so-called "Long War," the effort to secure more legitimate governments, and thus a more durable stability, in vital regions like the Persian Gulf.

So what does a Long War land force look like?

To begin with, it's bigger. Much bigger…

Read the rest here.

Continue reading "Reducing the Mission is Not the Answer" »

In my day job I have the pleasure of observing and interacting with majors from the Marine Corps’ Command and Staff College and the Army’s Command and General Staff College at Joint Urban Warrior, a Marine Corps – US Joint Forces Command annual seminar-style war game. Now in its sixth year, JUW has seen CSC and C&GSC participation since its inception and the success the program has seen is largely due to the extraordinary knowledge, professionalism and drive of what we call our “iron majors” and “young Turks”.

When these majors talk it’s best to listen, with one or more combat deployments under their belt and as serious students of our craft, they more often than not cut to the quick in identifying what works, what is broken and what needs to be done.

Hopefully we’ll hear much more from the Army iron majors with the recent decision by Lieutenant General William Caldwell, IV, Commanding General of the US Army Combined Arms Center, as excerpted from a recent CAC memorandum below:

Command and General Staff College faculty and students will begin blogging as part of their curriculum and writing requirements both within the .mil and public environments. In addition CAC subordinate organizations will begin to engage in the blogosphere in an effort to communicate the myriad of activities that CAC is accomplishing and help assist telling the Army’s story to a wide and diverse audience.

LTG Caldwell’s memo detailed the purpose of his directive as an essential part of CAC’s responsibilities to provide information to the public and usher in a culture of change within the Army’s officer leadership, development and education community as well as to support military operations - leaders within the Army need to understand the power of the internet and leverage as many communications means as possible to communicate what CAC is doing. You can visit the new CAC Blog here. And of course; faculty, staff and students at our PME schoolhouses have an open invitation to blog here at SWJ, contribute to the online magazine or spar with Council members at the SWC.

Nothing follows.

Continue reading "Welcome to the Blogosphere" »

In the 7 May issue of Jane's Defence Weekly there is an article about how Israel is adapting based on lessons learned from the Second Lebanon War. Here's an excerpt:

"At the same time, the IDF's doctrine was completely revised: concepts that were developed in the long years of low-intensity conflict with the Palestinians were replaced by simplified, classic warfare constructs. 'For years we have developed a language that no one understands,' said a senior IDF source. 'From now on there are no longer 'spectacles' or 'effects-based warfare'. There is the objective, the method and the required achievement."

Retired general Yossi Peled, who was one of the severe critics of the IDF's previous doctrine, told Jane's "The only effect I know in warfare is to kill the enemy."

Hat tip to Bill Aldridge.

Nothing follows.

Continue reading "Friday food for thought..." »

Lessons Not Learned: Contracting Out Iraqi Army Advising by Peter W. Singer at The Brookings Institution, 12 May 2008.

Singer is with Brooking's 21st Century Defense Initiative which is charterd to produce cutting-edge research, analysis, and outreach that address some of the most critical issues facing leaders shaping defense policy in the coming century. The initiative focuses on the following three core issues: The Future of War, The Future of U.S. Defense Needs and Priorities, and The Implications for the U.S. Defense System.

From Contracting Out Iraqi Army Advising:

One of the key questions surrounding the government’s escalating uses of military contractors is actually not whether they save the government client money or not (this, however, is getting harder to argue with the more than $10 billion that the Defense Contract Audit Agency believes was either wasted or misspent on contracting in Iraq. Rather the crucial question that should asked at the onset of any potential outsourcing is simple: Should the task be done by a private company in the first place?

...the Pentagon is seeking to hire private contractors to help fill out the teams that will train and advise Iraq army units, including in their operations in the field. In more blunt terms, arguably the most important aspect of the operation in Iraq, the crux to defeating the insurgency/getting our troops out of there (whichever you care more about), is starting to be outsourced.

This one is a doozy of lessons not learned. First off, outsourcing training of the Iraqi military has been tried before and is actually one of the many, many factors into why we have had such a hard time...

Second, to turn over the task of advising the Iraqis now, at such a critical stage in the war effort as we try to translate the limited tactical success of the surge into something more permanent, is not just horrible timing. In the words of one U.S. Army officer, it is “definitely not a job that rational USG policy-makers should want in the hands of U.S./western contractors anytime soon.”...

Thirdly, the resultant messaging and long-term effects have to be a cause for concern. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker testified a few weeks to Congress that building up Iraqi capabilities was the priority in the year ahead. Contrast this with the message that this contract sends to Congress, the American public, and most importantly, our Iraqi counterparts...

But, fourth, advising a partner military is not just about building up their military skillset. It is also about passing on values and building long-term relationships. When you contract out military advisors, the values of civil-military relations and professionalism are supplanted by the evident commoditization of military skills, not always the best message in a developing democracy. In turn, the relations are not built between officers advancing up the ranks between the two forces, but with a company and its ever-changing staff of employees...

Much more at Brookings. Hat tip to Phil Carter at Intel Dump for the e-mail pointer to this piece.

Discuss at Small Wars Council

Continue reading "Contracting Out Iraqi Army Advising" »

Finally got around to visiting the Canadian Military Journal web page again, long overdue. Here are three articles the SWJ community should find interesting.

Political Warfare Is A Double-edged Sword: The Rise And Fall Of The French Counter-insurgency In Algeria by Pierre Pahlavi.

This article will examine how French counter-revolutionary warfare in Algeria developed, how it was implemented, and what successes it achieved. It will also focus upon how the strategy impacted the traditional practices and structures of the army, with a view to better understanding the reasons that caused the French government to begin dismantling the army in 1959. The objective here is to elaborate upon the notion of a doctrine that became a vérité devenue folle1 [truth run amok], which resulted in the Grande Muette (the army) overextending its responsibilities, establishing for itself a political conscience, and rising against a central national power suspected of trying to betray its initial mission. The purpose of examining this ideologization and its possible role in the failure of the counterinsurgency experiment is also to better grasp the principles and the perverse impacts of a strategy that would play an increasingly important role in conflicts and in international relations during the 21th Century.

Preparing for Coalition Command - The Three Ps: People, Processes, and Plans by Ian Wood.

Coalitions are always complex systems, involving frictional interaction between political and military leaders through the entire spectrum of operations spanning the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. To that end, this article is designed to add to the body of professional knowledge on the important issue of coalition warfare command. More specifically, it will be argued that a methodology is needed that future commanders may apply during the pre-deployment period to assess the competence and capabilities of coalition force contributions. A series of factors will be provided that are intended to assist commanders in assessing the strengths and weaknesses of their assigned multinational forces. This article also, hopefully, will help prepare future Canadian commanders for success in areas such as leadership preparedness, force interoperability, and unity of effort.

Assimilating Urban Battle Experience - The Canadians at Ortona by Ian Gooderson.

At Ortona, the Allies encountered, for the first time, a built-up area turned by the Germans into a defensive zone in which to fight not just a rearguard action but also a prolonged defensive battle. For what it revealed of German urban fighting techniques, Ortona was invaluable, and the experience was characterized by further significant features. Defending Ortona were some of the most combat-proficient and motivated German soldiers in the field anywhere - paratroopers of the 1st Parachute Division, whose battalions had been deployed into theatre to stiffen critical sectors of the German front in Italy. Unlike their opponents, the Canadians lacked experience of, and possessed very little training for, such a battle, but, nevertheless, they gained the upper hand in the fighting. They adjusted to an unfamiliar battle environment quickly, and they devised and employed the methods necessary to win that battle.

