Comments
Prospective APH,
Courtesy of my branch rep, I have a APH PPT slideshow explaining some details of the program. I'd be happy to send it to you if you wish. I can be reached at:
I've volunteered for APH and have been scouring the net & other resources for all the info I can get. The comments here have provided some insightful info. For the record, I like to think that I've had a successful career to date with Iraq deployment experience, and don't qualify for the "dregs of the military" tag either.
APH... there you go with attempting to apply common sense and logic. Be careful, that is contrary to the beliefs of the fobbits. I could not agree more on the fact that all planning AND operations NEEDS to be done in active continuous partnership with the appropriate Afghan counterparts. It does slow our operations and certainly can be frustrating but it must be done. I think if we need to cut the ISAF, IJC, CSTC-A HQs by 50% and then pushed all of those field graders out to the PRT level and below to be mentors. Improvement to the ratio of workers/collectors vs. taskings (FRAGOs) would help the mission significantly.
I'm also an APH stationed in Kabul, and like some of the others I'd also argue the assertion that APHs represent the dregs of the military. There are certainly some running around who do great disservice to the program, either by hiding on a FOB or by simply providing nothing of value. That's pretty much the case in every headquarters though I suspect, APH or no. Most of the APHs in Kabul are at least assigned duties as advisors to the Afghan government, be it MOD, MOI, or the line ministries. Personally I spend all day every day at the MOI headquarters and my interaction with Afghans is limited only by my own motivation. Others I know have to deal with a lot more internal meetings that drag them back to their base entirely too much. What bothers me is that right or wrong there is still a strong perception out there that the people sent off to work with the Afghans are the second string while the first string stays at the base and cranks out powerpoint and FRAGOs. If we're serious about leaving this place eventually, it might help if we didn't write major plans in coalition only OPTs and then drop them on the Afghans and get upset when they don't agree with it. Frankly I don't understand why all our tactical HQs aren't combined coalition/Afghan at this point, but maybe I'm just an idealist who thinks partnering actually means something.
I'm with you: orders to ft. living room. Didn't mean to imply "one AH dying"- but "one AH dying who is assigned to a certain command". Troops have to fit a certain profile for ISAF to be worried NATO will stop sending (more than pull-out) troops. Unfortunately that affects many AH guys- not all- but many. I'm really not sure why the other AH guys are so stifled- I only have to suspect it is risk-averse subordinates.
ITK - The circular flow of your explanation required a few moments to comprehend but now I understand I think. The bad thing is that if you are correct we are all in need of orders to Fort Living Room. The day that P4 believes that one Afghan Hand dying on a mission would cause NATO to withdraw is a day that either he should retire, run for president quickly, or I quit because I have NO perspective on what is going on in this place. I know our country on the whole is far more risk averse than it was 30 or 60 years ago but the US had two US troops in Faryab killed by an ABP officer the here recently and we have neither seen any intent by NATO to pull out or even stop training ABP for that matter.
IAA-
I don't agree. There are examples wherein subordinate commanders have convinced COMISAF that for political reasons it is best to violate his COIN guidance. These political reasons assume that NATO forces will withdraw if Afpak hands guys are killed. I disagree with this assumption- and the corollary: that any fallout from AH deaths outweighs violating the COIN guidance. I think the COIN guidance is great- but we can't overcome terrible assumptions, micromanaging, and risk-averseness.
Morgan - Ultimately I feel the most effective route would be for COMISAF to put in writing what he wants, assuming he truly believes in the freedoms that are currently only encouraged, and orders it so. Anything less will not sufficiently cover the lower level commanders and then you are right back to what we have now... which is every Afghan Hand working within their chain of command to the best of their abilities and based on the personality of their commander. The AME in Kabul is doing a great job to try to push people into jobs that are a good fit and that do have commanders who "get it" but it would be far more effective and efficient if COMISAF were willing to "fight the battle for them". One signature from him would move more earth than 1000 of us digging for the rest of our tours.
We used to joke about one of the FORCEPRO policies in the Green Zone: you could walk around without body armor, but if you were in a vehicle- it had to be uparmored.
