Lessons Not Learned: Contracting Out Iraqi Army Advising by Peter W. Singer at The Brookings Institution, 12 May 2008.

Singer is with Brooking's 21st Century Defense Initiative which is charterd to produce cutting-edge research, analysis, and outreach that address some of the most critical issues facing leaders shaping defense policy in the coming century. The initiative focuses on the following three core issues: The Future of War, The Future of U.S. Defense Needs and Priorities, and The Implications for the U.S. Defense System.

From Contracting Out Iraqi Army Advising:

One of the key questions surrounding the government’s escalating uses of military contractors is actually not whether they save the government client money or not (this, however, is getting harder to argue with the more than $10 billion that the Defense Contract Audit Agency believes was either wasted or misspent on contracting in Iraq. Rather the crucial question that should asked at the onset of any potential outsourcing is simple: Should the task be done by a private company in the first place?

...the Pentagon is seeking to hire private contractors to help fill out the teams that will train and advise Iraq army units, including in their operations in the field. In more blunt terms, arguably the most important aspect of the operation in Iraq, the crux to defeating the insurgency/getting our troops out of there (whichever you care more about), is starting to be outsourced.

This one is a doozy of lessons not learned. First off, outsourcing training of the Iraqi military has been tried before and is actually one of the many, many factors into why we have had such a hard time...

Second, to turn over the task of advising the Iraqis now, at such a critical stage in the war effort as we try to translate the limited tactical success of the surge into something more permanent, is not just horrible timing. In the words of one U.S. Army officer, it is “definitely not a job that rational USG policy-makers should want in the hands of U.S./western contractors anytime soon.”...

Thirdly, the resultant messaging and long-term effects have to be a cause for concern. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker testified a few weeks to Congress that building up Iraqi capabilities was the priority in the year ahead. Contrast this with the message that this contract sends to Congress, the American public, and most importantly, our Iraqi counterparts...

But, fourth, advising a partner military is not just about building up their military skillset. It is also about passing on values and building long-term relationships. When you contract out military advisors, the values of civil-military relations and professionalism are supplanted by the evident commoditization of military skills, not always the best message in a developing democracy. In turn, the relations are not built between officers advancing up the ranks between the two forces, but with a company and its ever-changing staff of employees...

Much more at Brookings. Hat tip to Phil Carter at Intel Dump for the e-mail pointer to this piece.

Discuss at Small Wars Council

Continue reading "Contracting Out Iraqi Army Advising" »

Finally got around to visiting the Canadian Military Journal web page again, long overdue. Here are three articles the SWJ community should find interesting.

Political Warfare Is A Double-edged Sword: The Rise And Fall Of The French Counter-insurgency In Algeria by Pierre Pahlavi.

This article will examine how French counter-revolutionary warfare in Algeria developed, how it was implemented, and what successes it achieved. It will also focus upon how the strategy impacted the traditional practices and structures of the army, with a view to better understanding the reasons that caused the French government to begin dismantling the army in 1959. The objective here is to elaborate upon the notion of a doctrine that became a vérité devenue folle1 [truth run amok], which resulted in the Grande Muette (the army) overextending its responsibilities, establishing for itself a political conscience, and rising against a central national power suspected of trying to betray its initial mission. The purpose of examining this ideologization and its possible role in the failure of the counterinsurgency experiment is also to better grasp the principles and the perverse impacts of a strategy that would play an increasingly important role in conflicts and in international relations during the 21th Century.

Preparing for Coalition Command - The Three Ps: People, Processes, and Plans by Ian Wood.

Coalitions are always complex systems, involving frictional interaction between political and military leaders through the entire spectrum of operations spanning the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. To that end, this article is designed to add to the body of professional knowledge on the important issue of coalition warfare command. More specifically, it will be argued that a methodology is needed that future commanders may apply during the pre-deployment period to assess the competence and capabilities of coalition force contributions. A series of factors will be provided that are intended to assist commanders in assessing the strengths and weaknesses of their assigned multinational forces. This article also, hopefully, will help prepare future Canadian commanders for success in areas such as leadership preparedness, force interoperability, and unity of effort.

Assimilating Urban Battle Experience - The Canadians at Ortona by Ian Gooderson.

At Ortona, the Allies encountered, for the first time, a built-up area turned by the Germans into a defensive zone in which to fight not just a rearguard action but also a prolonged defensive battle. For what it revealed of German urban fighting techniques, Ortona was invaluable, and the experience was characterized by further significant features. Defending Ortona were some of the most combat-proficient and motivated German soldiers in the field anywhere - paratroopers of the 1st Parachute Division, whose battalions had been deployed into theatre to stiffen critical sectors of the German front in Italy. Unlike their opponents, the Canadians lacked experience of, and possessed very little training for, such a battle, but, nevertheless, they gained the upper hand in the fighting. They adjusted to an unfamiliar battle environment quickly, and they devised and employed the methods necessary to win that battle.

More at the Canadian Military Journal.

