Small Wars Journal

ANGLICO – A Test of Diversity

Tue, 10/25/2011 - 5:55pm

ANGLICO – A Test of Diversity

by Zacchaeus

There is a great deal of debate underway as to what the Marine Corps will look like as it emerges from our current conflicts and navigates its way through an era of fiscal austerity.  In 2010 General Conway commissioned the Force Structure Review Group to evaluate this issue and one of the key takeaways from the group was the realization of the USMC’s “sweet spot” -the Marine Corps provides the nation a primarily maritime, fully expeditionary, capability between special operations teams and conventional army units. 

In a recent hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, Jim Thomas, Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, noted the importance of examining service roles and missions during the current budget reduction process.  He notes that rather than having all services equally prepared for all contingencies across the spectrum of conflict, the DoD should explore greater differentiation between the services. He then provides an interesting vision for the Marine Corps:

The Marine Corps might reinvigorate its role providing forward presence and optimize itself as the Nation’s premiere on-call crisis response force on a day-today basis. In a state of general war, the Marine Corps might perform two main roles: first, small teams of highly distributed / highly mobile Marines could conduct low-signature amphibious landings and designate targets ashore for bombers and submarines as a vanguard force in the early stages of a blinding campaign; and second, the Marines could play an instrumental role seizing key bases and maritime chokepoints, particularly in peripheral theaters, to enable follow-on operations of the joint force.

The concept that Mr. Thomas, a former naval reserve officer and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, outlines is thematically aligned with the recommendations of the FSRG and other operational concepts, such as Distributed Operations. The capability he describes is resident, in part, in the current Marine Corps’ Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies (ANGLICO). Unfortunately this recommendation also duplicates similar capabilities of another service – The USAF Combat Control Teams.

United States Air Force Combat Controllers are ground combat forces specializing in a traditional pathfinder role while having a heavy emphasis on simultaneous air traffic control, fire support and command, control, and communications in covert or austere environments. Since their inception, USAF CCTs have performed admirably in a variety of operations and provided key support to SOCOM over the past decade.  Taking Mr. Thomas’ recommendation into consideration, it appears as though this ground combat role is more aligned to the Marine Corps than to the Air Force. Historically, the USAF may have retained this mission because the USMC was not integrated into SOCOM.  However it appears the USMC – SOCOM relationship will be an enduring one.

While the Marine Corps doesn’t organize for this specific mission, it does maintain those critical skills in a variety of MOSs. As the Marine Corps considers how to reorganize its forces to meet the recommendations of the FSRG, it must evaluate how to transition organizations designed to counter a Cold War adversary to a more agile and distributed one, capable of countering the full spectrum of hybrid threats.  The Marine Corps could create the type of capability Mr. Thomas describes by expanding the ANGLICO concept.

This evolution of USMC forces can be accomplished during this era of downsizing but would involve several tradeoffs. There are approximately 2,500 Marines (Officer and Enlisted) assigned to Marine Aviation Command and Control units.  MACCS units provide procedural control of aircraft, air traffic control and robust expeditionary C4I support among other functions. A significant percentage of these Marines are supporting Low Altitude Air Defense and Air Defense Control Missions. The Marine Corps should be willing to accept risk in these two mission areas and rely on the army and air force to provide mission support in the joint environment. Those Marines with CCT-like skills can be shifted to ANGLICO units resulting in increased capacity for the Joint an Special Forces with no growth in end strength.

For the sake of argument, let’s assume that to this point I’ve persuaded you of three things: 1) The Defense of the nation will benefit from shifting the current CCTs roles and missions to the Marine Corps, by creating an increased number of expeditionary teams with no loss of capability and eliminating duplication across the services; 2) The Marine Corps will benefit by transforming some out dated organizations into a capability that supports more palatable amphibious missions and is better aligned to the recommendations of the FSRG; and 3) The Air Force will benefit by getting out of the ground combat mission, thus allowing the service to focus on much needed cyber, space and air capabilities.

Unfortunately Mr. Thomas’ vision of celebrating the diversity of capabilities among the services will likely never be achieved.  In recent history senior leadership within DOD has done poorly in prioritizing missions and eliminating or realigning capabilities across services. In order to accomplish this, the Joint Staff and services must cooperate and leadership needs to breach some of the parochial obstacles emplaced along this avenue of efficiency. Hopefully the realities of the fiscal environment will force leaders to rethink existing programs and missions in order to optimize capabilities across the services.

Zacchaeus was a Greek tax collector hated by his peers for perceived collaboration with the enemy.  It is the pseudonym of a retired Marine, working at the Pentagon.  He lives in fear for his children, family pet and automobile should his real identity fall into the hands of status quo thinkers in the Marine Corps.

Comments

Slab,
Your wrong on so many pts:
1st) You state that Advanced Force/Pre-Assault "are largely the domain of SOCom" but basically imply they're only the domain of SOF which is false.

50yrs ago the USMC created the blueprint of what we now consider Advanced Force/Pre-Assault Operations. The USMC's Marine Corps Test Unit 1 MCTU-1's PathFinder Plt, which eventually became Force Recon, developed the concept of deploying teams 300+miles behind lines (thru HALO) capable of Controlling AirPower, leveraging Close Air Support & Specialized raids to shape the battlefield prior to an Assault.