That meant that the Afpak Hands guy who was seen as a "burden" to his unit and wasn't given a vehicle- couldn't bum a ride in his counterpart's pick-up truck on the way back from the ministry- but he COULD walk next to it as it drove by the command...
"I am also able to be more responsive to GIRoA officials as if they have a short notice need to discuss an issue with me I can readily attend"
The above is precisely why anyone in an advisory role needs a greater level of freedom...building and maintain the relationships that we are tasked with requires the ability to respond to your counterpart when he asks for you.
Not sure what the answer is regarding how to improve such advisory programs, whether it is to place such efforts under SOF, who routinely do this sort of thing, or screen leaders & weed out the hyper-risk averse. But IAA is correct, thos of us in such roles are well aware of the risks, know how to deal with them, and are capable of doing so without multiple levels of bureaucracy pressing down and demanding "risk mitigation" factors that ultimately hinder or negate the advisory effort.
It's a bit difficult to build/ maintain trust with your counterpart if you cannot be trusted to be there when your counterpart needs you.
IAA
Intheknow - Absolutely true. Commanders are regrettably overly emotional with regards to their concern for the safety of the Afghan Hands personnel. We are all adults and as such should be given the latitude to state our mission intent and be permitted to execute without undue concern from commanders for our safety. I am lucky enough to be located in an area where the threat is relatively moderate and my leadership is aware of how the real world works. I travel in my "up armored" land cruiser to numerous meetings every week. The ability to not neet to coordinate a "force protection" team prior to any movements allows me to have at least 50% more meeting, that detail being for those that are drawn to statistics. For those who do not have that predisposition I am also able to be more responsive to GIRoA officials as if they have a short notice need to discuss an issue with me I can readily attend. There are "other US Forces" in the area that are not able to do that and they are quite frustrated by the far slower pace at which they are able to engage on issues. There are challenges... but they are being worked out over time as one should expect. This is the 7th country I have been deployed to, and not my first time here and I have yet to see any location that was without faults. It will be better upon my return... and I do look forward to my return deployment. How many people in country can say that...
<EM>I suspect it is in part due to the fact that the commander of that entity is unwilling to use them per the COMISAF implementation guidance. </EM>
Exactly right. And that stems from a combination of micromanagement and "risk aversion" with invalid assumptions commanders have made as to what will happen if an Afpak hands guy (or anyone in their command) dies. What do they think will happen? NATO pulls out.
I think it is sad that we won't let guys do their jobs because we think NATO will pull out of Afghanistan if we lose one American...
Afpak Hands guys can't travel with their counterparts in some commands, have to wear "FRAG KIT 9" FORCEPRO and uniform everywhere no matter the occasion, and have to travel in convoys of MRAPs wherever they go. And COMISAF is aware of this.
Drew,
Maybe its naiveté or inexperience or pure unprofessionalism to make comments such as yours making a blanket assumption/assertion on an entire program based on the 6 AfPak Hands you are in contact with however, youre entitled to your opinion such as it is. I personally have been overseas in foreign countries for 14 of the 16 years I have been in the military and doubt that I am all that unique with my counterparts in the program. I'm not sure who would not take great offense to being referred to as "dregs of the military". What information do you have that qualifies that remark? Maybe instead of looking to fire your AfPak Hands you find a way to either better employ or, better yet, enable them to do the job that they were sent to do.
I find that those who oppose the program here in theater are more worried about losing their jobs because, like it or not, the AfPak Hands program is the enduring solution agreed on by those much higher than yours or my pay grade. Tweaks and adjustments are due as with any new group or program and there are always dissentions in the ranks as well as without but do you have a better solution, one more feasible than the one currently endorsed and supported by the highest ranks in our military? Im not presumptuous enough to assert myself into saying I have a better long-term solution and I would imagine you would be as well if faced without the anonymity of the internet.