Continue reading "Canadian Military Journal" »

According to Inside Defense (subscription required) U.S Special Operations Command is calling for a new executive agent for Irregular Warfare (IW) as part of its version of the fiscal year 2009 defense authorization bill.

Members of the House Armed Services terrorism, unconventional threats and capabilities subcommittee unanimously adopted the establishment of an executive agent of irregular warfare into their version of the FY-09 defense authorization bill.

While the legislative language is vague, subpanel Chairman Adam Smith (D-WA) noted that whatever action the department decides to take on the executive agent authority, the Pentagon needs to ensure that approach will have an interagency aspect. "There are a lot of different people that have concerns" with irregular warfare operations, Smith said, adding an interagency approach would ensure those concerns would be heard.

As far as which organization should be granted the executive-agent authority, subcommittee member Jim Marshall (D-GA) noted that of the two likely candidates for the job - the Army or U.S. Special Operations Command - the Army would benefit the most.

Arguing that the majority of future, full-scale conflicts the United States may be involved in will likely be conducted as irregular-warfare campaigns, Marshall said the Army had better become adept in waging that kind of war. "Big Army is going to have to be able to do [irregular warfare] and do it well," he said, adding that executive-agent authority for irregular-warfare would be a step toward that goal.

More at Inside Defense to include funding of USSOCOM’s unfunded mandates.

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Continue reading "On Executive Agent Authority for IW" »

Inside Defense (subscription required) is reporting the Defense Department is forming seven working groups to examine "priority" roles and missions issues, a few of which could plunge the military services into bitter internecine turf battles and give the Bush administration's Office of the Secretary of Defense a parting opportunity this summer to realign the defense bureaucracy.

The priority issues include ISR / Unmanned Aerial Systems, Intratheater Airlift / Joint Cargo Aircraft, Cyberspace Operations / Information Operations, Irregular Warfare, Excessively Overlapping Service Capabilities, DOD Governance Roles and Responsibilities, and Supporting Interagency Roles and Missions.

On Irregular Warfare Inside Defense had this to say:

The fourth issue group will focus on irregular warfare. It will be led by Michael Vickers, assistant secretary of defense for special operations / low-intensity conflict and interdependent capabilities; Marine Corps General James Mattis, commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command; and Lieutenant General John Sattler of the Joint Staff, also a Marine.

This group will examine irregular warfare capabilities that are common to special operations forces and general purpose forces in order to explore opportunities to forge greater integration and interoperability between the two, according to the draft document.

"What DOD organizational structure would provide the best oversight for irregular warfare, maximize efficiencies across DOD components, better balance risk and investment priorities, enhance future capabilities development and ensure effective operations?" asks the draft document.

With the Army and Marine Corps shouldering the bulk of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, this issue group will examine how "to develop air and maritime capabilities for counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense," according to the document.

For those who subscribe to Inside Defense there is much more on roles and missions issues and the upcoming review. Good read...

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Continue reading "IW on Roles and Missions Task List" »

New Army Handbooks Focus on First 100 Days of Combat by Navy Seaman William Selby.

American Forces Press Service

The U.S. Army has published three new handbooks to help soldiers prepare for the first 100 days of combat, officials said on a teleconference with online journalists and “bloggers” yesterday. (Transcript).

Army Col. Steven Mains, director of the Center for Army Lesson Learned, and Milton Hileman, a senior military analyst, explained that there was a small but clear rise in the number of casualties early in a combat deployment, concentrated in the first 100 days.

“It’s not a new phenomenon that … we just figured out and nobody had ever seen before, but it’s something we could clearly show was the case in Iraq,” Mains said.

“And so it drove us to say, well, what do they know at day 250 that they really need to know during those first 100 days?”

After an extensive interview process with approximately 1700 soldiers, Mains and Hileman said that there were three key elements to surviving the first three months; avoiding complacency, good decisions made by junior leaders, and the efficient staff processes at the battalion and brigade level for commanders...

Continue reading "New Army Handbooks Focus on First 100 Days of Combat" »

Will Hartley, Insurgency Research Group, has a great lineup of documents recently posted on the 'Net. Here are several examples:

Rethinking Counterinsurgency - John Mackinlay, Alison Al-Baddawy, Rand.

During the period of decolonization in Asia and Africa, the United Kingdom faced more insurgent activity than any other Western power. British government officials and military forces proved proficient at defeating or controlling these rebellions. However, these uprisings were much less complex than the modern jihadist insurgency. Past insurgent movements were primarily monolithic or national in form, had very specific local goals, and derived most of their power from the local population. These limitations made past rebellions vulnerable to strong military responses. In contrast, the modern jihadist insurgency is characterized by its complex and global nature...

Country Reports on Terrorism 2007 - US State Department.

US law requires the Secretary of State to provide Congress, by April 30 of each year, a full and complete report on terrorism with regard to those countries and groups meeting criteria set forth in the legislation. This annual report is entitled Country Reports on Terrorism. Beginning with the report for 2004, it replaced the previously published Patterns of Global Terrorism.

