One week after several battalions of Marines swept through the Helmand River valley, military commanders appear increasingly concerned about a lack of Afghan forces in the field.
"What I need is more Afghans," said Brig. Gen. Larry Nicholson, commander of the Marine expeditionary brigade in Helmand Province. He accompanied the top American commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, during a visit with troops at Patrol Base Jaker here on Monday.
General Nicholson and others say that the long-term success of the operation hinges on the performance of the Afghan security forces, which will have to take over eventually from the American troops.
General Nicholson said the American force of almost 4,000 had been joined by about 400 effective Afghan soldiers...
More at The New York Times.
Comments
I am concerned about a possible strategy policy mismatch here.
We seem to understand that we need to put an Afghan face on our ops, but politically are unable to make it happen. At times it appears we are repeating the mistakes of the past. During the second Anglo-Afghan War, the Britsh achieved tactical military success only to realize they could not achieve the politcal success they wanted. Another example is the the French Algerian war in the 1950s. The French strategy was based on the idea that they could win through operational military success. It did not work. They won every battle to include the battle of Algiers, but still lost the war. I see a similar logic/approach in some of US strategy over the last several years.
We have got to get the political aspects right. If we do not have the forces with the correct political skills (language, etc.) and have ANA support, we are bound to repeat history.
No, we certainly shouldn't be robbing Peter to pay Paul with regard to ANA forces. But if that's the case, then we shouldn't be launching major COIN operations into Taliban-held areas and then plastering it all over the news and holding it up as an example of how to "fix" Afghanistan. If we're not ready to take back Helmand, then we're just not ready. Rushing something like this and doing it incorrectly will further destabilize southern Afghanistan and needlessly endanger American troops and Afghan civilians.
Brandon and Alan:
Totally agree with you guys. Part of the problem that I'm sure everyone saw in advance but no one wanted to do anything about was that there just isn't a whole lot of ANA that can be shifted around without losing coverage in another province. In places like eastern Nuristan and Konar provinces where the Coalition can barely keep control of their own FOBs, taking out the ANA would probably result in Coalition deaths and cede a lot of control back to the Taliban. Perhaps some of the northern and western areas could sacrifice some of their ANA, but is it a good idea to rob Peter to Paul? (I don't just ask that rhetorically -- maybe it would be worth it to withdraw troops from some of those contested areas and deal with them later. I've heard some convincing arguments to that effect.)
Not having ANA troops as part of the operation seriously dilutes its effectiveness. The marines need the ANA in order to develop good area intelligence in their operational area. Area intel is about figuring out local politics and concerns. Without this, you cannot counter the Taliban narative and convince the locals that they should side with the Afghan government and the US.
This would be stunning, frankly, if the Afghan forces don't materialize. After all this talk of doing things differently after eight years, after all the talk of "putting an Afghan face" on it, after all the hoopla surrounding McChrystal's appointment and the "new" COIN strategy, we send 4,000 troops into a Taliban-held area without a full complement of Afghan forces?
I'm sure there's a lot of politicking taking place on the ground, so I'll withhold criticism until I hear that the Afghans definitely aren't coming. Hopefully this is just a temporary delay. Otherwise, I don't see this turning out well.