"The AF/PAK Hands program is, in my opinion, the exit strategy for this theater." Couldnt agree more with Bulldog. While the phrase "building the airplane while were flying it" is apropos, it will get better and more defined as time goes on and leadership adjusts when needed (hopefully). Applying the five Special Operations Forces Truths may be more than a bit presumptuous but drawing a parallel is not. Given time and support, the AfPak Hands program will succeed.
Gentlemen:
I am an APH officer and have been in country for almost a year. I have seen personnel assigned to the program in which they were not a good fit for this type of work, and I have also used the term "worthless" for these officers who just cannot work in the Advisor environment. I have often joked that we are the 1st Earth Battalion, using "Emerging Tactics" to build relationships and solve problems. The program is actually set up like the old MAAG programs we use to have until they were closed down in 1993.
We are specifically Military Advisors. Although some of our Hands are in the VSO program, Female engagement teams,with CFSOCC, or the CJSOTF, However, most of us are with conventional units, and at many times they are unsure how to employ us to our potential.
I have been very lucky as I was made the Coalition Force commander for the Operational Coordination Center Region East, so I work with Afghans for about 10-14 hours every day. The OCC-R is in charge of coordinating security with all 4 entities of the ANSF over 7 Provinces. Other Hands have been used as manning solutions and are stuck at staffs doing PPT.
The program is expanding and this is a good fit for SOF officers, as in many cases we are working on our own. Everything we do here is to build relationships and advise the ANSF, and even our own Coalition, on COIN and to improve their capabilities. All of us in the program have had varying degrees of success.
The AF/PAK Hands program is, in my opinion, the exit strategy for this theater. We have grown from the original 250, to a group of 700, with the Army and Marine Corps directed to increase the number of Hands by 30%.
As to this program being a Flop, I would have to disagree. This program was thrown together, and not spelled out well to the CJTF's that employ us. I have spent time explaining how we can be employed to support the TF Commander and even more time explaining why some CF good idea fairy initiative won't work in this culture. Usually it takes about 3 months for the CF guys to listen. I have been fortunate, as my XO is an AF/PAK Hands officer who has spent his entire adult life as a Islamic scholar and can converse in Dari and Pashto, one of the other Hands I have with me is a Marine officer who is also a COIN expert, who I have worked with in the past.
This program has growing pains, but I suspect as the program recruits more of the right people, this program will have very positive effects and APH's officers will be in demand.
IAA
Sounds like Drew needs to be placed in the Afghan Hands Program as he apparently would be such an outstanding asset to it. It is true that many of the Afghan Hands are on their 1st or 2nd tour but I have only met two that have never been to "ANY foreign country". I suspect this person works at USFOR-A HQ where the AME is located. Due to this proximity he does see some of the persons who are in fact coordinating with leadership to locate them an appropriate job. This is largely required due to the fact that many organizations are not willing to let their people go anywhere without a 12 person escort... which is unsurprisingly not available. It is unfortunate that a HQ PPT Ranger feels the need to be so negative. If I was unlucky to be stuck in a HHQ again I would be cranky too, but I hope I would have the decency to not to send out friendly fire to a group of people that are largely doing good things. Good things that many others are unwilling to do. The reference to the fact that "Many of them came here without assignments" is patently incorrect. To my understanding well over 80% came into theater with specific jobs, for many the jobs changed. Many of the jobs changed due to leadership not being willing to use their people properly. I do concur with Grant & Martin on the fact that "the system" on the whole is far too inflexible and that many of the field graders that are in staffs in Kabul could be far better utilized as mentors to GIRoA/ANSF out in the provinces and districts across Afghanistan. If Drews leadership is trying to fire the ones they have I suspect it is in part due to the fact that the commander of that entity is unwilling to use them per the COMISAF implementation guidance. It is unfortunate that all programs are not born fully formed; however it is more unfortunate that people only have the ability to be negative about things. Negative influencers are why other good people hesitate to volunteer for new programs. They prefer to sit on the sidelines and throw eggs vs. being a positive influencer.
Drew,
Without going into too much detail, what kind of unit are you with? What type of work are your APHs doing for you? What are they NOT doing that they ought to be doing?