More at the Canadian Military Journal.

Continue reading "Canadian Military Journal" »

According to Inside Defense (subscription required) U.S Special Operations Command is calling for a new executive agent for Irregular Warfare (IW) as part of its version of the fiscal year 2009 defense authorization bill.

Members of the House Armed Services terrorism, unconventional threats and capabilities subcommittee unanimously adopted the establishment of an executive agent of irregular warfare into their version of the FY-09 defense authorization bill.

While the legislative language is vague, subpanel Chairman Adam Smith (D-WA) noted that whatever action the department decides to take on the executive agent authority, the Pentagon needs to ensure that approach will have an interagency aspect. "There are a lot of different people that have concerns" with irregular warfare operations, Smith said, adding an interagency approach would ensure those concerns would be heard.

As far as which organization should be granted the executive-agent authority, subcommittee member Jim Marshall (D-GA) noted that of the two likely candidates for the job - the Army or U.S. Special Operations Command - the Army would benefit the most.

Arguing that the majority of future, full-scale conflicts the United States may be involved in will likely be conducted as irregular-warfare campaigns, Marshall said the Army had better become adept in waging that kind of war. "Big Army is going to have to be able to do [irregular warfare] and do it well," he said, adding that executive-agent authority for irregular-warfare would be a step toward that goal.

More at Inside Defense to include funding of USSOCOM’s unfunded mandates.

Nothing follows.

Continue reading "On Executive Agent Authority for IW" »

Inside Defense (subscription required) is reporting the Defense Department is forming seven working groups to examine "priority" roles and missions issues, a few of which could plunge the military services into bitter internecine turf battles and give the Bush administration's Office of the Secretary of Defense a parting opportunity this summer to realign the defense bureaucracy.

The priority issues include ISR / Unmanned Aerial Systems, Intratheater Airlift / Joint Cargo Aircraft, Cyberspace Operations / Information Operations, Irregular Warfare, Excessively Overlapping Service Capabilities, DOD Governance Roles and Responsibilities, and Supporting Interagency Roles and Missions.

On Irregular Warfare Inside Defense had this to say:

The fourth issue group will focus on irregular warfare. It will be led by Michael Vickers, assistant secretary of defense for special operations / low-intensity conflict and interdependent capabilities; Marine Corps General James Mattis, commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command; and Lieutenant General John Sattler of the Joint Staff, also a Marine.

This group will examine irregular warfare capabilities that are common to special operations forces and general purpose forces in order to explore opportunities to forge greater integration and interoperability between the two, according to the draft document.

"What DOD organizational structure would provide the best oversight for irregular warfare, maximize efficiencies across DOD components, better balance risk and investment priorities, enhance future capabilities development and ensure effective operations?" asks the draft document.

With the Army and Marine Corps shouldering the bulk of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, this issue group will examine how "to develop air and maritime capabilities for counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense," according to the document.

For those who subscribe to Inside Defense there is much more on roles and missions issues and the upcoming review. Good read...

Nothing follows.

Continue reading "IW on Roles and Missions Task List" »

New Army Handbooks Focus on First 100 Days of Combat by Navy Seaman William Selby.

American Forces Press Service

The U.S. Army has published three new handbooks to help soldiers prepare for the first 100 days of combat, officials said on a teleconference with online journalists and “bloggers” yesterday. (Transcript).

Army Col. Steven Mains, director of the Center for Army Lesson Learned, and Milton Hileman, a senior military analyst, explained that there was a small but clear rise in the number of casualties early in a combat deployment, concentrated in the first 100 days.

“It’s not a new phenomenon that … we just figured out and nobody had ever seen before, but it’s something we could clearly show was the case in Iraq,” Mains said.

“And so it drove us to say, well, what do they know at day 250 that they really need to know during those first 100 days?”

After an extensive interview process with approximately 1700 soldiers, Mains and Hileman said that there were three key elements to surviving the first three months; avoiding complacency, good decisions made by junior leaders, and the efficient staff processes at the battalion and brigade level for commanders...

Continue reading "New Army Handbooks Focus on First 100 Days of Combat" »

Will Hartley, Insurgency Research Group, has a great lineup of documents recently posted on the 'Net. Here are several examples:

Rethinking Counterinsurgency - John Mackinlay, Alison Al-Baddawy, Rand.

During the period of decolonization in Asia and Africa, the United Kingdom faced more insurgent activity than any other Western power. British government officials and military forces proved proficient at defeating or controlling these rebellions. However, these uprisings were much less complex than the modern jihadist insurgency. Past insurgent movements were primarily monolithic or national in form, had very specific local goals, and derived most of their power from the local population. These limitations made past rebellions vulnerable to strong military responses. In contrast, the modern jihadist insurgency is characterized by its complex and global nature...

Country Reports on Terrorism 2007 - US State Department.

US law requires the Secretary of State to provide Congress, by April 30 of each year, a full and complete report on terrorism with regard to those countries and groups meeting criteria set forth in the legislation. This annual report is entitled Country Reports on Terrorism. Beginning with the report for 2004, it replaced the previously published Patterns of Global Terrorism.

Iraq after the Surge I: The New Sunni Landscape and Iraq after the Surge II: The Need for a New Political Strategy - International Crisis Group.

The US military surge contributed to a significant reduction in violence but has reached the limit of what it can achieve. Without fundamental political changes in Iraq, success will remain fragile and dangerously reversible. The second of two companion reports, The Need for a New Political Strategy, analyses reasons for the current deadlock and suggests a way forward.

Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958 - Rand 2006 reprint of 1963 David Galula article.

Thus begins Lt Col David Galula’s account of his two years commanding a company of French troops in the Kabylia district, east of Algiers, at the height of the 1954–62 Algerian War of Independence. That uprising against French rule is remembered, if at all, as the last of the immediate post–World War II nationalist struggles waged by a colonized population against its European masters. For that reason, perhaps, France’s experiences in Algeria were mostly ignored by other countries, including the United States, which later found itself fighting remarkably similar insurgencies in Southeast Asia and Latin America, and today in Southwest Asia (e.g., Iraq).

Much more at Insurgency Research Group to include recent Small Wars Journal magazine offerings. Hat tip to ya Will.

Lastly, one not on the IRG list - American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador by Benjamin Schwarz of Rand.

This report assesses the political and social dimensions of American counterinsurgency policy in El Salvador. It attempts to explain why low-intensity-conflict doctrine has not produced the desired results and to reassess that doctrine's future utility. The author's appraisal of U.S. involvement in El Salvador leads him to conclude that there is a vast disparity between U.S. objectives and achievements there. For a decade, U.S. policy toward El Salvador tried to synthesize liberal and conservative aims: foster political, social, and economic reform, and provide security to a country whose freedom from communism the United States deemed essential. In attempting to reconcile these objectives, however, the United States pursued a policy that used means unsettling to itself, for ends humiliating to the Salvadorans, and at a cost disproportionate to any conventional conception of the national interest.

Nothing follows.

Continue reading "Sunday Light Reading" »

Hybrid Wars by Greg Grant at Government Executive with a hat tip to Frank Hoffman for the pointer.

What if the battles of the future are neither conventional nor irregular, but a combination of both?

The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War featured some of the largest set-piece battles fought since the end of World War II. For American defense planners, the conflict provided a bounty of information on the performance of the latest military hardware from Western and Soviet arsenals that had been sold to the Israeli and Arab armies, respectively. After the war, U.S. defense officials went to Israel and picked over the battlefields, searching out lessons from the fighting.