Iraq after the Surge I: The New Sunni Landscape and Iraq after the Surge II: The Need for a New Political Strategy - International Crisis Group.

The US military surge contributed to a significant reduction in violence but has reached the limit of what it can achieve. Without fundamental political changes in Iraq, success will remain fragile and dangerously reversible. The second of two companion reports, The Need for a New Political Strategy, analyses reasons for the current deadlock and suggests a way forward.

Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958 - Rand 2006 reprint of 1963 David Galula article.

Thus begins Lt Col David Galula’s account of his two years commanding a company of French troops in the Kabylia district, east of Algiers, at the height of the 1954–62 Algerian War of Independence. That uprising against French rule is remembered, if at all, as the last of the immediate post–World War II nationalist struggles waged by a colonized population against its European masters. For that reason, perhaps, France’s experiences in Algeria were mostly ignored by other countries, including the United States, which later found itself fighting remarkably similar insurgencies in Southeast Asia and Latin America, and today in Southwest Asia (e.g., Iraq).

Much more at Insurgency Research Group to include recent Small Wars Journal magazine offerings. Hat tip to ya Will.

Lastly, one not on the IRG list - American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador by Benjamin Schwarz of Rand.

This report assesses the political and social dimensions of American counterinsurgency policy in El Salvador. It attempts to explain why low-intensity-conflict doctrine has not produced the desired results and to reassess that doctrine's future utility. The author's appraisal of U.S. involvement in El Salvador leads him to conclude that there is a vast disparity between U.S. objectives and achievements there. For a decade, U.S. policy toward El Salvador tried to synthesize liberal and conservative aims: foster political, social, and economic reform, and provide security to a country whose freedom from communism the United States deemed essential. In attempting to reconcile these objectives, however, the United States pursued a policy that used means unsettling to itself, for ends humiliating to the Salvadorans, and at a cost disproportionate to any conventional conception of the national interest.

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Continue reading "Sunday Light Reading" »

Hybrid Wars by Greg Grant at Government Executive with a hat tip to Frank Hoffman for the pointer.

What if the battles of the future are neither conventional nor irregular, but a combination of both?

The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War featured some of the largest set-piece battles fought since the end of World War II. For American defense planners, the conflict provided a bounty of information on the performance of the latest military hardware from Western and Soviet arsenals that had been sold to the Israeli and Arab armies, respectively. After the war, U.S. defense officials went to Israel and picked over the battlefields, searching out lessons from the fighting.

The United States was busy extricating itself from the disaster of Vietnam, and many in the U.S. military, particularly in the Army, saw the big battles fought on the Golan Heights and in the Sinai as an opportunity to refocus their intellectual efforts away from fighting shadowy guerrillas in jungles and back to the conventional, big battles they preferred. The 1973 war displayed the lethality of new precision weaponry. It was the first war to feature large numbers of guided missiles, launched from both the air and the ground. Egyptian and Syrian troops, for example, used vast numbers of Soviet-built Sagger portable anti-tank missiles to savage attacking Israeli tanks.

Now, in a touch of déjà vu, American defense planners are examining another Arab-Israeli clash - this one from 2006, when Israel's army faced off against fundamentalist Muslim organization Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. In a war that lasted 34 days, Hezbollah fought the vaunted Israeli Defense Forces, considered one of the most technologically advanced militaries, to a standstill. The outcome sent shock waves through the world's military establishments, particularly the Pentagon. Ever since, Defense Department planners have been trying to discover how Hezbollah guerrillas could have defeated a conventional army outfitted with U.S. equipment.

Much more at Government Executive.

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Continue reading "Friday Night Read" »

CNN reported earlier today that the Republican National Committee takes exception to a Democratic National Committee campaign ad they say misuses Senator John McCain's remarks on US troops staying in Iraq for "100 years" in such a way to paint an incorrect portrait of McCain’s position on Iraq.

The Associated Press reported that he actually went on to say:

“As long as Americans are not being injured or harmed or wounded or killed, it's fine with me, and I hope it would be fine with you, if we maintain a presence in a very volatile part of the world where al-Qaida is training, recruiting, equipping and motivating people every single day."

The ad makes no distinction between sustained combat and other operations that require a much smaller US force footprint – a training and advisory role comes to mind here. Here is the ad - you be the judge:

I agree with the RNC on this one.

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Continue reading "RNC Says Unfair on DNC Attack Ad" »

Associated Press news item - Iran Dismisses Sabotage in Mosque Blast by Nasser Karimi.

Iranian officials on Sunday ruled out an attack as the cause of an explosion that killed 11 people inside a mosque in the southern city of Shiraz.

The explosion ripped through the mosque packed with hundreds of worshippers late Saturday as a cleric delivered his weekly speech against extremist Wahabi beliefs and the outlawed Baha'i faith, the semiofficial Fars news agency said.

Authorities said besides the 11 killed, 191 people were wounded, some of them critically, the state IRNA news agency reported...