Grant,
I agree with your sentiment. It's been a couple of years since I was in Kabul but I (and others) felt that most of folks at Phoenix and Eggers could be used elsewhere, like out where the bullets are flying. Could/should those folks be used in the positions that APH guys are being tagged for?
Seriously?
AFPAK "Hands" is a sick joke. Basically, they take the absolute dregs of the military, usually extremely "white" guys very few of which who've been to ANY foreign country, whose main qualification is their command's eagerness to release them from their units.
They then give them 4 months of Dari or Pashto training and then dump them in theater. Many of them come here without assignments, and are forced to go door to door and beg for jobs.
I am located in a place where I see most of the AFPAK "Hands", and they tend to be worthless, useless and extremely unsuited for Afghan service.
My unit employs 6 AFPAK hands, and we are eagerly trying to find a way to fire them, as they are worthless at best, and dangerous to themselves and others at worst.
This program needs to end, and these "hands" need to go back to the rocks they crawled out from under ASAP.
Hand- great points. I worked with several of the "new" hands and most of the negative comments resonated with me- but you're right about the slant of the article. Unfortunate too, because articles like that cause people to go on the defensive instead of working on really important issues that still need correcting in the program.
To me, however, the greater takeaway is that this is another example of how inflexible we are as an institution. We didn't need a "hands" program in the many COIN efforts we've done in the past- I'd suspect because we were less bureaucratic and able to adjust to what was needed to produce results. Why we require a new and separate program today means to me that we are too inflexible to handle requirements that aren't supported by our personnel (and other) systems.
There are a few comments on this blog and from the original article that I would like to address.
First: Oneteam...your comment stating that using an 8 month old survey taken from the very beginning of the program probably doesn't tell the story is in my opinion spot on. There were small groups of Hands in as early as mid Spring but the majority weren't in theater until early Summer. Between in-theater COIN training, in processing and immersion the first 6 - 8 weeks of the deployment were, while very important and helpful, not focused on a specific job. That means that most Hands didn't actually start digging into a job until July or August. This survey was conducted in August and September, most of the Hands responding to it had been in their jobs less than 2 months...some only a few weeks.
With that understanding, the listed mission of the APH Program is to build partnerships, develop in-depth knowledge & create enduring bonds/relationships. None of these things can be achieved in a few weeks to a couple of months. It takes time to create bonds and to build trust with individuals from a population that has been at war for over 30 years. A few unique individuals in just the right situations may have been able to achieve some quick successes but for the majority a few weeks to a couple months simply was not long enough to be successful. So a survey that asks about level of program success at the 2 month point should return numbers like it did... it shows that Hands were answering truthfully, had a decent understanding of what success looked like... and knew they werent there yet. More telling... and not mentioned by Mr Ricks was the other chart in that survey... it asked "are we meeting COMISAF intent?" In answer to that question with between 3 weeks and 2 months in their jobs 60% of the APHrs said yes or TBD. For a brand new program with a new mission set, a new cadre of people, having just started their jobs... a response of 60% saying we are meeting or might be meeting Commanders Intent is pretty good.
Mr Ricks goes on to quote a laundry list of negative comments from the survey. He does not quote a single positive comment, and there were positive comments... in fact quite a few of them. This lack of positive comments and the oversight I mentioned in the paragraph above should highlight that Mr. Ricks is writing a one-sided article clearly attempting to skew the data toward an outcome he wants. Now there is nothing wrong with this and everyone is entitled to their own opinion and inflammatory, politically motivated articles are now more the norm than the exception. It struck me that the thesis of Mr Ricks article was that "while the program is improving, it is not succeeding and that it is over-arching risk-averse and incompetent military leadership that is the problem." He used a couple positive quotes and the end... but caveats them with another jab at military leadership.