The United States was busy extricating itself from the disaster of Vietnam, and many in the U.S. military, particularly in the Army, saw the big battles fought on the Golan Heights and in the Sinai as an opportunity to refocus their intellectual efforts away from fighting shadowy guerrillas in jungles and back to the conventional, big battles they preferred. The 1973 war displayed the lethality of new precision weaponry. It was the first war to feature large numbers of guided missiles, launched from both the air and the ground. Egyptian and Syrian troops, for example, used vast numbers of Soviet-built Sagger portable anti-tank missiles to savage attacking Israeli tanks.

Now, in a touch of déjà vu, American defense planners are examining another Arab-Israeli clash - this one from 2006, when Israel's army faced off against fundamentalist Muslim organization Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. In a war that lasted 34 days, Hezbollah fought the vaunted Israeli Defense Forces, considered one of the most technologically advanced militaries, to a standstill. The outcome sent shock waves through the world's military establishments, particularly the Pentagon. Ever since, Defense Department planners have been trying to discover how Hezbollah guerrillas could have defeated a conventional army outfitted with U.S. equipment.

Much more at Government Executive.

Nothing follows.

Continue reading "Friday Night Read" »

CNN reported earlier today that the Republican National Committee takes exception to a Democratic National Committee campaign ad they say misuses Senator John McCain's remarks on US troops staying in Iraq for "100 years" in such a way to paint an incorrect portrait of McCain’s position on Iraq.

The Associated Press reported that he actually went on to say:

“As long as Americans are not being injured or harmed or wounded or killed, it's fine with me, and I hope it would be fine with you, if we maintain a presence in a very volatile part of the world where al-Qaida is training, recruiting, equipping and motivating people every single day."

The ad makes no distinction between sustained combat and other operations that require a much smaller US force footprint – a training and advisory role comes to mind here. Here is the ad - you be the judge:

I agree with the RNC on this one.

Nothing follows.

Continue reading "RNC Says Unfair on DNC Attack Ad" »

Associated Press news item - Iran Dismisses Sabotage in Mosque Blast by Nasser Karimi.

Iranian officials on Sunday ruled out an attack as the cause of an explosion that killed 11 people inside a mosque in the southern city of Shiraz.

The explosion ripped through the mosque packed with hundreds of worshippers late Saturday as a cleric delivered his weekly speech against extremist Wahabi beliefs and the outlawed Baha'i faith, the semiofficial Fars news agency said.

Authorities said besides the 11 killed, 191 people were wounded, some of them critically, the state IRNA news agency reported...

The police chief of the southern Fars Province, Gen. Ali Moayyedi, said he "rejects" the possibility of an intentional bombing and "any sort of insurgency" in the blast.

Moayyedi, in comments carried by state IRNA news agency, said the initial investigation found remnants of ammunition from a military exhibition that was held recently at the mosque....

Sure, that's the ticket.

Nothing follows.

Continue reading "Yea, Right" »

Doug Feith on Diane Rehm - Abu Muqawama

There is simply not enough booze in Abu Muqawama's apartment to get him through this interview on the Diane Rehm Show with Doug Feith.

I'd throw up my two-cents on the revisionists but it is much too nice a weekend to waste on the likes of Feith and company. If you really want more right now then curl up with this.

As many in the military publicly acknowledge here for the first time, the guerrilla insurgency that exploded several months after Saddam's fall was not foreordained. In fact, to a shocking degree, it was created by the folly of the war's architects. But the officers who did raise their voices against the miscalculations, shortsightedness, and general failure of the war effort were generally crushed, their careers often ended. A willful blindness gripped political and military leaders, and dissent was not tolerated...

Discuss at Small Wars Council.

Nothing follows.

Continue reading "Cousin Abu is Most Right" »

Just got back from spending five days watching Dr. David Kilcullen in action at Joint Urban Warrior (JUW) 08, a US Marine Corps and US Joint Forces Command cosponsored program. Dave's SWJ blog entries and links to his other works (SWJ Library) are among the most visited and linked to items on the site.

I have some JUW items to blog about later, for now I'll leave you with a "wavetop" snapshot of the who and what and a slide from one of Dave's briefs to mull over. The slide depicts a framework for understanding (or more precisely “how to think about”) the transition of responsibility and authority of security, essential services, humanitarian assistance, economic development, and political governance from a coalition to host nation - the snapshot and slide are at the end of this post.

With that – we give you Kilcullen redux...

Continue reading "Kilcullen Redux" »

The first Emerald Express was conducted in 1995 under the direction of then Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni, Commanding General of I Marine Expeditionary Force. Emerald Express 1995 was the first of several large-scale interagency exercises that addressed operations from a comprehensive military and interagency perspective.

The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory - Wargaming Division (WGD) picked up the Emerald Express program (1999 – 2007), conducting a continuing series of conferences and workshops designed to quickly garner critical insights and issues from recent operations and directly distribute the results to as wide a range of appropriate organizations and individuals as possible. Participants were typically commanders and senior staff of units from all U.S. services and multi-national partners as well personnel representing relevant interagency and non-governmental organizations.

Some of the more recent WGD Emerald Express events have addressed urban operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom I and II, the interagency dimensions of OIF, humanitarian assistance and stability and support operations in OIF, USMC and Royal Marine operations in Operation Enduring Freedom, and counterinsurgency.

Marine Corps University (MCU) now owns the program, conducting Emerald Express 2008 on 25 – 26 March at Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia. From the opening remarks by Lieutenant General James Amos, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command:

This two day symposium offers a forum to examine the critical issues involved in integration of all elements of national power in the pursuit of national security objectives. Throughout this event, presenters and panelists from both the operational and academic worlds will provide perspectives of interagency efforts in our national capital region, Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the Pacific Theater. Our presenters and panelists were selected based on their expertise, knowledge, reputation, and recent experience.

MCU has posted papers, briefings and maps from the symposium on their Emerald Express 2008 web site.

On a personal note, I had the privilege of running six Emerald Express seminars for WGD and found the experience one of the most rewarding of my 30-year stint as a Marine, Marine civilian and consultant. The insights and observations provided by U.S. and Coalition military and civilian participants, as well as their dedication and professionalism was exceptional in furthering our understanding of complex operations.

Nothing follows.

Continue reading "Emerald Express 2008" »

Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations by Richard Kohn at World Affairs Journal.

An excerpt:

When a new president takes office in early 2009, military leaders and politicians will approach one another with considerable suspicion. Dislike of the Democrats in general and Bill Clinton in particular, and disgust for Donald Rumsfeld, has rendered all politicians suspect in the imaginations of generals and admirals. The indictments make for a long list: a beleaguered military at war while the American public shops at the mall; the absence of elites in military ranks; the bungling of the Iraq occupation; the politicization of General David Petraeus by the White House and Congress; an army and Marine Corps exhausted and overstretched, their people dying, their commitments never-ending. Nearly six years of Donald Rumsfeld’s intimidation and abuse have encouraged in the officer corps a conviction that military leaders ought to—are obliged to—push back against their civilian masters. Egged on by Democrats in Congress—and well-meaning but profoundly mistaken associates who believe the military must hold political leaders accountable for their mistakes—some flag officers now opine publicly and seemingly without hesitation. Though divided about Iraq strategy, the four-stars unite in their contempt for today’s political class and vow not to be saddled with blame for mistakes not of their own making.

Read it all and then tell us 'what say you?' - Comment below or discuss at Small Wars Council.