The police chief of the southern Fars Province, Gen. Ali Moayyedi, said he "rejects" the possibility of an intentional bombing and "any sort of insurgency" in the blast.

Moayyedi, in comments carried by state IRNA news agency, said the initial investigation found remnants of ammunition from a military exhibition that was held recently at the mosque....

Sure, that's the ticket.

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Continue reading "Yea, Right" »

Doug Feith on Diane Rehm - Abu Muqawama

There is simply not enough booze in Abu Muqawama's apartment to get him through this interview on the Diane Rehm Show with Doug Feith.

I'd throw up my two-cents on the revisionists but it is much too nice a weekend to waste on the likes of Feith and company. If you really want more right now then curl up with this.

As many in the military publicly acknowledge here for the first time, the guerrilla insurgency that exploded several months after Saddam's fall was not foreordained. In fact, to a shocking degree, it was created by the folly of the war's architects. But the officers who did raise their voices against the miscalculations, shortsightedness, and general failure of the war effort were generally crushed, their careers often ended. A willful blindness gripped political and military leaders, and dissent was not tolerated...

Discuss at Small Wars Council.

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Continue reading "Cousin Abu is Most Right" »

Just got back from spending five days watching Dr. David Kilcullen in action at Joint Urban Warrior (JUW) 08, a US Marine Corps and US Joint Forces Command cosponsored program. Dave's SWJ blog entries and links to his other works (SWJ Library) are among the most visited and linked to items on the site.

I have some JUW items to blog about later, for now I'll leave you with a "wavetop" snapshot of the who and what and a slide from one of Dave's briefs to mull over. The slide depicts a framework for understanding (or more precisely “how to think about”) the transition of responsibility and authority of security, essential services, humanitarian assistance, economic development, and political governance from a coalition to host nation - the snapshot and slide are at the end of this post.

With that – we give you Kilcullen redux...

Continue reading "Kilcullen Redux" »

The first Emerald Express was conducted in 1995 under the direction of then Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni, Commanding General of I Marine Expeditionary Force. Emerald Express 1995 was the first of several large-scale interagency exercises that addressed operations from a comprehensive military and interagency perspective.

The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory - Wargaming Division (WGD) picked up the Emerald Express program (1999 – 2007), conducting a continuing series of conferences and workshops designed to quickly garner critical insights and issues from recent operations and directly distribute the results to as wide a range of appropriate organizations and individuals as possible. Participants were typically commanders and senior staff of units from all U.S. services and multi-national partners as well personnel representing relevant interagency and non-governmental organizations.

Some of the more recent WGD Emerald Express events have addressed urban operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom I and II, the interagency dimensions of OIF, humanitarian assistance and stability and support operations in OIF, USMC and Royal Marine operations in Operation Enduring Freedom, and counterinsurgency.

Marine Corps University (MCU) now owns the program, conducting Emerald Express 2008 on 25 – 26 March at Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia. From the opening remarks by Lieutenant General James Amos, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command:

This two day symposium offers a forum to examine the critical issues involved in integration of all elements of national power in the pursuit of national security objectives. Throughout this event, presenters and panelists from both the operational and academic worlds will provide perspectives of interagency efforts in our national capital region, Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the Pacific Theater. Our presenters and panelists were selected based on their expertise, knowledge, reputation, and recent experience.

MCU has posted papers, briefings and maps from the symposium on their Emerald Express 2008 web site.

On a personal note, I had the privilege of running six Emerald Express seminars for WGD and found the experience one of the most rewarding of my 30-year stint as a Marine, Marine civilian and consultant. The insights and observations provided by U.S. and Coalition military and civilian participants, as well as their dedication and professionalism was exceptional in furthering our understanding of complex operations.

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Continue reading "Emerald Express 2008" »

Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations by Richard Kohn at World Affairs Journal.

An excerpt:

When a new president takes office in early 2009, military leaders and politicians will approach one another with considerable suspicion. Dislike of the Democrats in general and Bill Clinton in particular, and disgust for Donald Rumsfeld, has rendered all politicians suspect in the imaginations of generals and admirals. The indictments make for a long list: a beleaguered military at war while the American public shops at the mall; the absence of elites in military ranks; the bungling of the Iraq occupation; the politicization of General David Petraeus by the White House and Congress; an army and Marine Corps exhausted and overstretched, their people dying, their commitments never-ending. Nearly six years of Donald Rumsfeld’s intimidation and abuse have encouraged in the officer corps a conviction that military leaders ought to—are obliged to—push back against their civilian masters. Egged on by Democrats in Congress—and well-meaning but profoundly mistaken associates who believe the military must hold political leaders accountable for their mistakes—some flag officers now opine publicly and seemingly without hesitation. Though divided about Iraq strategy, the four-stars unite in their contempt for today’s political class and vow not to be saddled with blame for mistakes not of their own making.

Read it all and then tell us 'what say you?' - Comment below or discuss at Small Wars Council.