Mr Ricks also uses some creative renaming to try to make his point. He says that COMISAF released a "corrective memo" in October. The clearly titled document that COMISAF released was the in-theater APH Implementation Directive (not as Mr Risks calls it a "corrective memo.") Up until the release of COMISAFs Implementation Directive there was no written Theater Commanders direction for this program... ie nothing to "correct." If you will remember, the current COMISAF did not get into theater until late June. Coming into the situation that he did, he had a lot to think about and a lot to work on. While the APH Program is a key program it was just standing up, also any of you who have worked in a 4 Star HQ will know that getting the 4 Star to personally sign out a command wide directive does not happen overnight. The fact that COMISAF in the first couple months of his tour in Afghanistan was willing to dedicate the time to develop and release an Implementation Directive for a program that makes up less than .002% of the total boots-on-ground force should highlight just how much emphasis he puts on APH.
One final point, as I have mentioned a few times already, APH is a new program. It was in many ways put in place to help ISAF figure out what they dont know and to build relationships that have not been built before. The APH Program does not come in over the top of or as a replacement for another developed program. It seems Mr. Ricks expectation is that APH members would be placed perfectly, right where they were needed then supported with just the support they required. However, a little analytical thought should lead to the realization that when a program like APH stands-up the generalities can be worked out but to get to the details you need to put good folks out on the ground with general guidance then let them work... in other words "you dont know what you dont know." What it turns into in military vernacular is a program growing based on the "recon pull" of the first individuals. That not all commands would see the program the same should be expected, that not all individual Hands would be successful should be expected, that the program will have to change and grow based on the input of the first group should be expected. Often determining what doesnt work is just as important as determining what does. If we knew how to do it perfectly the first time we wouldnt need Hands. But we didnt and we do. For .002% of the BOG force the Hands program is making a difference... and not in-spite of military leadership, but because senior military leadership had the vision and the courage to admit there were things they didnt know and relationships & bonds that had yet to be built.
APH is a solid program. VSO is a solid program. S-C-H-B-T are solid tactics. Our civilian and military are all doing a great job in their respective lanes.
Yet as all support a fatally flawed strategy that has drifted from the primacy of disrupting AQ in the region; and that in regards to the supporting mission of the insurgency in Afghanistan, pointedly ignores the primary source of causation in the design, policies and actions of the Government of Afghanistan.
Bad programs, bad tactics and poor execution and a little luck can carry a great strategy to victory; but no amount of hard work, money and great programs are apt to carry a poor strategy to that same victory.
Ref IAA...
The idea of working with my state government in between deployments to AfPak sounds like a great idea. If this were the case, I would seriously reconsider APH.
We seem to have difficulty finding enough civil service types to fill advisory positions in A'stan. Using some of the APH as experts in civil government (city manager, state-level budgeting, management analyst, etc) who carries military rank/ authority, sounds like it has much potential for success in developing similiar systems in Afghanistan, though it will requiring staying beyond 2014.
In the end there are two factors in how well AfPak Hands personnel are utilized. It is absolutely a combination of that persons willingness to get out mixed with their leaderships comfort level with that. There are/were some people who are non-volunteers who would prefer to hide on BAF or KAF for their entire tours. There are others who would love to live in a District or Provincial center, in a safe house and interact with local officials. From the people I have talked with there have been vast improvements in the last 4-8 months in utilizing the AfPak Hands better. That being said there is always room for improvement. Due to the significantly risk averse managers, not leaders, that the US Military has writ large but especially in Afghanistan today many of these changes will be extraordinarily difficult unless clear, mandated use of the Afghan Hands is sent out. If the previous guidance is read clearly all things are "encouraged" or "recommended" vs. required. This gives that lower level commander who is risk averse all of the latitude he requires to play it safe vs. focusing on the mission. Even within the Pentagon the pushback the individual services had towards the program was significant. There are many incentives that the services could use to truly attract the "best and brightest" volunteers but due to concerns by the individual service members many people in the program have been ordered to participate. The fact that COL/CAPTs (O-6) only are required to do one tour is in my mind further proof that in fact the services intend to at a minimum stifle the program. The benefits to the mission will be far more apparent on the 2nd and 3rd missions if they complete them. Many AfPak Hands will be attending school while in their OOT cycle, for some this may be productive however I suspect for many being in either a HQ position related to the CENTCOM AO or as an additional advisor to a State or Federal Political leader would be FAR more productive. Many US Military members are nearly oblivious about the workings of our own government, and the compromises that US Governors need to make every day. Working in an office with one of these persons would likely greatly increase the AfPak Hands understanding of ways to handle the multitude of challenges that arise.