Continue reading "Saturday Night Read: Crisis in Civil-Military Relations" »

National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies has posted its proceedings of the 2008 European Symposium - NATO: Bucharest and Beyond. Here are several take-aways from the report:

1) The NATO-ISAF operation poses the most critical test to date of NATO’s ability to generate the military forces required to meet its level of political ambition. In several categories, ranging from maneuver battalions to helicopters to C4ISR assets to Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) intended to build the capabilities of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Allied nations as a group are not filling the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) set by NATO Military Authorities. This allows opposition forces to operate in the space between what NATO-ISAF has and what it requires.

2) There exists a lack of “political will” among Allies whose publics and parliaments are questioning the goals and strategy of the Alliance commitment and, in some cases, are increasingly worried about casualties suffered by their forces and/or incidents of collateral damage affecting Afghan civilians. In addition, numerous Allies lack the required capabilities and/or funding to deploy and sustain their forces, particularly in the more challenging operational environment of Afghanistan. For some Allies, this is complicated further by their competing commitments to other operations (e.g., in the Balkans, Lebanon, and Africa.).

3) Allied governments have underestimated the tasks of simultaneously stabilizing the security situation, dealing with a complex set of opposition forces (Taliban, narco-terrorists, and tribal “warlords”), and developing a basic Afghan governmental capacity in a society wracked by decades of warfare and corruption. That said, there are important, albeit underreported, signs of progress in Afghanistan, and the strategic stakes remain high, for the region as well as the Alliance.

4) Within NATO, a variety of steps are underway to improve Allied individual and collective capabilities to deploy the forces and assets necessary for expeditionary missions, although resource limitations are a significant underlying problem. Within NATO and individual Allied forces, increased emphasis is needed on training military personnel and sharing “lessons learned” for complex and multinational counterinsurgency (COIN) operations with a heavy civilian military component.

5) “Naming and shaming” or “finger pointing” at Allies whose forces are not engaged, for various reasons, in the most dangerous areas will be counterproductive.

6) Serious effort is needed to improve NATO’s strategic communications capabilities with the Afghan population.

7) Notwithstanding public perceptions a few years ago that the United States had “lost interest” in NATO, the American commitment to the Alliance remains strong and enjoys broad bipartisan support.

*Hyperlinks inserted by SWJ.

Nothing follows.

Continue reading "NATO: Bucharest and Beyond" »

A small sampling of several recent discussions at the Small Wars Council - for our many lurkers - take the plunge - registration is easy and the price is right...

Continue reading "What's Going on at the Council" »

Yep, those of us who have been around a while know some military acronyms, maybe too many. Still, for old hands and young bucks alike - how many times have you sat in on a “way ahead”, “new concept” or “thinking out of the box” death by Power Point briefing scratching your head at the mind-boggling array of mumbo-jumbo that repackages old thoughts under a new wrapper or otherwise serves no purpose other than compelling the audience to pull out their buzz-word bingo cards?

One of my pet peeves is commonality of language – calling a spade a spade and sticking with doctrinally acceptable terms to describe doctrine that is, well, accepted. Before you go changing the language, please do us all a favor and change the doctrine first, ensure the new terminology is better suited than the old, and above all - make sure the new and improved terminology finds its way into the DoD Dictionary of Military Terms.

Continue on for the Army's attempt to reduce the noise level...

Continue reading "Army Doctrine Update" »

While not all inclusive, here are some blog items that caught my eye and interest this week.

Lots going on (expect no less) over at Abu Muqawama; the COIN doctrine debate, a French COIN reading list, the Lebanon narrative and US Army doctrine, a bit about Robert Fisk (The Independent) and his disdain for our new COIN doctrine, and finally (something we linked to earlier) a little about the history of that COIN doctrine.

U.S. Tongue-Ties Self In Talking To World by MountainRunner blogger Matt Armstrong over at Democracy Project.

...we must accept that the romantic days of the United States Information Agency are gone. So many confuse the USIA and the other information services, such as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, of recent decades with the USIA that was engaged in the active psychological struggle that largely ended with détente and the finalizing of the European partition.

Unlike half a century ago, the U.S. military has a clear voice and is arguably our dominant public diplomat. Therefore, simply resurrecting “USIA” without reorganizing our national information capabilities across civilian and military lines would turn it into just another voice struggling to be heard over America’s military commanders, spokespersons, and warfighters.

The candidates must look deeper than re-creating an agency and or re-establishing old outreach programs. They must show strong leadership and have a bold vision to rally the government and country to adapt to a world that requires understanding the information effect of action, agile response capabilities, and above all, credibility and trust...

Much more follows...

Continue reading "SWJ Items of Interest" »

Mentor: A wise and trusted counselor or teacher.

Without waxing poetic - mentors are crucial to leadership development and should a military mentor hall of fame exist - retired US Army Colonel John Collins would be one of the first inductees.

Colonel Collins has given his kind permission to post the following e-mail and attachment (letter to General Robert Kingston) – a piece of history, a fine example of mentorship as it should be and proof-positive that the requirement for sage advice does not diminish with rank - enough said.

I've accumulated many valued acquaintances since childhood, despite being a loner all my life, but General Barbwire Bob Kingston remains my only close friend. I've missed him every day since he checked out on 28 February 2007, a year ago next Thursday. I was Bob's boss in the 82d Airborne Division when he was a captain and his faculty adviser when he was a lieutenant colonel student at the National War College.

My advice didn't stop after he wore stars. I thought perhaps you might like to review my August 1981 correspondence to Robert regarding the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). It focused primarily on the Persian Gulf after Soviet armed forces invaded Afghanistan, but important parts remain pertinent today (see attached letter, written by hand because I had no secretary and couldn't type). Marine Lieutenant General P. X. Kelley was the first RDJTF commander. The key question was: Who should replace P.X. when his tenure expired? Plans called for amphibious assaults to seize footholds in Iran if required, but Pentagon computers confirmed that no active duty Marine flag officer had ever landed under enemy fire, whereas Major General Kingston had hit the beach as a second lieutenant at Inchon on Korea’s west coast in September 1950. Bob got the job and pinned on three stars.

John M. Collins is a retired U.S. Army colonel and a distinguished visiting research fellow at the National Defense University. Collins culminated his military career as the director of military strategy studies and then as chief of the Strategic Research Group at the National War College. He was subsequently the senior specialist in national defense at the Congressional Research Service for twenty-four years.

Note: General Robert Barrow, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, also landed at Inchon during the Korean War but was, at that time, considered too senior for command of the RDJTF. Links were added to Colonel Collins' e-mail for background purposes.

Continue reading "Auld Lang Syne" »

Got a quick note from SWJ friend Paul McLeary who is wrapping up a month-long embed with the 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team in central Iraq where he bounced around to different company-sized patrol bases. He's now writing of his embed experiences at the Columbia Journalism Review ('Dances’ With Strongmen) and on his blog - War, the Military, COIN and Stuff.

... No officer or NCO on the ground I spoke with had any illusions about who it is they’re dealing with when working with the sheiks or the SOI. “In my mind,” Captain Glen Helberg, commanding officer of Charlie Company at Courage told me one afternoon, “the biggest challenge for me is that we’re not able to hold together this very loose coalition of IPs (Iraqi police), IAs (Iraqi Army), SOIs, and us. If we’re not able to maintain that, then the SOI guys can take their weapons, go home, pull their IEDs out of the garage and go back to what they were doing. We know that there are guys in the SOI who were attacking IPs and coalition forces a year ago. So in my mind the biggest fear is that we can’t integrate these guys into the government and into society quick enough.”