Continue reading "Saturday Night Read: Crisis in Civil-Military Relations" »

National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies has posted its proceedings of the 2008 European Symposium - NATO: Bucharest and Beyond. Here are several take-aways from the report:

1) The NATO-ISAF operation poses the most critical test to date of NATO’s ability to generate the military forces required to meet its level of political ambition. In several categories, ranging from maneuver battalions to helicopters to C4ISR assets to Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) intended to build the capabilities of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Allied nations as a group are not filling the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) set by NATO Military Authorities. This allows opposition forces to operate in the space between what NATO-ISAF has and what it requires.

2) There exists a lack of “political will” among Allies whose publics and parliaments are questioning the goals and strategy of the Alliance commitment and, in some cases, are increasingly worried about casualties suffered by their forces and/or incidents of collateral damage affecting Afghan civilians. In addition, numerous Allies lack the required capabilities and/or funding to deploy and sustain their forces, particularly in the more challenging operational environment of Afghanistan. For some Allies, this is complicated further by their competing commitments to other operations (e.g., in the Balkans, Lebanon, and Africa.).

3) Allied governments have underestimated the tasks of simultaneously stabilizing the security situation, dealing with a complex set of opposition forces (Taliban, narco-terrorists, and tribal “warlords”), and developing a basic Afghan governmental capacity in a society wracked by decades of warfare and corruption. That said, there are important, albeit underreported, signs of progress in Afghanistan, and the strategic stakes remain high, for the region as well as the Alliance.

4) Within NATO, a variety of steps are underway to improve Allied individual and collective capabilities to deploy the forces and assets necessary for expeditionary missions, although resource limitations are a significant underlying problem. Within NATO and individual Allied forces, increased emphasis is needed on training military personnel and sharing “lessons learned” for complex and multinational counterinsurgency (COIN) operations with a heavy civilian military component.

5) “Naming and shaming” or “finger pointing” at Allies whose forces are not engaged, for various reasons, in the most dangerous areas will be counterproductive.

6) Serious effort is needed to improve NATO’s strategic communications capabilities with the Afghan population.

7) Notwithstanding public perceptions a few years ago that the United States had “lost interest” in NATO, the American commitment to the Alliance remains strong and enjoys broad bipartisan support.

*Hyperlinks inserted by SWJ.

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Continue reading "NATO: Bucharest and Beyond" »

A small sampling of several recent discussions at the Small Wars Council - for our many lurkers - take the plunge - registration is easy and the price is right...

Continue reading "What's Going on at the Council" »

Yep, those of us who have been around a while know some military acronyms, maybe too many. Still, for old hands and young bucks alike - how many times have you sat in on a “way ahead”, “new concept” or “thinking out of the box” death by Power Point briefing scratching your head at the mind-boggling array of mumbo-jumbo that repackages old thoughts under a new wrapper or otherwise serves no purpose other than compelling the audience to pull out their buzz-word bingo cards?

One of my pet peeves is commonality of language – calling a spade a spade and sticking with doctrinally acceptable terms to describe doctrine that is, well, accepted. Before you go changing the language, please do us all a favor and change the doctrine first, ensure the new terminology is better suited than the old, and above all - make sure the new and improved terminology finds its way into the DoD Dictionary of Military Terms.

Continue on for the Army's attempt to reduce the noise level...

Continue reading "Army Doctrine Update" »

While not all inclusive, here are some blog items that caught my eye and interest this week.

Lots going on (expect no less) over at Abu Muqawama; the COIN doctrine debate, a French COIN reading list, the Lebanon narrative and US Army doctrine, a bit about Robert Fisk (The Independent) and his disdain for our new COIN doctrine, and finally (something we linked to earlier) a little about the history of that COIN doctrine.

U.S. Tongue-Ties Self In Talking To World by MountainRunner blogger Matt Armstrong over at Democracy Project.

...we must accept that the romantic days of the United States Information Agency are gone. So many confuse the USIA and the other information services, such as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, of recent decades with the USIA that was engaged in the active psychological struggle that largely ended with détente and the finalizing of the European partition.

Unlike half a century ago, the U.S. military has a clear voice and is arguably our dominant public diplomat. Therefore, simply resurrecting “USIA” without reorganizing our national information capabilities across civilian and military lines would turn it into just another voice struggling to be heard over America’s military commanders, spokespersons, and warfighters.

The candidates must look deeper than re-creating an agency and or re-establishing old outreach programs. They must show strong leadership and have a bold vision to rally the government and country to adapt to a world that requires understanding the information effect of action, agile response capabilities, and above all, credibility and trust...

Much more follows...

Continue reading "SWJ Items of Interest" »

Mentor: A wise and trusted counselor or teacher.

Without waxing poetic - mentors are crucial to leadership development and should a military mentor hall of fame exist - retired US Army Colonel John Collins would be one of the first inductees.

Colonel Collins has given his kind permission to post the following e-mail and attachment (letter to General Robert Kingston) – a piece of history, a fine example of mentorship as it should be and proof-positive that the requirement for sage advice does not diminish with rank - enough said.