Force Recon & ANGLICO further perfected it in Vietnam (Stingray & Keyhole); it was later adopted by Army SF, LRRP Rangers, & AF Commandos.

2nd) Tell me when the USMC discarded DO? They haven't actually they've expanded it. Its grown to encompass DO Enhanced Coys under (ECO) & an entire MAGTF under (EMO).

The HASC speaker, Jim Thomas, was describing a USMC where current Specialized capabilities like FR & ANGLICO marry up w/emerging capabilities like Ship-to-Objective-Maneuver (STOM) in which an Enhanced MAGTF sitting 100+miles at sea & launches Company Landing Teams (CoLTs) for various missions.

3rd) You don't understand Amos' Middleweight force. Amos screwed up CMC Conway's much better analogy, the Two-Fisted Fighter. In it he describes a Middleweight Champ who has the skill and speed to box the Lighter skilled weight classes, but the KO power to bulk-up to fight Heavyweights.

In 2004 SOCOM evaluated the USMC's SOF capabilities their report stated that in the areas of DA/SR & Intel the USMC's MSPF deploys with capabilities not found outside of a Tier I SMU, & some capabilities like Radio Recon & the HET are only found in the USMC.

The Middleweight force is not half way between force, but a force that can comfortably flow fr/SOF to Heavy & operate in the Capability Gaps between them.

4) I think you have a superficial understanding of ANGLICO. The only thing that a CCT could do that an ANGLICO FCT couldn't is support a Highly Specialized mission such as OBL, ANGLICO's optimized for a much broader Skill Set.

ANGLICO training exercise http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=52738

5) As far as absorption into MarSoc, MarSoc doesn't exist to support the MAGTF or the Marine Corps, MarSoc exists to support Cmdr USSOCom. Like FR ANGLICO is a MAGTF asset, what makes the MAGTF unique is that it maintains its own Special Missions capability.

When the MEU(SOC)s lost FR to MARSOC it was the CoComs (CentCom, PacCom, etc) that were the most vocal because they lost a fwd-deployed Special Missions capability that was not directly under the control of SOCOM.

Understand that before you fill the blanks on what you don't know about the Marine Corps.

While I disagree with some things stated by the author I have to totally disagree with Slab.

The author makes a few key presentation errors where the reader is left w/the impression that said (improved) ANGLICO would duplicate AF's CCT. There are 2 problems w/that: 1) ANGLICO is already capable of conducting everything described above. 2) ANGLICO is not duplicative of CCT its been doing it for more than 50yrs & did it first.

Not only that but in an Advanced Force/Pre-assault role (not some singular specialized raid like the OBL raid) ANGLICO is far more capable.

Unlike CCT who's Fire Support is basically limited to controlling & directing CAS ANGLICO's teams are capable of planning & conducting all forms of Combined Arms/Fire Support missions fr/Naval Surface & Submarine Fires to coordinating Artillery & Mortar. They're also certified in the Fire Support practices of NATO & 15 other Allied Nations & have worked w/everyone fr/SEALs & SF to the SAS.

The problem w/how the author presented the article was that it came off sounding as if ANGLICO would be duplicating CCT instead of what I believe he meant which is that the USMC needs to do more to emphasize marrying up its Specialized capabilities like ANGLICO w/its emerging capabilities like DO/ECO/EMO.

crawley

Sun, 11/06/2011 - 7:54am

In reply to by Slab

There is certainly room for debate as to which services/components do what on the concept of small distributed ground units operating from the sea calling for air and naval fires. The concept put forth by Jim Thomas (and others...) has tremendous merit. It's time to begin wargaming and exercising the concept across a variety of scenarios and terrains.

I disagree both with the author's concept for ANGLICO and Mr. Thomas' envisioned first role for the Marine Corps. First, what Mr. Thomas envisions in fact better describes Advanced Force Operations, which are largely the domain of Special Operations Command. While the Marine component of SOCOM may very well play a role, SOCOM is better trained and equipped for the mission he describes. The Marine Corps tried Distributed Operations and, I believe, found it prohibitively expensive to train and equip GPF to perform these sorts of missions. Gen Amos articulated a much better concept of employment for the Marine Corps which is more in line with Mr. Thomas' second envisioned role, that of a middleweight force which bridges the gap between Special Operations Forces and the Army's heavier combat units.

Lastly, I disagree with the author's proposal to assign these types of missions to ANGLICO. Saying that ANGLICO replicates USAF Combat Control Teams shows a superficial understanding of both units' roles. ANGLICO exists to provide MAGTF commanders with a liaison and terminal control capability in support of joint or coalition forces assigned to the MAGTF. They do not, generally, support Advanced Force or Pre-assault Operations unless their supported unit is tasked to do so. This capability has been an absolute force multiplier for both the OIF and OEF MAGTFs, and I think it would be a mistake to attempt to realign it to another mission which could ultimately result in its absorption into MARSOC.