But they’re trying, and finding some success. In my few days at Courage, I accompanied Captain Helberg to several fruitful meetings with SOI leaders, local sheiks, and the area IP commander, all in the name of building trust among the groups...

Paul concentrated on 'boots on the ground' - how Non-Commissioned Officers, Lieutenants and Captains are working with the Sons of Iraq (formerly Concerned Local Citizens), Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army. Good stuff.

Continue reading "War, the Military, COIN and Stuff" »

While not all inclusive, here are some blog, news and commentary items that caught my eye and interest this week...

Continue reading "2 February Afghanistan / Pakistan / NATO Update" »

While not all inclusive, here are some of the items that caught my eye and interest so far this week...

Continue reading "31 January Iraq Updates" »

Tom Barnett on Counterinsurgency – US Army Field Manual 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 33.3.5.

The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, with forewords by David Petraeus, James F. Amos, John Nagl and Sarah Sewell. Naturally, I loved this one. I had gotten a sneak-peak preview from Conrad Crane himself at Leavenworth in Dec 05 when I was there interviewing Petraeus for the "Monk of War" piece (and addressing the student body) and finally perusing the book was quite enjoyable. The Sewell foreword is the best by far. Really rocks.

Nothing follows.

Continue reading "Tom Barnett on FM 3-24" »

Urban Operations Journal – 28 February 2003

General Anthony Zinni (USMC Ret); experienced in the theory, planning, and conduct of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) as well as a leading proponent of cultural intelligence; developed the following considerations for humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations. The successful conduct of operations in Iraq extends well beyond 'taking down Saddam'. The end state we achieve in Iraq - and how we achieve it - will have a direct and serious impact on all future operations in the conduct of our war on terrorism.

They are presented here as helpful guidelines on winning the peace before, during, and after the dust settles in Baghdad and other Iraqi urban areas...

Continue reading "Zinni's Considerations Revisited" »

The December ’07 issue of Armed Forces Journal contains two commentary pieces that are harbingers of a debate brewing “inside and outside the beltway” concerning Counterinsurgency (COIN) / Irregular Warfare (IW) operations “after Iraq.” While the two AFJ articles focus on Army and Marine Corps COIN doctrine approved last December and its execution in Iraq, the issues the authors raise will most certainly carryover into a larger debate that will shape our National Security Strategy and military capabilities for decades to come...

Continue reading "Peace, Love, COIN? (Updated Links)" »

While not all inclusive, here are some items that caught my eye and interest so far this week - Meeting Abu Muqawama and the SWJ / AM COIN Academy book drive, Roggio on Iran's ratlines into Iraq, HTS in Iraq and CORDS in Vietnam, Barnett and Boot on Iran and the NIE, ThreatsWatch and Westhawk on State-Defense Africa rift, and Betz on Hoffman on civil-military relations...

Continue reading "SWJ Odds and Ends" »

I read with great interest Michael Phillips’ Wall Street Journal piece - In Counterinsurgency Class, Soldiers Think Like Taliban - as well as several e-mails concerning what is right and what is wrong with the Army's new Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Academy.

From the WSJ article:

... Six years into the Afghan war, the Army has decided its troops on the ground still don't understand well enough how to battle the Taliban insurgency. So since the spring, groups of 60 people have been attending intensive, five-day sessions in plywood classrooms in the corner of a U.S. base here, where they learn to think like a Taliban and counterpunch like a politician.

The academy's principal message: The war that began to oust a regime has evolved into a popularity contest where insurgents and counterinsurgents vie for public support and the right to rule. The implicit critique: Many U.S. and allied soldiers still arrive in the country well-trained to kill, but not to persuade.

In April, the Army gave a 26-year-old Rhodes scholar, Capt. Dan Helmer, six weeks to get the school up and running. Capt. Helmer tells his students, who rank as high as colonel, that the important battles here are 80% political and just 20% military. He exhorts them to go to great lengths to understand local politics, culture and history, to make sure actions they take on the battlefield help convince Afghans that the Kabul government will serve and protect them...

For a synopsis of the good and the bad please see Ad-hockery in Afghanistan by SWJ’s COIN counterparts and partners in crime (Charlie and AM) over at Abu Muqawama. An excerpt:

The Wall Street Jounal has a long and excellent article about the COIN Academy in Afghanistan. Establishing tactical schools in-country is a well known COIN best practice (the Jungle Warfare School in Malaya is perhaps the best known amongst COIN scholars). And, as part of our steep learning curve in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have put together such schools in both countries…

This no knock on Capt. Dan Helmer--the 26 year old Army captain and Rhode Scholar tasked with setting up the Academy. (Your faithful bloggers have benefitted from many email exchanges with him, and they all share a common mentor in fellow West Point Rhodie, LTC John Nagl.)

But, as he'll tell you, he's a freaking Army captain. Charlie is quite certain that Capt. Helmer is among the best and the brightest, but he's not among those who can get @^*% done in the Army (or Afghanistan). If we were serious about such things, we might assign someone with a bit more institutional clout. Someone who could get paper copies of FM 3-24 for the Academy (it's cool, the Army posts them online. The students just wait 47 hours to download them over what passes for an internet connection in Kabul). Someone who could actually institutionalize the Academy within the Army instead of it being a Frankenstein science project dreamed up by folks who've read ATOM one too many times.

We can't win the war without places like the COIN Academy and officers like Capt. Helmer. But we also can't do it with them alone…

Nothing follows.

Continue reading "First, the Good News…" »

While not all inclusive, here are some items that caught my eye and interest so far this week - COIN reading, more on Secretary Gates and soft power, Iraq, Afghanistan, Al Qaeda IO, AFRICOM, Uganda, Pakistan, barbarians, Saudi Arabia, anti-war movies...

Continue reading "SWJ Odds and Ends" »

Dr. Marcus Griffin on the American Anthropological Association Executive Board’s Statement on the Human Terrain System Project - Andrew Exum and Stephen McInerney on Lebanon - BBC interview with Dr. Dave Kilcullen - tons on the new Pakistan COIN strategy from Bill Roggio, Phil Carter and Westhawk - more on LTG Sanchez’s Democratic radio address - ZenPundit’s new home and look - John Robb now officially a Best and Brightest - and Max Boot on Army promotions…

Continue reading "Black Friday SWJ Odds and Ends" »

Having just read (for the second time today) Ann Marlowe’s Weekly Standard article Anthropology Goes to War I feel compelled to take exception publicly to the overall tone of her piece and in particular several items she misrepresented, intentionally or otherwise. I do this as a card-carrying member of what Marlowe terms the "Army of the Small Wars Journal"...

Continue reading "On Anthropology Goes to War" »

LtCol Tim Grattan, Deputy Director of the newly formed Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG), was by my ‘day job’ office today and I was able to go through his briefing on the Group’s ‘way ahead’ to include the proposed table of organization and equipment, basic concept of employment and many other issues associated with training and advising foreign military forces. While I cannot go into any details, I can say I came away quite impressed and hopeful that the Marine Corps has a solid plan to meet future training and advising requirements. A recent Marine Corps News item on MCTAG follows...

Continue reading "USMC forms MCTAG" »

While not all inclusive, here are some of the items that caught my eye and interest so far this week...

Continue reading "13 November SWJ Odds and Ends" »

While not all inclusive, here are some of the items that caught my eye and interest this week...