I've accumulated many valued acquaintances since childhood, despite being a loner all my life, but General Barbwire Bob Kingston remains my only close friend. I've missed him every day since he checked out on 28 February 2007, a year ago next Thursday. I was Bob's boss in the 82d Airborne Division when he was a captain and his faculty adviser when he was a lieutenant colonel student at the National War College.

My advice didn't stop after he wore stars. I thought perhaps you might like to review my August 1981 correspondence to Robert regarding the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). It focused primarily on the Persian Gulf after Soviet armed forces invaded Afghanistan, but important parts remain pertinent today (see attached letter, written by hand because I had no secretary and couldn't type). Marine Lieutenant General P. X. Kelley was the first RDJTF commander. The key question was: Who should replace P.X. when his tenure expired? Plans called for amphibious assaults to seize footholds in Iran if required, but Pentagon computers confirmed that no active duty Marine flag officer had ever landed under enemy fire, whereas Major General Kingston had hit the beach as a second lieutenant at Inchon on Korea’s west coast in September 1950. Bob got the job and pinned on three stars.

John M. Collins is a retired U.S. Army colonel and a distinguished visiting research fellow at the National Defense University. Collins culminated his military career as the director of military strategy studies and then as chief of the Strategic Research Group at the National War College. He was subsequently the senior specialist in national defense at the Congressional Research Service for twenty-four years.

Note: General Robert Barrow, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, also landed at Inchon during the Korean War but was, at that time, considered too senior for command of the RDJTF. Links were added to Colonel Collins' e-mail for background purposes.

Continue reading "Auld Lang Syne" »

Got a quick note from SWJ friend Paul McLeary who is wrapping up a month-long embed with the 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team in central Iraq where he bounced around to different company-sized patrol bases. He's now writing of his embed experiences at the Columbia Journalism Review ('Dances’ With Strongmen) and on his blog - War, the Military, COIN and Stuff.

... No officer or NCO on the ground I spoke with had any illusions about who it is they’re dealing with when working with the sheiks or the SOI. “In my mind,” Captain Glen Helberg, commanding officer of Charlie Company at Courage told me one afternoon, “the biggest challenge for me is that we’re not able to hold together this very loose coalition of IPs (Iraqi police), IAs (Iraqi Army), SOIs, and us. If we’re not able to maintain that, then the SOI guys can take their weapons, go home, pull their IEDs out of the garage and go back to what they were doing. We know that there are guys in the SOI who were attacking IPs and coalition forces a year ago. So in my mind the biggest fear is that we can’t integrate these guys into the government and into society quick enough.”

But they’re trying, and finding some success. In my few days at Courage, I accompanied Captain Helberg to several fruitful meetings with SOI leaders, local sheiks, and the area IP commander, all in the name of building trust among the groups...

Paul concentrated on 'boots on the ground' - how Non-Commissioned Officers, Lieutenants and Captains are working with the Sons of Iraq (formerly Concerned Local Citizens), Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army. Good stuff.

Continue reading "War, the Military, COIN and Stuff" »

While not all inclusive, here are some blog, news and commentary items that caught my eye and interest this week...

Continue reading "2 February Afghanistan / Pakistan / NATO Update" »

While not all inclusive, here are some of the items that caught my eye and interest so far this week...

Continue reading "31 January Iraq Updates" »

Tom Barnett on Counterinsurgency – US Army Field Manual 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 33.3.5.

The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, with forewords by David Petraeus, James F. Amos, John Nagl and Sarah Sewell. Naturally, I loved this one. I had gotten a sneak-peak preview from Conrad Crane himself at Leavenworth in Dec 05 when I was there interviewing Petraeus for the "Monk of War" piece (and addressing the student body) and finally perusing the book was quite enjoyable. The Sewell foreword is the best by far. Really rocks.

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Continue reading "Tom Barnett on FM 3-24" »

Urban Operations Journal – 28 February 2003

General Anthony Zinni (USMC Ret); experienced in the theory, planning, and conduct of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) as well as a leading proponent of cultural intelligence; developed the following considerations for humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations. The successful conduct of operations in Iraq extends well beyond 'taking down Saddam'. The end state we achieve in Iraq - and how we achieve it - will have a direct and serious impact on all future operations in the conduct of our war on terrorism.

They are presented here as helpful guidelines on winning the peace before, during, and after the dust settles in Baghdad and other Iraqi urban areas...

Continue reading "Zinni's Considerations Revisited" »

The December ’07 issue of Armed Forces Journal contains two commentary pieces that are harbingers of a debate brewing “inside and outside the beltway” concerning Counterinsurgency (COIN) / Irregular Warfare (IW) operations “after Iraq.” While the two AFJ articles focus on Army and Marine Corps COIN doctrine approved last December and its execution in Iraq, the issues the authors raise will most certainly carryover into a larger debate that will shape our National Security Strategy and military capabilities for decades to come...