This comment by In-to-win was just posted today to a 6 January 2010 blog entry (<a href="http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/01/slow-start-for-military-corps/… Start for Military Corps in Afghanistan</a>) and is applicable here:
For Eric V: Program has a 17.5 month dwell period. You do a 12 month deployment, dwell for 17.5, then deploy again for a 10 month period. You do a 5.5 month pre-deployment training block which includes culture, COIN (Mr. Dave Kilcullen personally teaches a 4 day COIN seminar to each AFPAK Hand class) and 16 weeks of language training. 82% of the students attain 1/1 or better language proficiency during training.
Between deployments you will generally be assigned to DC, Tampa, Fort Bragg, Norfolk VA. The program has a number of seats available at Senior Service College and other Masters Degree programs that you can be picked for to attend between deployments. Some guys are doing ILE between deployments. There are briefs floating around that have this information -- Branch Managers have them. I know a lot of guys in the program are happy with it. Some guys are doing some really cool stuff. I don't think there's a catch, you just have to like this kind of work close to the locals.
I know a couple of Afghanistan hands and they enjoy the work they are doing, seem to be happy with the program. Some doing FAO type work. Some mentoring officials, wearing civilian clothes. USFOR-A has a shop dedicated to managing the assignments in theater, they brief P4. The article was interesting, but using an 8 month old survey for the story probably doesn't tell it like it is now. Survey was taken shortly after the hands got on the ground. It's like anything else, you hear from the unhappy ones. Happy ones are too busy. I think this type of the work is important.
Interesting article and one that reinforces what I have heard about AfPak Hands (including an email from MAJ Kotkin, a current APH).
As I've stated before, I was initially interested in the program until I discovered that the majority of the APH were not being utilized as advertised, begging the question, "Is anyone with authority monitoring this?".
If the point of APH is creating and maintaining a cadre of Af-Pak specialist who know the language (& culture), who work with a particular Afghan or Pakistani official, and who can share their insights with USF when back in CONUS, then perhaps we ought to assign APH members directly to their Afghan (or Pak) counter-part, but this only after asking the Afghans what they want (has anyone done this yet?).
The APH would work with his/ her Afghan counterpart as a member of his staff or office at whatever level the Afghan official is at. Since the APH would be a member of the Afghan staff/ team, the APH would need to be available for that Afghan official, meaning the APH would likely have to live off of a USF/ coalition installation (safehouses are used in Kabul; I'm certain entrepreneurial souls in other cities would provide such safehouses for a good price) and be free to move about among the populace. After all, if the point of APH is to create an expert in the AfPak region, the APH needs to be immersed in the AfPak community, meaning living among the locals.
Another place APH would be useful is at the advisory team level (this would also require that the advisory teams be properly employed.....get them off the FOBs, let them actually live, work, & fight along side ANSF).
It is unlikely that any of this will come to pass given how hyper-risk averse our leaders are; and implementing my suggestions would mean a far greater level of risk for APH than what many USF are accustomed to. But, given the description about the program many of us were presented with and the interest generated as a result, I believe there are many in our ranks that are willing to take on the risk.
Partnering with Afghan officials as described above can be viewed as a reversal of the KATUSA program we instituted (and currently maintain) in ROK. We would learn something about the Afghan system and they would learn much about us, specifically our morals, ethics, ideas about a meritocracy, etc. But this can only work if we get the APH off of USF/ coalition bases and into Afghan offices, whether in Kabul, J-Bad, Kandahar, or other smallers government centers in the provinces and districts.
Building and maintaining relationships is important. We've established them at the national level; using the APH to do the same at lower levels may be more productive than what we are currently doing.