Continue reading "9 November SWJ Odds and Ends" »

Pakistan Emergency - Wall Street Journal editorial
Musharraf's Latest Coup - Washington Times editorial
Crackdown in Pakistan Leaves U.S. in Quandary - USA Today editorial
Pakistan in Peril – London Times editorial
Terror in Pakistan – The Australian editorial
Pakistan: Desperate Act of Weak and Rattled President – The Independent editorial
A Second Coup in Pakistan - Ahmed Rashid, Washington Post
Pakistan: When an Anti-Terror Ally Fails – Christian Science Monitor editorial
Pakistan, The Heart of a Global Crisis – William Ress-Mogg, London Times
Musharraf’s Mini-Martial Law – Ali Eteraz, Guardian
Pakistan: A Plea for Moderation - Noreen Ahmed-Ullah, Chicago Tribune
Musharraf Has Lost His Marbles - Asma Jahangir, The Independent
Legal Loopholes in Iraq - New York Times editorial
This Won’t be the Iraq Election – Fareed Zakaria, Newsweek Magazine
Is Maliki's Corruption Worth American Lives? - Henry Waxman, Los Angeles Times
Turkey Under Fire - Washington Times editorial
Turkish Threat - Boston Globe editorial
Turks and Kurds – David Warren, Real Clear Politics
Kurdistan's Hope for Talks - Nechirvan Barzani, Washington Post
Turk-Kurd Turmoil Tripwires - Kenneth Timmerman, Washington Times
The Future of U.S.-Turkey Relationship – Bilal Cetin, Turkish Press
Lessons From Turkey’s Strife – Nicole Abadee, Canberra Times
Crisis in Turkey Only About PKK? – Khaled Salih, Daily Star
All Still Quiet on the Syria Bombing - Jackson Diehl, Washington Post
An Arab Initiative to Avoid a Failed Conference – James Zogby, Daily Star
Middle East: Enough of ‘Enough’ – Barry Rubin, Jerusalem Post
Nukes on the Nile – San Francisco Chronicle editorial
Iran: Nuclear Meltdown - Kurt Anderson, New York Magazine
The Don Quixote of Darfur – Romesh Ratnesar, Time Magzine
Balfour at 90 – Jerusalem Post editorial
Bolivia: No Crime, No Punishment - Roger Noriega, Miami Herald
Uncle Sam on the Line - John Ashcroft, New York Times
Confirm Mukasey -- and Stop Torture - Los Angeles Times editorial
Mukasey Should Espouse American Principles - Pittsburgh Post-Gazette editorial
Mukasey's America - Nat Hentoff, Washington Times
When Does Coercion Become Torture? - Richard Saccone, Baltimore Sun
Torture Moral Preening - Mona Charen, Washington Times
Interrogation Abuses Undercut Moral Authority - Cynthia Tucker, Baltimore Sun
U.N. Should Clean its Own House - Claudia Rosett, Philadelphia Inquirer
Strategic Airlift on Artificial Life Support - Jim Saxton, Washington Times

Continue reading "5 November SWJ Op-Ed Roundup" »

'We Band of Brothers’ – Jennie Yabroff, Newsweek Magazine
Iraqi Parliament: Reconcilable Differences – Frederick Kagan, Weekly Standard
Congress’s Unused War Powers – George Will, Washington Post
Mideast: Talking the Talk - Arnaud de Borchgrave, Washington Times
Lessons From Failed Camp David Talks – Moshe Amirav, Daily Star
Peace Talks: Ignore the Spoilers – Naomi Chazan, Jerusalem Post
Noun + Verb + 9/11 + Iran = Democrats’ Defeat? - Frank Rich, New York Times
How to Rein in Iran Without War – Jim Hoagland, Washington Post
Attacking Iran Makes No Sense – Joseph Galloway, Miami Herald
Bellicose Bush Pushing Iran to Arms – Mark Bowden, Philadelphia Inquirer
The Future War on Terror – Oliver North, Washington Times
Iraq Assignment Divides Diplomatic Corps – Pittsburgh Post-Gazette editorial
Of Diplomats and Men - William Kristol and Dean Barnett, Weekly Standard
Public Diplomacy: Selling America – New York Times editorial
End of the Karen Hughes Era – Stephen Hayes, Weekly Standard
Orwell Matters – Los Angeles Times commentary series
Rice: Why Her Dreams Crashed – Fred Kaplan, Washington Post
David Miliband and King Abdullah II – Rod Liddle, London Times
A Lesson on Muslim View – Jonathan Last, Philadelphia Inquirer
Britain’s Love Affair with the Saudi Kingdom – Jemima Khan, London Daily Telegraph
Pakistan’s State of Emergency – Washington Post editorial
Bhutto May Regret Bargain with Musharraf - Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, Daily Star
India’s New Untouchables - Asra Nomani, Washington Post
What Burma Must Fear – U Gambira, Washington Post
Appease the Druse – Gil Sedan, Jerusalem Post
Cuba: My Father’s ‘Crime’ - Yan Valdes Morejon, Boston Globe
A Hero in Castro’s Gulag – Jeff Jacoby, Boston Globe
Colombia: Time to Trade - Barbara Bowie-Whitman, Washington Times
The Perils of Petrocracy – Tina Rosenberg, New York Times
Two for Mukasey – Washington Post editorial
Drowning in Questions - Dan Ephron and Michael Isikoff, Newsweek Magazine
Tortured Justice – Linda Chavez, Washington Times
Waterboarding Used to be Illegal – Evan Wallach, Washington Post
Harper Blurs Canada’s Global Image – Gordon Barthos, Toronto Star
The Globe, Politically Corrected - Geoffrey Wheatcroft, Washington Post
Compensate our Soldiers – London Times editorial
Immunity for Wiretap Assistance is Right Call – Lee Hamilton, Baltimore Sun

Continue reading "4 November SWJ Op-Ed Roundup" »

Continue reading "Beersheba Sunday" »

The Petraeus Curve – London Times editorial
AFRICOM: The Next Frontier - Robert Kaplan, The Atlantic
Civilian Agencies: At War But Not War-Ready - Hans Binnendijk, Washington Post
The Disgrace at State - George Packer, The New Yorker
Diplomatic Infighting – Tammy Schultz, Washington Post
Linking Public Diplomacy With Policy – Los Angeles Times editorial
“War Stories”: A Healthy Dose of Reality – Victor Davis Hanson, National Review
Iran: Expect No World War III For Now – Dennis Jett, Miami Herald
OEF: Japan Exits Stage Left – New York Post editorial
That Promised Mideast Peace Conference – New York Times editorial
No Time to Give Up on Democracy – Liz Cheney, New York Post
Oil Prices Enriching the Enemy – Los Angeles Times editorial
When Terror Isn’t Terror – New York Post editorial
Honduras a Blueprint for Building Global Partnerships - Marco Cáceres, Miami Herald
Beacon of Hope in Kenya – James Martin, Washington Times
Britain Should Pay For Its Colonialism - Mukoma Wa Ngugi, Los Angeles Times
Hope and Progress in South Africa – Derrick Jackson, Boston Globe
Unbowed in Burma – Washington Post editorial
A Commonwealth for the New Century – London Daily Telegraph editorial
Are We Just a Satellite of the U.S.? – Matthew Parris, London Times
Mukasey Has my Vote - Dianne Feinstein, Los Angeles Times
The Campaign Against Mukasey – Rich Lowry, National Review
Tortured Logic – Mona Charen, National Review
LOST: A Sinkable Treaty – Wall Street Journal editorial

Continue reading "3 November SWJ Op-Ed Roundup" »

A good friend and mentor of mine and of the Small Wars Journal community of interest sent along a link to his latest article – Caution: Iraq is Not Vietnam by Ambassador David Passage.