Continue reading "Peace, Love, COIN? (Updated Links)" »

While not all inclusive, here are some items that caught my eye and interest so far this week - Meeting Abu Muqawama and the SWJ / AM COIN Academy book drive, Roggio on Iran's ratlines into Iraq, HTS in Iraq and CORDS in Vietnam, Barnett and Boot on Iran and the NIE, ThreatsWatch and Westhawk on State-Defense Africa rift, and Betz on Hoffman on civil-military relations...

Continue reading "SWJ Odds and Ends" »

I read with great interest Michael Phillips’ Wall Street Journal piece - In Counterinsurgency Class, Soldiers Think Like Taliban - as well as several e-mails concerning what is right and what is wrong with the Army's new Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Academy.

From the WSJ article:

... Six years into the Afghan war, the Army has decided its troops on the ground still don't understand well enough how to battle the Taliban insurgency. So since the spring, groups of 60 people have been attending intensive, five-day sessions in plywood classrooms in the corner of a U.S. base here, where they learn to think like a Taliban and counterpunch like a politician.

The academy's principal message: The war that began to oust a regime has evolved into a popularity contest where insurgents and counterinsurgents vie for public support and the right to rule. The implicit critique: Many U.S. and allied soldiers still arrive in the country well-trained to kill, but not to persuade.

In April, the Army gave a 26-year-old Rhodes scholar, Capt. Dan Helmer, six weeks to get the school up and running. Capt. Helmer tells his students, who rank as high as colonel, that the important battles here are 80% political and just 20% military. He exhorts them to go to great lengths to understand local politics, culture and history, to make sure actions they take on the battlefield help convince Afghans that the Kabul government will serve and protect them...

For a synopsis of the good and the bad please see Ad-hockery in Afghanistan by SWJ’s COIN counterparts and partners in crime (Charlie and AM) over at Abu Muqawama. An excerpt:

The Wall Street Jounal has a long and excellent article about the COIN Academy in Afghanistan. Establishing tactical schools in-country is a well known COIN best practice (the Jungle Warfare School in Malaya is perhaps the best known amongst COIN scholars). And, as part of our steep learning curve in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have put together such schools in both countries…

This no knock on Capt. Dan Helmer--the 26 year old Army captain and Rhode Scholar tasked with setting up the Academy. (Your faithful bloggers have benefitted from many email exchanges with him, and they all share a common mentor in fellow West Point Rhodie, LTC John Nagl.)

But, as he'll tell you, he's a freaking Army captain. Charlie is quite certain that Capt. Helmer is among the best and the brightest, but he's not among those who can get @^*% done in the Army (or Afghanistan). If we were serious about such things, we might assign someone with a bit more institutional clout. Someone who could get paper copies of FM 3-24 for the Academy (it's cool, the Army posts them online. The students just wait 47 hours to download them over what passes for an internet connection in Kabul). Someone who could actually institutionalize the Academy within the Army instead of it being a Frankenstein science project dreamed up by folks who've read ATOM one too many times.

We can't win the war without places like the COIN Academy and officers like Capt. Helmer. But we also can't do it with them alone…

Nothing follows.

Continue reading "First, the Good News…" »

While not all inclusive, here are some items that caught my eye and interest so far this week - COIN reading, more on Secretary Gates and soft power, Iraq, Afghanistan, Al Qaeda IO, AFRICOM, Uganda, Pakistan, barbarians, Saudi Arabia, anti-war movies...

Continue reading "SWJ Odds and Ends" »

Dr. Marcus Griffin on the American Anthropological Association Executive Board’s Statement on the Human Terrain System Project - Andrew Exum and Stephen McInerney on Lebanon - BBC interview with Dr. Dave Kilcullen - tons on the new Pakistan COIN strategy from Bill Roggio, Phil Carter and Westhawk - more on LTG Sanchez’s Democratic radio address - ZenPundit’s new home and look - John Robb now officially a Best and Brightest - and Max Boot on Army promotions…

Continue reading "Black Friday SWJ Odds and Ends" »

Having just read (for the second time today) Ann Marlowe’s Weekly Standard article Anthropology Goes to War I feel compelled to take exception publicly to the overall tone of her piece and in particular several items she misrepresented, intentionally or otherwise. I do this as a card-carrying member of what Marlowe terms the "Army of the Small Wars Journal"...

Continue reading "On Anthropology Goes to War" »

LtCol Tim Grattan, Deputy Director of the newly formed Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG), was by my ‘day job’ office today and I was able to go through his briefing on the Group’s ‘way ahead’ to include the proposed table of organization and equipment, basic concept of employment and many other issues associated with training and advising foreign military forces. While I cannot go into any details, I can say I came away quite impressed and hopeful that the Marine Corps has a solid plan to meet future training and advising requirements. A recent Marine Corps News item on MCTAG follows...

Continue reading "USMC forms MCTAG" »

While not all inclusive, here are some of the items that caught my eye and interest so far this week...