This article appears in the November 2007 edition of Foreign Service Journal.

From the Introduction:

The CORDS Program could not have been
successful in today’s Iraq or Afghanistan.

Over the past year, President George W. Bush and other senior administration officials have on numerous occasions invoked the U.S. assistance program in South Vietnam as an experience that offers lessons for Iraq. Specifically, the Vietnam-era Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program has frequently been held up as a model for the Provincial Reconstruction Teams currently operating in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The CORDS teams administered both security and development programs at the provincial and district levels in South Vietnam during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Like today’s PRTs, they comprised military and civilian personnel, the former always significantly outnumbering the latter. The civilians came primarily from the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, augmented by a limited number of direct hires from other agencies (e.g., Commerce, Treasury and Agriculture). There were also a limited number of personnel whom USAID brought on board expressly for CORDS, with no promise of career employment beyond Vietnam.

Yet despite basic similarities and parallels between the CORDS teams and today’s PRTs, there are also important and sharp distinctions. Lest today’s policymakers be misled into assuming that the earlier experience can be replicated today, I believe it is vital to identify several critical differences that affect the Foreign Service’s ability to help Iraq and Afghanistan deal with their internal difficulties and emerge as functioning economies with democratic societies…

Much more and well worth the read.

Links contained within quoted text inserted by SWJ.

-----

Link

"Iraq is Not Vietnam" - The Belmont Club

Continue reading "Caution: Iraq is Not Vietnam" »

How Iraq’s Elections Set Back Democracy - Ayad Allawi, New York Times
Hot Water for Blackwater – Mark Corallo, National Review
Don’t Blame Blackwater – R. J. Hillhouse, Christian Science Monitor
Iraq Media Coverage: “It’s Not the News” – Clifford May, National Review
Anti-war Movies Hurt America - Govindini Murty, New York Daily News
Taliban Bench Warmers – Christian Lowe, Weekly Standard
Who Wants to Kill Benazir Bhutto? - Robert Novak, Houston Chronicle
Diplomats, Pack Your Duffel Bags – Austin Bay, Washington Times
Iran: Carrots and Sticks – Cal Thomas, Washington Times
Europe Must Make Hard Choices on Iran - Timothy Ash, Guardian
Iran: Deterrence vs. Preemption in Collision – Zakaria and Podhoretz, The Australian
California’s New ‘Divest Iran’ Law - de Russy and Huessy, National Review
Bush's Daunting Warning on Terrorism – London Daily Telegraph editorial
The Real Madrid Bombers? - Thomas Joscelyn, Weekly Standard
Chasing Mideast Peace – Diana West, Washington Times
Glimmer of Hope in Africa – New York Times editorial
Mukasay and the Democrats – Wall Street Journal editorial
Mr. Mukasay and Torture – Washington Post editorial
Mukasay’s Fate Rests on Torture – USA Today editorial roundup
A Promising Senate Surveillance Plan - Los Angeles Times editorial
Sea Treaty Needs Safe Passage – Christian Science Monitor editorial

Continue reading "2 November SWJ Op-Ed Roundup" »

The Empty Chair at the Iraq Hearings – James Taylor, Washington Post
The Real Iraqi Miracle – Dean Barnett, Weekly Standard
Turkey’s Iraq Problem – David Phillips, Boston Globe
Iraq’s Next War – Daniel Pipes, Jerusalem Post
My Lost Year in Baghdad - Mokhtar Lamani, Ottawa Citizen
Afghanistan at the Brink – Roger Cohen, New York Times
OEF: The Japanese Navy Heads Home - Ayako Doi, Washington Post
Dangerous Cuba-Iran Kinship – Chris Simmons, Miami Herald
EU: From Payer to Player in Middle East - El - Hassan Bin Talal, Daily Star
Regression in Muslim Brotherhood's Platform? - Amr Hamzawy, Daily Star
Beyond Madrid, Terrorist Threat Remains – London Times editorial
Torture and the Attorneys General – New York Times editorial
Torture in the Senate – National Review editorial
Waterboarding is Torture - I Did It Myself – Leonard Doyle, The Independent
Mukasey's Black Magic on Torture – Rosa Brooks, Los Angeles Times
Dems and Torture: Mirror, Mirror on the Wall – Andrew McCarthy, National Review
Questioning Interrogation – Deroy Murdock, National Review
How to Try a Terrorist – John Coughenour, New York Times
Supreme Court Will Seal Pervez Musharraf’s Fate – Bronwen Maddox, London Times
Playing Sudan’s Game – New York Times editorial
Russia: Democracy Disinvited – Washington Post editorial
Russia: Memory, A Shield Against Terror – Boston Globe editorial
Gary Kasparov, Dissident – Daniel Henninger, Wall Street Journal
Argentina’s Presidential Transition – Jeremy Martin, Washington Times
UK: ‘The Kosher Conspiracy’ – Suzanne Fields, Washington Times
Nuclear India – Richard Halloran, Washington Times
The Meaning of Each Fold – Washington Times editorial
Beersheba’s Message – The Australian editorial

Continue reading "1 November SWJ Op-Ed Roundup" »

In reference to an earlier post - COIN Seminar: Dr. David Kilcullen – Wargaming Division of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory has posted my summary report (pdf – word) of the event.

From the earlier post (updated):

The Small Wars Center of Excellence had the privilege of organizing a Counterinsurgency (COIN) seminar featuring Dr. David Kilcullen on 26 September at Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia.

Dr. Kilcullen spoke to a standing room only crowd at the Gray Research Center and provided an excellent and very informative brief (1 ½ hour) followed by a Q&A period that could have lasted well beyond the allotted 45 minutes.

The purpose and scope of the COIN seminar was to share some basic observations on COIN theory and practice derived primarily from Dr. Kilcullen’s service in Iraq (2006 and 2007), Afghanistan (2006), and pre 9/11 campaigns in SE Asia and the Pacific. Additionally, the forum served as a conduit to open a discussion on issues relevant to seminar attendees.

Dr. Kilcullen opened with a caveat – everyone sees Iraq differently, depending on when they served there, what they did and where they worked. Because the environment is highly complex, ambiguous and fluid; observations from one time / place may or may not be applicable elsewhere – even in the same campaign in the same year. He enjoined the audience to first understand the essentials of the environment, then determine whether analogous situations exist, before attempting to apply “lessons”. Dr. Kilcullen’s role in Iraq (hence his bias) was as Senior COIN Advisor to General David Petraeus (Commanding General, Multi-National Force – Iraq [M-NF – I]). He spent approximately 65 percent of his time in the field and the remainder at M-NF – I Headquarters and the US Embassy in Baghdad.

The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s Wargaming Division has posted Dr. Kilcullen’s briefing slides here. The SWJ has posted a ‘backup’ copy of the brief here. The presentation, as well as the Q&A were videotaped and will be made available; along with the briefing slides, the summary report, a 45 minute video interview with Dr. Kilcullen, and several of his articles and SWJ Blog postings; on DVD. I’ll post another heads-up as the DVD production date nears.

Nothing follows.

Continue reading "COIN Seminar Summary Report" »

U.S. Defense Policy at a Crossroads - Frederick Kagan, American Enterprise Institute
War vs. ‘War’- Jonathan Foreman, National Review
Winning in Afghanistan - Harlan Ullman, Washington Times
Blackwater and Justice in Iraq – Los Angeles Times editorial
Saudi King: He’s One to Talk on Terror – Wall Street Journal editorial
Paying a Call on the Saudi Embassy – Stephen Schwartz, Weekly Standard
Yemen’s Truce with Al Qaeda – Jane Novak, Weekly Standard
Iran’s Challenge – Helle Dale, Washington Times
On Iran Fear is Counterweight of Overconfidence – Bronwen Maddox, London Times
Wildfires in the Middle East - Dan Simpson, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
Israel Lobby Has Sights on Iran – Rami Khouri, Daily Star
Mining for Trouble in Lebanon – Lenny Ben-David, Jerusalem Post
Jerusalem: An Embodiment of the Middle East Conflict - Ghassan Khatib, Daily Star
Rules of the Game: Palestinian-Style – Barry Rubin, Jerusalem Post
PM's Foreign Evasion is Highly Dangerous - Allan Mallinson, London Daily Telegraph
Tortured Logic - New York Daily News editorial
The Mukasey Test – Washington Times editorial
Target Mukasey - New York Post editorial
I Know Waterboarding is Torture - Malcolm Nance, New York Daily News
Mukasey's Confirmation: A Vote about Torture – Jonathan Turley, Los Angeles Times
There’s No Avoiding the Waterboarding Issue - Stephen Winn, Kansas City Star
Partners in the War on Terror - John D. Rockefeller IV, Washington Post
The Global Poverty Gap - Robert Samuelson, Real Clear Poltics
Surveillance Sanity – Benjamin Civiletti, Wall Street Journal
Shortsighted on Missile Defense - Charlie Szrom, Weekly Standard
On Cuba, The U.S. is an Island - Paolo Spadoni, Los Angeles Times
Cuban-Americans: Hardliners, Moderates, Appeasers - Frank Calzon, Miami Herald
Unbury the LOST Treaty – Washington Post editorial
LOST 25 Years and Counting – New York Times editorial
The Mysterious Case of the Law of Sea – National Review editorial
Engineer Corps Reform – Paul Harrison, Washington Times

Continue reading "31 October SWJ Op-Ed Roundup" »

Lt. Michael Murphy 'The Protector' - San Francisco Chronicle editorial
US Military: Asking Too Much of Too Few – Joseph Galloway, McClatchy Newspapers
New Threat Stirs Iraqi Nationalism – Richard Gwyn, Toronto Star
Kurdish Terror and the West - Tulin Daloglu, Washington Times
Will Bush Really Bomb Iran? – Sarah Baker, London Times
The Cost of Bellicosity Towards Iran - Kaveh Afrasiabi, Christian Science Monitor
Iran: “Murder with Impunity” – Paul Marshall, Weekly Standard
Mainstream Mosques: Studies in Hate – London Times editorial
How to Build Trust at Annapolis Summit – Alon Ben-Meir, Jerusalem Post
Saudis: Uncongenial, But Trustworthy – Amir Taheri, London Times
Upbeat Indicators – Donald Lambro, Washington Times
Restoring Habeas Corpus – Bruce Fein, Washington Times
The Waterboarding Dodge – Washington Post editorial
Is Mukasey Willing to be a 'No' Man in the White House? – USA Today editorial
Yes, It's Clearly Torture - Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel editorial
Bearing Witness to Torture - Clyde Haberman, New York Times
Reassess America's 'Idealism' – Janet Daley, London Daily Telegraph
Bush's Speech at Castro's Grave - Carlos Alberto Montaner, Miami Herald
Argentina: All in the Family – London Times editorial
Argentinians Elect Woman President - Pittsburgh Post-Gazette editorial
Kirchners: Two for the Price of One - Roberto Guareschi, Miami Herald
How Argentina Jump-Started its Economy - Mark Weisbrot, Los Angeles Times
Amazonian Swindle – Bret Stephens, Wall Street Journal
Uganda: Bush, Museveni: Step Up! - Carolyn Davis, Philadelphia Inquirer
Prosecuting Our Friends – Mona Charen, Washington Times
The Dalai Lama’s Plea – Toronto Star editorial
Australia: New Jet Fighters Buy Us Leverage – Nicholas Stuart, Canberra Times
German Soldiers and Toilet Paper – London Times editorial
LOST Runs Silent, Runs Deep – Frank Gaffney Jr., Washington Times

Continue reading "30 October SWJ Op-Ed Roundup" »

Al Qaeda's Quagmire - New York Post editorial
Learning the Right Lessons in Iraq – Michael Gerson, Newsweek Magazine
War, Like Life, Is Not a Movie – Mark Steyn, Orange County Register
Taking Down Terrorist Web Sites – James Zirin, Washington Times
Holy Land Trial: Evil Exposed - Steven Emerson, New York Post
Trash Talking World War III - New York Times editorial
Rein in the Rush to a War in Iran – Chicago Sun-Times editorial
Iran Continues to Meddle - James Lyons, Washington Times
Iran: Sanctions Smanctions – David Warren, Real Clear Politics
A Choice for the Ayatollahs - Ofer Bavly, Miami Herald
Don’t Alienate Ankara – Gidon Remba, Jerusalem Post
Can Bhutto Survive? – Robert Novak, Washington Post
The Importance of a Failed Israeli-Arab Summit – Gideon Levy, Haaretz
Israeli-Arab Conflict Not Ripe for Resolution Yet – Richard Haass, Real Clear Politics
Corruption’s Cost in the Arab World, Beyond – John Cooley, Christian Science Monitor
Don't Expect US to Push Egypt Democracy - Hrach Gregorian, Daily Star
Jordan: Elections without Surprises - Oraib Al-Rantawi, Daily Star
Be Decisive in Darfur – London Daily Telegraph editorial
NATO: Saying Yes to France – Ronald Asmus, Washington Post
Return to Bamiyan - Roger Cohen, New York Times
A World Overwhelmed with Hungry Little Mouths – Melanie Reid, London Times
America’s March of Folly - Francis Fukuyama, Canberra Times
Castro's Last Hurrah - USA Today editorial
More Cuba Fulminations – Boston Globe editorial
Cuba's Regime Deserves No Oxygen - Carlos Gutierrez, USA Today
Burma: Monks and the Military – Charles London, The Nation
Clinton: Foreign Policy Grownup – Sebastian Mallaby, Washington Post
Act on the Shield Law – Washington Post editorial
The Politics of Interrogation - Wall Street Journal editorial
Troubling Questions for Judge Mukasey - Miami Herald editorial
Mukasey: More Answers Needed - Carl Tobias, Batlimore Sun
Inspecting the CIA - Los Angeles Times editorial
PMCs: A Job for Uncle Sam - Baltimore Sun editorial
LOST at Sea - John Fonte, National Review
Annan: No Knight in Shining Armor - Nile Gardner, National Review

Continue reading "29 October SWJ Op-Ed Roundup" »

Abu Muqawama's counterinsurgency reading list to include bare bones essentials, intermediate reading (colonial and modern), advanced reading, political Islam and Islamist violence, fiction and films can be found here. Recommended additions to the list by site visitors can be found in comments.

One that I would add is The Village by Bing West.

To see what Council members are reading go here.

Nothing follows.

Continue reading "COIN Reading List" »

Inside the Surge - Michael Yon, New York Post
Ross Dead Wrong on How to Leave Iraq – Boston Herald editorial
Turks on the Border – National Review editorial
Armies of the Future: Brains, Not Bullets – The Economist editorial
The Real Heroes – Oliver North, Washington Times
On Guard Against Iran – New York Daily News editorial
Pressing Iran to Disarm – Toronto Star editorial
Walking Into Iran’s Trap – David Ignatius, Washington Post
The Challenge of Nuclear Deals - Mark Brzezinski, Boston Globe<