Continue reading "13 November SWJ Odds and Ends" »

While not all inclusive, here are some of the items that caught my eye and interest this week...

Continue reading "9 November SWJ Odds and Ends" »

Pakistan Emergency - Wall Street Journal editorial
Musharraf's Latest Coup - Washington Times editorial
Crackdown in Pakistan Leaves U.S. in Quandary - USA Today editorial
Pakistan in Peril – London Times editorial
Terror in Pakistan – The Australian editorial
Pakistan: Desperate Act of Weak and Rattled President – The Independent editorial
A Second Coup in Pakistan - Ahmed Rashid, Washington Post
Pakistan: When an Anti-Terror Ally Fails – Christian Science Monitor editorial
Pakistan, The Heart of a Global Crisis – William Ress-Mogg, London Times
Musharraf’s Mini-Martial Law – Ali Eteraz, Guardian
Pakistan: A Plea for Moderation - Noreen Ahmed-Ullah, Chicago Tribune
Musharraf Has Lost His Marbles - Asma Jahangir, The Independent
Legal Loopholes in Iraq - New York Times editorial
This Won’t be the Iraq Election – Fareed Zakaria, Newsweek Magazine
Is Maliki's Corruption Worth American Lives? - Henry Waxman, Los Angeles Times
Turkey Under Fire - Washington Times editorial
Turkish Threat - Boston Globe editorial
Turks and Kurds – David Warren, Real Clear Politics
Kurdistan's Hope for Talks - Nechirvan Barzani, Washington Post
Turk-Kurd Turmoil Tripwires - Kenneth Timmerman, Washington Times
The Future of U.S.-Turkey Relationship – Bilal Cetin, Turkish Press
Lessons From Turkey’s Strife – Nicole Abadee, Canberra Times
Crisis in Turkey Only About PKK? – Khaled Salih, Daily Star
All Still Quiet on the Syria Bombing - Jackson Diehl, Washington Post
An Arab Initiative to Avoid a Failed Conference – James Zogby, Daily Star
Middle East: Enough of ‘Enough’ – Barry Rubin, Jerusalem Post
Nukes on the Nile – San Francisco Chronicle editorial
Iran: Nuclear Meltdown - Kurt Anderson, New York Magazine
The Don Quixote of Darfur – Romesh Ratnesar, Time Magzine
Balfour at 90 – Jerusalem Post editorial
Bolivia: No Crime, No Punishment - Roger Noriega, Miami Herald
Uncle Sam on the Line - John Ashcroft, New York Times
Confirm Mukasey -- and Stop Torture - Los Angeles Times editorial
Mukasey Should Espouse American Principles - Pittsburgh Post-Gazette editorial
Mukasey's America - Nat Hentoff, Washington Times
When Does Coercion Become Torture? - Richard Saccone, Baltimore Sun
Torture Moral Preening - Mona Charen, Washington Times
Interrogation Abuses Undercut Moral Authority - Cynthia Tucker, Baltimore Sun
U.N. Should Clean its Own House - Claudia Rosett, Philadelphia Inquirer
Strategic Airlift on Artificial Life Support - Jim Saxton, Washington Times

Continue reading "5 November SWJ Op-Ed Roundup" »

'We Band of Brothers’ – Jennie Yabroff, Newsweek Magazine
Iraqi Parliament: Reconcilable Differences – Frederick Kagan, Weekly Standard
Congress’s Unused War Powers – George Will, Washington Post
Mideast: Talking the Talk - Arnaud de Borchgrave, Washington Times
Lessons From Failed Camp David Talks – Moshe Amirav, Daily Star
Peace Talks: Ignore the Spoilers – Naomi Chazan, Jerusalem Post
Noun + Verb + 9/11 + Iran = Democrats’ Defeat? - Frank Rich, New York Times
How to Rein in Iran Without War – Jim Hoagland, Washington Post
Attacking Iran Makes No Sense – Joseph Galloway, Miami Herald
Bellicose Bush Pushing Iran to Arms – Mark Bowden, Philadelphia Inquirer
The Future War on Terror – Oliver North, Washington Times
Iraq Assignment Divides Diplomatic Corps – Pittsburgh Post-Gazette editorial
Of Diplomats and Men - William Kristol and Dean Barnett, Weekly Standard
Public Diplomacy: Selling America – New York Times editorial
End of the Karen Hughes Era – Stephen Hayes, Weekly Standard
Orwell Matters – Los Angeles Times commentary series
Rice: Why Her Dreams Crashed – Fred Kaplan, Washington Post
David Miliband and King Abdullah II – Rod Liddle, London Times
A Lesson on Muslim View – Jonathan Last, Philadelphia Inquirer
Britain’s Love Affair with the Saudi Kingdom – Jemima Khan, London Daily Telegraph
Pakistan’s State of Emergency – Washington Post editorial
Bhutto May Regret Bargain with Musharraf - Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, Daily Star
India’s New Untouchables - Asra Nomani, Washington Post
What Burma Must Fear – U